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When Annelies van Heijst introduced the ethics of care to theology students at the 
Theological Faculty of Tilburg in 1993-1994, and I was one of them, a new and 
appealing moral perspective was opened. This was an ethical perspective that had to 
do with everyday life, with concrete responsibilities, making room for emotions, 
involvement, and context. It looked at life in a non-abstract, non-universal way, 
making one’s moral deliberation very personal and situational. Moreover, it was 
appealing, as it raised questions about human identity – about being both 
autonomous and dependent, vulnerable – and did not limit these questions to the 
sphere of mothering and parenting care, private care, professional care, or nursing 
care. Rather, it made these questions central to politics as well, conceiving of caring 
as a broad practice ranging from private to public, from personal to intersubjective 
to collective, from informal to formal; indeed it challenged the legitimacy of these 
boundaries, seeing many forms of care as intertwined and crossing these boundaries 
(Van Heijst, 2011, 188). 
 The ethics of care determined the course of my thought and work. Having 
trained care professionals in ethics and ethical deliberation in the context of their 
institutions, I was confronted by a question that became the focal point of my 
personal quest, the result of which is in front of you. It is the question of self-
sacrifice. I was struck by the readiness of professional caregivers to take up caring 
work that was intensely demanding, physically or mentally or both. Often everyday 
care for the elderly and for those with an intellectual disability is too burdensome for 
relatives, and professionals take over. In hospitals the care is often complex, and 
appeals for help are made night and day. This is not to say that care professionals do 
everything well. But their readiness, their intention to do good, to be prepared to 
persevere even when it got more difficult, struck me deeply. In order to distinguish 
this caregiving from any exchange or investment, with the hope of a future return 
on investment, I called it ‘self-sacrifice’ or ‘sacrifices of the self’. 
 The theme of self-sacrifice became more poignant to me when I became 
acquainted with the many forms of informal care (in Dutch, ‘mantelzorg’) for 
relatives like elderly parents, partners or children with a chronic disease, physical or 
mental disability, or for neighbors or friends (Emous, 2005; Isarin, 2005; Rikkers, 
2007). I heard and read stories of people who cared for loved ones for years, even 
for life, which had a great impact on their lives. They made sacrifices, and 
sometimes the care made them suffer, but often this care was inextricably linked to 
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their lives. And when I myself became a mother and experienced the effect of being 
a caregiver 24/7 the theme became even more pressing to me. I learned about the 
impact of broken nights and the bond between my children’s wellbeing on that of 
my own, and I realized that giving care could be more than a responsibility of a self 
– which can be limited, ignored, circumscribed, taken away, etc. Rather, caregiving 
can be a vital part of an identity, and self-sacrifice can be the expression of that 
identity. Not as an ideal or ambition that the caregiver pursues, but rather in all its 
ambiguity. 
 My theological background had made me aware of the rich traditions of 
philosophical, spiritual, and mystical sources that do not put the self at the center of 
our understanding and of our universe and which value a wide variety of ways to 
expel the self from that center. In my work for religious congregations of socially 
engaged (so-called ‘active’) sisters, I had the opportunity to both study their spiritual 
sources and discuss the implications in their practical lives. Self-sacrifice has been 
part of their practices, and the notion of self-sacrifice has its fertile ground in 
tradition. I was, however, well aware of the objections against self-sacrifice raised by 
care ethicists, rooted in feminist theory, and also by feminist theologians, unmasking 
the many ways in which ideologies have been idealizing self-sacrifice as something 
especially suitable for certain groups of people, the majority being women. Women 
have been pressed to submit themselves to ideals and commitments that have been 
profitable for others everywhere in society, both on the inter-subjective level and on 
the political level. Van Heijst’s historical research into religious caring practices that 
were founded in spiritual and theological sources interspersed with the terms 
‘sacrifice’ and ‘self-sacrifice’ showed the harmful effects of care rooted in low 
appreciation if not outright rejection of emotions, physicality, involvement, and 
appreciation of the self (Van Heijst, 2002, 2008).  
 
Among these roots of my research question, some people have been especially 
important. I start with Annelies van Heijst, since she has been at the root of my path 
through care ethics. She has been not only a source of inspiration but also a 
companion, giving support and opportunities for which I continue to be grateful. 
This research project originates in my former work at Reliëf. I am especially grateful 
to my former colleagues Thijs Tromp and Marijke Verhoeven, who were my 
‘sparring partners’ in care ethics. The first ideas for my research into ‘self-sacrifice’ 
arose from those discussions. I am most indebted to those religious congregations1 
that generously gave me not only the confidence to execute this project but also the 
                                                             
1 A list of the funding congregations is on page 4. 
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major insights I found in the works of Jean-Luc Marion, Axel Honneth, Emmanuel 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Victoria Soto was a 27-year-old first grade teacher who died 
at the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, 14 
December 2012, in Newtown, Connecticut. Reportedly she 
died while trying to protect ‘her’ children from rifle fire, 
trying to shield them from the bullets by hiding them in a 
closet behind her. “You have a teacher who cared more 
about her students than herself,” said Mayor John Harkins 
of Stratford Conn., Soto’s hometown. “That speaks volumes 
to her character, and her commitment and dedication.” 
 
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/16/victoria-
soto-newtown-tea_n_2311762.html) 
 
 
A caring teacher heroically sacrifices herself in order to protect ‘her’ children, caring 
more for them than for herself. What kind of action is this? How should we label it? 
Can we call it a morally good action? The mayor is certain that it is, ascribing it to 
her character, her commitment and her dedication. 
I propose to call this kind of acting self-sacrifice in giving care. Sacrifice and 
self-sacrifice appear to be difficult notions. In the general understanding, they 
appear to be admirable but supererogatory; they create uneasiness: ‘Could I, should 
I?’ In care ethics they have been acknowledged as a real risk involved in caregiving, 
or they are outright rejected, but they have not been conceptually well thought 
through.  
For instance, in Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (1982), which is care ethics’ 
conceptual beginning (Van Heijst, 2008b), an ethic of self-sacrifice is opposed to an 
ethic of self-development and the concept of rights (Gilligan, 129, 132). Her 
empirical research of women’s moral development shows that a central dilemma for 
women is the conflict between integrity and care, leading to two divergent 
constructions of identity, viz. in self-expression or in self-sacrifice (157). Hence, self-
sacrifice appears as opposed to and incompatible with self-development, integrity, 
freedom, power, and full self-expression. Nel Noddings (1982) elaborates an ethic of 
care in which she aims at protecting the caregiver, delineating caring responsibilities 
to the caregiver’s possibilities in terms of capacities and support (100-101), as well as 
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to inner, intimate circles of caring and chains of others linked to these circles (46-
47). Sacrificing is opposed to caring and must be prevented (105).  
More recently, Marian Barnes (2012) mentions self-sacrifice in the same 
breath as martyrdom, when care lacks awareness of the need of self-care, and 
opposes it to narcissism and self-centeredness, when it lacks attentiveness to the 
needs of others (8). Tove Pettersen (2011) argues that care as a normative value 
must be narrowed down in order to not entail self-sacrifice or the sacrificing of the 
wellbeing of a third part (54). Care ethics needs the principle of beneficence, but 
only when it is restricted in order to prevent systematic self-sacrifice (54). She rejects a 
view that equates care with self-sacrifice or self-denial, as well as one that equates 
care with a narrow particularistic and self-centered concern, as both are one-sided, 
without reciprocity or mutual recognition (56-57). 
Other thinkers about care do not reject sacrifice or self-sacrifice, but rather 
consider it as something that is inherent in care, and as such does entail a risk, either 
as a temptation or as enhancing inequality. Like those rejecting sacrifice, they too do 
not explain the term. Sara Ruddick’s (1989)2 analysis of mothering as a caring 
practice mentions self-sacrifice as one of the temptations inherent in a mother’s 
work (30). It is not the same as self-loss, self-denial and self-renunciation (119-123), 
but this is not elaborated any further. Joan Tronto’s (1993) pioneering work of care 
ethics as political ethics considers sacrifice and self-sacrifice in relation to power. She 
concludes that those with little power are especially likely to be too self-sacrificing 
(141). What counts as normal, acceptable, too little or too much self-sacrifice is not 
explained. 
Van Heijst (2005, 2011) distinguishes between the ideological use of self-
sacrifice and its use as a hermeneutic device in practice analysis. She rejects the 
Christian idealization of self-sacrifice found in both past and present theological 
views (2011, 183-190), but she also argues that exploring the topic of self-sacrifice 
helps to uncover the full reality of the processes of interaction that take place in 
caregiving, which cannot be covered by “a dual model of exchange,” since the 
process contains three elements, not two (198). Care is given from a surplus or a 
willingness to give that looks for a destination, and it contains the wish to remain 
faithful to what one understands good care to be all about. Professionals trying to 
give more than that which a dual model of contractual exchange can cover act 
                                                             
2 The two important and illuminating studies of Barnes (on the diversity of caring in social welfare 
and the usefulness to social and public policy of an ethic of care) and Ruddick (a foundational 
practicalist view of male and female maternal caring and the knowledge arising from it) are not 
incorporated into this study. The former lacks any thinking through of self-sacrifice, and the latter 
restricts self-sacrifice to one particular caring practice, i.e. mothering. 
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according to these beliefs and hence realize their identity both as professionals and 
as human beings (198). Hence Van Heijst offers elements for an understanding of 
self-sacrifice in caring.  
 
The problem that I have with these accounts of sacrifice and self-sacrifice in relation 
to care ethics is that all seem to have a certain idea of what the terms entail, but 
none of them, with the exception of Van Heijst’s account, explore them. Mostly 
these ideas of self-sacrifice remain implicit, and none provides a full and elaborated 
consideration or contemplation of the terms. And although the question of (self-)-
sacrifice is present in many care theories, little is said about why this question is 
raised by care. However, since the question is invariably raised, it requires being 
thought through in order to understand whether or not a rejection or an acceptance 
of a nuanced view of (self-)sacrifice is justified. Is it rejected on just grounds, or is it 
excluded prematurely from the ethical understanding of care, thereby impeding a 
realistic and adequate view of care? My claim is that such an exploration of self-
sacrifice is needed in order to see more, to have an adequate view and theory of 
care. Instead of excluding it prematurely, I aim to show that self-sacrifice is a vital 
element of an adequate theory of care. I aim at reappraising the terms ‘sacrifice’ and 
‘self-sacrifice’ as vital to caring from a care-ethical perspective. And although (self-)-
sacrifice needs not be present at all times, it is always there underneath the surface, 
emerging every now and then. Self-sacrifice and sacrifice are not only vital parts of 
caring practices within family or informal care, but also in professional care.  
 From the start it needs to be made clear that both practices and politics offer 
critical insights that are fundamental to care ethics, as well as to my understanding of 
self-sacrifice. In using the term ‘practices’ care ethicists express the view that care is 
something that needs to be done and therefore is more than an attitude or 
disposition. It is also a way to conceive of people as acting in relations and on a time 
continuum. Further, care ethics aims at not focusing on isolated actions but 
including their context. This is expressed by the term ‘practices’ too, since they are 
built collectively, contain standards, rules, common knowledge, ideas, or 
expectations, and develop in time. Further, practices involve both emotions and 
knowledge. The same elements, I argue, are also vital to self-sacrifice. However, 
there is a specific point to make concerning practices and its consequences for my 
research. If practices are really allowed to inform care ethics, they will cause unease with regard to 
self-sacrifice. It is a failure of care ethics to allow for this unease. 
The second key term, ‘politics’, also has consequences for conceiving of self-
sacrifice. Care ethics is a political ethics. Caring is not only a practice of individuals in 
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their private sphere. Rather, caring builds society. And since caring always involves 
power, it is political at every level (Tronto, 2010, 162). When conceiving of self-
sacrifice in caring, sensitivity to its relation with power is vital, in order to not 
confuse self-sacrifice with oppression or submission. However, as with practices, a 
specific point has to be made with regard to politics too. For power is not only about 
oppression or domination but also about wanting to live together, about being a community and 
belonging together. I argue that this view of politics allows for a political view of self-
sacrifice. Care ethics has failed to take this other idea of power into account and to 
think through its consequences. 
The focus of this research will primarily be on the self-sacrifice of the 
caregiver. Let me first give a provisional definition of self-sacrifice within caregiving: 
 
Self-sacrifice is an intrinsic commitment of caregivers to a good3 that requires 
them to give care. It resembles self-gift, devotion, dedication, but the term 
self-sacrifice more clearly than these terms expresses the element of giving 
and giving up required by a commitment to care. This consists, for instance, 
in suspending or even entirely giving up one’s own aims and goals or parts of 
one’s life that have been important. Caregivers’ intrinsic commitment guiding 
their caring practices is vital to their identity, even though it is always 
ambiguous, as caregivers are well aware of other meanings and goods. 
 
When the term ‘sacrifice’ is used, it is understood within the limits of this definition. 
With this definition I advocate a view that links caring to the caregiver’s identity. In 
this regard I concur with Van Heijst. The way in which ‘identity’ frames the 
understanding of caring and self-sacrifice is a topic of reflection in this research. 
What is more, with this definition I question the common understanding that giving 
care and giving up for care is worthwhile since one receives so much in return. This 
implicit or explicit expectation of a return is what is questioned in this research. I 
contest the commonsense understanding of sacrifice as the giving up of something 
in order to get something else that is thought to be more valuable (Daly, 2009, 1). 
The reality of care, I argue, requires that care ethics abandons the framework of 
exchange as well as that of identifying power with subordination.  
Taking the term ‘self-sacrifice’ to illuminate an aspect of caring practices and 
to contribute to care theory, I found out, meets with many objections. People have 
strong feelings and opinions about the term. I take this deep-seated inclination to 
avoid the term, the fear that it expresses a harmful idealization, and the frequent 
                                                             
3 A ‘good’ is an object or mode of conduct having moral value. 
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shortcut to rejection to be an invitation to look into what is at stake. The 
disturbance caused by the term ‘self-sacrifice’, I argue, must be allowed to express 
itself, for it offers the opportunity to overcome a narrow view. This unease, I argue, 
is a challenge to scrutinize the term and to see what it yields. 
 As a first step I look at stories drawn from literary, cinematic, and historical 
sources that contain these disturbing images of self-sacrifice in care. After that I 
draw up an inventory of the characteristics of self-sacrifice found up to that point. 
As a next step I argue why it is not only theoretically conceivable but also 
thoroughly imaginable that self-sacrifice is vital to care, and I explain what I mean by 
that. Then I describe the disciplines that I draw on and demarcate this research. In 
the last section I present the content of the subsequent chapters. 
 
1. Imaginations of self-sacrifice in caring 
 
Cultural sources like novels and films can challenge common thinking in a thought-
provoking and stimulating way, by upsetting us, causing discomfort, or offering new 
insights. They harbor realities that can help us to understand reality anew, slightly 
differently, better, or more completely. Therefore I consider these kinds of sources 
helpful for revealing a fuller reality of care. Several of these sources represent what I 
consider to be self-sacrifice in caregiving (a). They show the tensions present in care 
as experienced by the characters. Instead of resolving the tensions by excluding or 
cutting loose one aspect, characters resist simple shortcuts and endure ambiguities. 
Alongside these sources, I also consider three historical occasions of self-sacrifice in 
caregiving, which further illuminate my claim (b). 
 
a. Literary and cinematic imaginations of self-sacrifice in caregiving 
 
Leo Tolstoy offers a horrifying account of The Death of Ivan Ilyich (1886 [references in 
this text to Tolstoy, 2006]). There are only two persons who console him: his silent 
but crying son, Vasya, and his bright and cheerful peasant servant, Gerasim (68). 
Only they understand and feel for him, (89) unlike others, who are only interested in 
‘whether it would take him a long time to give up his place, finally release the living 
from the oppression caused by his presence’ (67). The meaning of the silent 
schoolboy Vasya’s terrible dark-blue rings under his eyes is not lost on Ivan. It 
comforts him, and he feels sorry for his son, even without a word or any contact 
(83). Gerasim, on the other hand, offers him sensitive and practical help when going 
to the toilet and cleaning up afterwards, without making him feel embarrassed. He 
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also offers Ivan invaluable relief from his tormenting pain by holding his legs up on 
his shoulders and by talking with him (Salinsky, 2004, 126).  
It was a comfort to him when Gerasim, sometimes for nights on end, held his 
legs up and refused to go to bed, saying, ‘Please don’t worry about it, Ivan 
Ilyich. I’ll catch up on my sleep.’ Or else he would suddenly address him in 
familiar language and add, ‘It’d be different if you weren’t ill, but with things 
the way they are why shouldn’t I help you out?’ Gerasim was the only one 
who didn’t lie to him; everything showed that he was the only one who 
understood what was going on and saw no need to hide it (Tolstoy, 72). 
For Gerasim death is not a forbidden subject (Salinsky, 127). What is more, he 
speaks to Ivan as his equal. Unlike Pyotr, the other servant, who keeps the positions 
of master and servant strictly in place (Tolstoy, 75), Gerasim speaks of common 
human mortality and neediness: 
‘We’ve all got to die one day. Why shouldn’t I give you a hand?’ This was to 
say there was a good reason for not making a fuss about helping out: he was 
doing it for a dying man and he hoped that when his time came someone 
would help him out in the same way (72). 
This story is more than one about caring and accepting a temporary burdensome 
role. There is more to the story than a son’s love of his father or a master-servant 
power inequality. It is not accurate to interpret Gerasim’s acts as subservient and 
lacking the power to later command others to support him this same way, if 
necessary. It is far more ambiguous than that. Both Vasya and Gerasim suffer with 
Ivan. Vasya’s tears give Ivan comfort in a wordless sharing. Gerasim is not lost in 
selflessness or subservience. Rather, he is committed to doing good to a dying man, 
and in this commitment he confirms common humanity and mortality. His words 
and acts express a human mutuality, a deep sense of a shared human condition lying 
underneath the surface of social inequality and caring asymmetry. There is no 
exchange or future return, but openness in giving: there is only what he does for his 
dying master, and there is hope – not certainty – that others will do the same for 
him when his time comes. This story disturbs views of inequality, for, although 
factual inequality is not erased, a simultaneous common humanity is uncovered. 
Further, it shows that giving care contains uncertainty: one gives while taking the 
risk of not being given in return. This uncertainty challenges reciprocity. Gerasim 
recognizes the shared human relatedness and acts according to it (instead of 
disengaging on the basis of a formal position). The concept of sharing human 
relatedness without ignoring inequality is both important and indispensable for 
understanding caring and self-sacrifice. 
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In Charlotte Brontë’s classic Jane Eyre (1847 [my references are to Brontë, 1996]), 
Jane is an orphaned girl, rejected by the family, growing up in a poor boarding 
school. As a governess she finally finds great happiness in the love of her master, Mr 
Rochester. However, their marriage is prevented on the wedding day when the 
existence of an impediment for the marriage is declared (323). It turns out that Mr 
Rochester is already married to a woman still living. When this is indeed proved true, 
Jane decides to leave the house, even though Mr Rochester does his utmost to 
explain to her his situation and to convince her to stay. Although her feelings make 
her decision difficult, she concludes: 
I will hold to the principles received by me when I was sane, and not mad – 
as I am now. Laws and principles are not for the times when there is no 
temptation: they are for such moments as this, when body and soul rise in 
mutiny against their rigour; stringent are they; inviolate they shall be. If at my 
individual convenience I might break them, what would be their worth? They 
have a worth – so I have always believed; and if I cannot believe it now, it is 
because I am insane – quite insane; with my veins running fire, and my heart 
beating faster than I can count its throbs. Preconceived opinions, foregone 
determinations, are all I have at this hour to stand by: there I plant my foot 
(356). 
Jane flees from the house, giving up her happiness and safety and risking even her 
life, rather than consenting to something that she and society reject as unworthy, 
sinful, and a crime. 
At first glance, this is a story of a nineteenth-century woman who, being 
financially dependent (at this stage of the story) and socially vulnerable, forces 
herself to abide by social and cultural rules that she has incorporated. However, 
underneath that surface, a woman dedicated to her own strong convictions becomes 
visible. As Nancy Pell has pointed out, throughout the novel Jane is resolved to care 
for herself, and in this instance caring for herself entails remaining true to a good, 
despite inevitable loss:  
When Rochester tries to persuade her to go away with him to the south of 
France, Jane tells him that she stands by “preconceived opinions, foregone 
determinations” (405[356]), “the law given by God; sanctioned by man” (404 
[356]), and is determined to leave him. Her real strength, however, lies not in 
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her verbal arguments but in a silent conviction, “impressed … on my heart… 
to serve me as aid in time of trial” [350-351] (Pell, 1977, 409-410)4. 
The good she prioritizes is not her individual convenience, but consists in laws and 
principles that are handed down to her by others. And she also finds them in her 
own heart, serving her in hard times. However, her having received this good is 
intertwined with her own determination to keep this good: ‘there I plant my foot’. 
The story reveals the bond between the public and the private, between what is 
determined by others and what is chosen as a commitment by and for the self. In 
her care for herself, Jane could have preferred the ‘easy’ path, giving in to 
Rochester’s effort to persuade her, and live as if they were married. However, Jane 
resists this temptation and prefers a good that exceeds immediate happiness. The 
tension between immediate fulfillment and ultimate good is deep and not easily 
resolved. Doubts remain as she sacrifices their togetherness, but she prefers to be 
dedicated to what she believes is good. Here self-sacrifice consists in the giving up 
of something very dear for a higher good that is vital to one’s personhood. 
 
In J.M. Coetzee’s novel Disgrace (2000), David Lurie and his daughter Lucy are 
robbed and violently assaulted in Lucy’s house, in South Africa’s outback. They are 
the white victims of a group of black men. Lucy is the victim of a violent gang rape, 
from which she becomes pregnant, while David is knocked unconscious, set alight, 
and locked up in the bathroom. Although wounded, he is able to extinguish the fire. 
The robbers by then have taken all their valuables in David’s car and have cut off 
their telephone line, leaving them on their own.  
David and Lucy respond to the experience in contrary ways. David pursues 
justice, wants the facts to be known and the criminals prosecuted. Since he did not 
witness Lucy’s rape he can only report the assault and robbery. Lucy wants her 
world to return to what it was as much as possible and prefers to keep silent about 
the rape. She only reports the robbery. This leads to heavy conflicts between them. 
David speaks of justice and retribution and tries to interpret their story within its 
broader social and political context, which Lucy considers to be abstractions from 
reality.  
Lurie, former professor of literature, is conscious of the importance of 
language and storytelling, and while he recognizes the limitations […] he still 
resents both his and Lucy’s subjugation in the narrative of others. […] 
Repeatedly he tries to impose an intellectual narrative on the event, by turns 
                                                             
4 Pell refers to a different edition; I have added in square brackets the pages of the edition to which 
I refer. 
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economic (“Too many people, too few things” [98]), feminist (“what women 
undergo at the hands of men” [111]), or sociological (“it was history acting 
through them” [156]). While Lucy too recognizes the political context (“what 
if that is the price one has to pay for staying on” [158]), she refuses abstraction 
and insists on the singularity of her experience, not only for herself but for 
her rapists: “It was so personal” (156) (McDunnah, 2009, 36-37)5. 
Lucy decides not to leave the farm and take part in a public trial, which she would 
consider a defeat, but to restore the fabric of her life as well as possible, to 
reconnect to her new reality and to the world around her. Even when it appears that 
the rapists are relatives of her black neighbor Petrus, on whom she depends for help 
on her farm, she prefers not to speak to him on the matter, but to protect and 
maintain those relations that matter in her life. She needs Petrus to keep up her farm 
and in case of need. She is also determined not allow the violence of the men to be 
taken out on the innocent baby conceived as a result of the rape.  
This story puts sacrifice and self-sacrifice in a social and political context. All 
explanations considered by Lurie may count as plausible: economic, feminist, and 
sociological analysis may count as valid. However, although Lucy has a clear sense of 
the social and political factors involved, she opposes a reduction of her reality to 
those factors. She warns: using political terms runs the risk of abstraction of facts, 
and of bracketing the subjectivity of those involved.  
Throughout the novel Lucy insists on this recognition of subjectivity for 
others as well as for herself […]. While David in his rage objectifies Pollux 
[the youngest of the rapists, IvN] as a “swine” and “jackal,” Lucy is able to 
see “a disturbed child” with an independent existence: “What you think of 
him is beside the point. He is here… he is a fact of life” [206-8] (McDunnah, 
2009, 38). 
This story uncovers the complexity of self-sacrifice, full of awkward tensions. The 
societal level and the personal level are intertwined and cannot be reduced to one 
another. There is a permanent tension between politics, economics, history, on the 
one hand, and personal experience on the other. A one-sided view, seeing Lucy as 
ignoring political struggle and preferring parochial peace, does not do her justice. 
She is aware of South African political reality, but she prefers to cope with it within 
the fragile network of relations on which she depends; and by maintaining these 
relations, she contributes to a society that breaks the circle of retribution. Self-
                                                             
5 McDunnah’s page references agree with the pages of the edition I refer to in the references list. 
However, one quotation contains an error. In the original Coetzee writes: “it was history speaking 
through them” (156), not acting through them. 
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sacrifice appears as a giving up and giving in: the giving up of retribution and a 
giving in to existing relations, with which she rebuilds her life’s fragile web.   
 
 
Films have also imagined (fictional and real) persons who sacrifice themselves for 
others. One film that has been criticized and rejected for its portrayal of a self-
sacrificing woman is Breaking the Waves by Lars von Trier (1996). The film is the first 
part of Von Trier’s so-called ‘gold heart’ trilogy, together with The Idiots (1998) and 
Dancer in the Dark (2000), all of which leave the spectator feeling unsettled and 
exposed to an unpleasurable affect (Bainbridge, 2004, 392). 
In Breaking the Waves, for example, we witness the unbearable propensity for 
self-sacrifice on the part of the protagonist, Bess (Emily Watson), who forces 
herself into prostitution in a desperate attempt to persuade God to save and 
cure her husband, Jan (Stellan Skarsgård), who has been paralyzed in an oil rig 
accident. Bess’s sacrifice culminates in her violent and fatal rape, and her 
suffering and death are made all the more unbearable for the spectator 
because Jan does, indeed, recover and survive once Bess has died (Bainbridge, 
392). 
For instance, feminist theologian Alyda Faber (2003) has criticized Bess for being 
self-destructive, subservient, lacking any sense of self-worth, and fitting all 
oppressive stereotypical images of the female character. She argues that von Trier 
represents Bess’s ‘goodness’ as masochistic debility, a dubious construction that 
valorizes male domination and invests sexual violence with redemptive meaning 
(59). 
Arnfriður Guðmundsdóttir (2002) follows the feminist-theological critique of 
the distinction between agape (unselfish or self-sacrificial love) and eros (selfish love). 
I return to this distinction and its critique in detail in chapter 2, but with regard to 
the film Breaking the Waves Guðmundsdóttir concludes:  
Bess incarnates fully the unselfish love that does not seek its own. Her love 
knows no limits, but sacrifices itself for others, indeed until death. […]This is 
a film about violence and abuse, which portrays a harmful misinterpretation 
of the cross of Christ. Bess is utterly a victim of the powerful, of those who 
take control of her life. She is a powerless woman in a society controlled by 
men, and even more in one in which man’s salvation is secured by the perfect 
sacrifice of the woman (34-35). 
I do not underestimate the powers used, including by filmmakers, to keep power 
imbalances in place. However, I disagree with this critique. Von Trier shows much 
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more ambivalence than he is given credit for. With the exception of the church 
elders, the patriarchs, who reject and abandon Bess, the other people connected to 
Bess at least have their doubts about condemning her. All struggle with what she 
does, try to convince her, love her, protect her, leave her, and regret that they did so. 
Reducing the story to one about male domination and female selfless redemptive 
sacrifice is unjust to the film. Bess actively questions male dominance in the church 
and protests against a faith proclaiming to love a word rather than a human being. 
Although the story has a bitter tang of self-destruction by a weak woman, Von Trier 
has also depicted Bess’s strength: her belief, her courage, her resistance, her 
perseverance and dedication. Reducing Bess’s sacrifice to weakness would be doing 
her wrong. Was she completely dominated by Jan? She chooses her own course of 
action out of love. When seriously confronted by Doctor Richardson with her 
sexual escapades, she reveals that God has given her a special talent: ‘I can believe’.  
Describing Bess as passive or selfless not only erases her agency but also the 
agency of others. Both the vicar who abandons Bess when she is lying unconscious 
in front of the church and the abusive men on the ship are portrayed as agents 
condemning themselves by their actions. Hence Von Trier’s purpose is something 
far more complex than a stereotypical portrayal of a foolish woman.  
The film establishes our discovery of Bess as a central purpose. While the 
camera relentlessly scrutinizes every aspect of her face and body, the narrative 
frames her actions and emotions with sensitive appreciation. Physically, 
sexually, emotionally, and spiritually, Bess appears to couple an extraordinarily 
intense capacity for feeling with exceptional fragility. […] In this way, the film 
pushes us not to view Bess as a victim of a psychological disorder or social 
manipulation, as a depleted subject with a weakened degree of agency and 
suspect powers of self-representation. I would like to suggest we do the same 
with the film – namely, take seriously its gambit for the sacred no matter how 
irrational this effort initially appears (Pence, 2004, 49). 
Bess believes that her sacrifices will save him. The ups and downs of his condition 
strengthen her belief as well as her interpretation of the Christian message she hears 
in the church. In the end she is proven right, although she dies in uncertainty and 
fear. 
When the bells are shown in the film’s finale, it appears as though Bess is 
idealized and canonized by Von Trier. This, I argue, is a simplifying reduction. 
Instead the filmmaker uses the classical cinematic canon and thereby creates unease 
in the viewer. He establishes the ambiguity of love, and does not dissolve it. This 
way the film raises the question of whether care can always be harmless and without 
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violence. It cannot. There cannot be a normative stance from which any self-harm 
committed by a caregiver is rejected. Rather, the harm, suffering, conflicts, and 
violence present in care need to be faced, to be taken seriously, even if it seems 
irrational. Further, the story raises the question of self-sacrifice as a gift of self for 
which one is given a talent.  
 
In the film What’s Eating Gilbert Grape (Lasse Hallström, 1993) Gilbert (Johnny 
Depp), together with his two sisters, has to care for his mentally impaired brother, 
Arnie (Leonardo DiCaprio), and for his obese, widowed, passive and grieving 
mother. Working long hours in the local convenience store, he cannot always keep 
an eye on his brother, who keeps getting into danger climbing up trees and towers. 
Gilbert and his sisters can barely manage the burdens of care and the demand on 
their time. When Gilbert meets the free-spirited Becky (Juliette Lewis) and falls in 
love, there seems hardly place for living a life of his own. Although there seems to 
be a lack of self-esteem and even self-awareness, Gilbert is acting from a moral 
motivation that includes a sense of self. He expresses this motivation when Becky 
asks him:  
“Tell me what you want, as fast as it comes to you. Okay?”  
“Okay…”  
“Okay, what do you want?”  
(silence)  
 “Faster!”  
Gilbert, still hesitating: “Okay. I want a new thing… A house, I want a new 
house for the family. I want Mama to take aerobics classes. I want Ellen [his 
sister] to grow up. I want a new brain for Arnie. I want…..” 
“What do you want for you? Just for you?” 
Silence. Then: “I wanna be a good person.” 
On the surface, Becky’s logic is comprehensible: there is a difference between 
wanting something for somebody else and wanting something for oneself. Gilbert 
does not fit into this logic and seems to lack self-awareness. He represents what 
feminists have criticized as the self-effacing or self-negating caregiver (cf. Chapter 2). 
However, for Gilbert a different logic counts, according to which wishing something 
for somebody else can be the same thing as wishing something for oneself: ‘Their good 
is my joy’. Looking deeper into Gilbert’s actions and words, he does not lack a sense 
of self, but he lacks a dichotomy of self and the members of his family whom he 
loves and honors.  
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 Self-sacrifice appears not as a decrease of self, which it only can be when the 
self is considered to be an isolated individual. Self-sacrifice appears as self-realization 
when what is given to and received by a community is considered as a shared good 
by the community’s members. 
 
b. Historical representations of self-sacrifice in caring 
 
Along with fiction, real-life examples also can be mentioned. First of all there are 
numerous reflective accounts of parents, partners and children of ill persons. John 
Bayley (1999, 2000, 2001) describes the period of caring for his demented wife, Iris 
Murdoch, as a period both of sharing intimacy and of inseparable connectedness, 
but also of his being increasingly burdened although determined to continue caring 
for her himself. His caring for and being with her, together with his happy 
memories, keep him going. In this connecting of the various periods of their relation 
he finds support, comfort and joy, which help him to carry on. This dimension, 
namely, that lives and relations can be divided into periods, is important with regard 
to conceiving of caring and self-sacrifice. Throughout their lives, John’s and Iris’s 
identities have become intertwined, and even now that her identity is blurred they 
cannot be separated without a devastating effect.  
Were she to be in a home, however ‘happy’ they would try to make her, the 
sense of apartness would soon destroy us both. Perhaps me before her, 
perhaps her before me? At the moment, she keeps me sane. The final egoism, 
is it? What would happen to me if she weren’t here? Is that my real fear? 
(2000, 187-188; quoted in: Berman, 2010, 96) 
Indeed, Bayley describes their marriage as a bond between two people who were 
also living separate lives, which because of Iris’s disease develops into a marriage of 
two inseparable persons, when he can no longer leave her alone for one moment 
(Berman, 2010, 67). Bayley describes it with joy and humor, but when his caring 
tasks become more demanding he cannot conceal dark feelings of bitterness, anger, 
and resentment. Still, he concludes paradoxically that trouble and pleasure go hand 
in hand:  
Midway through Iris and Her Friends Bayley postulates two complementary 
laws, existential in nature, which are survival strategies for everyone, not just 
caregivers and their patients. “There is certainly a law of the conservation of 
trouble, the troubles we must all undergo in this vale of tears. If some are 
taken away, by God or the government or scientific discovery, we can be sure 
not only that the ones which remain will seem more burdensome than before 
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but that quite new and unexpected ones will appear” (128). […] “Fortunately, 
there is also a law of the conservation of pleasure. In bed in the morning, 
waiting for the day to begin, I comfort myself with this knowledge. Thank 
goodness for it. As troubles get worse, small satisfactions increase, both in 
intensity and in expectation” (128). Thus he looks forward to putting Iris to 
bed, pouring himself a drink, and reading a page or two of a book. “I cling to 
this pleasure grimly, as if I were holding on to the side of a lifeboat” (129) 
(Berman, 90). 
This image of demanding care as having a paradoxical nature, being both an 
unbearable burden that one needs to endure and a priceless gift (68), may explain 
much about the nature of self-sacrifice in care. A caregiver may keep caring because 
of the connectedness with the one cared-for, and because, along with increasing 
burdens, the appreciation of small pleasures also increases. 
 
Two other historical examples of self-sacrifice differ from the aforementioned 
examples because of their extreme circumstances. Still they became a reference for 
my subject, because of some of their characteristics. The first is the story of a 
teacher at School Nr 1 in Beslan, who, together with 1,100 parents, children and 
teachers, is taken hostage by a group of armed separatist militants in 2004. She tells 
her story in the award-winning documentary ‘Return to Beslan’ (Ter Woerds, 2005). 
Her grandchildren are among the hostages. When the situation becomes hopeless, 
she decides to tell them what might happen. She also gives them instructions to lie 
down flat on the floor and that if something explodes she lie down on top of them 
and protect them, with her body taking the blows. This is an example of protective 
self-sacrifice under extreme conditions, which can be interpreted as the intuition: ‘I 
would rather sacrifice myself than let the other(s) be harmed’. 
The second example is the story of Father Kolbe, a Polish Franciscan friar 
who is imprisoned in the Nazi German concentration camp of Auschwitz (Peter, 
1999). After a successful escape from the camp, ten men are selected to be starved 
to death in an underground bunker as a warning against further escape plans. When 
one of those men collapses in despair, Kolbe volunteers to die in his place. In the 
starvation cell, Kolbe prays and sings. After two weeks he still has not died of 
dehydration or starvation, and is killed by a lethal injection (20). 
 These examples of self-sacrifice differ from the fictional examples not only in 
their being historical, but also because of their circumstances. Just like the 
grandmother, Kolbe finds himself in a place of terror and of non-chosen death, 
where no exit-options or possible choices are present, not even the choice of self-
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sacrifice (6). The Beslan grandmother/teacher in the end survives, as do her 
grandchildren. Kolbe is killed, but the man whose place he takes survives, however 
unlikely that is at the moment of Kolbe’s substitution. At that time, Kolbe’s action 
seems to be in vain, but still, he does it. His action has been interpreted as an act of 
charity, and – despite his pre-war “aggressive anti-Semitic and anti-secular 
statements” – he was declared a saint by Pope John Paul II in 1982 (6).  
 However, their stories are not those of holy persons who knowingly and 
willingly sacrifice themselves. Rather, their stories subvert such ‘perfect’ imaginings 
of ‘holy characters’. They do so, first, because of the uncertainty of their actions. 
Both the Beslan grandmother and Kolbe are not sure of the effectiveness of their 
actions. Their self-sacrifice, therefore, must be considered a risk, a gift given without 
knowing whether it will be received and produce any effect. As far as they can 
discern, the persons they seek to protect are likely to be killed, and the system that 
made them decide to sacrifice themselves will not be changed or influenced by their 
actions. This does not make their action insignificant to those present. Second, 
besides being uncertain and risky, their self-sacrifice is not calculated or planned; it is 
neither foreseen nor made to fit their own aims. Rather, it occurs in unforeseen 
ways. It is a mere coincidence that they are present when the occasion for self-
sacrifice is given, which we can label ‘occasionalism’. Hence self-sacrifice is more 
about the ‘walk of life’ than about character. 
Although these examples illuminate certain aspects of care, I do not want to 
focus on care under extreme circumstances, but rather on the everyday 
characteristics of care. This, however, does not mean that daily care is never 
extreme. For getting out of bed to take care of somebody may become extreme 
when it must be done frequently, for a long period of time or when it is added to 
other requirements, like being fit to work in the day. Still, the characteristics of 
uncertainty of effect as well as occasionalism still often apply to everyday care: the 
effectiveness of care is often uncertain, and one often just ‘happens to be’ in the 
neighborhood (instead of the other parent, professional colleague, neighbor, 
passerby, etc.). 
 
 
2. Inventory of characteristics of self-sacrifice discussed to this point 
 
I draw up an inventory of the characteristics of self-sacrifice that I have found up to 
this point. The first characteristics of self-sacrifice discussed to this point come from 
my reading of Van Heijst (2011), according to whom self-sacrifice helps uncover a 
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dimension of the reality of caregiving that exceeds a dual model of contractual 
exchange and points at a surplus or some readiness to give on the side of the caregiver. 
Self-sacrifice – on the part of both informal and professional caregivers – has to do 
with one’s own understanding of good care. In giving more than was contractually agreed 
upon, caregivers act according to these beliefs and hence realize their identity both as 
professionals and as human beings. 
 To these elements I would add an emphasis on the intrinsic commitment of 
caregivers to a good that compels them to give care and to give up other goods. 
Caregivers commit the self ‘from within’, in the sense of: ‘I know that there are 
other goods and that I originally had other plans and ambitions, but despite this I 
am committed to caring for this person.’ Imagine parents who decide to cut back on 
working hours in order to spend more time and energy with their children. The 
parents’ decision to give priority to this good, to which they are committed from the 
heart, from within the self, cannot be dismissed as the mere product of oppression 
or lack of a sense of self-worth. The caregivers’ own aims and goals may be 
suspended or entirely given up in the realization of their identity in giving care. The 
fictional and historical sources that I considered above both support and 
supplement these views. Gerasim’s care for Ivan Ilyich expresses the view of the 
human self as capable of giving from a surplus; an attitude of willingness to give; 
both an understanding of good care and an acting that is consistent with it; as well as 
realizing his humanity in caring for a dying man. But the story adds that both 
Gerasim and Vasya feel for and suffer with Ivan: Vasya by being a loving witness, 
Gerasim by carrying out demanding tasks in a sensitive and practical way. Gerasim 
does not avoid difficult subjects. He shares common human equality. And he is not only 
willing to give, but also expresses an openness in giving and uncertainty.  
Jane Eyre acts according to principles that – as she acknowledges – she has 
received from others, and the law given by God, sanctioned by man, which may be inconvenient 
to the individual but still have their worth, expressing a good that exceeds immediate 
happiness. These principles are not only handed down by others, but also impressed 
on her heart; hence there is not only submission to principles, but also acknowledgment of their 
worth. She is dedicated to these principles, also in times of temptation, mutiny, or 
insanity, and this dedication marks her self-sacrifice. 
Lucy’s self-sacrifice aims at restoring the fabric of her life after her violation, 
instead of retribution. She acknowledges the connection between politics and the 
personal, and the fact that public structures have consequences on a personal level, 
but she refutes any abstraction from the personal experience. Further, her self-sacrifice 
breaks the circle of retribution and is a gift to existing relations. 
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Bess’s story of her self-sacrifice shows that care also involves harm, suffering, 
conflicts, and violence. Although her story is rather extreme, I would argue that these 
elements are present in varying forms in caring practices. Self-sacrifice may be a 
means of enhancing stereotypes and male domination, for instance, by investing sexual 
violence against women with redemptive meaning. But Bess’s self-sacrifice is neither 
pure agape (unselfish love) nor passive victimization; it transcends the dichotomies of 
selflessness and self-centeredness, of passivity6 and agency, of capacity and fragility.  
Gilbert too transcends a dichotomy and establishes a paradox: wanting 
something for another does not oppose but rather can be the same thing as wanting 
something for oneself. Therefore, self-sacrifice may appear as self-realization in sharing a 
good. 
John Bayley’s self-sacrifice speaks of identities that are intertwined and inseparable, 
in the sense that apartness would destroy both. He acknowledges that trouble and 
pleasure go hand in hand, when increasing trouble must be endured and pleasures are 
numbered. Care contains the paradox of being both unbearable burden and priceless gift.  
The Beslan grandmother’s willingness to protect her grandchildren with her 
own body is an expression of protective self-sacrifice, in which she prefers her own harm 
or death to those of the children. And Father Kolbe in the same way gives his own 
life rather than see the other confronted with a horrible death. This is a form of 
substitutive self-sacrifice. These two stories together support the view of self-sacrifice as 
an act expressing uncertainty, the willingness to engage in risky giving, to give without 
expecting to cause an effect; at the same time, self-sacrifice is not a private, individual 
experience, but something that can be recognized as significant by others. Further, 
they show that self-sacrifice is often unforeseen rather than calculated or planned: one 
happens to have the occasion, by coincidently being in a given place at a given 
moment.  
I want to stress that self-sacrifice is not limited to the kind of extreme 
circumstances that characterize these last stories. Rather, self-sacrifice in caregiving 
is part of the everyday experience of giving care (as in the stories of Bayley and 
Tolstoy), which may develop into extreme forms, as I argue below. 
 
In response to the ways in which self-sacrifice has appeared in care ethics, and in 
support of my claim that the realities of caring contain self-sacrifice that needs to be 
taken seriously instead of rejected, I have presented these witnesses from books, 
                                                             
6 I understand passivity in the Ricœurian sense of passibility (passibilité), i.e. as undergoing, without 
any association of laziness or sloth.   
SACRIFICE 
30 
 
films, and history, that uncover a more complex image of caring. These stories 
enable me to formulate my claim more extensively and more in depth. 
 
 
3. Arguments for my claim 
 
Whether the ethics of care acknowledges self-sacrifice in caregiving as a possible 
risk, or rejects it outright, it has failed to think it through conceptually. Instead most 
care ethicists have backed away from the complexities of care, of the paradoxes and 
crosscurrents of meanings of self-sacrifice, and of violence, egoism, indecency, and 
independency within care. Thinking this through is what I aim to do in this research. 
As a first step I have gathered sources that have caused unease about self-sacrifice, 
circumventing a shortcut to both idealization and rejection. The fiction and non-
fiction stories and films provide a richer view of the complexity of self-sacrifice. 
Each protagonist has contributed to making self-sacrifice imaginable and 
conceivable. In saying this I mean that self-sacrifice is present in caregiving, 
although it is not always visible or present in every caring action. It is, however, 
present underneath the surface, and it is always imaginable that it surfaces. And 
when it does, it may be conceivable. For instance, it is imaginable that a 
grandmother is willing to protect her grandchildren and thereby willing to risk her 
life. Even if it does not happen, her moral reasons for acting are imaginable and 
conceivable. Hence by “making self-sacrifice conceivable and imaginable”, I mean 
being able to think of it as possible, plausible, not reprehensible, paving the way to 
be able to see that what people do when sacrificing the self in caring is morally good.  
What is more, I regard these stories not as abstractions from reality, but as 
corresponding to actual realities of caregiving. Caring, I claim, involves sacrifices, 
even to the point where the self is sacrificed. As said before, sacrifice does not need 
to be present all the time, but it is there underneath the surface of caring practices, 
and may emerge at any time. I have four arguments for substantiating this view.  
First, it would be hard to think of care without the possibility that caregivers 
‘walk the extra mile’ (Mt 5,41). Precisely defined and limited care would lack what is 
characteristic of care, viz. that it is directed by the relation between the caregiver and 
the one receiving care as well as by what happens within this relation deserving the 
caregiver’s attention. Because of the relational attuning care cannot be determined 
and restricted beforehand (Van Heijst, 2005, 2011). This argument can be called the 
argument of the via negativa, as it wonders what would be left of care if the aspect of 
sacrifice would be excluded from it.  
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Second, if the goal of care is the wellbeing of the one in need of care, care 
cannot be restricted to that which does not harm the caregiver’s own interest, does 
not obstruct the immediate fulfillment of his or her own goals, or does not restrict the 
caregiver’s own self-development. The goal of care intrinsically guides the caregiver 
towards the other’s needs and concerns, to a positive, to a good. 
Third, care has a temporal dimension: caregiving often occurs in a situation 
beyond the moment of decision and free choice; it is not something that caregivers 
can always decide on beforehand, but they find themselves in the midst of the 
situation. As such, caring often has a tragic dimension. This means that the caregiver 
is often already committed to this other person in need of care, a commitment 
leaving no room for free and boundless decision. For ‘leaving the other alone’ is not 
really an option. The acceptance of the caring task(s) is part of this commitment. 
Apart from the outright tragic, there is the care situation in which the self endures 
the tension between, on the one hand, being affected by the other, which is a 
moment of relating the self to this other that is not an option from a detached 
standpoint, and, on the other hand, giving way to what now has to be done, which 
expresses a sense of agency. In other words, ethics is about freedom and ‘the 
sensible thing to do’, but it cannot be reduced to a free choice between options. 
Rather, ethics is about what is fitting in this situation.  
And finally, my fourth argument stems from what I observe in caring 
practices: when people do sacrifice themselves and give disinterested care to the 
other, caring is at the same time partaking in a rich interpersonal contact.  
On these grounds, I want to conceive of care in such a way that self-sacrifice 
is vital to care. 
 
 
4. Demarcation of this research 
 
In this research I make use of various disciplines. Care ethics is its starting point and 
its aim. I start by elaborating existing views of care and the question of self-sacrifice 
as it is raised within these views. Also, several care ethicists provide important 
elements for a view of self-sacrifice in relation to caring, elements that I gather 
together. My aim is to contribute to a care-ethical thinking of care and the vital role 
of self-sacrifice in caregiving. However, care ethics leaves certain questions 
unanswered. Therefore I also draw on philosophy to scrutinize (1) care as a practice 
in which the self may be involved in self-sacrifice; (2) the intersubjective caring 
relation in which sacrifice might take place; (3) the political context in which power 
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and caring responsibilities are distributed amongst individuals and collectives, and in 
which caring relationality is embedded; (4) and the myths as well as beliefs, views, 
ideals, and convictions in which care is expressed, discussed, shared, and contested. I 
draw from both phenomenology and hermeneutics. Phenomenology helps me to 
reveal the complexities and paradoxes of care and thereby to suspend normative 
judgments. Hermeneutics helps me to see how meaning is found and given. Finally I 
draw from theology – more specifically from moral theology and spirituality, as well 
as from feminist theology – which has a multifaceted tradition of conceiving of 
sacrifice and self-sacrifice. I include several views on the Trinity as a contribution to 
understanding the relation of giving and receiving, by adding a view of ‘having 
received’. And I include Van Heijst’s analysis of historical practices of caritas, in 
which a spirituality of self-sacrifice was present. However, I do not see theology as 
providing an ‘ultimate answer’; ethics has to elucidate, from the bottom up, the 
uncertainties of practices. Theology may serve as an elucidation of practices, offering 
challenging insights that help one think about realities. Hence I argue that theology 
provides concepts that express, understand, or clarify the experiences, values, or 
beliefs that emerge in practices. I do not build a dogmatic theology but rather 
commit myself to the task of grasping the challenges that theology offers for 
conceiving of self-sacrifice by elucidating practices of care.  
Another demarcation with regard to theology needs to be made. I limit myself 
to Christian theological ethics or moral theology, including its ancient branch of 
spirituality, inasmuch as it fits within the scope of moral theology, i.e. reflecting on 
moral action. I leave aside the discussions of sacrifice as ritual, such as discussions 
about Abraham’s willingness to obey God and sacrifice his son Isaac and discussions 
about Christianity being (or not being) the religion that ended all ritual sacrifice with 
the one sacrifice of the innocent sacrificial lamb, Jesus. I only touch upon the long 
theological tradition concerning the interpretation of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross, 
which is strongly related to the Eucharist in the Catholic tradition. Terms like 
sacrifice, atonement, retribution, and redemption have been key to a wide variety of 
views. Since my goal is to think about the self-sacrifice of the caregiver in practices 
of care, the debates will be taken into consideration only insofar as they have 
consequences for the theological views on gender, sin, and theological views of 
moral demands. 
 
I also need to demarcate my use of the terms ‘sacrifice’ and ‘self-sacrifice’. I regard 
‘self-sacrifice’ as a term for a practice of caregiving in which the caregiver either 
offers part(s) of the self or offers the entire self, the self itself as a conscious, 
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considered, and intentional act. As indicated above, I understand sacrifice in this 
respect. Hence sacrificing and offering indicate that a good of the self is given up, 
that the caregiver gives what is required by the practice of care, that the self itself is 
given to the other in availability, commitment, or dedication. This giving is a pure 
gift, as it is not constituted by the expectation of a return gift but rather solely by the 
desire to give. In that sense practices imply normativity. 
 More specifically, I propose to use the term ‘sacrifice’ not as a symbol but as a 
metaphorical concept, in the sense used by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). A metaphor, 
like an allegory, expresses a likeness. What is more, a metaphor is not to be 
understood as ‘unreal’ or ‘figurative’; rather, as Lakoff and Johnson argue, a 
metaphor clarifies an element of one kind of thing in terms of another (5). This 
clarifying capacity is what I intend when using the term ‘self-sacrifice’ in relation to 
care. Accepting the term ‘self-sacrifice’ as a metaphorical concept for describing a 
certain aspect of caring means accepting that it expresses an understanding of 
practices of care. The way that one understands things also structures the way that 
one acts. For example, understanding care as also entailing elements of self-sacrifice 
allows for a practice of caregiving in which the self gives up aspects or components 
of the self. This means that my argument for including an understanding of self-
sacrifice in a shared concept of care aims at including tensions, violence, harm, and 
suffering as actual facets of practices of care.  
Therefore, self-sacrifice should be taken as a metaphorical concept for 
caregiving, because it clarifies an element of care. I found support for this view in 
Lakoff and Johnson, who state that concepts play a central role in defining our 
everyday realities (3), that most concepts are metaphorical in nature (4), and that 
such concepts structure our everyday activity (4). They point at our language, e.g. in 
the statement ‘Argument is war’, in which argument is described in the language of 
war: taking positions that can be defended, shot at, and attacked; can be targeted and 
demolished; arguments that can be won or lost; strategies that are chosen, etc. They 
argue: 
The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of 
another. It is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars 
are different kinds of things – verbal discourse and armed conflict – and the 
actions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially 
structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR. The 
concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, 
and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured (5). 
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Following their line of thinking, I propose to call self-sacrifice a metaphorical 
concept for an essential aspect of care. Understanding caregiving in terms of self-
sacrifice allows me to illuminate a certain aspect of caregiving that I consider 
neglected. Sacrifice is not a subspecies of caregiving, nor is caregiving a subspecies 
of sacrifice. But I do claim that caregiving is partially structured, understood, 
performed, and talked about in terms of (self-)sacrifice, and that it can be better 
conceived by including this metaphorical concept. As a consequence, caregiving is 
conceived of not only as commitment, engagement, connectedness, dedication, self-
gift, but also as a practice that requires, demands, asks, begs, of people that they give 
up other things, give in, and give themselves. This giving not only is a giving of a 
surplus, but it is transforming and sublimating of the self. In order to make this 
clear, I consider the term ‘self-sacrifice’ most appropriate. 
 
And third, I have limited my research to a conceptual study. Although I elaborate on 
the empirical research into the moral and political language of sacrifice conducted by 
Maria-Katharina Moser (2007), I have not done empirical research into caring 
practices. In order to do justice to the complexity of the term and to the nuances of 
the debates involved, it would hardly be feasible to observe practices using a term 
like ‘(self-)sacrifice’ as a hermeneutic device. The complexity of the term not only 
appears in literature showing its many meanings and ambiguities, but it has also been 
surfacing in discussions as a term capable of raising strong emotions like resistance 
and horror, impeding an analytic exchange of thoughts. I found that throughout 
history the term is susceptible to misuse, in politics, economics, and theology. It has 
frequently been misused to restrict women and minorities and impede their 
intellectual, economic, and political development. I therefore want to focus on how 
to think of sacrifice and self-sacrifice in relation to caregiving in such a way that it 
integrates the objections raised from a gender perspective. These nuances have 
impeded empirical research and first require analysis. The term needs explanation, 
which both involves a view of the self, of sacrifice, and of care, and also looks at this 
from a gender perspective. 
 
Fourth, I exclude from this research any self-sacrifice on the part of children. I do 
so not principally owing to a supposed lack of free will or rational deliberation in 
children, but rather because this topic brings with it additional ethical and 
phenomenological questions, such as children’s love of and loyalty to abusive 
parents.  
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Finally, in my research into self-sacrifice in caregiving I have come across terms that 
appear to be related but have proven to be unhelpful for understanding the 
complexities of caring practices. For instance, the dichotomy of altruism (forgetting 
the self) and egoism (forgetting the other) oversimplifies reality. Looking back at the 
literary, cinematic, and historical sources, I would argue that, although it might be 
possible to label certain persons as egoists or altruists for a limited period, it would 
not be helpful for understanding the full complexity of the caring practice. Those 
eighteenth-century normative concepts are too simplistic and disregard complexity 
by overemphasizing morality in the self. There is the centuries-old tradition of 
supererogation, which reflects on those acts that exceed what is morally required. 
The Belgian philosopher Elke Lagae argues that an action is supererogatory if it is 
permitted, free of obligations and moral value, and praiseworthy (2005, 29-43). As 
such, the self-sacrifice of Father Kolbe is considered a supererogatory act (iii). 
However, as stated, I aim to show that self-sacrifice is not something ‘above’ or 
‘more’ than a moral duty but rather something happening in everyday life, belonging to 
everyday care. My argument starts from normal and common everyday practice 
rather than from the exceptional or extreme. 
 
 
5. The course of this study 
 
Throughout the following chapters the term ‘frameworks’ will prove to be 
important, as it is my claim that four care-ethical frameworks need to be ‘re-framed’ 
in order to make self-sacrifice conceivable as part of caring practices, as well as to 
enable the metaphor of self-sacrifice to uncover realities of caring. Frameworks are 
constellations that ‘work’, i.e. they ‘present’ a problem and simultaneously ‘limit’ it. 
They consist of two layers. The first is the framework of purposefully selected 
concepts (e.g. autonomy, vulnerability, social position) that are placed in a certain 
relation to each other (e.g. opposition, hierarchy, complementary), which enable an 
author to pose and analyze a problem. The second layer consists of the author’s 
conscious and unconscious presuppositions. These two layers together make up the 
framework. Thus, in arguing that these frameworks need to be re-framed, I do not 
criticize care ethics for its consciously chosen concepts alone or for its 
(un)conscious presuppositions alone but rather for these two together. In care ethics 
four frameworks ‘work’ to contain the understanding of self-sacrifice. These are the 
frameworks of the subject, of intersubjectivity, of the community, and of the 
understanding of meaning. These frameworks need to be reset if the concept of self-
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sacrifice is going to be serviceable instead of rejected prematurely and contrary to 
factual experience. I have named these frameworks using general ethical terms. 
However, within each framework specific key care-ethical concepts and notions 
emerge, such as relations, context, practice, power, and a battle against dichotomies. 
I demonstrate the way in which I concur with, correct, or radicalize these concepts.  
 
a. The framework of the subject 
 
This research reframes the framework of the subject. It needs to be re-drawn or reset, 
as care ethics has failed to examine its own modern thought with regard to the 
subject. Despite its emphasis on human dependency, care ethics still incorporates 
modern concepts and presuppositions regarding the subject that posit it as a 
detached, responsible agent, standing over against others, and lacking passivity 
(passibilité). In other words, it puts the subject center stage. Instead, I propose to 
think of the subject as de-centered, and thus to reframe the framework of the subject 
in two respects.  
 First, the framework of the subject needs to incorporate far more passivity 
and fragility. I argue for the subject as a de-centered subject, which is a 
radicalization of the subject’s dependency. For as the above stories have 
shown, the self’s dependency is not restricted to the care of others, but is 
extended to a passivity with regard to what happens, to what is given, to what 
befalls and overwhelms the subject. Often the self is not in control, suffering 
from what happens, undergoing things that influence and determine the self. 
Passivity also exists in the relations in which the self finds itself, sharing life in 
which a common good is experienced. Moreover, the self’s identity can be 
intertwined with that of another or others to such an extent that it is 
impossible to distinguish what is ‘my own’. This research argues that the 
subject’s life needs to be seen as a ‘continuous trajectory’ between what has 
been given and what is aimed at in the future. Within this trajectory periods 
can be discerned, periods with specific characteristics that are parts of one’s 
trajectory, all of which belong to the subject’s context. This passivity has been 
insufficiently recognized within care ethics, wherein self-sacrifice is restricted 
to a freely chosen act of a self that is acceptable only when it is a free choice 
that does not stem from self-deprecation. Such a view places the self at the 
center, in control and detached; moreover, it psychologizes caring instead of 
contextualizing it. For this reason, such a view of the subject is in itself alien 
to care ethics. Opposed to this I propose a far more passive self, which 
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consequently discloses self-sacrifice as giving in to what happens, sharing 
what occurs, by sacrificing the self for a good that emerges within the relation 
of the self and one other but also that transcends the individual level and can 
be recognized as a good by all. 
 Second, and paradoxically, the framework of the subject also needs to 
incorporate far more agency, but agency of a specific kind. This agency is a 
reaching out of the subject to a meaning as an aim of the self, a finding or an 
establishing of sense, within practices. This research introduces ‘meaning’ and 
‘sense’ as new categories for thinking through caring practices. It is the self’s 
capacity to reach out to a good, to embrace it, to aim at establishing it as part 
of the self’s identity, giving sense and direction to one’s life. Therefore the 
subject that sacrifices the self cannot be generally reduced to being oppressed 
or exploited but may need to be recognized as an agent finding sense and 
establishing meaning when realizing the self in dedication or commitment to a 
good or to others. Care ethics has insufficiently taken into account this notion 
that the subject is an agent embracing meaning when sacrificing the self.  
Therefore, this research proposes the framework of the de-centered subject, which 
extends the framework of the subject in two respects: more passivity and more 
agency, both of which have been insufficiently thought through within care ethics. 
Both shed a different light on self-sacrifice, seeing it as undergoing and giving in, 
and as embracing a good.  
 
b. The framework of intersubjectivity 
 
I advocate a new framework of intersubjectivity in this study. The framework needs to 
be re-drawn or reset since here too care ethics has failed to recognize its own 
modern presuppositions. If the subject is posited as detached despite being 
dependent, and if the context is not radically taken into account, then 
intersubjectivity appears as the horizon within which caring takes place. Therefore I 
reframe this framework in the following respects: 
 Also within intersubjectivity much more passivity and contextuality need to 
be taken into account. The two subjects involved in this relation do not 
control what happens but stand in a much wider horizon of passivity, of what 
has been given and befallen them, of how their lives have unfolded as a 
trajectory and through episodes. When the horizon is broken and the two 
appear as far more passive, what happens within the relation appears as 
radically different from before. For this broken horizon makes what the two 
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‘do’ less central, and their acting appears against the background of what has 
happened, what they have passively been given. ‘Giving’ is then neither a 
subjective nor an intersubjective decision, of which either one or both are the 
starting point; rather they acquiesce to what has been given. ‘Giving’ is neither 
a subjective, autonomous decision nor a reciprocal agreement; rather it is a 
going along in a movement that has started elsewhere by what has been given. 
The horizon of intersubjectivity within which subjects act and decide is 
shattered in this research: intersubjectivity must radically incorporate more 
passivity and contextuality. 
 With regard to the relation of intersubjectivity, I adopt the care-ethical view 
of it as a vital source for finding out what good care is. However, I aim to 
radicalize its importance by de-emphasizing the two subjects and emphasizing 
the relation itself. In doing so, I oppose any dichotomy of self and other, 
which can be found in care ethics that speaks of the separated interests of self 
and other. Various care-ethical authors have failed to think about the relation 
as non-dichotomous (important exceptions are Tronto and Van Heijst). 
Throughout this research the dichotomy of self and other is replaced by a 
concept of philia (friendship) that stresses the relation as the third pole 
‘between’ the two subjects, and it is contested by views that de-center the 
subject and argue for otherness as interior to the subject (interior ipseity). As 
a consequence, the two poles no longer oppose each other but are inescapably 
engaged, which alters the idea of self-sacrifice as well. If the self and other are 
related, the sacrifice is no longer necessarily on behalf of the other but on 
behalf of the relation that is constitutive of the self’s identity as well.  
Therefore, this research underscores the importance of intersubjectivity within 
caring but also extends the intersubjective contextuality and stresses the third pole 
of the relation itself. Both have repercussions with regard to self-sacrifice, by 
overcoming the idea that a sacrifice is an act of one for the other without context, as 
well as the idea that a sacrifice on the part of one is only to the benefit of the other.  
 
c. The framework of the community 
 
This research argues for an alternative framework of the community. Care ethics has 
emphasized that caring also builds up society. However, care ethics sees power in 
the Weberian sense, i.e. as being able to impose one’s will on others. This view of 
power makes it hard to understand why people would want to build up the 
community, why they care for others simultaneously on the societal level and on the 
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individual level, pursuing both collective goals, for which an institution such as 
healthcare is established, and individual goals, like having good contact with some 
as-yet unknown patient. These goals, of course, are mixed in practice but can be 
discerned. Therefore I reframe this framework in the following respects: 
 The community framework needs to entail the idea of power as a centripetal 
force, as a foundation for relations of domination. If people want to belong 
together, form a community, build a society and share life with various 
unknown others, this explains why people care and sacrifice on the political 
level too. This requires a view of the community in which subjects relate to 
themselves by incorporating a sense of being a member of society within their 
own sense of self, participate in the society, and thereby assume the positions 
and roles that society distributes. Hence the idea of power as domination is 
still a valid and valuable concept within care ethics since it explains why care 
is marginalized and unrightfully so, but it must be complemented with a 
different view of power. Only if a sense of belonging is shared does it become 
conceivable why people would sacrifice for a common good for the 
community.  
 Care ethics has a realistic view of the community that involves conflict as 
unavoidable. This view is supported by this research. However, the reframing 
needs to take into account the role played by conflicts, which, I argue, do not 
destroy the community but are a way of building up the community. Conflicts 
that are seen as inevitable and constitutive of a new sense of belonging that 
allows self-sacrifice to be conceived of in a different way. The emphasis is less 
on victims or victimization and more on how people are willing to enter a 
conflict in order to build a better society, thereby possibly sacrificing 
themselves. 
Therefore, this research underscores the need of care ethics to develop a political 
ethics, to recognize caring as a collective and political practice that builds up the 
society. This political ethics also needs provide a perceptive analysis of how power 
and inequality are involved in caring practices. Community is founded by a desire to 
live together, which inescapably involves conflicts that contribute to a better society. 
Consequently this reframed framework of the community allows for an 
understanding of self-sacrifice as required by the shared life with others or the 
struggle for a better life for more people. 
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d. The framework of meaning and sense 
 
This research proposes to add a framework that so far has been insufficiently 
thought through within care ethics, namely, the framework of giving or finding 
meaning. Care ethics has stressed the centrality of caring for human life as a practice 
within complex, life-sustaining webs (Tronto & Fisher in Tronto, 1993), but it has 
insufficiently thought about the finding and establishing of meaning in this practice. 
I argue that self-sacrifice finds its place in the context of dedication to what is 
believed to have meaning, to make sense, to be significant, to lead to a happiness 
that exceeds the immediate fulfillment of needs, such as in the stories of Jane Eyre’s 
(Brontë), Bess (Von Trier), the grandmother of Beslan, and Father Kolbe. 
Throughout this research I cite various authors who reveal how sense is found in 
specific relations, situations, and positions, giving direction to one’s life, while 
meanings are embraced as part of one’s identity, as vital for self-realization and 
requiring self-sacrifice. 
 
The reframing of the above frameworks is unfolded in the chapters of this research 
as follows. 
In Chapter 1, Defining caring and the question of self-sacrifice, I survey a handful of 
care ethicists with divergent concepts of care. Their manners of framing care lead to 
various ways in which the question of self-sacrifice is raised. I show how the 
question of self-sacrifice emerges in their works in light of their views of care and 
the ways in which they think about self-sacrifice (although some barely consider it as 
such). Four positions can be discerned: 
 A definition of caring that rejects any acceptance of self-sacrifice; 
 A definition of caring that entails involvement to the extent of self-
sacrifice, yet simultaneously aims to limit it; 
 A definition of caring that allows for self-sacrifice but does not think 
through its consequences for caring; 
 A definition of caring that entails self-sacrifice but does not fully think it 
through.  
This survey shows that care ethics reflects on relations, practices, and politics, but 
these reflections need to be radicalized in order to provide a proper understanding 
of caring and self-sacrifice. The various positions help me to specify the research 
questions that determine the further course of this study.  
 In Chapter 2, Theology, caring and life trajectories, I turn to theology, for this 
discipline offers concepts that are indispensable for thinking about the de-centered 
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subject, about the intersubjective relation not as dual but as triadic, and about the 
community as involving a desire to live together stemming from a sense of 
belonging. Theology offers a view of life as a trajectory in which human life unfolds 
on a time continuum between an origin and a destination. These concepts, if not 
made into a dogmatic view of life that ‘kills’ ethics, are indispensable for critically 
reframing the above frameworks.  
In Chapter 3, Givenness precedes giving, I turn to phenomenology, in which I 
have found an approach that de-centers the subject. Taking a completely different 
departure point from that of the subject, and instead of offering concepts, as 
theology does, phenomenology starts from the most common and everyday 
experience of what happens and what is given. Not only does this lead to a humbled 
and de-centered view of the subject, which includes the greater passivity (passibilité) 
that I am seeking, but it also reframes intersubjectivity as far more passive. 
However, whereas phenomenology (and especially Marion’s phenomenology, on 
which I draw) strictly refrains from making ethical claims, my research underpins 
phenomenology’s relevance for ethics and develops a view of how ethics and 
phenomenology are related. I argue that phenomenology does have ethical 
implications for conceiving self-sacrifice.  
In Chapter 4, Struggle for community, I turn to political theory. As noted, 
phenomenology offers a view of the de-centered subject as passive to what is given. 
But my other research questions—concerning politics, power, community, and 
conflict—prompt me to turn to political theory as well. In taking up the ideas of the 
community, politics, and power found in care ethics, as well as the theological ideas 
of the community and sense of belonging, there remains the need for a different 
view of politics, in which the desire to live together is related to conflict, not as 
destroying the community but as a necessary means of building and developing it. A 
political view of self-sacrifice finds a fertile soil in this idea of political struggle that 
originates in the moral experience of injustice and that aims at a better society.  
In Chapter 5, Affective coexistence, I return to phenomenology, but that of a 
different kind: a phenomenology that is connected to theology, the latter radicalizing 
the former. Although care ethics stresses human interdependency, although 
phenomenology illuminates human passivity and the discovery of the self solely 
through what has been given, and although theology and political theory illuminate 
why a subject needs others to become and be a self, it has not yet been thought 
through how being passively affected by another also gives the self in the ethical 
sense. In other words, human passivity and pathos have not yet been linked to 
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human agency and ethos. I therefore turn to a view that connects bodily affection to 
the discovery of coexistence as the ground for an ethos of giving the self. 
In Chapter 6, Keeping tensions alive, I turn to dialectical thought. For, although 
many insights are gained in the first five chapters, a dialectical approach is 
indispensable for connecting these insights together in a tension that becomes 
fruitful when maintained and endured. The subject’s extended passivity needs to be 
connected to agency, otherwise no ethics is possible. However, neither passivity nor 
agency can be abolished or excluded. Excluding passivity leads to ‘too much ethics’, 
and in fact kills ethics by taking a premature normative stance. Excluding agency, 
however, equally kills ethics, as this would only allow for the tragic. The tension 
between the self and the other in intersubjectivity also needs to be maintained. In 
other words, the dichotomy of self and other in intersubjectivity must be replaced by 
an emphasis on friendship and mutuality, in which the relation itself is emphasized. 
What is more, a dialectical ethics is needed in which the tension between general 
norms and concrete situations can be mediated by practical wisdom. This allows for 
a view of self-sacrifice as potentially morally required in a concrete situation—
however neither by making it a general obligation nor by prohibiting it in all 
situations. Finally, a view is needed that supplements the political theory of Chapter 
3: a phenomenology of generosity as temporary ‘states of peace’. These states do not 
resolve or abolish the tensions within society but rather underscore the founding 
desire to belong together.  
 In Chapter 7 I draw my conclusions regarding the reframed frameworks. 
Since the authors provide new and unforeseen insights that help make it possible to 
conceive of self-sacrifice in caring, I incorporate these insights in my conclusion. 
And I conclude by showing that a fuller understanding of caring practices requires 
the concept of self-sacrifice. 
One final remark needs to be made. I demarcate the choice of scholarly 
literature in two respects. First, with regard to the primary literature used in this 
research, I have made a selection of works guided by my research questions. Second, 
with regard to the secondary literature, I restrict myself to those authors who help 
me to understand what is ‘typically’ the author’s , who have clarified and 
characterized the author’s work, for instance, by providing short sentences which 
illuminate a core thought, an essential insight. I therefore do not enter into their 
debates and discussions with other authors. 
 
  
 CHAPTER 1: Defining caring and the question of self-sacrifice 
 
 
In the Introduction I briefly described the various ways in which several care 
ethicists either reject or acknowledge self-sacrifice within caregiving. From the vast 
body of works that has developed since the origin of the ethics of care with Carol 
Gilligan’s In a Different Voice I have selected several strong exponents thinking about 
care who explicitly mention self-sacrifice and take various positions with regard to it. 
A thinking through of the term that describes the contours and depth of caring, 
however, is still lacking. Before I can do that, I start by exploring various care-ethical 
definitions of caring and how the question of self-sacrifice emerges within them. I 
have therefore made a small selection of care ethicists taking four positions:  
 A definition of caring that impedes any acceptance of self-sacrifice (Gilligan 
and her followers Pettersen, Hem) 
 A definition of caring that entails involvement to the extent of self-sacrifice, 
yet simultaneously aims to limit it (Noddings) 
 A definition of caring that allows for self-sacrifice but does not think through 
its consequences for caring (Tronto) 
 A definition of caring that entails self-sacrifice but does not fully think it 
through (Van Heijst). 
I aim to contribute to the field of care ethics by clarifying how self-sacrifice not only 
is part of the reality of caring practices, and so need not be smuggled away, but in 
fact is crucial for facing the meaning of caring.  
 Two remarks must be made in advance. First, not all of the care ethicists 
treated in this chapter have actually researched practices of care. Care ethicists argue 
that caring practices are sources of knowing what good care is. This is their 
epistemological claim that I concur with. However, the care ethicists in this chapter 
relate differently to these practices: some have done actual empirical research or 
have explicitly scrutinized practices, others have not. I pay attention to the author’s 
epistemological position, as I too have an epistemological claim, viz. that in order to 
know what caring is it is indispensable to be informed by practices of care. Not all 
care ethicists do this in a similar way, as will be clear in this chapter. Epistemology 
remains a continuous point of attention of this research.  
Second, I have arranged the four positions in a systematic order. I do not 
pretend to give a full overview of care ethicists but the selection is made based on 
the array of stances with regard to self-sacrifice in caregiving as presented above. 
Each subsection presents one position with regard to care and self-sacrifice followed 
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by my critical review. In my concluding section I give my systematic analysis of these 
positions, which will also result in a survey of the questions that determine the 
further course of this study. 
 
 
1. Defining caring and rejecting self-sacrifice  
 
The question of caring for the self and others has been a main characteristic of the 
ethics of care from its start (Held, 2006, 538). Psychologist Carol Gilligan conducted 
empirical research on morality and moral development by interviewing women on 
the relation between judgment and action in situations of moral conflict and choice 
and by developing a theory on women’s identity and moral development (Gilligan, 
1982, 1). Her knowledge of the morality of care stems from this psychological 
research rather than from an analysis of practices. She criticized Lawrence 
Kohlberg’s research method and psychological literature by uncovering the 
‘different moral voice’ that is not inferior to argumentation from a justice 
perspective but that argues from the different moral perspective of care. 
Like the morality of justice, this morality of care, as Gilligan describes it, has a 
staged development. An initial focus on caring for the self in order to ensure 
survival develops into a later phase, one that is characterized by a focus on caring 
for others, ensuring care for the dependent and unequal. The good is equated with 
caring for others (74). This leads to problems in relationships because of the 
exclusion of the self, causing a second transition towards the third, mature 
perspective of cumulative knowledge of human relationships that revolves around 
the insight that human beings are interdependent (74). This mature stage is the 
capacity to dissipate the tension between selfishness and responsibility in a new 
understanding of interconnection between other and self (74). (Throughout this 
research I oppose the suggestion that it is possible to dissipate this tension.) 
 Gilligan argues that women’s moral development has been hampered by 
ideologies promoting self-sacrifice as a woman’s virtue and that an ethic of self-
sacrifice is opposed to an ethic of self-development and the concept of rights (129, 
132). She argues that the conflict between integrity and care is a central dilemma for 
women, leading to two divergent constructions of identity, viz. in self-expression or 
in self-sacrifice (157). Therefore the capacity to dissipate the tensions between 
selfishness and responsibility is the mature stage of care.  
 More recently, Gilligan’s view of mature care is adopted by the Norwegian 
philosophers Tove Pettersen (2008, 2011) and Marit Helene Hem (Hem & 
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Pettersen, 2011; Pettersen & Hem, 2011; Hem, 2012). Moral philosopher Pettersen 
aims to analyze and articulate value systems, drawing attention to problems and 
possibilities, and supplying well-founded justification when necessary. She argues 
that the stage of mature care is a ‘golden mean’ in the Aristotelian sense, i.e. a mean 
between too little and too much care for self and others (Pettersen, 2011, 56).  
It would be misconceived and evidence of a misunderstanding of what it 
means to care were we to equate care with self-sacrifice or self-denial on the 
one hand, or, with a narrowly particularistic and self-centered concern on the 
other hand. Both perspectives would be one-sided, without reciprocity or 
mutual recognition (Pettersen, 2011, 56-57)7. 
Instead, care should be comprehended as mature care, as Gilligan has called it, 
preventing harm and/or promoting flourishing for both the carer and the caree (55), 
as well as recognizing that in principle one should have as much care for oneself as 
one has for others (56, emphasis in text). Pettersen argues for a balancing of the 
interests of self and others (59). 
Hem and Pettersen apply the concept of mature care to various cases from 
psychiatry (Hem & Pettersen, 2011; Pettersen & Hem, 2012). They develop a 
normative account of nursing with regard to demanding relationships with patients 
in psychiatry (Hem & Pettersen, 2011, 66, 73-74) and aim to adequately and 
realistically conceptualize nursing (Pettersen & Hem, 2011, 218). They present the 
concept of mature care as a more cognizant concept of care that is more 
theoretically nuanced, precise, and resilient than the more common altruistic views 
that picture care as an unselfish, spontaneous, and compassionate act in which the 
needs and interests of the other take precedence over one’s own (217-218, cf. Hem 
& Pettersen, 2011, 74). 
 
The problem with Hem and Pettersen’s view is that it rejects self-sacrifice without 
describing how it occurs, what it looks like, and what makes people do it. This 
rejection resolves the tension within care, but it also restricts the research area. 
Pettersen argues that care philosophers who are concerned about developing an 
ethical theory that pays attention to the interface between the normative and the 
empirical should scrutinize real life experiences to extract from them a normative 
concept of care (Pettersen, 2011, 61). I would argue that this requires scrutiny into 
what happens when people sacrifice themselves within care and that applying 
normative concepts to these practices is not the best point of departure. I therefore 
                                                             
7 Barnes (2012, 8) argues in the same vein. 
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advocate a phenomenological approach of self-sacrifice in caring that looks at the 
phenomenon itself and the meanings that emerge. 
 I also object to the idea of mature care as a normative concept of care, 
because I do not find the normative arguments convincing that in principle one 
should have as much concern for oneself as for others, that one’s own interests and 
those of others should be balanced. Why would such a balance be good in principal? 
As I argued in the Introduction, good care often involves ‘walking the extra mile’, 
doing more than is required or agreed. Reciprocity is not a precondition for good 
care, as various stories in the Introduction made clear, such as the cases of Gerasim 
(Tolstoy), Gilbert (Hallström), and John Bayley, as well as the stories from Beslan 
and Auschwitz. 
 
 
2. Defining caring and its limits to prevent self-sacrifice  
 
Nel Noddings’s book Caring (1984) was one of the first elaborations of an ethic of 
caring, having drawn from Gilligan’s research. Noddings locates caring on an 
interpersonal level as a dyadic structure, that is, a structure of two persons, the one-
caring and the cared-for. She constructs care according to mother-and-child care, 
which makes her view both essentialist and romanticized. Although I adopt Tronto’s 
rejection of Noddings’s dyadic structure, as I shall show in the next section, and 
although I have criticized Noddings’s work elsewhere (Van Nistelrooy, 1996), I 
nevertheless think that her view contributes to an understanding of how feelings and 
thought are connected in care practices. Caring, according to Noddings, starts with 
feeling, as arising out of a pre-moral good. It is my aim to explore this term ‘pre-
moral good’ as well as the role of feeling in evoking care, as I expect both of these 
to illuminate several of the aspects of self-sacrifice in caregiving that I discussed in 
the introduction. However, there is a long philosophical tradition of reflection on 
empathy (Slote, 2007), and Noddings’s argument is not as new as she herself 
presumes.  
 
a. Noddings’s view of caring 
 
Noddings’s view is rooted in the concrete universal human experience of caring and 
being cared for, which form the foundation of ethical response (Noddings, 1984, 3). 
The heart of morality is sensitivity, i.e. a very concrete feeling of “I must do 
something”, that is, I must act, help, reduce pain, in short: care. Noddings calls this 
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feeling a “pre-moral good” and explains that this is a goodness that lies in a region 
with the moral good and shades over into it (84). To be touched, Noddings argues, 
we must apprehend the other’s reality as a possibility for ourselves:  
This is the fundamental aspect of caring from the inside. When I look at and 
think about how I am when I care, I realize that there is invariably this 
displacement of interest from my own reality to the reality of the other. […] 
Kierkegaard has said that we apprehend another’s reality as possibility. To be 
touched, to have aroused in me something that will disturb my own ethical 
reality, I must see the other’s reality as a possibility for my own (14)8.  
Caring is essentially non-rational in that it requires a constitutive engrossment and 
displacement of motivation (26). Two elements are essential to caring. The first is 
feeling, which means being totally with the other, which Noddings throughout her 
book calls “engrossment”. This feeling is not generalizable, because it occurs in 
unique situations of relatedness. The second element is “a motivational shift”, which 
is a flow of motive energy toward the other that may even go toward the other’s 
ends (33). This moment entails a fragile balancing between the self and the other, in 
which the one-caring is made vulnerable (33). Noddings calls this an “affective-
receptive mode”, in which we quietly receive what is there without evaluation or 
assessment and allow ourselves to be transformed (34). It happens in the concrete 
situations that are central to morality, for instance, in our considerations of how we 
would feel if we were not to respond (84).  
 Although for Noddings caring can be attributed especially to the natural 
female experience of motherly caring for children, everyone can relate to it. For 
everyone, consciously or not, values as ‘good’ the relation of natural caring, and the 
memory of the best moments of caring and being cared for incite in each of us the 
feeling of ‘I must’. Therefore Noddings distinguishes between natural and ethical 
caring. The sensation of ‘I must’ often comes naturally, and when the sensations of 
‘I must’ and ‘I want’ are the same, one speaks of natural care (81). Ethical caring 
comes about when I encounter the other and feel the natural pang conflicting with 
my own desire – ‘I must’ but ‘I do not want to’, and one remembers what has 
followed in one’s best moment (80). This is the moment of ethical caring, in which 
the subject-in-relation decides what is good in this situation. This decision cannot be 
guided by abstract rules or general guidelines but only by sensitivity, receptivity and 
responsibility from within the situation (42). 
                                                             
8 Katherine Gardiner (2008) considers Noddings’s view of “apprehending another’s reality” to be 
one of the three possible answers to her question of how caring affects people and motivates them 
to action (next to Harry Frankfurt’s account of “volitional necessity” and Christine Korsgaard’s 
neo-Kantian theory of normativity). 
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This view is both problematic and helpful. What is problematic is the idea of the 
‘naturalness’ of caring, of being engrossed, and of remembering the best moments 
of being cared for, as the sources of giving care. For one can also ‘naturally’ 
experience disgust, fear, or desire to run away, when confronted with a demand to 
care. What is helpful, however, is Noddings’s idea that people are always in some 
way responding affectively to an appeal. What is considered as good cannot be 
separated or abstracted from feeling. In this sense a person does not make ethical 
decisions based solely on rational arguments. Still, to advocate that everyone is 
especially determined by good caring experiences without incorporating an analysis 
of power is to take a romanticized and politically naïve view of care (Van Heijst, 
2008, 31), a view which is daily disproved, since for many caring for others is not an 
essential value (Reinders, 1996, 63-64). I return to this problematic ‘naturalness’ of 
care in the next section, but first I present Noddings’s view of self-sacrifice. 
  
b. Self-sacrifice in Noddings’s view 
 
Noddings conceives of caring as a dyadic relation between the one-caring and the 
cared-for. She argues: 
[S]ince caring is a relation, an ethic built on it is naturally other-regarding. 
Since I am defined in relation, I do not sacrifice myself when I move toward 
the other as one-caring. Caring is, thus, both self-serving and other-serving 
(99). 
However, since she considers the one-caring the sole source of caring, she also 
considers self-sacrifice a risk that can destroy care. Contrary to the above quotation, 
she also fiercely rejects this risk and proposes ways of acting for the one-caring in 
order to be able to uphold her ethical ideal of caring. 
An ethic of caring strives to maintain the caring attitude. That means that the 
one-caring must be maintained, for she is the immediate source of caring. The 
one-caring, then, properly pays heed to her own condition. […] To go on 
sacrificing bitterly, grudgingly, is not to be one-caring and, when she finds this 
happening, she properly but considerately withdraws for repairs (105). 
Noddings therefore proposes that the one-caring construct and accept a constrained 
ideal, keeping it close to the concrete, for instance, by requiring attainability of the 
ideal in the actual world (109). She further argues that the one-caring stands in the 
center of concentric circles, making care more required in the inner circle of love 
than in the outer circles (46). If the strain on the one-caring becomes too great, 
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Noddings argues, then the one-caring may restrict the load of the natural imperative 
of the “I must” to these inner circles. 
 
c. Reflection on Noddings’s view 
 
There is an inconsistency in Noddings’s view of self-sacrifice. She makes an 
important statement with regard to viewing the self as related, which alters the view 
of self-sacrifice. I develop my own position on the framework of the subject in line 
with this. However, she also rejects self-sacrifice and proposes two general rules to 
prevent it. Both the natural limits on the time, energy, and resources of the one-
caring and the type of relationship that holds between the cared-for and the one-
caring offer protection against self-destructive care (Groenhout, 2003, 159). 
Groenhout has criticized Noddings’s view for failing to resolve the problem of self-
sacrifice, since the first point offers “too little too late”, limiting care only when the 
absolute limits of resources have been reached, and the second point does not 
protect against self-sacrifice in caring for a close other (159-160). I concur with 
Groenhout that Noddings’s limits fail. What is more, I think Noddings fails to see 
the contradiction in her own view when she speaks of being defined in a relation of 
engrossment and being totally with the other, on the one hand, and limiting care, on 
the other. It would have been more illuminating if she had considered the hardships 
of limiting care and had looked into the ways people try, succeed, or fail to do so, 
instead of trying to come up with a more general rule. Looking into the complexities 
of care might have given a clue to the paradox of both wanting to give care even 
when it is unbearable, on the one hand, and being a priceless gift, on the other, as 
John Bayley has shown. This paradox makes it hard to limit care and shifts the 
question from avoiding one extreme to understanding how the self is realized in the 
tension of the extremes. This paradoxical nature of care is one of this research’s 
central thoughts. 
 
 
3. Caregiving and possible self-sacrifice  
 
In her pioneering book Moral Boundaries (1993) Joan C. Tronto develops a moral and 
political concept of care that is still authoritative in the ethics of care. Because of 
that, and since her work offers important insights for my research, I pay extensive 
attention to her view. Although Tronto looks at practices of care, she does this as a 
feminist political theorist who focuses on the injustices of sexism and racism that 
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continue in our world (1993, ix). I first present her view of caring (a), then show 
how she develops caring as a moral and political concept (b), and finally show how 
she speaks of self-sacrifice (c). Each subsection concludes with a critical reflection. 
 
a. Tronto’s view of care 
 
Key to Tronto’s view of care is a definition that she devised together with Berenice 
Fisher and that has become authoritative in the ethics of care (Manschot, 1994, 105; 
Verkerk, 1997, 10; Van Heijst, 1997, 33; Van Heteren, 1997, 159; Berg en Van de 
Lyke, 1997, 177; Conradi, 2001, 37; Groenhout, 2004, 28; Schnabl, 2005, 412; 
Diedrich, Burggraeve & Gastmans, 2006, 35; Vanlaere & Gastmans, 2008, 204; 
Vanlaere & Gastmans, 2011, 22; Maillard, 2011, 181; Barnes, 2012, 1):  
On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species activity 
that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we 
can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves, and 
our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-
sustaining web (Tronto, 1993, 103, italics in text; 1995, 9; 1997, 21; 2011, 36; 
2013, 19).  
Before I proceed with this view, I need to say something about the term ‘definition’. 
Although Tronto and Fisher present this quotation as a definition, it is rather a 
description. As Mol et al (2010) have pointed out, a definition restricts and 
delineates words, fixing it to a limited spot and differentiating it from other things 
(83-84). Mol et al, however, defend a different approach. They consider caring to be 
a practice that is tinkered with, where ways of working are developed and 
boundaries get contested; caring is unstable and takes a variety of shapes (84). 
Therefore they study the practice of care not by fixing its essence in a definition 
beforehand and studying the extra, accidental attributes (84-85, emphasis in text). 
Rather, they take the “practice turn” by opening up the wide variety of caring 
practices and endless complexities (85-86). In other words, Mol et al take care as a 
verb, not a noun: one can describe it but not tell ‘where’ it is (84). This is important 
to my research. For, although I have not taken the “practice turn” in the sense of 
doing empirical research, it is my aim to describe how self-sacrifice emerges in 
descriptions of practices. To this end, I have started with a variety of stories that 
illuminate various aspects of self-sacrifice. Therefore I adopt Mol’s view. But I also 
consider it applicable to Tronto and Fisher’s words: they describe a practice rather 
than fix its essence. And although their description starts on the most general level, 
they continue by describing a broad range of caring activities (1993, 104) and 
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practices (2012, 3). Therefore, the term ‘practice’ is key to Tronto’s work as well as 
to care ethics, as I remarked in the Introduction. 
Tronto and Fisher’s description, then, illuminates several characteristics of 
caring. It is not restricted to caring for others but includes caring for ourselves, 
objects, and our environment. It is not dyadic9 or individualistic, and therefore is 
broader than a mother-and-child-relationship (1993, 103). Further, caring can vary 
among cultures and is on-going (103). Finally, caring is both a practice and a 
disposition (104), hence a caring attitude and work. Tronto and Fisher argue that all 
are agents and recipients of care. The ideological context of care, however, consists 
of ‘a complex series of ideas about individualism, autonomy, and the “self-made 
man”’ that serves to maintain the position of the relatively powerful and privileged 
(111). Hence power is in a complex way involved in views and ideologies of care. 
Along with providing a description, Tronto and Fisher analyze the practice of 
caring as a model of subsequent phases or elements of the caring process (1993, 
105-108), which has become authoritative as well (Sevenhuijsen, 1996, 88; 
Sevenhuijsen, 1998, 71; Gremmen, 1997,106; Gelauff & Manschot, 1997, 198; Van 
Heijst, 2002, 24; Van Heijst, 2008a, 28; Martinsen, 2011, 175-176; Leget, 2011, 114; 
Barnes, 2012, 19-25). Caring starts with noticing the existence of a need (phase 1, 
caring about); it then assumes some responsibility for the identified need and 
determines how to respond to it (phase 2, taking care of); after that, it directly meets 
the need for care (phase 3, caregiving); finally the object of care responds to the care 
it has received (phase 4, care-receiving). Tronto later added a fifth phase, namely, 
caring with:  
To understand the meaning of the fifth phase, ‘caring with,’ we need to think 
about how the other phases of care fit together. While in an integrated care 
process they would all fit together, the fifth phase builds expectations around 
the “feed-back loop” that works among the four phases. When care is 
responded to, through care-receiving, and new needs are identified, we return 
to the first phase and begin again. When over time, people come to expect 
that there will be such ongoing engagement in care processes with others, 
then we have arrived at “caring with” (Tronto, 2012, 4). 
In order for caring to be caring well, the four (later, five) phases need to be 
integrated (109). However, conflicts cannot be excluded. They may exist either 
                                                             
9 Tronto uses ‘dyadic’, whereas Van Heijst uses ‘dual’. Both express a relation between two poles. 
’Dual’ refers to the feminist analysis of dualism, which also involves a hierarchy: one is better, 
higher, of greater value than the other. I use ‘dyad’ or ‘dyadic’ when referring to Tronto or authors 
discussing a relation between two poles without the connotation of hierarchy. When referring to 
Van Heijst or dualism I use ‘dual’. 
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within a phase, when caregivers need to mediate between their own needs and those 
of the ones in their care, or between the four phases, when bureaucracies decide 
about which needs must be met, while being distanced from the actual caregiving 
and care-receiving (109). The determination of which caring needs receive which 
resources is also a source of conflict, due to culturally diverse views of adequate care 
and the scarcity of resources (110).  
 
In reflecting on Tronto’s view of care I first gather together her insights on the 
caring process itself that are relevant for conceiving self-sacrifice. At the end of the 
next subsection I focus on her contribution to an institutional and political ethics of 
care with regard to self-sacrifice. In the third subsection I reflect on one of her own 
texts on self-sacrifice.  
According to Tronto, caring involves a movement towards another (person, 
body, thing, environment). Care is neither self-absorbing nor self-referring, but 
instead it implies a reaching out to something other than the self (102). Care is best thought 
of as a practice, not as a principle or an emotion. As a practice it involves both thought 
and action, which are interrelated and directed towards an end (108). Within the 
practice conflicts may arise, either within or between the phases. In relation to self-
sacrifice, the most relevant conflict mentioned by Tronto is that faced by caregivers 
when their needs to care for themselves come into conflict with the care that they 
must give to others (109). The foundation of care is a view of human nature not as 
autonomous but as interdependent (101). Thinking of people as interdependent allows 
us to understand both autonomous and involved elements of human life (162). 
Suddenly, we do not only see the world as consisting of autonomous 
individuals pursuing rational ends and life projects, but we see the world as 
comprised of people enmeshed within networks of care and committed to 
meeting the caring needs around them (Tronto, 2011, 37). 
Two points need to be made here, first on interdependency and second on needs. 
First, this view puts autonomy and dependency in tension within human nature. 
People are related as well as capable of commitment. Although I previously 
criticized Tronto’s emphasis on autonomy as a goal of care as an implicit rejection of 
dependency (Van Nistelrooy, 1996, 92), I see that differently now. Like Tronto, I 
consider dependency to be a human condition that stands in tension with autonomy, 
in which both are present and neither should be lost, ignored, excluded, or taken 
away by others. This tension needs further exploration, since it is fundamental to 
understand self-sacrifice. 
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Second, the care-ethical emphasis on human interdependence leads to an 
emphasis on needs rather than interests. Needs are necessarily intersubjective and 
more cultural than individualistic (Tronto, 1993, 164). Finally, this relatedness also 
leads to a shift on the moral level, making subjects appear as morally engaged rather 
than morally detached (164). Tronto’s notion of needs instead of interests is 
important to this research, since it points at caring as an intersubjective practice and 
a reaching out to an other than the self. However, I prefer a view of care in which 
relationality and the sharing of life together with others, and not needs (or other 
terms like ‘demands’, ‘ailments’, or ‘frailties’) are the source of care. The stories told 
in the Introduction point at this sharing rather than at needs, e.g. the lives of Lucy 
(Coetzee), Gilbert (Hallström), and John Bayley. Their care cannot be covered by 
the terms ‘responding to the needs of others’. It would be a reduction of their 
reality.  
Finally, I want to amend Tronto’s fifth phase, which emphasizes a 
characteristic of caring that is most relevant to self-sacrifice. The moral virtues of 
trust and solidarity that are connected to the ongoing engagement of caring resonate 
in terms like ‘endurance’, ‘dedication’, and ‘commitment to a shared life’, as in the 
aforementioned stories of Lucy, Gilbert, and John Bayley. However, these stories 
show that a different order of the phases would more adequately describe their care, 
since their ongoing engagement with others preceded rather than followed from the 
caring process that developed. Tronto argues that the fifth phase, which is 
characterized by solidarity and trust, is the result of the caring process. Instead, I 
would advocate that trust and solidarity exist beforehand and enable care. They are the 
starting points of care, both in informal and formal caring relations. Nevertheless, 
this trust and solidarity may be increased as a result of good care. Therefore I 
propose to amend Tronto’s five-phased model by placing this fifth phase at the 
beginning. 
 
b. Tronto’s moral and political ethics of care 
 
Tronto regards care as a manifold, individual, and collective practice that builds 
society. It is both a political and a moral practice. Her ethic of care (Tronto, 1993, 
125-155) starts with the following initial statement: 
To be a morally good person requires, among other things, that a person 
strives to meet the demands of caring that present themselves in his or her 
life. For a society to be judged as a morally admirable society, it must, among 
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other things, adequately provide for care of its members and its territory 
(126). 
For Tronto, care is central in life, as needs present themselves both on an individual 
and on a social, collective level, and they must be met on both levels. Her moral 
concept of care consists in moral elements belonging to each phase of care. Of 
special interest to this research is the first phase, caring about, i.e. the recognition of a 
need, which requires attentiveness as a moral task (127). Attentiveness is the need to 
suspend one’s own goals, ambitions, plans of life, and concerns, in order to 
recognize and to be attentive to others (128). Attentiveness concerns others 
immediately around us but also in other parts of the world (128). The moral quality 
of attentiveness is difficult to establish in practice; and it is further complicated, 
since one must first be attentive to one’s own needs for care in order to be able to 
recognize the needs of others (128-129). Tronto, inspired by feminism, warns 
against the caregiver’s over-identification with others, which would be self-sacrifice 
and self-deprivation (129). Although Tronto does not address it, this statement 
stands in tension with the other-directedness of care. I return to this point below 
when considering Tronto’s analysis of the relation between care and power, which is 
the framework of her warning.  
The second phase, taking care, requires responsibility taken as a contextual, 
flexible notion, not as a formal obligation (131-133). The third phase, caregiving, 
makes competence a moral element, since the one in need of care should be given 
good care that is performed competently (133). And the fourth phase, care-receiving, 
makes the responsiveness of the care-receiver a moral element of care (134-136). 
The virtues of the fifth phase, caring with, are trust and solidarity. Trust builds as 
people realize that they can rely on others to participate in their care and care 
activities. Solidarity forms when citizens come to understand that they are better off 
when they engage in such processes of care together rather than alone (Tronto, 
2012, 4-5). Tronto argues that responsiveness requires attentiveness and therefore 
that the four (later, five) phases, as well as their moral elements, should fit together 
into a whole (136). This integration is not simple and involves conflicts, knowledge 
of the situation and of the actors involved, and judgments. Hence care ethics must 
include the social and political context (136-137).  
 This makes Tronto’s care ethics a political ethics. Care is provided not only in 
interpersonal relations but also within and by institutions; and on both levels society 
is built through care. Conversely, society distributes caring tasks, thereby also 
distributing positions of power. Tronto’s model of care can serve as an instrument 
to analyze the relation between care and social and political power positions, as her 
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phases of care mirror the distribution of power. In the first phase, caring about, power 
consists in defining people’s needs on a social and political level, as well as 
determining society’s approach to social needs (106, cf. Van Heijst, 2008, on the 
power of definition, 91). In the second phase, taking care of, power consists in 
assigning or rejecting (or ignoring) responsibility and determining the response 
(106). In the third phase, caregiving, those doing the actual care work often have 
limited power to determine their work and its limits (107). (Van Heijst [2008] has 
commented on this view and added that the power of caregivers in shaping the 
practice of care should not be underestimated [203, 303-304]). In the fourth phase, 
care-receiving, the one needing care responds to care (108). Power is therefore lacking 
when care-receivers do not succeed in making their caring needs socially and 
politically visible and recognized.  
Tronto’s fifth phase calls for democracy that supports a system of caring in 
which all caregivers and care-receivers (and not only a state’s citizens) are protected. 
Tronto focuses on the distribution of power and care. She argues that, 
if we look at questions of race, class, and gender, we notice that those who are 
least well off in society are disproportionately those who do the work of 
caring, and that the best off members of society often use their positions of 
superiority to pass caring work off to others (113). 
Ideologies and myths help to sustain power positions and to contain care, treating it 
as a marginal part of existence10. For instance, the privileged can define other 
“needs” than the powerless (116-117). Or care can be regarded as a disposition 
rather than a practice, allowing care to be sentimentalized or privatized, instead of 
regarding it as something people simply do (118). When care is privatized and not a 
matter of public policy, its provision continues to take an enormous toll on women 
(119). Further, care-receivers are seen as relatively helpless in a culture that values 
autonomy and independence, which marginalizes them and their care (120). And 
finally, those in privileged positions can ignore their caring responsibilities because 
their privilege allows them to ignore the hardships that they do not face (120-121). 
Tronto calls this “privileged irresponsibility”, induced by the mechanisms at work in 
the distribution of care exposed by her analysis of the phases of care (121).  
                                                             
10 Illuminating in this respect is the moral epistemology of Margaret Urban Walker (2007). She 
argues that the ways in which responsibilities are assigned, negotiated, and deflected are greatly 
determined by standing assumptions about caring being natural, private, and the normal 
responsibility of certain groups of people, so that it is hard to discover how these responsibilities 
are in fact forced upon these groups (105, 177). Naturalizing, privatizing, and normalizing 
responsibilities are effective mechanisms for keeping responsibilities in unquestioned and 
unquestionable place (180-181). 
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 This leads Tronto to argue for a caring democracy in which all people have a 
voice in determining the allocation of caring responsibilities (2012, 4). Democracy 
should be understood as a society of equals, who are equal not in autonomy but in 
human vulnerability. When this is included, equality involves the reality that all are 
both agents and recipients of care (4). On a societal level this means that caring 
democracies can no longer pass caring responsibilities to the most vulnerable or 
import care labor to solve care deficits (5). A global view of care is also needed, 
creating solidarity with global care workers in a political order that is diverse and 
pluralistic (5-6). 
 
I adopt Tronto’s view that care and power are connected and that an ethics of care 
must include attentiveness to power. Such attentiveness is required especially regarding 
self-sacrifice, due to the potential of self-sacrifice to be a matter of subordination, self-
harm, and oppression. Tronto’s fifth phase, however, requires a different view of 
power, one that entails the desire to live together that precedes the distribution of power. 
I elaborate on this view in Chapters 4 and 6, where I argue that, if one understands 
power this way and is not restricted to an analysis of unequal positions, with those in 
the powerful positions oppressing those in the powerless positions, then power may 
also include solidarity.  
 
c. Sacrifice and self-sacrifice in Tronto’s work 
 
Tronto’s political ethic of care emphasizes that care is essential in individual life and 
in building society. Still, those involved in care and especially those engaged in the 
actual care work (both givers and receivers of care) are often marginalized in society. 
Those deciding about policies of care and involved in organizing care often have 
more power than those doing the care work.  
Tronto also reflects on sacrifice and self-sacrifice against this background. 
Caring, she argues, involves taking the concerns11 and needs of others as the basis of 
caregivers’ actions (1993, 105), but it also implies the need to keep a balance 
between the needs of caregivers and care-receivers (136). This is the problem of 
evaluating proper levels of care, which Tronto relates to (self-)sacrifice: 
Some people make greater sacrifices of themselves than do other people; 
some will even sacrifice too much. Part of this moral problem is exacerbated 
                                                             
11 As argued above, needs are not the starting point of care, as such a view reduces the reality of 
caring. Therefore, it is important that Tronto includes ‘concerns’ here. 
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by the fact that those who are most likely to be too self-sacrificing are likely to 
be the relatively powerless in society (141). 
Since those involved in caregiving are often in relatively powerless positions, and 
since caregivers already start from the concerns and needs of others, they are 
particularly at risk of (self-) sacrificing. The problem Tronto seems to have with 
(self-)sacrificing is the over-identification of caregivers with the needs of care-
receivers, leading to subordination and further disempowerment. Caregivers sacrifice 
‘too much’ when they regard their own needs as subordinate to those of others, 
harming the self through neglect and increasing inequality and marginalization.  
Tronto does not elaborate any further on her view, but I interpret her as 
regarding sacrifices on a practical level as acceptable only when done voluntarily and 
by a subject with rights. She strongly argues for equality, for democratic citizenship 
in the sense of having a voice in the allocation of caring responsibilities, and for 
global empowerment of and solidarity with the powerless. As a result, she 
problematizes self-sacrifice where it is incompatible with this plea. 
 
At this point I gather together the insights that I adopt from Tronto’s moral and 
political theory of care. Tronto is the primary care ethicist who actually describes 
caring as building society on an institutional level, thereby defining care in political-moral 
terms. The political and private are intertwined, and Tronto rightly contests the 
boundaries between the two spheres, breaking with views that restrict care to the 
private sphere. Care requires equality of all citizens in a democracy. Tronto’s political ethics 
of care draws our attention to oppression, marginalization, and the need for equality. 
Self-sacrifice is likely to be part of those myths that enhance power positions and marginalize 
care. She provides a clear overview of the mechanisms that contain and marginalize 
care. Further, Tronto offers a view of care in which conflicts are likely to occur, on an 
interpersonal as well as a social and political level.  
 These elements support the argument that an ethics of care should not be 
politically naïve but should take account of the fact that practices of care are 
embedded in social and political contexts that influence personal decisions. Self-
sacrifice may be a personal choice, but this choice is never disconnected from this 
context or from the myths and values that are handed down socially, culturally, and 
politically. This research needs to take account of the role of conflicts and power, as 
well as the public mechanisms at work. The question of the need for equality in a 
democratic society and the questions of power and conflict return in Chapters 4 and 
6.  
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4. A definition of caring that entails self-sacrifice  
 
I already indicated in the Introduction that Van Heijst’s view is close to my own. I 
elaborate on her view in two subsections, each of which concludes with a reflection 
on self-sacrifice, indicating the points on which we concur and differ.  
 
a. Van Heijst’s normative concept of care 
 
Van Heijst makes a strong argument for a more normative ethics of care (2005, 
2011). The latent normativity of care ethics can use a more explicit interpretation 
(2005, 38). The central values of connectedness and care do not provide sufficient 
ground for deciding about good care (76). Van Heijst therefore proposes the 
explicitly normative concept of professional loving care (PLC), which she considers 
absolutely necessary for improving professional health care, tackling both patients’ 
unease and professionals’ discontent (2011, 7-16).  
Van Heijst confronts the dominant ways in which caring is seen and 
organized, and she offers a different view. Care needs to be seen as an uncertain 
practice (31)12 in which the care-receiver has a central place (28) and in which values 
are realized (119-123) and persons appear as unique human beings (116-117). 
Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s concept of ‘action’ (39-65), she reinterprets healthcare 
as an unpredictable practice of unique human beings. Opposing dominant 
tendencies of control within the healthcare system, she pleads for a human-oriented 
practice in which human beings appear as unique subjects, not as objects (64-65). 
This requires that care not be restricted to what can be measured as effective, 
predictable, and efficient in terms of strategic means-end thinking (62), but allows 
for openness and attentiveness to what is not, and still wants to be given and 
received. Of special interest for this study is the concept of ‘expressionate acts’, a 
term coined by the German ethicist Rudolf Ginters (119-123). These acts are 
valuable in se and take place while the situation cannot be changed and no external 
purpose is served (119). Their value lies in what is expressed and in the person who 
                                                             
12 Van Heijst’s emphasis on caring as a practice is shared by Sara Ruddick (1989). Ruddick 
advocates a ‘practicalist view’, according to which practices are the source of thinking/knowledge 
and the test-case of such knowledge (13). Central to Ruddick’s work are the practices of 
mothering, which are performed not only by women but by anyone for whom child care is a 
regular and substantial part of their working life (17). Since mothering is a particular kind of caring 
and since I aim to conceive of caring and self-sacrifice in the broad sense, her study is not included 
here.  
DEFINING CARING AND THE QUESTION OF SELF-SACRIFICE 
59 
 
expresses it, as in the case of placing flowers on the grave of a dead person (119-
120).  
Van Heijst wants care ethics to be more normative and makes a contribution 
in this direction by arguing that professionals need to reclaim the loaded term ‘love’ 
when speaking about their work (152). Hence the term ‘Professional Loving Care’ 
(PLC), which she defines as follows: 
Professional Loving Care is a practice of care in which competent and 
compassionate professionals interact with people in their care; to them tuning 
in with the needs of each individual patient is a leading principle and if 
necessary they modify the procedures and protocols of the institution; the 
main purpose of this type of caring is not repair of the patients’ body or mind, 
but the care-receivers’ experience of being supported and not left on their 
own; important, too, is that all people concerned in healthcare (professionals, 
care-receivers and their relatives) are able to feel that they matter as unique 
and precious individuals (3). 
She calls for professional care to be a practice that involves the whole person instead 
of a dysfunction. Its goal is not repair but support. Therefore a relation must be 
established in which professionals can draw from a professional repertoire that 
involves human qualities as well as traditional instrumental-technical competencies. 
Personal as well as institutional aspects play a role. Van Heijst’s view requires a 
reassessment of lovability (i.e. the condition of belonging to others), a reassessment of 
professional carers as fellow human beings, and a new sensitivity to asymmetry 
(148). Finally, care is founded on the common humanity of human beings who are 
connected in a web of human life and therefore inter-dependent, needing others to 
survive and to give meaning to their lives (148).  
 
Reflecting on this concept, I conclude that Van Heijst’s work contributes to my 
research owing to her emphasis on the uncertainty of caring practices. Giving care 
without certainty about its effects or return helps one to understand self-sacrifice as, 
indeed, a sacrifice. However, the uncertainty does not make it insignificant. The 
concept of ‘expressionate acts’ is illuminating in this respect, showing how 
significance may lie in the act itself, in the presence of the performer, which is 
valuable as such, regardless of its effect in terms of utility. Therefore, self-sacrifice is not 
part of any means-end-thinking, but stands in an open end, as a risk, as an expression of value. 
Further, the central place of the care-receiver, the realization of values within care, 
and the uniqueness of human beings all make caregiving a practice that is not 
generalizable but that requires attuning within the relation. This impedes the 
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development of a general rule for self-sacrifice. Further, Van Heijst’s concept of 
lovability points to the belonging to others of each human being. This common 
humanity, expressed by Gerasim in the story of Ivan Ilyich and by Gilbert, is 
relevant since giving care is not an action of one person for the benefit of another 
person but rather a practice which must be seen against the background of shared 
humanity. Because of this background a gift (of care or love) is not a loss for one 
and a gain for another, but a gift to a community which benefits all. 
 
b. Neediness, lovability and institutional professionalism 
 
The idea of interdependency has been further elaborated by Van Heijst. It has been 
a recurring theme in care ethics and is relevant for self-sacrifice, for it is often 
viewed as a lack of dignity or self-worth. Instead, Van Heijst proposes a 
foundational sense of belonging, which sheds a different light on self-sacrifice.  
Van Heijst examines the late modern tendency to connect independence with 
dignity and to consider dependency as an infringement of one’s dignity (Van Heijst, 
2011, 128). She argues that today’s view of professional care as a non-private 
relationship requiring distancing by the professional rests upon the false 
presupposition of human equality and fails to take actual asymmetry into account 
(135). Van Heijst expounds a view of a double structure of neediness (144). On the 
surface there is evident asymmetry, since there is inequality of needs. However, 
professionals too are fragile and in need of a response from those receiving their 
care. This is not a matter of exchange but rather of an asymmetric interaction of 
reciprocity (144). Hence, although there is an asymmetry of needs, there is also a 
shared condition of neediness lying at a deeper level (145).  
Care interaction is rooted in a communal neediness that is characteristic of all 
humans who are therefore reliant on each other (145). 
This neediness also points to the necessity of a relational web of human life in order 
to make one’s life meaningful (145). Dignity, in Van Heijst’s view, consists in 
belonging to others rather than in autonomy or independence. The individualized 
concept of the good life has to be replaced by a view of a sensible and dignified life 
that essentially involves being loved by others and giving love to them, in short, 
‘lovability’ (148, emphasis added). The common ground is 
the common humanity of human beings who are connected in a web of 
human life and therefore inter-dependent. Human beings share their 
condition of vulnerability and transience and they need each other to survive 
and to give meaning to their lives (148). 
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Van Heijst’s concept of Professional Loving Care (PLC) aims at recognizing the 
vulnerability and preciousness of both the care-receiver and the caregiver, and so it 
applies the central term ‘love’ to both involved in care (2011, 181). She defends a 
view of care in which mutual bonds are established, temporarily but full of meaning, 
in which both interact and experience feelings of affinity, sympathy, and friendship 
alongside feelings of anger, mistrust, and dislike (188). In this intersubjectivity there 
is something else at play than the suffering of one that naturally evokes pity. Instead, 
a professional caregiver’s position as a professional health worker is key to his or her 
being driven to action. The spontaneous impulse may be to flee from suffering. 
However, the professional’s moral feelings and actions are driven by an 
interpretation-scheme that is embedded in a professional and institutional context, 
instead of being rooted in a “natural” drive (189).  
 The moral standard of PLC is the affirmation of the preciousness of every 
human being and their deserving protection in their vulnerability (190). Self-
sacrificial acts like giving up time and energy are not harmful only if they are given 
freely, driven by a sincere commitment to the person concerned and by feelings of 
professional responsibility without any sense of self-depreciation (197, emphasis added IvN). 
The reality of the full dynamics of giving and receiving in professional caregiving is 
richer than an economic paradigm can uncover, since there is more at play than 
giving care and receiving an income. Van Heijst proposes a triadic model that 
accounts for the willingness to give care, rooted in the experience of having 
previously received beneficial care oneself (198-199, cf. Van Heijst, 2008, 259-260).  
Many professionals are motivated by the wish to help others. Their actions 
spring from a surplus, a willingness that looks for a destination. At the root of 
it lies the experience of knowing how beneficial it is when one has been given 
to. The argument also works the other way around. Professionals who have 
nothing extra to give, who are only obeying orders, or who try to compensate 
for a feeling of meaninglessness in their own life, fall short (2011, 198). 
And healthcare workers not only experience the beneficial effects of their actions, 
but they also enjoy the encounters with the care-receivers, receiving gratitude in 
return. These aspects of professional loving care are of great significance, but they 
are invisible from an economic viewpoint (199). 
 In her analysis of the present institutionalized context of professional care, 
Van Heijst elaborates on the systemic pressures that diminish the space in which 
professionals can find their manner of caring and the degree of responsibility that 
they are allowed to take (172-179). Adopting Vosman’s view of institutions (2008) as 
large societal domains, she considers the institution of healthcare as 
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the entire field of organizations in which medical treatment, nursing and other 
healthcare is provided. An institution such as healthcare is regulated by laws 
and regulations and by professional codes of conduct (172). 
Van Heijst pleads for professionals to retrieve their responsibility by acknowledging 
the demanding structures that are operative in the institution, by admitting power 
inequalities, and by being ready to respond to the needs of the patients (176).  
 
At this point I want to gather together Van Heijst’s insights into the kind of 
relationality that is established in caring relations. She explores what is at stake 
underneath these practices, as well as the communal neediness that is characteristic 
of all humans. On the surface there is an asymmetry of needs, but underneath there 
is a double structure of neediness, making both caregiver and care-receiver equal in their 
fragility. I prefer to consider this shared fragility that requires relationality, rather than 
needs, as the source of care. Neediness is not the same as needs, as Van Heijst has 
made clear, and neediness is a condition shared by human beings. The foundation of 
this view is a concept of the good life in which dignity consists in belonging to others, in 
which life is shared and one is considered ‘lovable’. Her view of a surplus on the side 
of the caregiver sees care as starting not with needs but with a desire to give to 
another. In other words, instead of understanding caring as starting with obligations 
and responsibilities (‘I must care for this need’), Van Heijst looks at how people 
actually tend to relate and live together, an approach I share. 
 Van Heijst contributes to professional caring by supporting the insight that 
caring by professionals, such as nurses, is not a natural inclination but that being in 
their position is key to their being driven to action and that their moral feelings are 
embedded in a professional and institutional context. She regards self-sacrificial acts as 
morally acceptable only if given freely, driven by a sincere commitment to the person 
concerned and by feelings of professional responsibility, without any sense of self-
depreciation. Van Heijst’s triadic model offers the space for a rich dynamics of giving 
and receiving. Finally, she offers an analysis of the institutionalized context of 
professional care. I underscore that understanding institutions is indispensable for 
understanding caring. Van Heijst provides a description of the institution of healthcare in 
which systemic pressure and power imbalances are acknowledged and yet the core 
of care, i.e. responding to the needs of patients, is retrieved.  
 However, although I owe much to Van Heijst’s view, I also need to criticize 
her. For she insufficiently thinks through the consequences of her view. The pillars 
of her view of care (fragility, the double structure of neediness, belonging, lovability, the triadic 
structure of giving and receiving care) provide the foundation for thinking through self-
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sacrifice as non-dichotomous (i.e. something one does for another) and as giving in 
to what life gives. A deconstruction of the self-interested subject, of the polarized 
intersubjective relation, and of power as oppressive, would be in line with her 
thought. However, she does not draw these consequences from her view of self-
sacrifice. Instead, for her self-sacrifice is permitted only on the conditions that it is 
given freely, is rooted in a commitment and feelings of professional responsibility, 
and does not express a sense of disregard for the self. Hence, she fails to think 
through the consequences of human fragility, of having received in passivity, and of 
the subsequent dynamic of giving and receiving, of radical relationality, sense of 
belonging, and lovability. So although her view of care provides the foundation for 
radically reappraising self-sacrifice, she herself does not do so.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I presented four definitions of caring and the views of self-sacrifice 
stemming from these definitions. I can now conclude that self-sacrifice is regarded 
as reprehensible (Gilligan, Pettersen, Hem), as something that may occur due to the 
caregiver’s capacity to be engrossed but should nevertheless be avoided (Noddings), 
as an actual risk of the relatively powerless (Tronto), and as a term that can uncover 
valuable characteristics of caring practices that cannot be covered within schemes of 
exchange (Van Heijst).  
In light of this variety one can conclude that a coherent view of self-sacrifice 
has not yet been offered by care ethicists. Some dispense with self-sacrifice 
altogether owing to their wrongly placed critique, since they approach practices and 
contexts starting from a normative concept that precludes the possibility of self-
sacrifice (especially Pettersen). Others give a more significant place to practices in 
their thought, which alerts them to the actual reality of self-sacrifice in caring 
(Tronto, Van Heijst). However, due to their emphasis on power inequality, which 
leads them to attempt to protect powerless caregivers, they do not address the 
possible meaning of self-sacrifice for caring (Tronto) or think through its full 
consequences (Van Heijst). This conceptual gap determines the course of this study.  
As indicated above, this study aims at reframing four frameworks. These 
frameworks, as is clear from the views considered in this chapter, limit the 
possibility for conceiving of self-sacrifice in care ethics.  
 First, the framework of the subject in care ethics does not sufficiently 
incorporate passivity, fragility, and a sense of belonging to a community, 
which would make self-sacrifice conceivable as a giving in to what life has 
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given, a giving to others, to a good cause, or to a community, seen not as 
opposed to the self but as inseparably part of the self’s identity. Hence the 
subject needs to be de-centered by including passivity but also by radicalizing 
the subject’s agency to include self-sacrifice as a form of self-realization. 
When the self embraces a good that seems, from an outside point of view, to 
undermine the self’s own interest (as in the cases of Lucy (Coetzee), Bess 
(Von Trier), and the Beslan grandmother), this appearance of conflict might 
be illusory. Rather, an act of self-sacrifice might in fact simultaneously be a 
way for the self to realize the self’s identity by establishing meaning. In the 
remaining chapters I elaborate on the radicalization of the subject’s 
temporality, passivity, contextuality, affectivity, embeddedness in a 
community as well as the subject’s agency as establishing meaning. 
 Second, the framework of intersubjectivity in care ethics repeatedly appears as 
entailing a dichotomy between the self and the other. Despite a battle against 
dichotomies on the part of some care ethicists, founded on their alternative 
views of relationality and the community, there is a persistent tendency to see 
self-sacrifice as a diminishment of the self to the benefit of the other, which 
either cannot or can only conditionally be allowed. Thus a correction or 
radicalization of these views is necessary to replace these dichotomies by 
views in which goods are shared to the extent that one cannot distinguish 
between what is good ‘for me’ and what is good ‘for the other/others’. Then 
self-sacrifice can be seen to serve a good that is shared by individuals in 
private relations (Gilbert (Hallström), John Bayley) or in the community 
(Lucy (Coetzee), Father Kolbe). In the following chapters I consider thinkers 
who engage in this battle against dichotomies, radicalizing relationality as 
mutuality (Halkes, Crysdale, Vacek, Honneth, Ricœur), shattering 
intersubjectivity as a horizon of what happens (Marion), and reframing the 
relation as interior ipseity (Housset). 
 Third, some care ethicists fail to take into account the idea of the community 
and view caring as a dyadic structure. I fully concur with Tronto’s political 
care ethics, which has rejected this view and sees caring as a practice that 
builds up society on all levels. In her view of care she presupposes a ‘we’ that 
she fails to elaborate on, and her emphasis on power inequality does not 
account for why people do build up society. And although Van Heijst’s idea 
of a sense of belonging could serve as a foundation of a different view of 
power as a centripetal force, motivating people to care for others and sacrifice 
the self for a common good, she does not sufficiently think this through. 
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These ideas, therefore, need to be radicalized in order to provide an 
understanding of self-sacrifice on the political level. Especially Honneth’s 
political philosophy of struggle for recognition offers this radicalization, 
which construes conflicts as a way to develop the community. A deeper 
insight into how one finds oneself in a community is offered by Housset’s 
phenomenology of the discovery of affective coexistence in pity.  
 And fourth, I argued that care ethics fails to take into account the reality that 
people not only sacrifice the self for the benefit of others in their care but 
also aim at establishing meaning, at realizing what is significant in their lives. 
This framework of meaning needs to be further thought through in order to 
understand self-sacrifice.  
In the next chapter I turn to theology. This discipline offers insights into all four 
frameworks: it helps to de-center the subject, to radicalize intersubjectivity, to 
reset the framework of community, and to elaborate on a framework of meaning. 
First, theology de-centers the subject by thinking of the subject as in some sense 
a member of a larger whole, hence as non-individualistic. Second, theology 
radicalizes relationality by providing important insights into intersubjectivity. 
Third, theology presents a view of the community as a belonging together that 
precedes a ‘bringing’ together or ‘building up’ of society. And fourth, theology 
offers a rich tradition of meanings that people have embraced. What is more, 
theology is particularly relevant to self-sacrifice not only because it contains many 
critical reflections on the concept, but also because there are theologians who 
have researched the effects of the language of self-sacrifice. Van Heijst has 
explored how self-sacrifice was key to a spirituality of religious sisters historically 
devoted to charitable caring practices and how it affected their care; and Maria 
Katharina Moser has conducted empirical research among feminists from two 
cultures (Germany and the Philippines), discussing the appropriateness of the 
term ‘self-sacrifice’ to the analysis of their actual practices from a feminist-
theological perspective. From theology, therefore, I seek to gain more theoretical 
insight into the term and more insight in its applicability to the exploration of 
practices and experiences. 
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 CHAPTER 2: Theology, caring and life trajectories 
 
This research originates in the problem that care ethicists reject self-sacrifice without 
having fully thought through the concept. I claim, to the contrary, that self-sacrifice 
is vital to the practices of care. Admittedly, these practices involve complex issues 
that need to be worked out. I do not propose to provide an unambiguous 
explanation but rather to elaborate a plausible, argumentative view. In order to do 
this, I have chosen to enter into the complexity of caring practices through stories 
from literature, film, and history. I consider stories a valuable source of information, 
alongside of empirical research into care practices. And I consider the metaphorical 
concept of self-sacrifice to be a helpful means for uncovering this complex reality. 
 A point that has become strikingly clear from the stories is that the 
protagonist’s life is often a road, a trajectory, an unfolding course of life, full of 
bumps and sharp turns. Trajectories are filled with concrete, expected and 
unexpected experiences, with beauty and ugliness, and can be divided into periods, 
e.g. periods before and after the death of a person or the periods of youth and old 
age, as is made clear in John Bayley’s memoirs. Throughout the trajectory of their 
lives individuals have become closely attached to others (Bayley to Iris Murdoch, 
and Gilbert Grape (Hallström) to his family), to a way of life within a web of 
relations (Lucy (Coetzee) to living in the outback community), and even to their 
convictions (Jane Eyre (Brontë) and Bess (Von Trier)). The trajectory of their lives 
makes it at least unsurprising if not wholly plausible and understandable that they 
sacrifice themselves the way they do. This can be ascertained better by looking 
phenomenologically at how their lives unfold than by taking an anthropological or 
normative approach. This research aims to look at these practices from an ethical, 
rather than a dogmatic, point of view, by looking at their complexity and at the way 
moral orientation emerges in trajectories.  
Theology has a lot to offer to this approach. Self-sacrifice has been the 
subject of study, debate, and critique in Christian theology ever since Jesus’ 
followers struggled to interpret his death on the cross. The pinnacle of the debate 
came in the twelfth century and in its nineteenth-century’s revival. In the most 
recent decades, feminist theology has pointed out that theology has suffered from a 
male bias, including with regard to sacrifice and self-sacrifice. I have several reasons 
for using theology in this research. First, theology contains a view of how people’s 
lives unfold as a trajectory between an origin (creation) and a destination (eschaton), 
about how people walk the trails of their lives and practice care along the way (in 
loving one’s neighbor as oneself), as well as how they are ‘members of a flock’, 
SACRIFICE 
68 
 
belonging together as sisters and brothers (hence an anti-individualistic approach). 
Second, theology contains a rich tradition of stories of self-sacrifice that think 
through the concepts of sacrifice and self-sacrifice, including gender analyses of 
these concepts, even prior to the ethics of care. Feminist theology criticizes 
patriarchal ideology that has made use of self-sacrifice in ways that strengthen the 
oppression of women. In turn, an emphasis on women as victims has been criticized 
as unjust and covering up their role as (co-)perpetrators of racism and classism. 
Hence theology offers a vast body of thought from which this study can draw. 
Third, theology offers support for my argument that care ethics needs to tap into 
stories. Theology elaborates on the biblical and hagiographical stories and thereby 
exemplifies the method that I propose. Fourth, theological concepts are not absent 
in the Western culture. As indicated elsewhere (Van Nistelrooy and Vosman, 2012), 
I adopt Charles Taylor’s view of secularization not as the decline of religion, but 
rather as its fragmentation (Taylor, 2007). Therefore I also agree with philosopher of 
religion Douglas Hedley, who argues in his extensive study of sacrifice (2011) that 
sacrifice is a universal component of human imaginary (2) and still plays a role, not 
only in religion, but also in our language and ethics (58). And fifth, theology thinks 
about the de-centered subject as somehow a member, not an atom. Theology, 
therefore, has a lot to offer for thinking caring practices in the full context of sharing 
life. 
However, I also restrict my use of theology to moral theology. I do not make 
dogmatic theology ‘the’ answer for care ethics, as an ‘ethics killer’. Instead I consider 
theology a helpful discipline providing concepts for expressing, understanding, or 
clarifying experiences, values, or beliefs that emerge in present practices (Van 
Nistelrooy and Vosman, 2012). Theology does two things: first, it systematically 
thinks about the secrets of faith; and second, it offers helpful views for both 
believers and non-believers. I take the position of presenting systematic theological 
thought (the former function of theology) and using it as information about self-
sacrifice and as sources for reflecting on questions that emerge in caring practices 
(the latter function). In other words, since I aim at conceiving of self-sacrifice in 
caring practices, I draw upon various disciplines that are constitutive for what I seek 
to understand. Theology offers images and concepts that are useful to that task. I 
adopt images offered by theology, such as the image of the human being as a 
member, not an atom, as such a view is co-constitutive for answering my research 
questions. I take this image seriously; however, I need not enter into dogmatic 
discussions and debates about the concept of ‘familia Dei’. The idea of ‘being a 
member’ is a useful category for reflecting on and understanding self-sacrifice, as it 
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helps to reset any individualistic framework of the subject, which is a condition for 
understanding caring and self-sacrifice as a moral practice.  
In this chapter I proceed as follows. First, since theology offers a rich 
tradition for understanding the concept of self-sacrifice, I offer several short 
descriptions of self-sacrifice from a history-of-religion perspective as well as from a 
theological perspective. Second, since theology also contains a rich tradition of 
critical reflection on self-sacrifice, I review those critiques that are relevant to caring 
practices. Especially feminist, womanist, and historical research have explored the 
often detrimental effects of ideologies and the language of self-sacrifice on those 
who were particularly supposed or called upon to sacrifice themselves, especially by 
providing care for others. These critiques have given rise to alternative views that 
call for relations to be righted, to be transformed from domination into caretaking 
relations. Third, I present a unique empirical-theological study of women from two 
different Christian cultures discussing the language of sacrifice. This study underpins 
the adequacy of the concept as well as the need to keep alive its ambiguity. Finally, I 
turn to two theologians who have developed a view of how community is built on 
caring and self-sacrifice. Such community-building requires two things: the embrace 
of suffering that comes with righting relations and a form of love that is neither 
agape nor eros but stands for mutual relations in friendship. 
 
 
1. Descriptions of self-sacrifice from history-of-religion and theology 
 
In this section I turn to three recent theological studies of sacrifice. First I present a 
general history-of-religion survey of the development of the term ‘sacrifice’ offered 
by Maria Katharina Moser (2007). Then I turn to specifically Christian self-sacrifice. 
Robert J. Daly (2009) offers a Trinitarian view of Christian sacrifice, which I develop 
further using the work of Douglas Hedley (2011), who argues more extensively 
about the reversal of pagan sacrifice in the Christian concept and about its 
consequences for ethics. 
 
a. Moser’s description of the variety of meanings of sacrifice and self-sacrifice 
 
Moser (2007) offers an overview of various meanings of the terms ‘sacrifice’ and 
‘self-sacrifice’ from a history-of-religion perspective (1-17). First, ‘sacrifice’ is a 
composite term, sacrum facere, which means “making holy”. It is a religious term that 
indicates an open-ended, symbolic-ritualistic expressive act of a cult community, 
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expressing a meaning shared by that community (2-3). This act addresses an other 
that can only be addressed and understood metaphorically (3). Therefore a sacrifice 
is always a symbolic performance. It is a general, cross-cultural phenomenon in 
which something of value is sacrificed (e.g. resources that are important for self-
preservation) and is consecrated, i.e. it is transferred to a different sphere of 
belonging (6-7). 
 Second, in Christian theology, especially that of Augustine, self-sacrifice is a 
religious-historical novelty (11). Augustine indicates four points that can be 
discerned in each sacrifice: (a) the one to whom the sacrifice is given, (b) the one 
who offers the sacrifice, (c) what is sacrificed, and (d) the beneficiary of the sacrifice 
(10). The foundation of Augustine’s understanding of Christ’s self-sacrifice starts 
from the Trinitarian understanding of God, which unites God the Father, God the 
Son, and God the Holy Spirit into one ‘trinity’. Christ’s sacrifice on the cross 
identifies three of the elements of sacrifice with each other: the one sacrificing (b), 
the matter that is sacrificed (c), and the receiver of the sacrifice (a). Christ reconciles 
God and humankind through his sacrifice.  
 Finally, the term ‘sacrifice’ has been secularized in modernity in the sense that 
the consciousness of the religious dimension has increasingly disappeared (14-17). 
According to Moser the term has come to include a self-interest of the one 
sacrificing (14). Further, it is used in a way that divides the guilty perpetrators who 
offer the sacrifice, on the one hand, from the innocent victims who are sacrificed, 
on the other (15).  
 
Moser’s survey is useful for understanding the theological concept of (self-)sacrifice. 
I appropriate her idea that sacrifice as used in religious practices involves the giving 
up or the giving away of something of value, something believed to be brought to a 
‘holy’ dimension. The sacrifice has value and is founded upon a belief about a good and 
oriented towards that good. I also take over her view that the Christian concept of 
Christ’s self-sacrifice introduces the paradox of self-sacrifice, as both directed at another and 
returning to the self by giving up the self for the other. Hence the other is the indispensable 
beneficiary of the self’s sacrifice, which nevertheless returns to the self through the 
other. I elaborate on Christ’s self-sacrifice in the next section, but I aim to keep this 
paradox as an important feature of self-sacrifice. In the secular meaning of sacrifice 
the open-endedness and uncertainty of the act as a religious category are lost. A 
sacrifice is a price to be paid in order to establish a goal or a good. The dimensions 
of the other and the uncertain sacred are lost, and so too is the paradox of self-
sacrifice, since there is no movement towards the other that is simultaneously a 
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movement towards the self. This secular use of the term ‘sacrifice’ involves a serving 
of one’s self-interest, and therefore the terminology of investment might be more 
fitting. In my view, the term ‘sacrifice’ indispensably involves more than self-
interest.  
 
b. Christian theological understanding of self-sacrifice 
 
Two recent studies of Christian self-sacrifice offer an understanding of self-sacrifice 
as participation. I first briefly present these views and then reflect on them.  
Robert J. Daly’s study Sacrifice Unveiled. The True Meaning of Christian Sacrifice 
(2009) states:  
Christian sacrifice is not some object that we manipulate, nor is it something 
that we do or give up. It is first and foremost, a mutually self-giving event that 
takes places [sic] between persons. It is, in fact, the most profoundly personal 
and interpersonal event that we can conceive or imagine. It begins, in a kind 
of first ‘moment’, not with us but with the self-offering of God the Father in 
the gift of the Son. It continues, in a second ‘moment’, in the self-offering 
‘response’ of the Son, in his humanity and in the power of the Holy Spirit, to 
the Father and for us. And it continues further in a third ‘moment’ – and only 
then does it begin to become Christian sacrifice – when we, in human actions 
that are empowered by the same Spirit that was in Jesus, begin to enter into 
that perfect, en-Spirited, mutually self-giving, mutually self-communicating 
personal relationship that is the life of the Blessed Trinity (5).  
Daly’s Trinitarian concept of sacrifice emphasizes the first moment, which is not 
with humans. He puts ‘moment’ in scare quotes since it is a metaphorical use of the 
term and has nothing temporal about it. Christian sacrifice starts with God the 
Father in a self-offering gift of the Son. This ‘first’ gift is called incarnation (the 
second person of the Trinity taking on human nature, while also being divine) or 
kenosis (the self-emptying of God in becoming human, which also has been analyzed 
as self-sacrifice by Groenhout [2006]). The sacrifice continues in the self-offering 
response of Christ to both God the Father and to humanity, which refers to his 
whole life, his death, his resurrection, and his sending the Holy Spirit. So even 
though his death on the cross remains ineluctably central to Christian sacrifice, it 
must not be reduced to it (11-12). The third ‘moment’ is that in which humans 
participate in the self-giving movement. 
 Douglas Hedley (2011) confirms the idea that in Christianity the sacrifice is a 
‘complete transformation of the pagan paradigm’, since it is top-down, so ‘from 
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God to man rather than from man to God’ (170-171). He argues that the imagery of 
sacrifice leads to an ethics of renunciation, since it interprets the loss, suffering, and 
painful toil of conscious human existence as inspired by the Divine, making it a 
sacrifice in the true sense of ‘making holy’, or sacra facere (170). Hence the language 
of sacrifice fuses different levels of meaning (i.e. the religious offering and the 
ethical renunciation, which are still preserved in our language) and does not separate 
the ritual, the ethical, and the religious (58).  
 
Daly’s and Hedley’s theologies emphasize (self-)sacrifice as something that is first of 
all ‘done for us’. In Christian theology any sacrifice offered by humans has been 
preceded by sacrifices made by God. This Christian idea leads to a more general idea 
of self-sacrifice that I adopt in this research: self-sacrifice is primarily participation, i.e. 
I can only give because I have been given to; I can only sacrifice myself because I 
have received my life and my capacity to sacrifice as a gift or a grace. Hence I 
understand the religious language of sacrifice as expressing the experience of giving 
way to or participating in what life gives, i.e. the abundance of life. One finds oneself in 
the position of beneficiary first. The image of the Trinity – Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit – and the emphasis on the threefold mutuality of sacrifice helps to think of 
sacrifice as a way of sharing and participating in human existence, in a continuous 
back and forth of giving and receiving that started with a ‘having received’.  
 
 
2. Critical reflection on self-sacrifice from a feminist, womanist, and historical 
theological perspective 
 
In this section I survey critiques of the concept of self-sacrifice from various 
perspectives. The issues of power and abuse of the relational are at stake. First, the 
feminist-theological critique of theologies of self-sacrifice criticizes self-sacrifice as 
Christian ethical counsel for believers because of its effect on women who are often 
already in subordinate and subservient positions (Hilkert Andolson, 1981, 69). This 
critique has given rise to a debate about the adequacy of dichotomies, which has led 
feminist critics to understand self-sacrifice within a more balanced ethics of 
mutuality (70). In the first subsection (a) I offer a brief survey and evaluation of their 
views. In the second subsection (b) I consider a relevant critique from a different 
perspective offered by womanist (i.e. African-American feminist) theologian Delores 
S. Williams (2007). Her focus is on black women’s ‘surrogacy roles’, by which she 
means those roles that black women have been forced to take on as a less valuable 
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surrogate, or substitute, for others. The idea of substitution is part of theological 
interpretations of the cross, in which the innocent and sinless Christ died as a 
ransom for human sin. Williams criticizes this idea of redemption through 
substitutive suffering. Finally, I consider a third relevant critique (c) provided by 
Annelies van Heijst in her research into historical practices of charitable care (Van 
Heijst, 2008a). According to Van Heijst, the theological and spiritual concept of self-
sacrifice has had an ambiguous effect on institutional caring practices.  
From these critical theological views I appropriate important insights into 
self-sacrifice, the effects of sacrificial language, and the criteria for the careful use of 
self-sacrifice. From this collection of views a common thought emerges, i.e. that 
dichotomies need to be overcome. 
 
a. Feminist-theological critique of self-sacrifice  
 
The Christian faith has counseled self-sacrifice as a way to follow Christ on the road 
of love. A great deal of the discussion about self-sacrifice among feminist 
theologians, especially Protestant feminist ethicists (Hilkert Andolson, 1981, 69), 
circles around the distinction between agape (absolutely disinterested love, modeled 
on God’s love for unworthy human beings, as self-sacrifice) and eros (natural self-
love). Theologians like Anders Nygren, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Paul Tillich put agape 
at the center of their theology, which provokes feminist critique. 
 Theologian Valerie Saiving Goldstein’s article The Human Condition: A Feminine 
View (1960) is regarded as the locus classicus of feminist-theological rejection of the 
notion of self-sacrifice (Groenhout, 2006, 292). She argues that the theological 
attention given to a gospel message of neighborly love, emptying the self, 
servanthood, and humility has different effects on different groups of people. 
Taking up the object-relations theory and Simone de Beauvoir’s view of the social 
construction of the feminine (although not directly quoting De Beauvoir), Saiving 
Goldstein analyzes how men generally develop a sense of self that tends toward 
pride and self-glorification, and how women, conversely, develop a lack of sense of 
self (292-293). Her analysis focuses on the tendency of theological views (like 
Niebuhr’s and Nygren’s) to identify sin with self-assertion and love with selflessness 
while failing to take different types of sin into account. Men, she argues, tend toward 
the sin of pride and women to selflessness. She argues for a theological view of the 
human situation that correctly takes into account the experiences of both sexes 
(Saiving Goldstein, 100-102).  
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 Saiving Goldstein’s article has been the ground for further feminist-
theological elaborations (Hilkert Andolson, 1981; Fozard Weaver, 2002, 61-66). The 
main point of these critiques is that a message of self-sacrificial love (agape), 
expressed mainly by male theologians in positions of power, has served to control 
and oppress women and minorities (Fozard Weaver, 62-64; I draw upon her survey 
in this analysis). These critiques build upon the feminist analysis of the division of 
reality along gender lines, with man, the public sphere, culture, activity, and 
independence from nature on one side, and woman, the private domestic sphere, 
nature, passivity, and closeness to nature on the other. This division is hierarchical, 
the former being valued more than the latter. Both this hierarchy and claims about 
what is essential to the nature of women have been criticized. Two different feminist 
estimations of sacrifice have been elaborated. Fozard Weaver argues that some 
feminists have argued that women should pursue self-realization, e.g. Judith Plaskow 
(62-63), while others have criticized the dichotomy of eros and agape and have argued 
for overcoming all dualism, e.g. Beverly Wildung Harrison (65-66). These latter 
feminists, according to Hilkert Andolson (1981), have developed a view of mutuality 
and a Trinitarian grounding of ethics; they have argued against the identification of 
receptivity with passivity, submissiveness, and self-surrender and argued for love as a 
relationship in which receiving is also active, as when receiving a guest. Both giving 
and receiving should be seen as active qualities of love relationships that require the 
maintenance of openness and vulnerability (77-78). Friendship is an excellent model 
for this relation, as it entails mutual respect and regard built on equality, while 
simultaneously affirming and enriching both involved (78). The cross, on this view, 
should not be interpreted as Christ’s self-immolation for the sake of sacrifice but 
rather as a consequence of his absolute dedication to love in the friendship mode, 
which Christians should emulate. So a Trinitarian understanding stressing relational 
mutuality, and not the atonement theory, should found our understanding of 
Christ’s self-sacrifice (78). 
The idea of friendship is further developed by the Roman Catholic 
philosopher Edward C. Vacek S.J., who sees friendship as a mutuality that 
terminates the either-or choice between agape and eros. I turn to his thoughts at the 
end of this chapter. In this section on feminist ethics, I consider the thought of the 
Dutch Roman Catholic pioneer in feminist theology, Catherina Halkes. She too 
contests dichotomies that divide reality, but her view is interesting since she 
develops the Christian message as an emancipative and transformative vision in its 
fullest context as an ecological feminist theology (Radford Ruether, 162). She does 
not explicitly take a stance for or against self-sacrifice, but conditions for conceiving 
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of self-sacrifice can be deduced from her view. Her relevance to this research 
consists of her illuminating theological framework of human life as a ‘trajectory’ from 
which it is possible to rethink human identity, relatedness, community, and the 
environment, with consequences for ethics.  
 In her book New Creation (1991) Halkes takes the basic Christian theological 
symbols of creation – incarnation – resurrection – eschaton as one continuous trajectory 
that calls human beings into a process of renewal and transformation, whose goal is the 
reign of God on earth where all creatures live in just relations in community (Halkes, 
1991, 141-142; Radford Ruether, 2012, 162). This trajectory is connected to the 
Trinity. God has created humankind in the image of God and by nature capax Dei, 
i.e. capable of knowing and manifesting God, thereby giving all human beings their 
calling to become fully mature and responsible caregivers in non-dominating relations 
with one another and the earth (Radford Ruether, 162). The incarnation of Christ is 
the center point of the trajectory in which God became human to make the human 
divine, being called to their own fulfillment as humans (162). Finally, the Holy Spirit 
founds the church as a community of persons in solidarity with each other and 
reaching out to all of creation in the ongoing process of redemptive transformation 
(163).  
Halkes elaborates on the Christian vision of redeemed humanhood in 
community as a utopian view that aims at transforming all unjust relations, on a personal, 
social, and ecological level (162-163). She argues that God does not give dominion to one 
gender or social group over another (162). Rather her vision calls on gender 
relations to overcome patriarchy. Hence women, who have been directed to develop 
qualities of relationality and care, are called to enlarge and politicize these qualities, 
while men must renounce dominance and privilege and embrace the work of 
everyday care for others (163). The social structures of community must be 
transformed by changing the model of power itself, from domination of some over 
others to mutual empowerment (163). Her vision, therefore, calls the self and the 
community to be open to an ever-expanding future, hence to the criticism of other 
races and cultures (163). In short, Halkes sees the Christian message as a call for 
conversion or metanoia, a call to transform all distorted relations on a personal, social, 
and ecological level into sustaining and caretaking relations that allow all creatures to 
flourish, the face of the earth to be renewed, and God’s glory to manifest itself 
(Halkes, 1991, 162; Radford Ruether, 2012, 164). 
 
Even though Halkes does not use the term ‘self-sacrifice’, her feminist-theological 
ethics of mutuality, particularly her idea of ‘trajectory’, is relevant to this research. 
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The theological symbols of creation and eschaton create space to think of human 
life as a continuous process, as a road on which people travel as they transform and 
aim at a better life. These symbols express not only an irretrievable human origin but 
also a utopian, inviting perspective of what a good life looks like. Such a life is not 
lived at the cost of others or of the earth. Dichotomies of self and other, of private 
and public, of local and global, of human and non-human, must be overcome, for 
goods are shared; the goods of the self and the other are mutually connected. Halkes 
points at the reality in which this good life is not yet realized, and hence at concrete 
relations that are waiting to be transformed from dominance and privilege to 
mutuality and sharing in everyday caring. Mutuality can only arise when those who 
are individually or collectively privileged and dominant renounce their position, 
allow themselves to be questioned and give room to others to participate, to gain a 
voice and have political power, and when they turn towards those living creatures 
who have been given life not to be wasted but to be cared for and honored.  
This mutuality requires a re-framing of the ideas of identity and of power 
both on the interpersonal and political level of the community and on the level of 
the environment. Instead of calling for a counterbalance to dominance, Halkes calls 
for relations based on the mutual goal of flourishing and fulfillment for all, a 
community that needs to encompass plurality in an open-ended process of 
transformation, and humankind seeking ways to renew the face of the earth. From 
this view I derive a conception of self-sacrifice that is part of the ongoing mutual human 
struggle and aspiration for a better life as individuals, as communities, and as living 
creatures. Self-sacrifice is part of a transformation that aims at renewal without 
guarantees. It emerges as self-limitation, openness, participation, and mutuality, 
which can be recognized in emancipatory movements advocating rights for 
minorities, women, and lower-class and lower-educated people.  
 I conclude that views that divide reality into two parts confine self-sacrifice 
to the domain of oppression or submission. This is a reduction of self-sacrifice, as I 
argued in Chapter 1. I value, therefore, the alternative theological ethics of mutuality, 
in which self-sacrifice emerges in a radically different light. Most valuable is the idea 
of human life as a trajectory, which allows for a wider scope of human practices, 
including past and future, open-ended aspiration, struggle, a view of a shared life in which all 
benefit from right and fair relations. 
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b. Critique of self-sacrifice as substitution by womanist theology 
 
African-American theologians have criticized feminist theology for appropriating 
strategies of dominance by elevating the sole experience of androcentrism and male 
dominance to the level of the general norm, thereby marginalizing or even rendering 
invisible other experiences, including the contribution that white women have made 
(and still make) to the oppression of women of color (Moser, 2007, 40-41). Delores 
S. Williams (2007) elaborates on the specific experience of black women serving as 
surrogates for white women and black men. Starting from these experiences she 
reinterprets theologies of the cross that depict Jesus as the innocent sacrifice for 
human sin, a reinterpretation which has consequences for the way one conceives of 
self-sacrifice. 
 Before the abolition of slavery, surrogacy was imposed in three forms. First, 
the ‘black mammy’, in her position of premier house slave, served as a surrogate in 
the area of nurturance for the entire white family; she was a surrogate governess and 
mother, who at the same time was powerless vis-à-vis her own family and the well-
being of black people (62-63). Second, black female energy substituted for black 
male energy in the area of field labor, without any possibility for black women to 
ascend to the position of slave driver or overseer, which was a white or black male 
role (65-66). And third, coerced surrogacy existed in the area of sexuality, with slave 
women being forced to fulfill white men’s need for sexual pleasure, since the 
Victorian ideal of true womanhood entailed the idea that sexual relations between 
white men and their wives were solely for the purpose of procreation, not for 
pleasure (67). These forms of coerced surrogacy have contributed to the formation 
of negative images of black women that prevail in America to this day, according to 
Williams (70-71). These are the image of black women as perpetual mother figure 
that stems from the mammy tradition; the image of black women as unfeminine that 
stems from their masculinization as field laborers; and the image of black women as 
immoral, passionately natured, over-sexed, erotic, and readily responsive to sexual 
advances that stems from the antebellum southern way of putting the responsibility 
for the sexual liaison between white masters and black slave women on the latter 
(70). 
 ‘Voluntary surrogacy’ is the term for surrogate roles that black women 
continued to fulfill after emancipation, even though these roles were forced on them 
by certain social realities. Poverty forced women to continue to substitute for male 
energy in the area of farm labor. They either worked alongside their husbands or 
were farmers themselves while their men were employed elsewhere. Black women 
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also worked in metal industries, laundries, the garment industry, and factories (73-
74). The mammy role too was perpetuated after slavery in the form of black female 
servants in white families. Hence surrogacy has been a negative force in African-
American women’s lives (81).  
This critique has consequences for a theology that teaches believers that sinful 
humanity has been redeemed because Jesus, the ultimate surrogate figure, died on 
the cross in the place of human beings, thereby taking human sin upon himself (161-
162). The place of the cross is a major theological problem in any theology 
significantly informed by the experience of African-American women (162). Key to 
Christian womanist theology is the rejection of any view that asks innocent victims 
to be the servants for the sake of the evildoers’ salvation (200). 
 
Williams has drawn attention to actual victims of racist violence, oppression, and 
discrimination. Looking at a theology of the cross from the perspective of African-
American women challenges any theology developing the idea of redemptive death. 
A history of destructive oppression needs different images and metaphors. In other 
words, the trajectory from creation towards salvation should not require the sacrifice of an 
innocent victim. This critical rejection of sacrifice because of its capacity to cover up 
actual victims is an important caution for this research. Key is the differentiation 
between surrogacy and substitution. A substitute is not less valuable than the ‘original’, but 
a surrogate is. The original idea is that what is offered up, in order for it to be a 
sacrifice, is something valuable. Surrogacy, therefore, is a perversion of sacrifice. The story of 
Father Kolbe is not one of surrogacy but of substitution in self-sacrifice: he did not 
substitute himself for the originally appointed victim because he thought himself of 
less value; rather, his substitution was a sacrifice exactly because he was (as) valuable 
(as the original victim). Therefore Williams contributes a demarcation line to this 
research: whenever the good of others is served by sacrificing persons who are 
considered to be of less value, this is indefensible, as basic human worthiness is a 
precondition for any view of self-sacrifice.  
 
c. Self-sacrifice in historical charitable practices: idealization, critique and inspiration 
 
Van Heijst analyzed the historical practices of spiritual caregivers by closely 
examining the history of one large congregation of charitable care for children in the 
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Netherlands (2002 and 2008a)13. I turn to this research for two reasons. The first is 
that self-sacrifice is key to the spirituality at the origin of these practices. This 
spirituality is the only source in this research that takes a ‘maximum’ stance toward 
self-sacrifice by unreservedly recommending it as a religious ideal. Van Heijst 
scrutinized this spirituality, as well as its consequences for the religious caring 
practices. Second, Van Heijst’s historical research into spirituality and charitable 
practices is at the foundation of her model of the triadic structure of giving and 
receiving, which she considers applicable to present-day professional caring 
practices. Here I show how this triadic model, described in Chapter 1, is founded on 
historical practices rooted in a spirituality that idealized self-sacrifice. In Van Heijst’s 
later work these religious roots are no longer emphasized. I first present how self-
sacrifice is key to this spirituality and the consequences it led to in the historical 
charitable practices. After that I present the spiritual roots of Van Heijst’s triadic 
model, in which self-sacrifice is key. 
 
The Poor Sisters of the Divine Child, the congregation that Van Heijst examined, 
took care of children in need who had no parents or whose parents did not look 
after them. Self-sacrifice has been a crucial aspect of the spirituality of this and other 
religious congregations committed to charitable care (2008a, 214-215). Rooted in 
monastic asceticism, these congregations encouraged their sisters and brothers to 
suffer and denigrate the self in their pursuit of self-sanctification.  
[T]he central theological idea was that nothingness, pain and death would lead 
to spiritual perfection, resurrection and eternal life. […] Ascetic mortification 
and self-sacrifice were viewed as exquisite ways of taking part in the 
redemptive suffering of Jesus. […] Central in the ascetic spirituality was the 
idea that suffering was excellent and valuable as such (214). 
As is clear in this account, the idea of a trajectory is recognizable in the terminology 
of a spiritual road leading to eternal life. Hence, willing acceptance of the cross was 
part of the road to salvation. 
Van Heijst describes how the sisters were trained to increase their ability to 
suffer, as this was a way of participating in Christ’s suffering, interpreted as a surplus 
of love, on the cross. The sisters were stimulated to look for opportunities to suffer 
and to give more than they had. In their practices they were trained to be 
emotionally distant care providers (215). After the Second Vatican Council (1962-
                                                             
13 For a vast study of the impact of apostolic congregations of religious sisters in the Dutch church 
and society, their self-understanding, and their wanted and unwanted heritage, during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see: Van Heijst, Derks & Monteiro (2010).  
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1965) this theological idealization of suffering and pain was rejected (215)14. The 
sisters realized that it had been harmful to themselves as well as to the ones in their 
care. Care leavers15 too have been raising their voices against the care that was 
corroded by the sisters’ rigid and anti-worldly mentality, although it was sincerely 
aiming at good care (216).  
From a care-ethical point of view, which stresses care’s relationality, the 
responses of care receivers are indispensable for evaluating care. Therefore Van 
Heijst has included sources voicing the experiences of those who as children were 
entrusted to the sisters’ care. Van Heijst concludes that charitable care must be 
valued both positively and negatively. What was positive was the fact that the sisters 
offered ‘humanizing care’, as children in need were treated according to an 
educational view that emphasized patience, gentleness, and understanding. Further, 
the children were accepted without reservation and received care that others could 
not or were not willing to provide. The children received an elementary education, 
with special attention given to the weakest among them (243). Their care, however, 
was negative in three respects. First, it was characterized by a dualistic and moralistic 
mentality which resulted in alienation from one’s physical and affective needs. 
Second, the institutional setting required uniformity and transparency, leading to a 
care emphasizing control. And third, there was a huge practical pressure of too 
much work for too few sisters (243-244).  
 
Van Heijst shows how self-sacrifice is part of a triadic spirituality. For self-sacrifice 
did not stand on its own, nor was self-denial a purpose in itself, but it stood in 
relation to a higher goal, viz. self-sanctification. The basic religious structure 
founding the care for children is a religious reciprocity that is dual, and also triadic, 
on the material and spiritual levels (257-260). The duality exists in the assurance that 
the sisters received that their congregation would take care of them for the rest of 
their lives and that their sacrifices would be rewarded after this life, in heaven. The 
triadic structure consists in a triple reciprocity. The works of charity, first, were a 
form of worshipping God. Therefore the works of charity were performed pro Deo. 
Second, the works of charity, together with the practices of penitence and the vows, 
were an instrument for self-sanctification of the religious person. And third, the 
works of charity were a way to lead others to God and to eternal salvation (257-260, 
                                                             
14 Bosgraaf scrutinizes the transition of monastic ascetic practices during the twentieth century 
(2008), and the possible relation between mental mortification and abuse in Catholic institutions 
(2013). 
15 A term found in Schumacher’s research on former receivers of charitable care by religious 
congregations. See: Schumacher (2005). 
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italics in text). These latter two make clear that the soul was the primary goal of care, 
for which the physicality was conditionally relevant. When the soul was lost, all was 
gone (259). Van Heijst brings these elements together in a triadic structure of do quia 
mihi datum est, meaning ‘I give, because I have been given to’ (259-260)16:  
On the spiritual-moral level, the sisters did not expect something in return 
from the children they cared for. They thought they were obliged to love 
others (in a practice of charitable care) because God, as a third and mediating 
party, had loved them. Proofs of God’s love were the creation and the 
incarnation of Jesus and his suffering and resurrection (260). 
Hence the sisters gave from a surplus that had been given to them, and they 
sacrificed themselves as a response to God’s preceding love and sacrifices, (which in 
this chapter has been elaborated in the concept of the Trinitarian Christian sacrifice, 
expressed by Daly). To this triadic reciprocity Van Heijst adds a fourth kind of 
reciprocity, that is, religious reciprocity (261-262).  
The sisters used family-related and affective reciprocity as a metaphor since 
they saw themselves as relatives in faith, connected by bonds of (neighbourly) 
love. This love for their neighbours did not stand alone; it was rooted in 
God’s love for human beings. Thus, a kinship installed by faith caused 
women religious to take the responsibility for people in distress, to whom 
they were not connected by blood ties or social conventions (261). 
The sisters gave care, which family members often failed to give, to unknown, 
neglected people in need, without receiving payment (263). In their practices they 
built a community, inspired by faith, for which they took care. 
 In her work on present-day professional care (2008, 2011), Van Heijst draws 
upon this triadic model (minus the fourth dimension) for understanding health care 
work. As I have shown in Chapter 1, she considers the triadic model, understood in 
secular terms, to be applicable to present professional practices of cure and care 
(2008, 353; 2011, 198).  
  
To conclude, Van Heijst’s work contributes to this research in five respects. First, 
her analysis of historical practices of charitable care illuminates how theological and 
spiritual concepts have supported the establishment of confessional caring institutions and 
the work ethic of religious sisters. Her analysis shows that people have considered 
themselves to be participating in a religious trajectory, which inspired them to care 
                                                             
16 Although Van Heijst’s translation of ‘quia’ is ‘because’, I prefer ‘as’. ‘Because’ suggests that 
caregiving is ‘caused’ by previous care, making for a relation, which also limits the care that is 
given. Caring, however, is a constant break from this cause-and-effect relation. The term ‘as’ does 
not necessarily suggest such a cause, but simply that care is given ‘as’ it has been received before.  
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for others and seek self-sacrifice on their way to salvation. Second, the same 
concepts were also perverted in practice, when the caregivers and care receivers 
were harmed by the religious idealization of suffering and self-sacrifice. Third, and 
important from a care-ethical point of view, Van Heijst’s analysis includes the response 
of care receivers to this care, which they often experienced as harmful, although 
indispensable. Fourth, self-sacrifice arises from the idea of ‘having been given first’. 
The self-sacrificing is a response to God’s preceding love and sacrifices, in creation, incarnation, 
crucifixion and resurrection. The preceding gifts and sacrifices oblige the believer to 
sacrifice the self, in loving others, since the self has received God’s love. Van Heijst 
reinterprets this triadic model in which self-sacrifice is key to uncovering realities of 
professional care in late modernity. Finally, self-sacrifice emerges in relation to 
community, of feeling and acting according to a sense of belonging together, making 
the outcasts the primary recipients of care. In the case of the sisters, this community 
was religiously founded. This idea will return in Chapter 5 where I study Housset’s 
idea of commonness as grounding a community.  
 
 
3. Empirical and intercultural research into the language of sacrifice as a political and 
theological category 
 
Up to this point the ideas of self-sacrifice that I have discussed have been 
theoretical. What has been missing is an empirical argument for its use, i.e. a study 
of whether or not the language of self-sacrifice applies to actual experiences 
according to people today. Qualitative empirical research on sacrifice is offered by 
theologian Maria Katharina Moser’s Opfer zwischen Affirmation und Ablehnung 
(Sacrifice/Victim in between Affirmation and Rejection, 2007). This study offers 
women’s views about the adequacy of the language of self-sacrifice as a political and 
theological category to describe their and other women’s experiences. What is more, 
this research is conducted in two cultures, Austria and the Philippines.  
 The question is raised against the background of the motto of the feminist 
movement in German-speaking countries in the 1960’s, Frauen sind Opfer (Women 
are sacrifices/victims), when violence against women was the central theme. The 
term ‘Opfer’ was the general term to describe the situation of women in the 1960’s, 
but it became fiercely criticized by feminist theorists in the 1980’s as inadequate 
(235-300). Women should not only be seen as victims but also be recognized as co-
perpetrators (Mittäterinnen) and perpetrators (Täterinnen) of violence. And later it was 
argued that classification itself, such as the totalitarian concept of gender, needs to 
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be recognized as violent (418). In the theological field the language of ‘Opfer’ refers 
to a central question of feminist-theological theory, as it both fits the experiences of 
women as victims of oppression and has a problematic effect on them, e.g. that 
Jesus’ substituting sacrifice lends a sacred aura to black women’s exploitation (230-
233). 
 
a. Qualitative-empirical field studies 
 
The sources of Moser’s empirical research are groups of women with feminist 
consciousness or an interest in women who are actively involved in social and socio-
political areas of civil society (59, 76). Her method is group discussion in six groups, 
three in Austria (24 participants) and three in the Philippines (17 participants) (71-
84). Group members discussed (1) everyday theories of ‘Opfer’ (what does it mean, 
how does it occur in one’s everyday life?); (2) the ways in which the self and others 
are considered to be ‘Opfer’; (3) the useful and dispensable meanings of the category 
‘Opfer’ in feminist theory and practice; and (4) the religious meaning or dimension 
of the term ‘Opfer’ (81). 
 In the Austrian field study a distinction is made between Opfer sein (being a 
sacrifice/victim) and Opfer bringen (make sacrifices) or sich (auf)opfern (self-sacrifice). A 
complication of the discussion is that ‘Opfer’ means both sacrifice and victim as well 
as being a term for a religious action. The Austrian discussions analyze these various 
meanings (85-132). The term appears as neither wholly positive nor wholly negative, 
but rather as ambivalent, an ambivalence that must be maintained, for instance by 
distinguishing between ‘Opfer’ as a term in the perception of others, as a juridical 
category, as a category for assessing situations of violence, and as a term naming a 
role.  
The main distinction is that between ‘being a sacrifice/victim’ and ‘(not) 
feeling oneself to be a sacrifice/victim’. The first term, being a sacrifice/victim, 
meets with resistance and rejection in the Austrian groups, as it impedes feminist 
aims like women’s self-determination, activity, and rights as subjects (99). The term 
is nevertheless considered adequate for describing concrete situations of injustice, 
violence, exploitation, exclusion, harm, and force that limit or destroy one’s 
subjectivity (112). However, even when the perception of women being an ‘Opfer’ is 
somewhat justifiable on a structural level it remains problematic, as it becomes an 
attribution, determining women as passive and robbing them from their subjectivity 
(112).  
SACRIFICE 
84 
 
The second term, ‘(not) feeling oneself to be an ‘Opfer’’, helps distinguish 
between the structural and the personal levels, for even when the conditions of 
injustice, etc. are present, a person suffering from them may not feel like an ‘Opfer’. 
In the discussions three factors were named as crucial to this distinction: first, a 
subjective feeling of unequal treatment; second, a subjective perception of 
possibilities for action; and third, the ideological grounds that are embedded in a 
complex microstructure of structures and norms, individual levels of awareness of 
discrimination, inequality, and violence, as well as personal strategies of avoidance 
and self-preservation that have grown from the need for protecting one’s own worth 
and integrity (112). 
The usefulness (or dispensability) of the term ‘Opfer’ was discussed along the 
same lines. It depends upon whether it obstructs action, due to the connection 
between ‘Opfer’ and passivity, or whether it generates action thanks to feelings of 
indignation on account of being an ‘Opfer’. In their concluding discussion the 
Austrian groups emphasize the need to recognize what has happened to a woman 
(violence, injustice, discrimination), without prolonging a woman’s passivity or 
status as an object (113-132).  
 
In the Philippine field study (133-194) the discussion is in English, allowing the term 
‘sacrifice’ to be clearly distinguished from ‘victim(ization)’. Here making sacrifices is 
a socially expected role of women that is firmly grounded in social hierarchies and 
structures of inequality and oppression. It occurs as a normal experience that 
embosses women’s everyday life (133). It is active action and must be distinguished 
from being a victim, which indicates passively being treated. However, both terms – 
‘sacrifice’ and ‘victim’ – are connected to suffering. Sacrifice is described as the – 
painful – renunciation of one’s own needs, wishes, and interests in favor of another 
person and as enduring without complaint violence, poverty, and problems (134, 
138). This everyday experience is located mainly in the family, where girls are 
expected to make sacrifices so that their brothers can attend school, and women 
expected to sacrifice themselves for their husbands and children – for instance, by 
eating little leaving enough for them and by staying with violent husbands for their 
children’s sake (141-143). These practices are made plausible by the church’s 
teaching that girls and women are good in God’s eyes by making sacrifices. Within 
the church too sacrifices are expected of women. For instance, the practice of 
paying lay women working as pastoral workers too little to cover their everyday 
living costs is justified by calling their work ‘missionary work’. Similarly, in 
monasteries young religious are expected to accept their exploitation as laborers in 
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the community as sacrifices. Calling these practices ‘sacrifices’ exemplifies the fact 
that expectations of sacrifice are permeated by inequality and injustice within the 
church’s hierarchical structure (138, 146-148). Sacrifice, therefore, is a strong 
symbolic support for hierarchical structures that oppress and foster inequality (162). 
It is taken as self-evident that sacrifice is expected of women, that it is their 
prescribed role (138, 140). This self-evidence is often experienced as a strong force, 
and so sacrifice comes close to victimization, although women themselves often 
regard sacrifice as self-evident as well. Experiences of sacrifice are linked to one’s 
gender, with poverty, with cultural ideas, and with the church’s teaching. The core of 
the sacrifice-critique is twofold: the lack of choice in the matter and inequality (138-
139). Despite this critique, the adequacy of the term ‘sacrifice’ is seen as ambiguous, 
as it can have a positive value, but only on the condition that it is the result of a 
weighing of goods and of a decision; that it leads to a positive result; that the well-
being of the one making the sacrifice is respected; and that the conditions under 
which sacrifices are made are just. When deciding whether a case of sacrifice is 
meaningful, the subjectivity of the sacrificing person is crucial (138-139). Being a 
subject entails being in the position to choose and decide. Therefore the term ‘choice’ 
is closely connected to sacrifice (177, italics in text). When such a decision is made 
voluntarily and out of love for somebody, the Filipina participants prefer using the 
term ‘self-gift’ to ‘sacrifice’ (178-190, italics in text).  
 
In her evaluation of the empirical results Moser concludes (195-203) that the 
Austrian discussions mainly circled around the passivity of ‘being an ‘Opfer’’, 
whereas the Filipina groups mainly discussed actively ‘making sacrifices’. Both the 
Austrian and the Filipina women regard the term ‘Opfer’/sacrifice as a highly 
ambiguous term. This has led Filipinas to prefer other terms, such as ‘choice’ and 
‘self-gift’, and to discuss further differentiations of the term. At this point I need to 
make an argument about these terms. For when the groups suggest the use of the 
terms ‘choice’ and ‘self-gift’ in place of ‘self-sacrifice’, it is exactly the ambiguity of 
the latter term that is lost. In emphasizing the subjectivity of the self that is 
sacrificing, the indispensable attention to what happens to the self, what is given to 
the self, what is out of the self’s control, all this is cut off and lost. My argument for 
ambiguity is a thread running throughout this research. 
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b. Dovetailing of empirical and conceptual analysis 
 
In addition to conducting empirical research, Moser also offers a thorough 
conceptual analysis of the term ‘Opfer’ as well as an analysis of its feminist critiques 
in the contexts of theologies of the cross; violence against women; National-
Socialism and war; and racism, colonialism, and the trafficking of women (209-416). 
She emphasizes that the language of ‘Opfer’ in each context has a dynamic that 
creates realities (205). In the context of this research I limit myself to those 
conclusions in which she fuses the theoretical and empirical findings (429-442). 
Both in the empirical and in the conceptual analysis the distinction was drawn 
between the active and the passive side of the term ‘Opfer’. Actively ‘making 
sacrifices’ as a voluntary act of renunciation and self-denial for the sake of others, 
which was barely considered in the Austrian groups, was a common experience of 
Filipinas. It had both a negative side, being something forced upon women, and a 
positive side, on the condition that it was a voluntary choice. Seeing sacrifice as a 
matter of choosing a certain goal that one values more highly than others, while 
taking for granted actions that at first sight appear hardly acceptable or reasonable, 
may lead one to see sacrifice as an expression of invisible dignity, a term Moser adopts 
from Katie Cannon (481). She concludes: 
Making sacrifices considered as the reflected and conscious renunciation of 
one’s own interests in favor of someone or something else in this sense can 
be an appropriate ethical and valuable act from a feminist perspective. Not 
despite, but rather in all the ambivalence (482, transl. IvN). 
However, making sacrifices as a positive act is absent from theories of ‘Opfer’. 
Therefore, speaking of bringing sacrifices as a meaningful act is the merit of the 
Philippine group discussion (430). 
Theory and experience converge regarding the expectations concerning 
women’s social (and ecclesial) roles. ‘Opfer’/Sacrifice as a religiously motivated act 
was specifically mentioned in the Philippines, confirming that these expectations 
contain spiritual meaning. It is precisely for this reason that women accept and 
actively fulfill these roles. For this reason too theologies of ‘Opfer’/sacrifice are seen 
as justifying abuse of women, which has been shown both in Moser’s conceptual 
analysis and in her empirical research. 
As for the active side of ‘Opfer’/sacrifice, Moser concludes that the empirical 
research has proven to be of essential importance, for the experiences of women, 
mainly in the Philippines, have highlighted this meaning of the term, which would 
not have come so clearly into view in a research project exclusively based on theory 
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(429-431). The passive side of ‘Opfer’, which accentuates helplessness and being at 
the mercy of others, has appeared in the group discussions as more than a mere 
descriptive term. Having a determining and performative character, this language 
also has effects on persons, both dividing ‘Opfer’ from ‘Nicht-Opfer’ (non-sacrifices 
non-victims) and binding them together (431).  
 Still, participants in the group discussions have confirmed the possibility that 
the term ‘Opfer’ has potential for explanation and for transformation. The 
theoretical emphasis on the negative effects may be caused by its protests against the 
negative effects of the term ‘Opfer’, but also may be caused by feminism being itself 
incorporated in a dualistic structure, opposing passivity to agency. Moser refutes this 
view, since her empirical research shows that in experience this distinction can 
hardly be drawn clearly and unambiguously (431-432). The group discussions have 
emphasized that even when women appear to have no possibility for action, these 
are never completely dissolved. Moreover, the interpretation of women themselves 
must be valued, without losing sight of their being oppressed and violated, since 
their circumstances must still be disclosed and named (433). Moser concludes that 
the term ‘Opfer’ is adequate to describe and name situations in which women 
actually can be ‘Opfern’. As a situational term it does not deny anyone’s subject 
status; as it is not a description of identity, it avoids over-generalization of persons 
and takes into account that a situation is always limited. Hence a precondition for 
using the term ‘Opfer’ is that its deep ambivalence, as well as its risks, is taken 
seriously, and its effects should be checked continuously. Moser concludes: 
Keeping an eye on the subjectivity and capability for acting of persons, also in 
situations where they have become ‘Opfer’, is necessary in order not to fall 
prey to a representation of ‘Opfern’ as a strategy of dominance (486). 
As a result of the empirical research, more than the conceptual, ‘Opfer’ emerges as 
an ambivalent term. Under specific conditions, the term has some ‘credit rating’ 
(Bonität) as having a certain potential for explanation and transformation, and the 
groups see that making sacrifices can make sense (434-435). The usefulness of the 
term ‘Opfer’ was judged to be more ambiguous and contradictory in discussing 
experiences than discussing theory. This leads Moser to argue that: 
It seems to me to be a central point for a successful implementation of the 
paradigm of experience that we do not assume that “we” – as feminist 
researchers – know exactly what the experiences of women are, but instead 
explicitly ask for their experiences in light of the particular object of study 
(437-438, transl. IvN). 
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c. The insights gained from Moser’s work 
 
From Moser I gather four key insights for my research. First, especially important is 
that her Philippine study strongly argues against a view that denies women’s agency, 
even when supposedly being powerless or voiceless. Nobody can be denied agency. 
Second, she supports the ambivalence of self-sacrifice that she found in her qualitative-
empirical research. More than in theory the term discloses a potential for explanation and 
change and is meaningful for describing reality. Third, Moser sees the meaning of sacrifice 
as an expression of invisible dignity (a meaning that she adopts from Katie Cannon). 
No general idealization or rejection of sacrifice can account for the personal 
decision to pursue a certain goal requiring actions of sacrifice that one considers 
higher than other goals. This is further supported by the fourth key insight that I 
adopt from Moser, i.e. her proposal to see sacrifice or self-sacrifice as situational terms. 
This situational use, as I see it, is adequate to describe concrete relations and 
concrete circumstances in which persons find themselves throughout their lives, 
walking their course together with others.  
 
 
4. Theological views of self-sacrifice 
 
This chapter on theology aims to contribute to conceiving of self-sacrifice in care17. 
Theology, I have argued, offers the foundation for regarding self-sacrifice as 
standing in a wider horizon of the abundance of life. As such it aims at contributing 
to care ethics. First, theology has something to offer for thinking about suffering as 
inescapable. Cynthia C. Crysdale adds to an understanding of inevitable suffering 
and unfolds an ethic of risk in which this suffering that is necessary for righting 
relations is embraced rather than resisted, however without falling into the pitfalls 
indicated in this chapter. Her view underpins the necessary uncertainty and 
ambiguity of such suffering, as nothing can be said about its consequence. Second, 
theology has elaborated on the idea of neighborly love. Edward Collins Vacek S.J. 
has elaborated on love as philia instead of eros or agape and overcoming this 
dichotomy. He stresses open-endedness as well as communion, without excluding 
conflict. 
 
  
                                                             
17 Erin Lothes Biviano (2007) has elaborated a theological view on self-sacrifice. Although she 
explicitly thinks about self-sacrifice, her dogmatic approach is incompatible to mine.  
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a. Crysdale’s view of the cross as embracing suffering 
 
Cynthia Crysdale (2001) aims at retrieving a Christian faith with the cross and 
suffering, while taking stock of the feminist critique of pathologies of the cross as 
they have often operated in Christian practice (xii). She develops the theological idea 
of redemptive suffering (xi), using the image of ‘embracing travail’, with which she 
expresses the need to accept and enfold unavoidable pain, necessary for new birth, 
which is redemption (20). Crysdale speaks of a qualified acceptance of suffering – 
hence, an acceptance that is specific about who should do so, when, for what, and 
how – and does not advocate a general submission to violence. Thus she construes a 
conceptual space within tensions between unavoidable pain and newness of life. 
Previously I presented the idea of redemptive suffering and its critique from a 
womanist view. Crysdale’s view of redemptive suffering does not entail death-
requiring redemption requiring death nor the substitution of others for one’s own 
redemption. Rather, her view is very close to that of the women in Moser’s study: no 
matter how much one is the victim of oppression and exploitation, one’s 
possibilities for action are never completely expended. This requires understanding 
that suffering can be redemptive only when one honestly faces false messages about 
oneself – for instance, when one has a one-sided view of one’s own identity – and 
acknowledges that each person is, at some level, a more complex unity of passivity 
and agency. The pain that must be embraced consists in this discovery of the self 
(20). Embracing in this respect involves actively accounting for one’s actions and for 
one’s passive suffering. Destructive ideologies that enclose the self in self-
righteousness or victimhood must be rejected, and a process of change needs to take 
place (26-27). Only by embracing travail and by accepting suffering can the endless 
cycle of violence and revenge be broken (30). Crysdale’s title is revealing in this 
respect: embracing travail is necessary in order to give birth to a new, unenclosed 
life. 
 The ethic of risk that Crysdale develops is especially relevant to this study. 
This ethics understands moral action as potentially leading only to partial results and 
accepts vulnerability. It does not aim at control. Further, a community confers 
meaning on such action, e.g. by telling and re-telling stories of resistance and hope. 
And third, taking a risk is not the same as throwing oneself away in a sacrifice but 
entails calculating a likely positive outcome (42-43). An ethic of risk, therefore, has 
the following four qualities: 
(1) a restructuring of meaning, involving the creation of a new set of choices and 
values emerging out of love rather than fear, (2) embracing oneself as an agent of 
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action (responsible for sins) as well as naming the ways in which one has been 
victimized or socialized into a system of oppression, (3) recognizing the limitations 
and risks of moral action rather than determining expected outcomes, and (4) 
reclaiming the liberating elements of the communal past and creating new communities 
of meaning (46-47, emphases in text). 
Surrender here is not capitulation, and resistance is not violence, nor will the 
struggle be without pain, ambivalence, or ambiguity (50). The rigid polarity of good 
and evil, seeing domination as the only way to overcome evil, is dissolved in favor of 
ambiguity and tragedy (59-60). Genuine solidarity and compassion, Crysdale argues, 
can emerge only in an honest sharing of our being both victims and sinners, 
embracing the travail of recognizing our own complicity (65). 
 Crysdale pays extensive attention to the power structures at work and 
incorporates feminist analysis of women and others who have had to (and still have 
to) struggle to gain a voice in naming their pain (68-95). She also elaborates on how 
the Christian tradition often has been an instrument of oppression, as uncovered by 
feminist and womanist theologians18. But still, she argues, all religious artifacts – 
rituals, songs, narratives, artwork, icons – are meant to be vehicles of 
transformation, serving to move us out of ourselves and towards that which is 
ultimately beyond us (118). For this reason religious life stands in the in-between, in 
the tension of formation and unpredictable transformation, which cannot be 
contained or prescribed (121). The true enemy is the drive for certitude, making the 
acceptance of uncertainty and the embracing of ambiguity and unpredictability a 
precondition (121). Redemption itself must be redeemed from false certainty, and 
placed in the ambiguity of the search and the conviction that we hold the truth 
(122). 
Moreover, the human condition itself is characterized by ambiguity, due to its 
limited existence and infinite aspiration: 
This tension [..] is not in itself evil. Creaturely existence is not the ultimate 
source of alienation but its precondition. Self-transcendence – full human 
flourishing – involves accepting our innate spiritual orientation and 
actualizing it within the limits constraining us (129, emphasis in text). 
 
In weighing the value of Crysdale’s thoughts to my research, I conclude that she 
rescues the idea that evil and suffering are inescapable, with which I fully agree. I value 
her idea of embracing travail, which means that inescapable suffering is actively 
                                                             
18 The oppressive use of an ideology of self-sacrifice in the Roman-Catholic counsel for 
homosexuals has been elaborated by Crowley (2005). 
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accepted and taken upon oneself as a task to relate to basic human fragility. Crysdale 
underpins the paradox of human fragility and human capability by her opposition to 
certitude and by facing uncertainty, ambiguity, and unpredictability, on the one hand, and 
by her emphasis on human agency when they create meaning and embrace their 
infinite aspiration, on the other hand. With this latter idea of embracing what one 
holds as truth, Crysdale argues that people may sacrifice themselves for something 
they see as valuable above other things and which they believe is worth risking and 
sacrificing for. As such they establish meaning in practices. However, when Crysdale 
speaks of redemptive suffering, she runs the risk of determining a certain outcome 
or result, viz. redemption. This language has been criticized by both Williams (for 
covering actual victims) and Moser (for obstructing action). Despite her emphasis 
on ambiguity and false certainty, the idea of redemptive suffering contains a message 
about a result stemming from an actual suffering, hence about suffering as a means 
for a goal. It would be more consistent to her own line of thought to claim that 
hope remains open-ended, that truth is embraced in ambiguity, that suffering is 
inescapable and human struggle for a better life requires continuous endeavor, but 
that human beings remain limited and their struggle remains within an ethic of risk. 
The Christian view of life as standing in the in-between, as a trajectory, contains 
tempting ideals of a better life that inspire human transformation. Their utopian 
character (as described by Halkes) must be safeguarded by refraining from any suggestion 
about a certain outcome. All these elements, I propose, are essential elements of self-
sacrifice. 
This is stressed by Crysdale when she speaks of the ethic of risk. Her image of 
embracing travail, requiring the restructuring of meaning, acknowledging the entanglement of agency 
and suffering, recognizing limitations and risks, and creating new communal meanings is helpful 
to overcome myths of separation and fixed myths about certain outcomes and 
controllable ways of acting. It requires retelling a story in which the tension is 
present of acting and suffering, which also includes the idea of non-control and that 
incorporates given meanings and develops new common understandings. This is in 
line with the epistemological claim of this research that stories allow for a view of 
care that restructures the idea of identity. This will be further elaborated throughout 
the next chapters.  
 
b. Vacek’s elaboration of love as mutuality and communion 
 
For a further elaboration of the concept of love as mutuality that explicitly aims at 
giving priority to mutuality rather than to eros/self-love or agape/other-love, building 
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on Christian theology, I draw on the work of Edward Collins Vacek S.J. In his book 
Love, Human and Divine (1994) he opposes theological ethicists who have limited 
their focus on love to eros and agape and thereby have considered moral life as if it 
consists of isolated individuals performing isolated acts on other isolated individuals 
(312). They have fed individualism by failing to take into account the idea of love as 
being with the other. Instead Vacek proposes a phenomenological orientation of 
close attention to human experience (xiv), which elaborates on the idea of Christian 
love as sharing life in communion. I focus on Vacek’s elaboration of love as 
mutuality, which he calls philia, i.e. love for the sake of the mutual relationship that is 
shared. People through philia share a commitment to the continued well-being of the 
relational life that unites them (281). It points at special moral relationships that are 
embodied in families, friendships, congregations and professions. Vacek’s argument 
alters the debate about Christian agapic love decisively and puts an end to the either-
or-scheme of self-love and other-love by drawing attention to the idea of 
communion.  
 
Vacek’s main point is that philia is the love that enables people to live in 
communion. Philia creates mutuality and draws people together in special 
relationships (281). He argues that there are two aspects of philia: 
We love others for the sake of the mutual relationship we share with them, and we 
love them as partners in that relationship. […] In philia, unlike pure agape and 
eros, there is a communal life which, so to speak, circulates between the 
members (286, italics in text). 
Mutuality or philia is characterized as follows. First, it is a form of shared life that is 
desired. It is mutually welcomed and enacted, much like dancing together. Friends 
want to make a difference in each other’s lives and contribute to the mutuality of the 
friendship (287-289). Second, philia is the interaction of free persons and consists of 
a dialogue of lives that involves both of them in unpredictable ways (289). For each 
is free, and philia aims at this freedom rather than at control of one over the other 
(289-290). Third, philia is characterized by willingness (to the degree that is possible) 
to communicate the self and to receive the other, hence at mutual self-disclosure. As 
such it differs from a therapeutic relation. This mutual communication is a way of 
further forming the shared world (290-292). It also points at human vulnerability, as 
in this self-disclosure the identity of each is opened to what is beyond their control 
(291). Fourth, philia is progressively mutual involving and is therefore open-ended. 
The two are not separate but related and so is their identity (which is not restricted 
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to this one relation). They develop their relation together and the deeper it becomes, 
the more their actions are “normed” and their communion modified. 
In fact, special relationships provide the basis for much of our moral life. That 
is, we make many of our choices as a friend, as a father, as a citizen, and so 
forth (293). 
So mutuality is embedded in institutions. But Vacek also relates it to time, as these 
relations are a historically evolving shared life (293). And fifth, mutuality does not 
exclude conflicts and tension, which are almost inevitable; the communion is never 
completely secure, and ambiguity is an irremovable element (293-295). 
The idea of mutuality or philia possesses the general characteristics of love 
(295-304). It is spiritual self-transcendence; it is valuable in itself as well as oriented 
towards value; it is emotional, as partners and communion are affectively involved. 
It is enduring, as it consists in faithfulness. It is universal in principle, though 
particular in practice, and it is uncontrollable, as one cannot decide to have philia. In 
sum, Vacek characterizes philia as love. His theological foundation is that God loves 
us in the same way, with a preferential love and in special relationships (307). 
Therefore the preferable option for a Christian ethics is to begin with special 
relations, as God too treats human beings as daughters and sons, as friends, and as 
covenant partners (312).  
This book arises out of the convictions that God relates to us in special 
relationships, that human selfhood begins in such relations, particularly in the 
family, and that the fullness of human personhood is possible only through 
deep philia relationships (312).  
 
In evaluating this work I argue that Vacek’s starting point is not the moral acts or 
practices of a self. He starts rather where the self finds the self, i.e. connected to 
others in special relations. Over against moral theories that abstract from the 
normativity present in ethics, theories that reject special relations as particularism or 
parochialism, he argues that it is precisely here in these particular relations that 
human beings find themselves, and also that this is valid and valuable theological 
ground for thinking about love. In making this plea he concurs with care ethics, 
which also underscores the need for concrete ethics that necessarily involves an 
engagement with the concrete, the local, the particular (Tronto, 1993, 142). 
However, Vacek adds an important distinction. For he proposes that we start 
thinking ethically, not only from factual human connectedness, but also from human 
desire to belong together. Hence not only is the other not a threat to the self, but the 
other is even the one I want to be with, I want to do good to, I want to be involved with over 
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time. The self and the other together face an open-ended involvement and aim at a 
lasting involvement.  
My research can draw from a theology like Vacek’s, which sees philia relations 
and open-ended shared life as an important contribution to care ethics and to the 
conceiving of self-sacrifice. If care ethics would more extensively incorporate a 
sense of sharing life, it could help put an end to the narrow view of intersubjectivity 
as a sort of balance or seesaw. In this narrow view, a gift given to one necessarily 
involves a decline of the other. When something is added to one side (time, energy, 
money), the balance needs to be regained by adding something to the other (respite, 
return). Instead, philia allows for a concept of care that stresses open-ended 
communion. The ones involved in care no longer threaten each other’s interests or 
freedom. Rather, they share their lives with each other and with others, together 
with whom they desire to live a good life. This can be connected to self-sacrifice 
thanks to its characteristics as love: spiritual self-transcendence, valuable in itself and oriented 
towards value, affective involvement, endurance, faithfulness, universal in principle though particular 
in practice, and uncontrollable. 
 
 
5. Conclusion: self-sacrifice in Christian theology 
 
Many valuable insights have emerged throughout this chapter. As this research aims 
at thinking through caring practices and the questions that arise there, theology is 
helpful for developing a plausible, argumentative view of self-sacrifice in caregiving. 
First, philosophy of religion and theology have analyzed the religious practice of 
sacrifice, which results in a view of a practice in which people give up, give in, from 
a common understanding that this giving can be a ‘making holy’, i.e. a transfer of 
something valuable to a different sphere of belonging. From a Christian perspective 
it is added that this giving up has been preceded by a sacrifice of God and of Jesus, 
who have given first to all humankind. This not only enables humans to give, but 
also inspires them to do so, as a moral obligation. From this theological foundation 
Van Heijst has drawn her triadic structure do quia mihi datum est. As I have been 
given, I give. This is an ethic of renunciation that aims at a higher good. Three key 
terms for understanding the idea of self-sacrifice that theology has offered are: first, 
‘trajectory’, i.e. human life unfolds against a horizon with an untraceable beginning 
and a future of hope that invites us to continuous transformation. A trajectory is a 
span between a past and a future, which theology has termed an origin and a 
destination. Theology thereby offers a concept that can incorporate where people 
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come from and what they aim at. I consider the concept of trajectory indispensable 
for conceiving of caring and self-sacrifice, however without offering any dogmatic 
determination or fixation of what both origin and destination mean. The second key 
term offered by theology is ‘participation’, i.e. life’s trajectory is a practice embedded 
in a community that invites people to join in, to participate in working toward a 
common good and to welcome others as members as well. And third, theology 
stresses ‘uncertainty’, i.e. the sacrifice is open-ended, aiming at a hoped-for good that 
is without guarantee. 
 The feminist debates have made clear that any thought of self-sacrifice that – 
uncritically – remains within dichotomies is unfruitful. Either the opposition 
between agape and eros, or the dualism of self-realization and self-sacrifice, or the 
replacement of self-sacrifice by mutuality, all lead to a blind spot. A view of 
mutuality that incorporates self-sacrifice, and hence has overcome dichotomies, 
makes plausible that people can transform and sacrifice the self for the sake of a good for all and 
for all of creation, including the self. Decisive, however, is whether this sacrifice is freely 
done (hence the subject’s agency is unquestioned and the sacrifice is not an innocent 
victim) and whether this sacrifice is of value and not considered a worthless surrogate. 
Further, self-sacrifice becomes perverted when it is idealized, leading to harmful practices 
for both the ones sacrificing and their beneficiaries. Besides, the question about 
benefit can only be answered when beneficiaries are included in the evaluation. The 
historical research into charitable care underscores the triadic structure of giving and 
receiving as well as the idea of the religious community that inspired religious 
congregations to provide humanizing care. Also in present-day caring the idea of a 
surplus looking for a destination, i.e. the desire to give care to others serving a good, 
is still valid.  
 Moser’s multicultural empirical research has resulted in four key insights. 
First, no matter one’s position or situation, nobody can be denied agency. Hence, ‘being a 
sacrifice’ can describe one’s situation but not one’s identity. Second, cultural 
expectations exist with regard to women sacrificing themselves, for instance in the Philippines, 
forcing women to take this role, which they have also incorporated themselves. As a 
consequence of this insight, I argue that a view of the community must always 
contain both the social level of norms and cultural expectations and the individual 
level on which norms and expectations are incorporated or rejected. Third, the 
ambiguity of the terms ‘sacrifice’ and ‘self-sacrifice’ is exactly what makes them useful. 
The terms can express a situation that is oppressive or violent while simultaneously 
expressing one’s invisible dignity. This ambiguity, valuable because consciously 
accepting the actual in order to further the good, is lost when the terms are replaced, 
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for instance, by self-gift or choice. However, this also entails the need to check its 
effects continuously, since, when the ambiguity is lost, it runs the risk of becoming a 
strategy of dominance. And finally, her research has shown the need to combine 
theoretical and empirical research, to ask people themselves instead of giving the answers 
for them. 
 Finally, both the idea of the need to embrace unavoidable suffering that comes with 
transformation, with breaking through a false belief in a one-sided identity, and the 
idea of philia as a form of love expressing ‘living with’ others are helpful ideas for 
conceiving of self-sacrifice within the trajectory of human life. Both Crysdale and 
Vacek aim to gain a view of human trajectories in life’s complexity without 
reduction. This requires that meanings are changed, simplifications and certainties 
rejected, and ambiguity incorporated into our understanding. 
 
In light of the above, I want to substantiate my claim that a new framework needs to 
be added to care ethics, i.e. the framework of meaning. For it has become clear that 
people find and connect themselves with some meaning; they “embrace” (to use 
Crysdale’s terminology) a good as giving sense and direction to their lives. This idea 
is also recognizable in the works of Halkes (the utopia of a new creation), Van Heijst 
(having received love, which gives meaning to giving love), and Vacek (philia as 
special relation, given by God and desired by humans). The framework of meaning 
is needed in order to think of the subject as a moral agent embracing meaning in 
self-sacrifice, finding sense in self-sacrifice, and considering it as a way of self-
realization. To elaborate on this, I draw upon Charles Taylor’s work. Taylor (2007) 
uses the term ‘meaning’ for 
the perceptions we have, as well as the beliefs or propositions which we hold 
or entertain about the world and ourselves. But I also mean our responses, 
the significance, importance, meaning, we find in things. I want to use for 
these the generic term ‘meaning’, even though there is in principle a danger of 
confusion with linguistic meaning. Here I’m using it in the sense in which we 
talk about “the meaning of life”, or of a relationship as having great 
“meaning” for us (31). 
In other words, meanings are what people believe, consider precious, significant or 
valuable, aspire to or dream of in the sense that it directs their actions, projects, and 
goals. However, they are never unambiguous. For there is a plurality of meanings, 
and articulating a meaning opens a moral map inclusive of its inner conflicts 
(Pijnenburg, 2010, 26). This map transcends the level of mere subjective experience 
and is an effort to spell out what is experienced as good in se (26, italics in text): 
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For instance, respect for other human beings is not a subjective invention, but 
it is demanding in itself, and that is why we value it. In this sense, it is 
objective: not dependent [on] the capriciousness of personal feelings. It is a 
kind of objectivity that differs from the objectivity in the natural sciences: in 
the latter it refers to entities that exist in space and time, and that can be 
observed (26). 
Hence horizons of meaning form a shared understanding of what is valuable in se 
and which transcends the subjective level. As I explained elsewhere (Van Nistelrooy 
& Vosman, 2012, 4), this moral map consists of pre-existent frameworks that Taylor 
calls ‘horizons of meaning’. They are part of culture, tradition, and community, 
offering qualitative distinctions between good and evil, worthwhile and worthless, 
admirable and reprehensible, which orient us in life. When individual articulation 
and evaluation of experiences and practices arise in our subjective understanding, 
they are rooted in undeniable common normative sources. Taylor (1989, 3) speaks 
of the inescapable frameworks and horizons in which we live, which include 
normatively qualitative discriminations.  
 I further elaborate on this framework in Chapter 6, where I turn to Ricœur’s 
dialectic narrative identity, which incorporates the self’s infinite imagination of 
possible goods, and his dialectic ethics, which involves the ethical aim of the good 
life.  
 
Finally, I conclude that there remains an epistemological tension between the 
authors of this chapter regarding their anthropologies, on which I cannot reflect 
within the limitations of this research. A remark, indicating the direction of a 
pressing problem, needs to be made. Some authors offer a critical, historical 
anthropology that incorporates practices, e.g. Moser looks at how women speak of 
themselves, and Crysdale incorporates concrete examples. Vacek’s point of 
departure, criticizing the eighteenth-century separation of eros and agape, also seems 
to criticize a-historical views that limit thinking about moral life as non-
individualistic. His battle against this dichotomy contributes to care ethics by 
proposing the alternative of philia, a radical idea of community, of wanting to belong 
together. However, in his answer he returns to an a-historical anthropology, 
developing his idea of ‘sharing life’ without considering actual practices. However, 
vital to care ethics is an anthropology that incorporates an understanding of late 
modernity and refrains from a-historical views, such as the view of human beings as 
‘unique’ (Van Heijst), or from an uncritical view of ‘the human self’ that operates in 
politics (Tronto). This insight should be more generally endorsed in care ethics as 
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fitting with its own insistence on incorporating into ethics an understanding of the 
concrete historical, political, and social context. 
In the next chapter I turn to Jean-Luc Marion, whose radical phenomenology 
aims to break the horizons of the subject. For we are in need of an inquiry into the 
pre-moral and modernity’s incapacitating conceptual ethical binaries, such as 
freedom as absence of constraint and acting as causing. 
  
 CHAPTER 3: Givenness precedes giving 
 
This research aims at filling a conceptual gap in care ethics. This gap concerns a 
conceptually thinking through of self-sacrifice in caregiving, meaning that the 
complexities, paradoxes, and crosscurrents of meanings that are involved in the 
caring practice are fully taken into account. In the Introduction I argued that the 
framework of the subject needs to be reset in order to incorporate more passivity. 
Care ethics insufficiently recognizes its own late-modern categories by putting the 
self center stage, in control, thereby limiting self-sacrifice to those acts that are done 
freely and without a lack of self-worth. By thus psychologizing self-sacrifice, it fails 
to radically contextualize it. Care ethics needs a redrawn frame of the subject that is 
radically dependent and passive, since such a frame makes self-sacrifice conceivable 
as a matter of giving in to what happens. In Chapter 1 I showed the persistence in 
care ethics of the tendency both to reduce self-sacrifice to a diminishment of the self 
and to oppose the self to the other by separating the interests of each, despite claims 
to the contrary. 
My conceptual question has emerged as an epistemological question as well. 
In the Introduction I argued that no shortcut to either idealization or rejection of 
self-sacrifice is justified. I argued at the end of Chapter 1 that care ethics benefits 
from taking an epistemological position that scrutinizes what happens rather than 
approaching practices with normative concepts that foreclose any acknowledgment 
of actual self-sacrifice (as Pettersen did). Rather, I advocate a phenomenological 
approach that looks at what people do when sacrificing themselves. This requires a 
suspension of the normative and maintenance of the phenomenological approach as 
long as possible in order to see more and gain a fuller idea of the concrete situation, 
before making a judgment.  
Thus in this chapter I turn to Marion’s book Being Given. Toward a 
Phenomenology of Givenness (2002a). This title indicates the experience, central to 
phenomenology, that many phenomena simply are given, i.e. are simply there, 
happening, already given, prior to an ego. This has implications for thinking about 
human identity, as it breaks the horizon of the subject and emphasises human 
fragility. In other words, I turn to Marion to elaborate on the ideas that have already 
been indicated by Van Heijst, such as ‘surplus’ and ‘datum’ in do quia mihi datum est, 
as well as the theological concept of trajectory, indicating that humans find 
themselves amidst a given life shared with others. Marion thinks through what is 
given, happens, shows itself, appears. In exploring the idea that care relations are 
already given and that things arise and evolve in a given situation, in which much is 
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already and irreversibly given, I aim to gain clarity about a certain characteristic of 
caring practices, namely their inescapability. This approach not only shows that the 
moral subject of the caregiver is less central when it comes to self-sacrifice, but also 
uncovers the importance of the pre-moral for how care ethics speaks of the ethical 
or moral. Marion’s radical phenomenology will shed a different light on the agency 
of the subject by uncovering the subject’s ‘givenness’, as he calls it, but he also 
contributes to a demoralization of the discussion of care.  
 
In this chapter I proceed as follows. First, by way of introduction, I present the 
philosophical tradition of phenomenology to which Marion belongs and the way he 
aims to radicalize it. In the second section I sketch Marion’s three main lines of 
‘being given’: the gift, givenness, and ‘me’ being given. In the third section I first 
make a detour to see what Marion’s phenomenology yields with regard to 
conceiving of self-sacrifice and to answer the two questions that have drawn me to 
Marion, i.e. what his work contributes to the concept of self-sacrifice and how 
phenomenology contributes to care ethics. This detour is entirely my own and not 
Marion’s, since he strictly limits his work to non-ethical phenomenology. I finish 
with a concluding section. 
 
1. Marion and the tradition of phenomenological reduction 
 
Jean-Luc Marion is a phenomenologist inspired by Descartes, Husserl, and 
Heidegger. He aims at radicalizing the phenomenological reduction, i.e. the 
bracketing of all prejudices, all ideas and plans, all theory, which shape and construct 
the way in which one looks at and considers reality. Phenomenology earlier on 
aimed at bracketing or deferring our daily employed knowledge of the world, in 
order to be able to see the phenomenon as it appears itself (Welten, 2000b, 11-12). 
To Marion this is important, because he regards modernity as the tradition of the 
‘subject’ that places prior constraints on the self-giving of phenomena (Caputo & 
Scanlon, 1999a, 5). His aim is to be even more loyal to the aim of phenomenology 
(5) than his predecessors had been. 
Jean-Luc Marion proposes to stretch phenomenology to the limits of its 
highest possibility, to the limits of an impossibility, to the possibility of 
something “impossible,” something declared off limits by the “conditions of 
possibility” imposed by modernity and onto-theology (Caputo, 1999, 185).  
Phenomenology started with Husserl, who opposed nineteenth-century scientific 
objectification and aimed at liberating the phenomena from the opposition of 
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subject and object, stressing Gegebenheit (donation, givenness) of phenomena, their 
being given, beforehand, before any ego or objectification19. For Husserl, appearing 
still happens to a consciousness, i.e. being aware of something, which he terms 
‘intentionality’, which is the observing gaze. Other phenomenologists have criticized 
Husserl for this central role of intentionality and have stressed the fact that not 
everything can be grasped by consciousness (Jonkers, 2003, 10-11).  
Marion stands in this tradition and shares this critique. He is interested in 
phenomena that are amazing to intentionality. Ultimately he aims at opening the 
horizon to the unimaginable, the impossible, which the subject cannot hold or 
control and which leads to the question of how to think God as a non-product of 
my own thinking (Welten, 2000b, 14). The impossible ‘destructs’ a subject that 
thinks beforehand, but it ‘deconstructs’ the subject as a being exceeded by that 
which overflows it, bedazzles it. Intention is not a ‘looking at’, but the intention is 
saturated by an overflow of givenness, making the intention wonder, stunned, and 
amazed (Caputo & Scanlon, 1999b, 6). He examines what it means when something 
‘gives itself, as itself’, without any constraints of the subject’s intentionality. 
Therefore, throughout Being Given, he offers many examples of phenomena that give 
themselves, that come upon us, cannot be grasped, take us by surprise, are beyond 
imagination and exceed intelligence and horizon. If these phenomena are possible, 
and not even rare, and if this experience is still completely mine, then why should it 
not be possible that God’s revelation happens? Marion claims that to deny this 
possibility, to shut it out, would not be compatible with phenomenology itself.  
 
Before I elaborate further on Marion’s analysis of givenness, I need to mention two 
difficulties. I have claimed that the ethical should be suspended in order to see more, 
and that Marion contributes to this. First I must give an initial indication of what 
this ‘more’ is that phenomenology uncovers, and second I must show how 
phenomenology and ethics can be connected, which is something I myself must 
account for, since Marion strictly separates the two and limits his work to the first.  
First, Marion’s radical phenomenology discloses the fact that the vast majority 
of phenomena fall outside of ethics: the appearance of a tree, the sky, a painting, the 
weather. It would be absurd to regard these as appearing to a moral gaze20. Marion 
emphasizes the significance of simply looking at what appears rather than 
                                                             
19 With special thanks to Ruud Welten, who clarified this to me. Personal conversation d.d. 24 
August 2009. 
20 Idem. 
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immediately drawing it into ethical considerations. A case in point is a quotation 
from an article on love and charity:  
In order to approach the question of charity, it is above all important not to 
suffer the influence of what metaphysics has thought about love. For today, 
in this tradition, love and charity have suffered similar devaluation. Love is 
reduced to “making love,” charity to “doing charity” – words prostituted in 
the first case, betrayed in the second, each equally submitted to the iron law 
of “making or doing,” and thus of objectification (1994, 168). 
Marion wants to simply regard love and charity and all other phenomena, before 
doing and making, as givens giving themselves, showing themselves. However, there 
are a few exceptions, e.g. when he mentions giving without a perceivable receiver, as 
in the altruistic raising of money for a humanitarian cause, or the solidarity of giving 
money to humanitarian organizations, or giving to one’s enemy, which one might be 
inspired to do by the biblical command to love one’s enemy (87-89). He mentions 
the field of ‘what I will call, for convenience’s sake, intersubjectivity’ (285) only 
starting in §28 (of 30 sections), where he also redefines responsibility (293). 
Second, while Marion limits his work to phenomenology, excluding ethics, I 
argue for a connection between phenomenology and ethics. The connection of 
phenomenology to care ethics, I argue, is its relevance to, as well as its indispensable 
presence in, ethics. Phenomenology is relevant to care ethics because, like care 
ethics, it opposes neo-Kantianism and proposes to lead philosophy back to the 
experience itself. Its approach is an inductive one, starting from experience and 
relations. Further, I argue that phenomenology’s presence in ethics is indispensable 
in the sense that the phenomenal does not disappear in the moral or normative 
‘phase’ but remains present in a phase of action and experiences in which relational 
bonds, responsibility, decisions, and helping others appear. I therefore re-interpret 
phenomenology as giving ethics a determined place: ethics becomes a phase of 
becoming aware and action, and it always starts from what is given. It also never 
completely becomes full and exclusive morality, as if it could be separated from 
phenomenality. Ethics always remains within what has been given. 
As a consequence, the horizon of what happens is much wider than 
intersubjective choices and behavior, and it puts up front the sheer experience of 
what is being given. Hence phenomenology’s inductivism and its suspension of 
ethics are relevant and valuable contributions to care ethics. 
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2. Marion’s phenomenology of the gift, givenness, and the gifted 
 
In this section I present three key elements from Marion’s phenomenology, i.e. his 
analysis of (a) the gift, (b) the experience in real life of givenness, and (c) the ‘Me’ 
being given that is the discovery of the self as ‘gifted’. All of these elements 
contribute to a conceptually thinking through of self-sacrifice, although this is in no 
way Marion’s research topic. His contribution mainly lies in his view of the subject, 
hence in re-framing the ‘self’, which also has consequences for thinking about 
intersubjectivity. Each subsection of this section consists of three elements: first, a 
short presentation of my research question, which leads me to this particular key 
element of Marion’s thought; second, a presentation of this particular part of 
Marion’s thought; and third, a preliminary conclusion about my own account of 
what this understanding yields with regard to self-sacrifice. In the third section I 
make a detour through Marion’s phenomenology, harvesting ideas that strike me as 
relevant to ethics, before I present my own comprehensive conclusions. 
 
a. The gift 
 
In the previous chapters I argued that caring should be limited neither to a dyad of 
giver and receiver nor to a dual structure of giving and receiving, for such limitations 
make self-sacrifice a diminishment of the self for the benefit of the other, as the 
subjects involved are viewed as opposed entities. With Van Heijst and other 
theologians I argued for a non-dual view that starts from a ‘having received’. This is 
what Marion’s analysis of the gift offers. 
Marion bases his description of the gift on Derrida’s rejection of the 
metaphysical system of giving in which  
the giver gives the gift in the role of efficient cause, mobilizing a formal and a 
material cause (in order to define, reify the gift), and pursuing a final cause 
(the good of the givee and/or the glory of the giver) (Kearney, 1999, 75).  
Like Derrida, Marion rejects this system, which he calls ‘the standard model’ of the 
gift (Marion, 2002a, 82), as it annihilates the gift itself by turning it into economics 
(81). Any notion of giving as causing something (an effect) or gaining something (as 
in economic exchange) implies an intrinsic contradiction of the gift, for giving 
means letting go, losing something. What is given is lost, is detached. Therefore 
Marion argues that the standard model really is not about a gift but about a loan, as 
it has exchanged its gratuity for a price (83). 
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 Marion’s reduction of everything that is alien to the gift leads him to the 
horizon of ‘givenness’ (Caputo, 1999, 201). First, there is the possibility reducing the 
gift to the donor’s lived experience (20121), as in the gift of a ring, which is more than 
a transferred object.  
[T]he ring is but a token of what is truly given, an icon of the love, which 
means that the finite, visible surface of the ring is possessed of an overflowing 
and invisible depth (201).  
Second, there is the possibility of reducing the gift to the recipient’s experience of 
having sacrificed autonomy and become indebted by the gift:  
[A] recipient is [...] someone who agrees to sacrifice one’s autonomy, agrees to 
be put in debt by the gift, graciously to accept a debt of gratitude (201).  
This is not decided by the recipient as subject but is the effect of the gift itself. 
Finally, the gift can be reduced to the gift itself. The gift should not be seen as the 
object that two subjects, the giver and the receiver, have decided to transfer and 
accept as gift.  
Rather the gift itself prompts both donor and recipient to enter into the 
sphere of giving, [as] subject subjected to, swept up in and acted upon by it 
(201-202). 
 
These reductions can be taken one step further, by turning the reductions to the 
giver, the recipient, and the gift into the reduction of them (202). Marion (2002a, 85-
113) shows how givenness resides neither in the receiver, nor in the giver, nor in the 
gift itself. The receiver, called the ‘givee’, can be bracketed (85-94), as in the case of a 
gift given to a humanitarian cause, which is actually given to an organization, with 
the recipient never being known by the giver. For a gift to be truly given, it is 
required even that there is no recipient. If she22 were present beforehand, she would 
be able to claim herself as the cause; and if she were present afterwards, she could 
develop the burden of having to repay in some way, thereby making the gift an 
object of exchange. Either way, as causality or as exchange, there would not be a 
given. Also, a gift might be given in such a manner that there is no possible way that 
a givee can ever repay it. The examples that Marion offers here are germane to this 
research on self-sacrifice:  
                                                             
21 Caputo refers to the giver as the donor, a term related to donation and don, the French terms 
that Marion uses in the originally French essay that Caputo uses here: Jean-Luc Marion, “Esquisse 
d’un concept phénomenologique du don” (“Outline of a Phenomenological Concept of the Gift”). 
In: Filosophia della revelatione, ed. M. Olivetti 72(1994): 75-94.  
22 Although I aim at inclusive language throughout this research, at times I give priority to 
readability by alternating between ‘he’ and ‘she’ instead of a using ‘he or she’ and ‘his or her’. 
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The “gift of self” for the nation (death for the fatherland, etc.), for humanity, 
for a chosen fraternal order, and finally for the children cannot really be 
repaid (even if one claims symbolically the opposite). What is given – time, 
energy, life – will never be returned to the giver, since he gives himself and 
since this self that he loses cannot be given back to him by anyone (93, 
emphases in text). 
For this gift to be given, the givee can be bracketed. But the giver gives consciously, 
gives the self, and gives up or loses the self.  
 Also the giver can be reduced (94-102), as in the case of gifts being given by 
an anonymous or unreachable giver (as in an inheritance). The gift itself requires that 
the giver should not be known and present, claiming the gift as his. Both givee and 
giver can be bracketed, and yet givenness still remains:  
The gift will now manifest itself of itself, without depending on an efficient 
cause (giver) or a final cause (givee) (115).  
It is sufficient for only one of the two (givee or giver) to be conscious of the gift for 
a gift to be given (116). A gift received from a deceased or an anonymous giver, as 
well as a gift given unintentionally, with the giver unaware of the effect (as in the 
case of athletes focusing on their sport, unaware of the pleasure they give to their 
public), are still gifts that appear as gifts to the receiver. But for the giver there is no 
consciousness of the giving, no auto-recognition, self-approval, or narcissistic 
gratitude (77). The giver is not an ego that returns to itself; the giver is lacking, 
remains unknown, anonymous, in giving:  
The ontic loss of self, sacrifice, then becomes a mere consequence of this self-
forgetting of the giver (98).  
Giving is done without any search for personal gain or fulfilment, for reciprocity or 
mutuality, without any thought of a balance of giving and receiving. Through this 
reduction of the giver, the scope of giving indeed becomes much wider, including 
everything that is being given without a transcendental cause (subject or God) or 
economy, and is not confined to what is given consciously by a giver. 
 Finally, even the gift does not have to exist as a being, an object, or a good 
that is transferred from a giver to a givee (102-111). It does not have to be reified; 
one can also give power, or oneself as a person, or one’s word (104-106).  
 
What does interpreting Marion’s analysis of the gift yield for conceiving of self-
sacrifice? At this stage I can give a preliminary answer. The giver might give 
unconsciously; the recipient might remain unknown; the gift might not be reified. 
There can be a gift only in the conception of either the giver or the recipient. The 
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giver gives and loses the gift, uncontrolled, as in the gift of a ring, which is a risky 
gift of the self. The recipient might receive something that was never intentionally 
given but that still makes her feel grateful. Because of such excessiveness of the gift, 
reciprocity is impossible. Hence the gift is not between the giver and recipient (making 
them the horizon of the gift and impeding its excessiveness), but it affects both giver 
and recipient by putting them in the position of ‘having received’. This analysis is 
most helpful both for overcoming a dichotomous or dyadic view of giving and 
receiving and for opening the horizon of both the subject and intersubjectivity. Both 
are in the sphere of giving, of having been given, and what has been given and 
received might not be determinable. The sphere of do ut des is shown to be illusory: 
the gift is not controlled, and there can be no idea of what ‘therefore’ could be a 
return gift. The sphere of giving ‘humbles’ the subject and intersubjectivity: they are 
real but not central. They are necessary to ethics but in themselves not the ultimate 
normativity. 
 
b. The experience in real life of givenness 
 
In this section I elaborate on Marion’s view of ‘givenness’ in order to gain a better 
understanding of human passivity, hence of what has been given to humans, what 
overcomes them, befalls them, and determines them. It contributes to a ‘re-framing’ 
of the subject, by including more human passivity. Because care ethics aims at 
contextualizing ethics, it benefits from the phenomenological aim of suspending the 
ethical and first looking at the phenomenal. The phenomenological aim of 
uncovering the wide horizon of facts and givens, radicalized by Marion, helps one to 
see that existence in general and caring practices in particular are complex and made 
paradoxical by what is given in life, in life’s currents and crosscurrents. This sheds a 
different light on the self as well as on self-sacrifice. 
Marion describes how phenomena emerge, arise, and appear in real life. The 
way he uncovers phenomena as embodied experiences in everyday life is 
illuminating. He calls these ‘determinations’ of phenomena ‘empirical confirmations’ 
(119). Using the terminology of empiricism Marion indicates that the givenness of 
phenomena is not an opinion, an option, or a doctrine, but that givenness is 
theoretically compulsory because of its facticity (119). In other words, he aims at 
showing that phenomena give themselves in common human experience. He 
describes five ‘determinations’ of the given phenomenon: anamorphosis, 
unpredictable landing, fait accompli, incident, and event. These determinations 
support the idea that what manifests itself is given. None of these ways in which the 
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phenomenon accedes to its visibility (123) involve an other, and therefore they 
accord with Marion’s aim not to confine what appears to anything. I first present his 
five determinations and then I give a preliminary answer to what these contribute to 
an understanding of self-sacrifice, which I elaborate on in the final section of this 
chapter.  
 
Anamorphosis 
First, Marion offers an example of what a work of art might give to the person 
looking at it. Phenomena appear; they accede to visibility, like ‘anamorphosis’ (119-
131), which indicates a 
procedure [that] involves first presenting to the uncurious gaze of the viewer 
a surface entirely covered with colored pigments but apparently void of any 
recognizable form whatsoever, then moving this gaze to a precise (and 
unique) point from which it will see the de-formed surface trans-form itself in 
one fell swoop into a magnificent new form (123).  
Hence the image appears to the viewer conditionally. It is not even an image to an 
uncurious gaze but requires of the gaze an exact position and the willingness to 
move. Only then is there an immense effect, an amazing “apparition”. Marion 
speaks of the ‘arrival’ of the phenomenon, the ‘rising from the first to the second 
form’ (124, emphasis in text), which is neither immediately nor easily available. On 
the contrary:  
To accede to it, not only must a gaze know how to become curious, available, 
and enacted, but above all it must know how to submit to the demands of the 
figure to be seen (124). 
Anamorphosis thus indicates a willingness of the gaze to change, to move, to let 
itself even be dictated to by the phenomenon itself in order for the phenomenon to 
start giving itself from itself (124). It is clear that there is no point in trying to 
intentionally fit the phenomenon in a preceding model, but only a vision that 
happens to a gaze is given. 
 
Unpredictable landing 
Elaborating on the contingency of givenness, Marion criticizes the metaphysical 
opposition of necessity and contingency, arguing that they do not contradict each 
other but that both belong to phenomenality. He wants to do justice to the paradox 
of givenness, to the fact that it is necessary but could also not be given (138). He 
speaks of ‘a single and new, phenomenologically superior contingency’ (128), which 
he calls ‘unpredictable landing’ (131-139), to express the uncontrolled and 
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uncontrollable character of phenomena. It is both necessary (a landing will come 
about) and contingent (one does not know when and what). This combination 
would be impossible in metaphysics, because necessity and contingency are 
considered to be opposed. But in phenomenology they fit perfectly well23. 
Extending the idea of contingency as arriving, Marion explains how this arriving is 
to be understood:  
[N]ot of a continuous and uniform arrival, delivering identical and foreseeable 
items, but of discontinuous, unforeseen, and entirely dissimilar arrivals. 
Sometimes phenomena arrive, sometimes they do not, and each time, 
differently (132). 
The common experience of the guesswork that surrounds the landing of a jet at any 
major airport shows its unpredictability and uncertainty (315, translator’s footnote).  
 This does not mean, however, that the I/me is completely passive or the 
victim of what happens, nor that I may withdraw or abandon the place. It means 
that the initiative of making itself visible lies with the phenomenon, and the I/me 
can only remain ready to receive, not being certain that the landing will take place 
(132-133).  
 
The fait accompli 
The contingency of the given is further determined by its appearing or happening at 
a certain moment, in a certain way, and never again in the same way, for it would be 
different for the single reason of the other moment. In short, the given appears ‘in 
fact’ or it does not appear ‘in fact’, but in both cases ‘in fact’ (138-139). The idea of 
the fait accompli (139-150) stresses the factual experience of what gives itself, the 
non-necessity of the knowledge of the object, and the enactment of what gives itself 
(140). Hence the given phenomenon appears as a fait accompli before which we are 
always found ‘already in’ it (150). The I, called ‘I/me’ by Marion, is involved, but not 
as initiator. Rather, the I is a me, who is simply there to receive, at whose expense 
facts happen.  
Facticity does not consist in my being reducible to the factuality of a fact, but 
in exposing me to the fact, which can thus be accomplished only by weighing 
on me, no longer as a detached observer but as an engaged actor – or better, a 
critical patient into whom the fact has crashed in being visibly accomplished 
(146).  
                                                             
23 I leave aside the exhaustive technical discussion Marion has with metaphysics on this point, 
which will become clear in the examples of ‘unpredictable landing’, the ‘fait accompli’ as well as 
‘the event’.  
GIVENNESS PRECEDES GIVING 
109 
 
It does, however, mean that knowledge of what has arrived only comes after the 
arrival. Only when there is an arrival in fact can the question of a cause (or possible 
causes) have sense (140-141). 
 The phenomenon that arrives as a fait accompli weighs on me, crashes on me, 
and has an effect on me that is well expressed in the French “je me suis fait”, marking  
unambiguously [that] I am neither the author nor the spectator of the 
phenomenon, but where my encounter with it, exposed without flight, leaves 
it the power to say its fact to me and appear in its fait accompli (146-147).  
Phenomena – probably all – have a certain bruteness about them, namely, their 
factuality as a brute fact (147). Their contingency consists in their facticity, but also 
in their possibility of being completely different or absent:  
The fait accompli produces neither chance nor necessity; it opens the 
possibility by giving it (150).  
Marion widens the phenomenological scope by including phenomena that are not 
bound to being, like brute facts or accidents (147). Even if these facts (such as 
mathematical or logical idealities) do not seem to occur in time, Marion argues that 
these immaterial beings also appear as facts to me, as facts that are accomplished 
for, before, and without me (149).  
 
The incident 
Marion further elaborates on his description of the appearing of the given 
phenomenon as incident (151-159):  
Following the path toward its final appearing, it is defined by its obscure 
movements and appears only when it finishes, by falling upon what receives 
and then sees it. This process of the phenomenon authorizes me to think it as 
the incident. By incident, dictionary usage means a – small – event that comes 
up. This could not be put better, on condition of understanding it as literally 
as possible: what comes upon me in such a way that it consists of nothing 
other than this first and last coming upon, without existing or making itself 
visible prior to this. [...] Its final moment, that of the fait accompli [...] 
coincides with its first moment, that of the explosion coming forward [i.e. the 
incident, IvN] (151). 
This description stresses the non-causality of the fact and opens horizons for 
phenomena that are unforeseen, the overwhelming impact of phenomena, and the 
‘explosive’ character of appearing phenomena, without any background, foresight, 
or forewarning, reduced to its fact (151). The utter inability of any subject to be in 
control of what happens shows phenomena as falling upon me, as receiver, and then 
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I see it. This is very close to the facticity as the final moment coinciding with the 
first, for a fact can never be made a non-fact. What has factually fallen upon me can 
never be un-fallen. And when I have seen it, it will be impossible to make what I 
have seen un-seen.  
 Metaphysical language can only point to the incident as “a deficiency – 
absence of cause” (151). Radical phenomenology opposes metaphysics, or 
subordinates it, by giving the incident primacy over form, cause, or essence (158), 
which do not show, appear, and are not experienced. The incident simply happens. 
This is where metaphysical ontology falls short of human experience, for we do not 
experience the essence or substance or ousia, but only that which appears, which 
touches and affects us (157). 
Consisting in its pure arising, in the fact of its bursting forth, the incident 
remains unforeseeable, exceeds all antecedent, and rests on no ousia. As a 
consequence, it remains unconstructable, unconstitutable, and therefore 
unavailable (158, italics in text).  
 
The event 
Until this point, Marion has aimed at showing how the phenomenon appears 
(anamorphosis), imposes itself (fait accompli), and evades construction (incident) in 
its arising, proving that the initiative belongs in principle to the phenomenon, not to 
the gaze (159). What remains is an elaboration of the ‘self’ of the phenomenon. This 
is what is implied in the event (159-173): 
The self of the phenomenon is marked in its determination as event. It comes, 
does its thing, and leaves on its own; showing itself, it also shows the self that 
takes (or removes) the initiative of giving itself (159-160, emphasis in text).  
The event is the impression or the pressure that the phenomenon exerts on the 
gaze, the weight that is experienced, in which the self of the phenomenon can be 
verified (159). But this self itself cannot be constituted; it can be noticed in the 
phenomenality of the event. 
 Contrary to metaphysics, Marion simply and radically suggests that the given 
phenomenon should be understood as event without cause or reason and rethinks 
the principle of causality as it has been considered by Suarez, Pascal, and Kant, as 
the universal category of all beings (161). He argues that an effect always has more 
causes, circumstances, and also more effects (163). Cause and effect are 
incomparable, as they do not appear together. The effect, as event, belongs within 
phenomenality, but the cause belongs to (metaphysical) ontology (165). Marion even 
reverses the order of cause and effect: hence the effect comes first, is experienced, 
GIVENNESS PRECEDES GIVING 
111 
 
and gives itself as event. And knowledge only begins here (165). Using the examples 
of historical events (which always have many factors leading up to them, but no 
cause, not even a combination of causes) and of natural phenomena like avalanches, 
landslides, and bursts of thunder (which decide for themselves and by themselves), 
Marion argues that in phenomenology necessity and contingency are both modalities 
of the event, which would be a contradiction in metaphysics (168-169). Moreover, 
still one step further, personal experiences can also exist without an adequate cause, 
as in the famous sensation, described by Proust, of the tea and the biscuit:  
An exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses, but individual, detached, with no 
suggestion of its cause (169, quotation by Marion of Proust, emphasis in text).  
In short, the event, now emancipated from its cause, can be characterized as 
unrepeatable (viz. absolutely unique), excessive (viz. exceeding its precedents and 
thus noted as event), and possible (viz. it is happening ‘outside of essence’, for 
existence is not ‘a mere complement of essence’, but it happens, while it also might 
not happen) (170-173). 
 
I propose to interpret these empirical determinations of givenness as contributing to 
this research with regard to understanding the complexity not only of caring 
practices, but also of other phenomena. These determinations uncover the much 
wider range of phenomena as uncaused things that happen, emphasizing their 
uncontrollability, which nevertheless co-determine human life, even to the extent of 
being overwhelming. By showing how many things happen and are not ‘done’ or 
‘made’, hence things that do not involve human action, control, or causing effects, 
and yet that are not irrelevant to human life, Marion emphasizes the need for 
phenomenology and the suspension of ethics. Phenomenology not only uncovers a 
wider contextuality, but also denounces the tendency to prematurely indicate causes 
or intentions and to draw phenomena into the sphere of ethics, of judgment, of 
evaluation. Marion dethrones any premature ethics and puts the scrutinizing gaze 
radically up front. Bringing into view what is given, what is passively undergone, 
what appears as complex and paradoxical due to what is given in life’s currents and 
crosscurrents, sheds a different light on caring and self-sacrifice. Following the next 
section I make a detour in order to connect these pre-moral experiences to ethics. 
But first I turn to Marion’s next step, in which he considers the human subject.  
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c. Receiving the given phenomenon: ‘Me’ being given 
 
With his notion of empirical determinations Marion has shown that phenomenality 
can be led back to givenness and does not need a giver or givee (173-175). I now 
turn to the idea that the I/me is constituted through givenness, as a radical thought, 
opposed to a self-conscious and self-developing subject. This idea contributes to my 
research question, as it takes further distance from the idea of the human subject as 
the one deciding what to do, also in self-sacrifice. When the self not only is 
determined by what happens, but is even constituted as a self by what is given, the self 
of self-sacrifice is a radically different self.  
 Marion argues for a radical reversal in which even the receiver receives one’s 
self from what gives itself (262). What is this receiving about? It is filled with feeling, 
as in the experiencing of a piece of wax, an example already given by Descartes. 
Experiencing wax is mainly feeling it, experiencing it as ‘mine’, i.e. a sensible 
immediacy that insinuates a ‘me’ that is discovered as the receiver itself in the 
experience, hence a receptivity vis-à-vis the manifestation (262-264). Therefore the 
receiver should not be considered an actively awaiting person but can be compared 
to a filter or prism that functions as the ‘consciousness-pole’ of givenness (264). So 
the receiver does not produce what arises but submits to it without interfering or 
causing a disturbance (264). Since the impact of what gives itself brings about the 
arising, the prism too receives itself in the exact instant when it receives what gives 
itself (265).  
 This is the image of the receiver that Marion sketches: the receiver finds out 
about the self through receiving, through experiencing, feeling an impact. The most 
radical impact is that of the saturated phenomenon, which is that which exceeds, 
overwhelms one’s intention, cannot be conceptually grasped, like the sun, which 
dazzles, blinds, and cannot be looked at (Welten, 2000b, 24; Van den Bossche, 2000, 
143-144). Such a phenomenon is the call:  
The impact [when a phenomenon given as saturated arises] will be radicalized 
into a call, and the receiver into the gifted (Marion, 2002a, 266, emphasis in 
text).  
The saturated phenomenon is the radical opposite, or better, the reversal, of 
intentionality. It is this kind of impact by the call that is characteristic of every 
saturated phenomenon, which clearly counters intentionality and submits the 
receiver to the presence of the call (267). Hence Marion states: ‘Thus is born the 
gifted’ (268). The gifted comes into the world by receiving the impact of the call and 
finding itself instituted by it. The four characteristics of the call illustrate its 
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inescapable impact. First, the call has the character of a summons that is so powerful 
and compelling that the gifted suffers from it and has to surrender to it (268). 
Second, the call catches the gifted by a surprise that is overwhelming (sur-prise) 
rather than consisting of objectifying comprehension (sur-prise) (269, emphasis in 
text). Third, the call is not a dialogical situation in an equal relation, but the unequal 
situation in which I find myself interloqué (Angesprochen), that is: called (269). This 
characteristic of interlocution brings Marion to discern the cases of the I: 
It is no longer the case of understanding oneself in the nominative case 
(intending the object – Husserl), nor in the genitive (of being – Heidegger) 
nor even in the accusative (accused by the Other – Levinas), but in terms of 
the dative: I receive my self from the call that gives me to myself before giving 
me anything whatsoever. […] Thus the gifted is delivered straightaway – with 
its birth – from solipsism (269, emphasis in text).  
And the fourth characteristic of the call is its facticity. The call is given, in the most 
literal sense: every human being is first spoken to, before speaking herself. Marion 
denounces the idea of authenticity, as it hides the fact of the call, and the fact that 
the call alone always already gives (me) (as) to myself (270). 
 
With the idea of the call Marion enters the field of intersubjectivity (a term that he 
actually uses, 285) in the final sections of the book (especially §27 and §28, 271-296). 
Marion argues that the call shows itself not in itself but in the response (282-296). 
As in Caravaggio’s painting The Calling of St. Matthew (which is on the book’s cover), 
the call itself is not shown, but rather the silent gesture of a hand indicating the 
question ‘Me?’, thus showing the unheard call, making it visible. This phenomenon 
can also be established within the field of intersubjectivity, for instance, in seduction, 
which does not succeed when the seductive call is not grasped, and in vocation, 
where the call depends on the response (285-287). 
Thus, in the loving intersubjective situation, as well as in that of election, the 
word that takes the initiative (the word that elects, that seduces) begins to be 
understood only when and if the response accords it having been heard – the 
a priori call awaits the a posteriori of the response in order to begin to have 
been said and to phenomenalize itself (287).  
Since the call, as saturated phenomenon, exceeds all horizons, there is no preceding 
expectation, as no hearing can in advance outline a horizon of manifestation for it 
(287). This means that the call is received by the gifted from outside his own 
horizon. The gifted thus does not receive the call as a subject capable of language 
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and understanding, nor as a subject able to receive the call within his horizon. It is 
the other way around:  
The gifted does not have language or logos as its property, but it finds itself 
endowed with them – as gifts that are shown only if it regives them to their 
unknown origin (288, emphasis in text).  
The call finds a way of coming to visibility, because the target of the call opens a 
field for manifestation by lending itself to its reception and to the retention of its 
impact (287, emphasis added, IvN). Marion calls this kind of response of the gifted 
the responsal, which does not pull the call into its own horizon but lets the call speak, 
lets the call phenomenalize (288, emphasis in text). He distinguishes the responsal 
from the response by arguing that the responsal begins as soon as the call finds an 
ear in which to settle (288). The responsal is the prism, the screen, on which the 
phenomenon explodes; and just as the prism or the screen have nothing to say 
about what they make visible, so too the ear does not have anything to say about 
what it hears. And since the gifted only becomes visible in the response, the 
response is belated. This delay of the response to the call leads Marion to redefine 
responsibility:  
All the determinations by which the phenomenon gives itself and shows itself 
starting from itself to the point of exerting a call (impact, counter-
intentionality, unpredictable landing, anamorphosis, fait accompli, incident, 
event, etc.) are concentrated and transcribed for the gifted in the 
responsibility that he suffers from them. The pertinent question is not 
deciding if the gifted is first responsible toward the Other (Levinas) or rather 
in debt to itself (Heidegger), but understanding that these two modes of 
responsibility flow from its originary function of having to respond in the face 
of the phenomenon as such, that is to say, such as it gives itself (293-294, 
emphases in text). 
This ‘having to respond’, however, should not be understood as a will that decides 
about seeing or hearing. Such a metaphysical understanding of the will is opposed by 
Marion (305). The subject does not decide, but the given humbles the gifted (305), 
which receives much more than one could ever imagine (309). Since it is a matter of 
receiving the given, this moment is not preceded by any vision or reason:  
Here opens a space of indecision that cannot be imagined without fright: the 
decision in favor of staging the given as a phenomenon, therefore also that in 
favor of the reason of things, can be made only without vision or reason since 
it makes them possible. The responsal decides with nothing other than itself 
alone (306). 
GIVENNESS PRECEDES GIVING 
115 
 
The will to see does not originate from the self, but it is the givenness itself that 
‘gives’ the will to see (307). This is a complex moment, in which the given gives 
itself and the gifted receives the self as gifted at the same time. And the gifted is 
given a chance to cross one of the greatest divides that he can cross: his indifference 
(308). The given can only wait for its being received. 
 
By way of a preliminary conclusion, I want to stress this redefinition of 
responsibility that Marion offers based on his analysis of the call and the responsal. 
Keeping in mind his distinction between ‘response’ and ‘responsal’, the latter 
preceding the former, he points at the call that uncontrollably enters the ear and 
settles there. Like the call, as well as all phenomena that appear, the gifted suffers from 
having to respond in the face of the phenomenon. This suffering is the originary function of 
responsibility with which the self is endowed. Hence this suffering is not a suffering 
from a moral claim, but a suffering from the impact of the phenomenon as itself. 
Responsibility is radically re-framed as response to the unpredictable, uncontrollable, 
and – in the case of the saturated phenomenon of the call – overwhelming 
phenomenon. Thus responsibility is delayed, since its point of departure lies outside 
the horizon of the self. Even the self itself was not there beforehand but is instituted 
by the call. One finds oneself in the face of the phenomenon. Literally: finding the self. 
Givenness constitutes the self. The self finds the self summoned, overwhelmed, 
interloqué, due to the factual call. 
The gifted then has to decide whether or not to put the given on stage, 
without having anything at one’s disposal but the responsal. This is a moment of 
frightening indecision, in which there is only the possibility of crossing the divide of 
indifference. This view, therefore, does not abandon the self’s agency, but this is an 
agency that is humbled by givenness, which in turn can do nothing but wait.  
 Marion has a lot to offer to the search for an alternative view of the self that 
does not develop the self starting from the self nor from within the self’s horizon. 
He reverses the idea of responsibility as ‘belonging to me’ beforehand. His self is not 
waiting before ‘things happen’. Marion shows how ‘the subject’ becomes ‘a gifted’, is 
transferred from the nominative into the dative, finding the self as having to 
respond. This idea has implications for understanding self-sacrifice. Before I draw 
my final conclusions in this regard, I need to make a detour by describing how 
Marion’s given phenomenon can be interpreted as relevant for ethical reflection on 
self-sacrifice.  
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3. Detour: the relevance of the pre-moral for thinking self-sacrifice  
 
Marion has scrutinized how phenomena appear to experience, in the broadest sense 
of the word and applicable to any kind of phenomenon. He expressly contests any 
containment to whatever horizon, including the ethical. So one cannot and should 
not convert the terms of givenness into ethical terms. Rather, I consider Marion’s 
phenomenology as pre-ethics: it is not ethics, but there is a first impulse toward 
ethics, whereas ethics itself is redrawn by the phenomenological layer. In this 
concluding section I aim to interpret the insights of Marion’s phenomenology and 
see what they yield with regard to self-sacrifice in care. To do this a bridge needs to 
be built between Marion’s radical phenomenology taken as a pre-ethics and this 
ethical research. The detour is taken with this aim. I will argue not only that the 
ethical has the phenomenal as pre-moral but that the phenomenal is in ethics as well. 
Therefore I first return to Marion’s reductions in the analysis of the gift and see 
what they yield for the attempt to conceive of self-sacrifice (a). Second, I harvest 
from Marion’s five determinations of the given phenomenon and see what impulse 
they give for conceiving of self-sacrifice (b). Finally, I return to Marion’s analysis of 
the call and the responsal, and I elaborate on my conclusions with regard to self-
sacrifice of a ‘Me’ being given (c). 
 
a. The reductions of giving and receiving and their consequence for self-sacrifice 
 
In his analysis of the gift, Marion argues that it should not be seen as the object that 
two subjects, the giver and the receiver, have decided to transfer and accept as gift. 
Rather the gift itself prompts both donor and recipient to enter into the 
sphere of giving, [as] subject subjected to, swept up in and acted upon by it 
(201-202). 
Not only can a gift be reduced to the giver, the receiver, or the gift itself, but the 
giver, receiver, and gift can also be reduced themselves. Hence givenness resides 
neither in the receiver, nor in the giver, nor in the gift itself.  
 Marion’s analysis of the gift, I argue, sheds a light on self-sacrifice that differs 
radically from a moral view of self-sacrifice as it is expressed by various care 
ethicists. They confine self-sacrifice to a transfer of something (time, energy, one’s 
life) from someone to another one, at the expense of the former and to the benefit 
of the latter, that is, considered under the terms of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. This narrowed 
view confines self-sacrifice within a chain of cause (expense) and effect (benefit) as 
well as within ethics (good or bad intentions, means, and aims). Marion has 
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shattered this ethical horizon. I go even further than Marion, however, and offer an 
account of self-sacrifice as something that can be done without any intention of 
doing so, as something unintentionally done. Based on Marion’s analysis of the gift 
as unintentional and unconsciousness, in which he actually calls sacrifice ‘the mere 
consequence of self-forgetting of the giver’ (98), my own account allows for the 
removal of intentionality from self-sacrifice. Critics of self-sacrifice could argue that 
this is a naïve account of self-sacrifice, one which ignores the lack of self of 
members of some social groups, causing them to sacrifice more than others. 
However, such a critique would draw sacrifice into the horizon of intersubjectivity, 
of power balance, of good and evil ‘making’ or ‘doing’, which is contrary to Marion’s 
phenomenological approach. He uncovers the possibility of a gift that lacks a 
conscious self. Parallel to this, self-sacrifice too can lack another, a beneficiary, that 
causes or deserves the sacrifice, as well as lacking some ‘thing’ that is sacrificed. As 
with the gift, the receiver can be unknown or undeterminable, and what is given may 
be impossible to return, as it is the self, one’s life.  
Hence the horizon of intersubjectivity of self-sacrifice is broken by Marion. It 
is not necessary that self-sacrifice be intended by someone or received by another 
(let alone be balanced). Nor is it necessary that sacrifice be circumscribed. Rather, 
self-sacrifice is radically pulled out of the hands of a giver, who is not its source. The 
starting point of self-sacrifice lies elsewhere, namely, with the phenomena that 
appear, and especially with the overwhelming phenomenon of the call. 
 
b. Five pre-moral determinations and their consequence for self-sacrifice 
 
In this section I return to the five determinations of the given phenomenon and see 
what impulse they give for thinking self-sacrifice. I proceed as follows: I first give a 
quotation of Marion’s on the determination, followed by a brief explanation; then I 
look for its pre-moral content and its moral relevance; finally I formulate its effect 
on understanding self-sacrifice. 
 
The figure of anamorphosis indicated a willingness of the gaze to change, to move, to let itself 
even be dictated by the phenomenon itself (124). 
Phenomenology is about letting the phenomena appear as they give themselves, 
without presupposed knowledge or theory. This means that phenomena may (or 
necessarily) require the gaze to adjust to moving, or even be ‘dictated’ to move. The 
pre-moral is located in the phenomenon as anamorphosis, in its capacity of directing 
the gaze through its immutableness. The moral relevance is shown in its humbling 
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of the gaze: it cannot dictate phenomena, but must itself be dictated. This sheds a 
different light on self-sacrifice. The self no longer decides nor is in control but is 
rather directed and humbled. And sacrifice is then giving in to the given 
phenomenon, giving up control, moving along with what is given.  
 
The figure of the unpredictable landing showed that the arrival is to be thought in the literal 
sense: not of a continuous and uniform arrival, delivering identical and foreseeable items, but 
of discontinuous, unforeseen, and entirely dissimilar arrivals. Sometimes phenomena arrive, 
sometimes they do not, and each time, differently (132). 
Phenomena do appear, but there is no possibility that one can predict them. One 
can expect them to appear, but it is impossible to know when and how, and even if 
they do. The pre-moral is located in the unpredictability of its landing, which denies 
certainty and shuts the door on controllability. The moral relevance lies in the 
humbling of the subject, turning him into a ‘one being given’, who does not have 
control over what is received, what ‘lands’. Consequently, self-sacrifice appears as 
unforeseen, unpredictable, uncontrollable. The self is humbled, not in command of 
sacrificing, which instead falls upon the self.  
 
The fait accompli showed that facticity does not consist in my being reducible to the factuality 
of a fact, but in exposing me to the fact, which can thus be accomplished only by weighing on 
me, no longer as a detached observer but as an engaged actor – or better, a critical patient 
into whom the fact has crashed in being visibly accomplished (146). The fait accompli 
produces neither chance nor necessity; it opens the possibility by giving it (150). 
If phenomena appear, they do so in fact. And this facticity is experienced as weight, 
as a crash into me, pulling me into what is an inescapable fact, a fait accompli. The 
pre-moral is located in the given fact, the fait accompli, which cannot be made to 
un-happen, and as such crashes into one’s life. The moral relevance is that the 
factual appearing of a phenomenon turns me into an engaged actor, pulling me right 
into the middle, and gives me possibility, a world of possible worlds24. Self-sacrifice 
may also be thought of as fait accompli, when considered as a situation or a relation 
in which one already finds oneself. The idea of fait accompli draws attention to a 
factual situation that crashes into one’s life.  
 
The incident was the coming upon of the given phenomenon. Consisting in its pure arising, 
in the fact of its bursting forth, the incident remains unforeseeable, exceeds all antecedent, 
                                                             
24 I owe this expression to Frans Vosman’s reading of the Sermon on the Mount (Mt. 5). 
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and rests on no ousia. As a consequence, it remains unconstructable, unconstitutable, and 
therefore unavailable (158).  
The phenomenon shows itself, gives itself, by coming upon, through its pure arising. 
There is no form, cause, or essence before the arising; therefore there is no 
possibility to construct, constitute, or have free disposal of it. The pre-moral is 
located in the unforeseeable bursting forth of the incident, which affects us (unlike 
form, cause, or essence, which do not). The incident’s moral relevance is the 
humbling of the (moral) subject, who cannot influence the incident and cannot help 
experiencing it. Consequently self-sacrifice may be thought of as finding oneself in 
an unforeseen situation that is inescapable and puts one in the position of surrender. 
The self can neither escape nor undo the situation.  
 
The event showed the non-caused self of the phenomenon. The self of the phenomenon is 
marked in its determination as event. It comes, does its thing, and leaves on its own; 
showing itself, it also shows the self that takes (or removes) the initiative of giving itself 
(159-160, emphasis in text). The given phenomenon should be understood as event 
without cause or reason (161). 
The given phenomenon shows itself as an event that comes, shows, and leaves. One 
simply finds oneself being given the event. The pre-moral is located within the 
uncaused event that has the initiative of showing itself (or not). This is morally 
relevant, because it breaks the chain of cause and effect, also showing morality as 
something which is not fettered to this chain. On the contrary, it liberates the 
subject, who now finds himself with the phenomenon, free to decide, as possibility. 
Self-sacrifice, then, thinking one step further, appears as an uncaused occasion 
without a history that has led to this point. Self-sacrifice is not necessarily the result 
of previous choices, intentions, character, or commitments, but may be the free 
decision of a moment in which the possibility of giving in is given, without cause or 
reason from the world of barter and any quid pro quo.  
 
In conclusion, the phenomena that arrive and that are not limited to the moral (since 
they do not even stem from somebody, are without cause or intention, and hence 
appear as themselves) uncover the complexity of caring practices. Not only do these 
practices have to deal with facts that stand apart from the ethical, but these facts 
contain the pre-moral that requires a re-framing of the moral. The moral is 
definitively no longer something upon which a detached self can decide. Rather, the 
phenomenal that also contains the pre-moral is and remains relevant throughout the 
moral, directing the self. The contextual, i.e. what gives itself as dictate in 
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anamorphosis, what lands unpredictably upon the self, what pulls the self in the 
midst of the factuality of a fait accompli, what comes upon the self as an 
unforeseeable incident, and what is given as uncaused event, all show the world 
unavoidably outside and beyond my control, my calculation, my agency. However, 
the contextual inextricably binds me, directs me, and pulls me, weighs upon me and 
shows me to be already engaged. My subjectivity is humbled by its passivity, but it 
also forces upon me the discovery of my possibilities. This is further elaborated on 
in the ‘Me’ as gifted.  
 
c. The shining through of the moral: the gifted being called from solipsism and indifference 
 
As I aimed to show in the previous section, Marion’s radical phenomenology can be 
drawn upon in order to replace a view of self-sacrifice in terms of choice, since this 
view draws self-sacrifice within the horizon of a self. Instead, a view of self-sacrifice 
that is informed by Marion’s phenomenology of the gift necessarily incorporates a 
view of the self that is far more passive. Still, passivity is not all there is. For in 
Marion’s considerations of the pre-moral one can almost see the moral shine 
through. In his discussion of anamorphosis, he states that the gaze must be willing to 
be dictated. And in his elaboration of the gifted that is instituted by the call, he states 
that ‘the gifted opens a field for manifestation [to the call] by lending itself to its 
reception and the retention of its impact’ (287, emphasis added IvN). These terms 
express a deed on the part of the subject, despite passivity. 
 Marion entirely refrains from entering the sphere of morality, but he does 
draw attention to the moment of decision (which I interpret as the moment before 
and during the moral phase), which provides the self with the possibility to decide to 
be humbled, to expose himself to the counter-gaze of the icon25, to the 
overwhelming of the saturated phenomenon, or else to remain indifferent. This pre-
moral moment seems to be the moment of choice. It is pre-moral because the 
moment precedes morality (either giving over or not, remaining indifferent or not, a 
givenness that gives the will the occasion to see, but does not decide about its being 
received), and it is pre-moral because the moment is decisive for the gifted to receive 
                                                             
25 Marion distinguishes between ‘icon’ and ‘idol’ as two ways in which God appears to human 
consciousness (hence, both are part of his phenomenological analysis). The ’idol’ is an aspect of a 
‘longing for God’ that directs consciousness. Marion criticizes such divine submission to human 
measures. On the other hand, ‘icon’ is the paradox of an image, which is not an image, a paradox 
that Marion adopts from orthodox theologians. In his phenomenology the icon stands for the 
transcendence of intentionality and the possibility of the appearance of God without becoming an 
idol (Welten, 2000, 18-21)  
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the self as gifted, as exposed to the counter-gaze of the icon, in short, to be born as 
not-indifferent, delivered from solipsism. It is the moment of the silent hand (of 
Caravaggio’s St. Matthew) asking, ‘Me?’, the moment of grasping the seductive call, 
the moment of response to a vocation. This is where, possibly, the moral emerges 
from within the phenomenal. But Marion remains silent here and strictly keeps to 
describing the pre-moral as the possibility of the moral, a possibility given by the 
call, Anspruch: ‘In the beginning, amazement; at first, admiration’ (Marion, 1988, 
180). The subject remains the gifted and never leaves the experience of givenness. 
As a consequence—and this is relevant to thinking self-sacrifice—the moral 
that follows necessarily remains of a specific kind. It will never completely leave 
givenness by becoming completely and fully moral; rather, it remains within 
givenness since the phenomenal will always remain present, including within the 
moral. The moment of decision will return; the possibility of abandoning 
indifference will be repeated with each phenomenon that arises, with each call that 
summons. This makes self-sacrifice dependent on givenness, and the self never 
detached from the call. Morality is first and foremost a response. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
I started this chapter with two questions, i.e. the conceptual question about the 
nature of self-sacrifice and the epistemological question about the relation between 
phenomenology and ethics. The answers to both questions, I repeat, though 
deduced from Marion’s thought, are fully my own, as Marion himself wrote neither 
about self-sacrifice nor about ethics in Being Given. I therefore re-interpret Marion’s 
thoughts on the gift, on givenness, and on the gifted, as containing elements that 
contribute to a new conceptual understanding of self-sacrifice. To sum up, first, the 
self is not a starting point of self-sacrifice, and neither is intersubjectivity its horizon, since a 
conscious self, a beneficiary other, and a reified sacrifice may be bracketed. As a 
consequence, self-sacrifice is radically uprooted from control, from the subject, and 
from the intersubjective relation. It can appear either as unconsciously given or as 
unconsciously received, as consciously but open-endedly given, or as consciously 
received without having the possibility to track down its source; and it can appear 
without an object. Second, Marion’s analysis of givenness makes clear that a much 
wider range of phenomena appears, without cause or intention, uncontrollably 
falling upon the subject, dictating and crashing into the self. Self-sacrifice, therefore, 
can never be considered apart from the wide context of circumstance, situation, or 
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factuality. Not just in extreme circumstances but also in everyday life the given is 
actual, and giving in with the given is a possibility. And neither should the given be 
fettered to a chain of cause and effect, as much more is given, uncontrollably. Third, the 
self is constituted as gifted by the phenomenal and is founded or established by the 
given, literally amidst givenness, and it receives the possibility to abandon 
indifference. Thus the self in self-sacrifice should not be seen as being already 
present, weighing and deciding from a detached point of view, but rather as being 
engaged before decision, being in conflict, having received the decision to give over 
or not. Such a humbled self as gifted in self-sacrifice is a self abandoning the self as gifted when 
remaining indifferent, and sacrificing the self when becoming visible as gifted. Giving in to the 
counter-gaze of the icon, to the call, is, for Marion, to become visible in glory. In 
self-sacrifice—again, going one step further than Marion—this giving in may occur 
when one responds to the call, making it visible, and becoming visible oneself.  
 The epistemological question has been answered extensively in the above 
‘detour’, which elaborates on my claim that care ethics should suspend the ethical as 
long as possible. Marion has contributed to my understanding self-sacrifice precisely 
by his radical phenomenological approach, which uncovers what is experienced in 
the gift, in the real life in which phenomena appear, and in the way that the self is 
not a self that precedes what is given but that finds the self amidst givenness as 
receiver, as dative, as gifted. Although Marion explicitly avoided ethics, looking for 
examples outside of ethics, there is no difficulty in applying his phenomenological 
terminology to human experiences within the sphere of caring. For the examples of 
phenomena are most helpful for ‘de-moralizing’ the caring practice. Like the gift, 
caring too can be un-caused by the self and by the other, and it does not need to be 
reified. It is in no way a case of reciprocity, and no moralization is allowed center 
stage. Just like the appearing of phenomena, diseases or accidents also appear as fait 
accompli, as incidents, as events. They crash into the self, expose the self to the fact, 
not as a detached observer but as an engaged actor, hence as ‘already taken in’, as ‘je 
me suis fait’. What is more, the chain of cause and effect is broken, which has 
another ‘de-moralizing’ effect on caring, for what happens is primarily out of 
control, appears as effect, and exceeds any ethical decision or action. Caring appears, 
happens, befalls someone; and responsibility is not there beforehand but is an 
originary response to the appearance of the phenomenon. Any ‘making responsible’ 
is metaphysics, as Marion argues.  
This epistemology significantly changes the contours of the debate about self-
sacrifice within everyday caring. All shortcuts towards moralization or normativity are 
rejected, and the significance of a wide contextualization of care ethics has been 
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substantiated by Marion’s uncovering of the relevance of the phenomenal for the 
ethical, not only at a preliminary stage, but throughout ethics.  
 
Thus Marion offers a radical view of the de-centered subject that aids our 
understanding of caring and self-sacrifice, by giving a much wider horizon to what 
happens and by what has an impact on the subject. The frame of the subject is reset 
at vital points. However, the subject is not an isolated individual but lives with 
others in relations and in a political context. Care ethics is both a relational ethics, 
thinking about human connectedness, and a political ethics, raising the questions of 
politics, power, community, and conflict on the social and political levels. For this 
reason, in the next chapter I turn to the political-ethical theory of Honneth, who has 
thought about the human dependency on the recognition of others as a political-
ethical foundation. The questions to be answered concern the idea of the desire to 
live together that founds the political organization of the community, which does 
not dispense with conflict but involves conflict as a means of developing the 
political society, rooted in the moral experience of injustice. A view of the 
community that incorporates these points allows one to conceive of self-sacrifice 
without reducing it to subordination or oppression.  
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 CHAPTER 4: Struggle for community 
 
In the Introduction I presented stories that uncover a reality of self-sacrifice in 
caring. Not only did I show using these stories that self-sacrifice is part of caring, 
but I also argued that self-sacrifice is a metaphorical concept that helps illuminate 
caring practices. I claimed that care ethics fails to think through self-sacrifice as part 
of the caring practices. Part of this failure has to do with the way care ethics frames 
the subject. In the previous chapter I elaborated on the subject’s passivity with the 
help of Jean-Luc Marion’s concept of givenness. This provided a rich idea of how a 
self finds the self amidst what happens, what is given, what is already there and must 
be undergone by the subject. As a consequence, space is found for thinking of self-
sacrifice, not as restricted to an ethical horizon of a responsible agent, but as a way 
of giving into what life gives, what befalls the subject as given. This reframing of the 
subject as far more passive creates more space for understanding self-sacrifice and 
even making it a plausible course of action.  
Another dimension of the subject, however, needs to be elaborated on, that 
is, the subject as a member of a political society. This is a political-ethical question, 
so I turn to political theory in this chapter. I argue that care ethics needs a different 
political-ethical view of society and show how subjects within society relate to 
themselves and to others, in order to understand self-sacrifice as something else 
than idealized subordination or praised heroism. In other words, care ethics needs a 
new framework for understanding the political sphere. I suggest three alterations, 
but first I introduce the problems I have with how care ethics frames politics, with 
regard to self-sacrifice.  
Especially thanks to the pioneering work of Joan Tronto, care ethics is a 
political ethics. It is definitely to her merit to have explicated that caring is essential 
to life not only in the private realm but equally in the public realm, for building up 
society. She presupposes a community in which life is shared and caring takes place 
to support that community, for instance, in her and Berenice Fisher’s definition of 
caring as everything ‘we’ do to maintain, continue, and repair ‘our’ world so that ‘we’ 
can live in it as well as possible. Despite its importance, caring has been politically 
and morally marginalized. Therefore she aims at empowering care as a moral and 
political concept as well as empowering those involved in care. When I conceive of 
self-sacrifice on a political level, I do so suspicious of the ideological misuse made of 
self-sacrifice to keep both political and religious power mainly in the hands of 
Western, highly educated, economically and socially powerful white men. 
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Thinking about self-sacrifice on the political level, however, can be done in a 
radically different way, to the benefit of an understanding of everyday caring. With 
his idea of stopping aggression through recognition, for instance, Honneth has 
shown modernity’s pitfalls with regard to conflicts: this idea breaks the chain of 
cause-effect. Community exists in the making of it. And in the process, conflict 
appears, not as mere oppression or exclusion, but as a way of developing the 
community and letting ever more people participate as members of that community. 
The basic idea is that people sacrifice (parts of) themselves for the good of a shared 
life, but they do so in an ambiguous manner. The ambiguity stems from the 
awareness of the many goods that exists, of which only one or some can be aimed 
at. This plurality of goods makes conflict and struggle inevitable. Nevertheless, living 
a shared life with others makes self-sacrifice indispensable. Hence I want to think of 
a moral foundation of the community that motivates people to sacrifice themselves 
in their aim of a shared life. And I also want to include in the idea of community the 
idea of ambiguity and plurality of goods, which makes conflicts indispensable. Such 
a conception of the community allows for the tensions and ambiguities that make 
self-sacrifice understandable, not as a simplistic subordination or heroic self-
effacement, but as an ambiguous practice within a shared life. I have substantiated 
this idea with stories from literature, movies, and real life, in which this ambiguous 
and conflictual character of self-sacrifice was uncovered, such as the story of Lucy 
(Coetzee), which shows how the societal level and the personal level are intertwined, 
leading to tensions and ambiguities that are not resolved but endured. Lucy’s 
experience, she maintains, would be debased if it were reduced, for instance, to a 
public call for justice or to a matter of economics, feminism, or politics. She resists 
this reduction and holds on to the personal experience as well. Therefore, a view of 
wanting to live together that requires sacrifices (even of the self) is needed. For this, 
the private and the political should not be separated, but self-sacrifice in caring 
should be thought through within the tension of politics and personal life, of 
wanting to live together despite required sacrifice. 
In sum, three problems are raised regarding self-sacrifice in caring on the 
political level. First, there is this problem of separating the public from the private 
sphere. This separation is inadequate and detrimental to both. When caring is 
represented as belonging to the private sphere it is marginalized and impeded from 
having moral and political impact. In such representations, social mechanisms and 
oppressive (political and religious) ideologies, of which self-sacrifice is often a part, 
are at work, as has been uncovered by feminist and womanist analyses. Hence, when 
thinking about self-sacrifice, one should not separate the private from the public 
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domain. Therefore I suggest a critical relation between the two, in which self-
sacrifice can be seen as an understandable and plausible course of action in both 
domains.  
The second problem is that, if power is understood in the Weberian sense as 
‘being able to impose one’s will upon others’, then self-sacrifice can only be viewed 
as either subordination or oppression. Care ethics can gain from an alternative view 
of power that illuminates what people actually aim at when building society by 
caring. More importantly, it contributes to understanding self-sacrifice since it helps 
one to understand the political as a domain in which people (like Coetzee’s Lucy and 
the Beslan grandmother) aim at a societal good in giving care, without depreciating 
or effacing themselves while sacrificing themselves. Hence I suggest an alternative 
view of power that builds up a community, in other words, gives it coherence.  
The third problem is closely related to the second. It concerns the relation 
between conflict and building up a community. Care ethics thinks of care as building 
up a society and also empowering those involved in care, which requires political 
struggle. But what is lacking is a political view of the relation between community 
and conflict. This is relevant to thinking about self-sacrifice, since self-sacrifice can 
be required in the tensions inherent in being part of a community yet striving for 
recognition. Therefore I suggest a view of the community that does not lack 
conflict. 
It is the goal of this chapter to find this framework for politics that is 
reframed in three respects – as entailing a critical relation between the public and the 
private, a view of power that gives coherence to society, and a view of community 
that does not exclude but involves conflict as unavoidable and necessary for 
developing the community. 
 
In order to find this altered framework and think through these questions I turn to 
Axel Honneth. His thought enables care ethics to analyze the modern idea of 
conflict. I use two works of Honneth: Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen 
Grammatik sozialer Konflikte (2003, 1st ed., 1992, translated as The Struggle for Recognition. 
The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, 1995) and Verdinglichung. Eine 
anerkennungstheoretische Studie (2005; literal translation: reification, a study in the theory 
of recognition). In these works Honneth (drawing upon Hegel) represents the 
elementary relation of the subject to the self and to others within a moral society 
through conflicts. His notion of recognition also involves a view of caring. Kampf um 
Anerkennung is Honneth’s primary work on Hegel’s theory of recognition, on which 
he further elaborated in later works. In Verdinglichung he develops the basic idea of 
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emotional involvement, also in the public sphere. Although I am aware that 
Honneth has written more about the relation of the subject to others in personal 
and societal relations (Honneth, 2010, 2011) and has thoroughly discussed the issues 
of political philosophy with feminist Nancy Fraser (Fraser & Honneth, 2003), I have 
limited myself to these two studies. They provide important insights to help me 
think through the three key questions of this chapter.  
 
In this chapter I proceed as follows. In the first section, I briefly present the main 
lines of Honneth’s thought in these two works in relation to my research questions. 
In the second section I turn to Kampf um Anerkennung. I present his thought guided 
by my research questions. In five subsections I present Honneth’s thoughts and the 
conclusions to which his thoughts yield regarding self-sacrifice. However, Honneth 
limits his idea of recognition as affective relation (i.e. the first form of recognition) 
to primary relations, which he describes as relations of love, relations of friendship, 
and relations of parents and their children (2003, 151-153), in short, as emotional 
bonds that exist between a small number of people (153). Since this first form of 
recognition also contains care (Fürsorge), and this form is connected only to the 
primary relations within the private sphere, he limits caring to that sphere (151-153). 
What is more, he takes mother-and-child care as an elementary pattern (elementares 
Muster) for this form of recognition in other love relations (162), thereby founding 
care on an essentialistic dyad. This view has been contested by care ethics because it 
privatizes, naturalizes, and marginalizes care. I concur with care ethics here and 
consider the reduction of affectivity to the private sphere detrimental to both 
spheres. The question that arises regarding this part of Honneth’s work is: how 
about caring for others, for relations further away, for those we do not look in the 
eyes? To answer this question, I turn in the third section to another of Honneth’s 
works, Verdinglichung. In this work he elaborates on the idea of an initial emotional 
involvement in intersubjective relations, also in the public sphere, that may be lost 
when subjects are turned into objects (reification). I close this section with my 
conclusions regarding self-sacrifice in public relations, such as in professional care. 
In the fourth section I present Honneth’s contribution to this research concerning 
the three questions that I presented above. Honneth provides the tools for thinking 
critically about the relation between the political and the private spheres; he also 
provides an alternative view of power; and his thoughts are important for thinking 
about the community and conflicts. These three points help to reframe the political, 
which is important for thinking about self-sacrifice in caregiving and also 
contributes to a further understanding of caring on the political level. However, 
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questions remain about how Honneth thinks about the subject’s affectivity regarding 
unknown others and about the subject’s vulnerability. I return to these questions at 
the end of this chapter and indicate how I seek an answer to them in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
1. Introduction to Honneth’s thought 
 
Using the ideas of the young Hegel, Honneth designs a normative social-political 
theory in which people develop themselves as well as their society, not based on the 
defense of their self-interest (à la Hobbes), but rather based on a moral longing to 
live well together with others (à la Aristotle). The driving force behind this 
development is the subject’s moral longing for recognition, leading him or her to 
enter a struggle to gain it. Honneth draws on Hegel for this moral motivation for the 
community, which is a desire to live together, to share their lives in an organized 
society. This, however, does not exclude conflicts, for the members of a society are 
involved in constant struggle for new and wider forms of recognition. This ‘struggle 
for recognition’ is central to Honneth. What is more, the notion of care is found 
within his idea of recognition. He elaborates on three forms of recognition – love, 
respect, and solidarity – as the stages of subjective and collective development, and 
he supports this thesis empirically with the help of social psychology. Corresponding 
to the forms of recognition are three forms of contempt, which are motivational 
impulses to social conflict and the struggle for recognition.  
 In Verdinglichung, Honneth elaborates on the idea that in interpersonal life 
emotional involvement and connectedness precede knowledge, as a subject’s 
identification with another person is essential for entering a world full of meaning. 
Verdinglichung is especially relevant to my research since it overcomes the separation 
between the private and public sphere in Kampf um Anerkennung. Honneth, again, 
seeks empirical support for his conceptual thought by drawing on psychology, but 
he also finds categorical support for this thesis.  
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2. Honneth’s Struggle for Recognition26 
 
In this section I turn to Honneth’s Kampf um Anerkennung (2003 [1992]). From this 
work I select those parts that are relevant to my questions. First, although Honneth 
in this work limits affective relations to a small number of primary relations and 
thereby excludes affectivity from public relations – a view that I reject, as argued – 
he does present a view of the subject that on the individual level also regards the self 
as socially and politically embedded, i.e. as a member of society, as a subject of legal 
recognition and social esteem (without affective bond). This idea offers the 
foundation for thinking the critical relation between the private and the public, as 
the public sphere and the public forms of recognition are present in the individual’s 
relation to the self. However, the matter of the public sphere lacking affective 
relations needs to be further examined in the following section with the help of his 
work Verdinglichung, which makes an essential contribution to the other two 
questions (power and conflict). First, he offers an alternative view of power, i.e. an 
alternative to the Weberian view of power as the ability to impose one’s will on 
others. I seek an understanding of power that does not divide oppressors from 
oppressed in an overly dichotomous manner, but that also accounts for the 
common aim that people have of building a society, which they do when giving care. 
In other words, caring seems to aim at a good that requires the organization of a 
community. Despite possible and actual domination and oppression, there is also a 
sense of a ‘shared life’ in a ‘shared world’, which points at an underlying moral 
motivation. Honneth, drawing on Hegel, elaborates on this idea in a way that allows 
for thinking about self-sacrifice not as submission or oppression but as contributing 
to a common good. Second, his view also incorporates conflict within the political 
view of community, as community develops through conflicts that follow from 
experiences of injustice. This dialectics, I argue, creates space for thinking about self-
sacrifice as a moral and political struggle for a good.  
With regard to these questions I primarily pay attention to the following 
elements of Honneth’s thought: (a) the original idea of a dialectic between the 
morally motivated community and the struggle of the young Hegel; (b) the 
systematic actualization of the structure of social relations of recognition, first by 
providing empirical socio-psychological support for the idea of indispensable mutual 
recognition and (c) second by providing empirical support for the thesis that the 
three forms of recognition are the necessary stages of the development of ethical life 
                                                             
26 References to Honneth’s work are made to his German work Kampf um Anerkennung (2003 
[1992]). I have reworked Honneth’s language in order to make it inclusive. 
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and of intersubjective social relations; (d) the three corresponding forms of 
contempt that are the motivational impulse for the struggle; and finally (e) the moral 
logic of social struggle. Each subsection consists of the presentation of his thought 
and a concluding paragraph in which I think through what his thoughts yield for 
thinking about self-sacrifice. 
 
a. The dialectic of morally motivated community and conflict 
 
Honneth’s work is founded on the original idea of the young Hegel that one can 
discern a moral tension within society that Hegel called ‘struggle for recognition’. It 
takes place between individual subjects as well as between groups, and it stimulates 
the practical and political development of institutions that guarantee the freedom of 
individuals. Hegel proposes a moral basis of societal development, which means that 
social progress starts with the moral longing for recognition, inducing individuals 
and groups to struggle for recognition whenever society fails to give it to them. This 
moral basis is opposed to the idea that individuals and groups only enter into social 
struggles when their self-preservation is at stake (2003,11-12).  
Hegel’s idea was inspired by Aristotle’s classical political thought as well as 
Christian natural law, which defend the idea of ‘natural ethical life’, i.e. that humans 
by nature reach their destination within the moral society of the polis or civitas (13). 
Hegel opposes Machiavelli and Hobbes, both of whom see humans as basically 
egocentric, involved in a constant hostile contest for self-preservation (14-16). The 
goal of political practice in this latter view is to bring the continuous conflict to a 
halt, time and again. Hegel opposes this reduction of politics, but he uses this idea of 
a constant struggle to explain the moral tension within society (18-19). 
Hegel aims to theoretically develop a situation of moral totality, in which the 
members of society recognize their own eventual singularity within their publicly 
practised mores and customs (Sitten) (23-24). Essential building blocks for his theory 
are recognition (drawing on Fichte) and struggle (drawing on Hobbes). Recognition 
is the willingness of individuals to simultaneously and mutually restrict their own 
free space for action in favor of the other. At this point a common consciousness 
develops that can succeed in gaining objective legitimacy within the law (30-31). 
Hegel reinterprets Hobbes’s idea of struggle as a moral medium for the 
development from an underdeveloped condition of ethical life towards an ever more 
mature phase of ethical relationships. When subjects experience a new dimension of 
their special identity, they must also experience a conflict with the already achieved 
step of common ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in order to gain recognition for this new 
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form of their individuality. His concept of the social area, thus, essentially involves 
both the moral tensions and the social medium through which the conflicts can be 
aufgehoben, i.e. brought to a higher level on which they are resolved (32). 
 
Honneth’s thought develops the idea of the community as motivated morally by the 
longing of individual subjects and groups for recognition by society, which requires 
struggle. Hence community develops by means of conflict towards a consciousness 
of a common good that requires the continuous struggle for extending mutual 
recognition. This is important for my research, as it provides an answer to my 
second and third questions concerning a view of power as building community 
without excluding conflict. Honneth presents a political-ethical understanding of social-
political life in a community in which conflicts are unavoidable due to the moral tensions within the 
community. The community is founded on the moral motivation to belong together. 
At this stage it is important to point out the basic dialectic between the ideas of 
community and struggle. The community is the indispensable context in which the 
individual life develops, which from the start requires the restriction of the 
individual’s free space for action. This is not a question of oppression but of 
common ethical life within which the self’s identity develops and gains recognition 
through conflict. Underneath the actual conflicts in society, caused by a moral tension between 
the already achieved step of common ethical life and the not yet recognized new form of identity, there 
is a moral motivation for common ethical life.  
This idea makes space for thinking of self-sacrifice not as oppression or 
subordination but rather as something that is required of all, handing in free space for 
the benefit of all, for the common good that serves all, including the self. It may also 
entail self-sacrifice when one is morally motivated to enter the struggle to gain new 
recognition for new forms of individuality. Hence the good that is served cannot be 
separated between ‘my’ good and ‘the other’s’ good, but it is a common good, as the 
recognition that is gained is mutual, i.e. simultaneously given to others and received 
by the self.  
 
b. Empirical support for the idea of indispensable mutual recognition 
 
Honneth turns to the philosopher George Herbert Mead (114-147), who developed 
a social psychology drawn on Hegel, for empirical socio-psychological support for 
the view that it is mutual recognition that develops both the self’s and the 
community’s identity. Mead researched the development of human awareness and 
the eccentric perspective that is its condition (119). In order to understand this, he 
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distinguishes between the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’, the latter being the socially interactive 
part, the former being the agency of human personality that is responsible for the 
creative response to action problems, but without ever becoming visible. Both are in 
constant dialogue within the one personality (120). He reverses the usual relation 
between the I and the social world, asserting the priority of the observation of 
others over the development of self-awareness:  
A ‘Me’ is thus not an early formation. […] It is rather the transfer from an 
area of social objects into the amorphous, unorganized area which we usually 
call the inner experience (120). 
The Me is no longer the neutral agency of cognitive problem solving but also 
embodies the moral agency of intersubjective conflict resolution, thus changing 
from a cognitive into a practical image of the self (122-123). The idea of the so-
called ‘generalized other’ is the developmental mechanism in which the subject 
internalizes moral norms arising from the behavior expectations of all members of 
society. This idea informs subjects of what they may legitimately expect of others’ 
behavior and of what duties they justifiably have towards others, through which they 
learn to understand themselves as members of an organized society (125). Mead 
calls this mutual relation ‘mutual recognition’, in which subjects understand 
themselves as legal persons and in which generalized others recognize them as such 
(126). Rights are, to a certain extent, individual claims, of which the subject can be 
certain that the generalized other will comply with, and as such they are a solid but 
merely general basis for self-regard (127-128). 
 This general recognition does not apply to the specific abilities of persons that 
distinguish them from others. It is mutual recognition as a member of society, not as 
an individual subject (129). Mead elaborates on the subjective identity by focusing 
on the frictions between the Me and the I. As the Me accommodates the social 
norms, controlling the subject’s behavior as to make it correspond to social 
expectations, the I is the collection place of inner impulses that find their way out in 
involuntary reactions to social challenges. The I is a reservoir of psychic energies of 
different kinds (desires, imaginations, fantasies, sensitivities) (130-131). The Me, 
however, is not the mere internalization of socially recognized norms of society, as it 
is constantly evaluated in light of these inner forces, which may be incompatible 
with the social norms (131). This friction between the I and the Me is, according to 
Mead, the basic character of the conflict explaining the moral development of both 
individuals and societies: the Me embodies the conventional norms by representing 
those of the respective society, which the subject is constantly trying to widen, in 
order to be able to socially express the impulses and creativity of the I. The Me has 
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an interest in the I, which is the Me’s partner in justifying the Me’s actions (133). 
Therefore the Me is dedicated to the struggle for new forms of social recognition 
(132). The Me, then, must anticipate and imagine a new, enlarged just society that 
allows for these new realizations (133-134).  
Mead argues that the abundance of these normative ideals stimulates subjects 
to constantly change the social system of society, thanks to their intelligent 
imagination of a counterfactual new society (133-134). This argumentation provides 
the social-psychological basis for the struggle for recognition, taking moral deviation 
as its historical driving force (134). A historical chain of normative ideals emerges, 
increasing personal autonomy, which Mead calls the ‘process of civilization’ and is a 
widening of the quality of legal recognition (135). Mead explains this process by 
pointing at the uncontrollable forces of the I, which push the movement of 
recognition time and again, widening the legal relations and struggle for an enriched 
society. Honneth calls this process the ‘struggle for recognition’ (136), which, when 
pushed by charismatic persons influencing large groups of people, can have 
revolutionary effects in two respects: first, society is widened by the enlargement of 
individual free space and, second, rights are being applied to an ever larger circle of 
persons (137-138). 
 
To conclude this subsection it can be stated that Honneth finds socio-psychological 
support for the development of the community through the struggle for recognition. 
Mutual recognition is indispensable for development of the self as a person, 
including the dimension of being a member of society, and it is indispensable as well 
for developing the society as a growing space for individual freedom and as an ever 
larger circle of persons. What is especially relevant to my research is that it offers a 
new idea for thinking of the subject as relating to the self and to (plural) others on the political level, 
i.e. to ‘the third’ or ‘others’ outside the immediate social context. The subject relates 
to the self and these others in mutual recognition, that is, as members of the society, 
not as individuals. This is essential to Hegel and Honneth. Although they separate 
the private and public spheres, it nevertheless is clear that to them the individual 
incorporates the public sphere, such as moral norms and expectations of all 
members of society, and one understands that on the political level one is 
generalized in the mutual recognition as a member of society. Hence the self 
develops through others, and self-understanding includes intersubjective 
expectations that always involve political ideas, norms, and duties as members of 
society. 
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Thus when the self has transferred others, the society, and institutions (such 
as citizenship) into the self, the self experiences a tension within the self between the 
individual and the common interests or aims, which Mead calls the tension between 
the I and the Me, i.e. between inner forces and social norms. This struggle is a basic 
friction that explains moral development of individuals and societies. Self-sacrifice 
may take place within the tension between conventional norms and the impulses for 
new forms of social recognition, either by ignoring one’s inner forces in order to 
meet established social norms, or by sacrificing the self’s need for recognition by 
being true to inner forces, causing one to enter a struggle that dismisses existing 
social norms and aims to establish new ones. In both cases, however, the ambiguity 
of the preference is obvious, as the other good is not contested but confirmed as 
well. Self-sacrifice is not an unambiguous choice for one good by refuting the other 
goods, but is rather a preference for one good in the awareness of other goods. The 
first option was chosen by Jane Eyre (Brontë), who, well aware of the good of her 
love, ‘planted her foot’ on the norms given to her. The second option was preferred 
by Lucy (Coetzee), who acknowledged the public factors playing a role in her 
situation that justified her father’s call for justice, but who nevertheless gave 
preference to her inner force to safeguard her network of relations. 
This idea contributes to our understanding of self-sacrifice, as it is not 
restricted to self-sacrifice for the sake of one other, but is also possible with regard to 
‘all’ in a society, including the self as a member of this society. This differs from the idea of 
self-sacrifice as sacrificing for others alone, damaging the self, which is rightfully 
criticized by feminists and womanists (cf. Chapter 2); and it makes self-sacrifice 
more ambiguous. Honneth’s work helps make it conceivable that self-sacrifice 
serves a common good without oppression, exploitation, or lack of self-worth, as it 
entails both sacrificing (part of) the self and establishing the self as a member of 
society.  
 
c. Love, respect and solidarity as necessary developmental stages  
 
Honneth presents three forms of recognition that he regards as necessary stages in 
the development of ethical life and of intersubjective social relations, for which he 
also finds empirical support. This is relevant to my research, as the first form 
contains care. However, it also raises questions to which I turn afterwards. 
 
(1) The first form of recognition, love, was considered by Hegel as the mutual 
acknowledgment of subjects having concrete needs and hence as needy beings (153). 
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His argumentation implies that whenever a subject does not recognize the other 
subject of the interaction in some way, neither is the self fully or unlimitedly 
experienced as a person. So there is a ‘pressure of reciprocity’ within the system (64).  
Honneth argues that empirical support for this thesis can be found in 
psychology. Especially psychoanalytic object-relations theory has illustrated that love 
is a form of recognition enabling persons to have affective relations on the 
condition that in early childhood they learned to create a balance between symbiosis 
and self-assertion (157). Honneth builds on Winnicott’s theory of this development, 
according to which a child, in his or her first months, depends on the mother’s 
practical care for his or her needs to such an extent that both are merged. The 
mother learns to adapt herself to the helpless neediness of the infant, and she herself 
in turn needs the protecting recognition by third persons of her own precarious 
dependency, which corresponds to the complete helplessness of the infant (160). It 
is important to note that this insight, i.e. Honneth’s recognition of the position of 
the mother who has to learn to adapt and who in turn needs others to support her, is 
lacking in Van Heijst’s critical analysis of Honneth’s work (Van Heijst, 2008, 
especially 47 and 49). However, I share her critique of Honneth’s limited view of 
both care and the subject, to which I return below. 
Later, both mother and child develop into two separate (but related) persons, 
gaining new independence, when the mother regains her attention for a larger social 
field, forcing the child to renounce immediate fulfillment of needs, and when the 
infant intellectually develops and learns to differentiate between the I and the 
environment (160). They enter the stage of ‘relative dependency’, in which the child 
learns to see an object as a being with rights of its own (162). This makes ‘love’ a 
special relation of recognition (167). The child’s elementary trust that others will take 
care of her needs (i.e., will recognize these needs), because these needs are of unique 
value to others, is an indication of self-consciousness (168). In other words, ‘love’ is 
defined as mutual relational independence in adherence27. 
This first mother-and-child relation proves to be essential for successful 
affective relations with others later in life. The unconscious memory of the original 
merging with the mother leads to the wish to merge again with one other in this 
way. Love emerges through new disappointment by a new separation, leading to the 
recognition of the other as an independent person (169). The two abilities, to be 
alone and to dissolve limitations and merge with the other, are mutually demanding 
counterbalances that together enable a reciprocal being-with-the-self in the other 
(Beisichselbstsein im Anderen) (170). 
                                                             
27 With special thanks to Frans Vosman for this illuminating phrase. 
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Honneth concludes that this form of mutual recognition logically and 
genetically precedes the other forms, because the love relation causes a certain self-
relation in which subjects mutually develop an elementary confidence in themselves. 
The experience of love forms the psychic condition for the subsequent development 
of self-regard (172). 
 
(2) The second form of recognition, respect, is different in almost every sense (174). 
For within the emotional relation of sexuality and the family no struggle for 
recognition is needed. However, the integration into the moral community, in which 
subjects understand themselves as persons endowed with rights, requires the use of 
universal norms for interaction. It takes place through the struggle for recognition 
(68). Legal recognition is the expression of the conviction that each person is a legal 
person, which is equally true for all subjects, and that each person should count as a 
‘goal in itself’ (179-180). Since each subject within legal relations also needs to 
recognize all others’ moral accountability, a quality that is needed for legal 
recognition can be indicated. This would be at least the ability to decide about moral 
questions in individual autonomy, which entails that the modern legal state is 
founded on the assumption of the moral accountability of all its members (184-185). 
These conditions have increased historically (186-190). Recognition has unfolded 
both on an individual level – meaning the enlargement of individual, but socially 
guaranteed, freedom – and on a universal level, in the growing circle of groups of 
people who are now recognized as having the same rights as others. Thus, the 
struggle is about both the material quality and the social range of the status of a legal 
person (191).  
When the subject has gained self-confidence in the love relation, the 
acknowledgment of one’s rights is an anonymous sign of social regard (Achtung) 
(192), through which persons are enabled to relate positively to themselves, i.e. are 
enabled to ‘self-regard’ (195). 
 
(3) The third form of recognition, apart from love and rights, is social esteem (soziale 
Wertschätzung). It is social recognition that enables subjects to positively relate to 
their own concrete qualities and capabilities. It presupposes the existence of an 
intersubjectively agreed upon horizon of values (196), a social orientation toward 
values, serving as a means to decide whether personal qualities contribute to 
common goals (198). In modern society the positions of social esteem are subject to 
a constant struggle in which different groups try to claim esteem for their way of life 
by means of symbolic violence (205). As social esteem is also indirectly connected to 
SACRIFICE 
138 
 
the distribution of financial means, this struggle for recognition is also an economic 
struggle (206).  
Honneth advocates the concept of solidarity for this third form, arguing that 
social esteem may be gained by a social class when the group has struggled 
collectively, experiencing solidarity in their togetherness. Solidarity is also 
experienced when revolting against political oppression or when different groups 
have to survive crises (e.g. war) together and social boundaries disappear (207-208). 
These kinds of relations can be called ‘solidary’, because they are marked not by 
passive tolerance, but by active interest in the individual specialties of the other 
person. The social relations of symmetrical esteem do not entail mutual and equal 
estimation, but indicate that any subject has the chance, without collective 
gradations, to experience oneself and one’s own capacities and qualities as valuable 
for society (210). 
 
To conclude this subsection, I value Honneth’s contribution to thinking about self-
sacrifice. His view of the three forms of recognition helps us to see how individuals 
develop within socio-political relations, how the development of society is morally 
motivated, and how in each form of recognition a tension exists between the 
subject’s own interest and the common good. He offers something that up to now 
the ethics of care, including Van Heijst, is not able to offer: a political-ethical 
standpoint that incorporates longing for community and changes the game of 
violence and conflict and its cause-effect chain in modernity. What is more, his view 
gives a specific place to care. The positive side is that he does not ignore care, while 
the negative side is that in this book Honneth restricts care to the private sphere, 
and within that primarily to the mother, which marginalizes care. For the moment I 
leave aside my critique in order to focus on what Honneth yields for thinking about 
self-sacrifice.  
 In Honneth’s idea of recognition, the forms of love, respect, and solidarity 
together form a staged process of individual and societal development in which a 
shared life is confirmed and institutionalized. These forms of recognition precede 
and resonate in the practices of caring and express what society expects and requires 
of its members in social relations. They are a further elaboration on the political-
ethical view that allows for tensions in which self-sacrifice may emerge and even be 
required. In Honneth’s representation of love, this can be seen in how the mother 
has to learn to adapt to the needs of the child, as well as in his argument that others 
need to support her. Hence the mother’s adaptation is not without tension. The 
tension that is caused by legal recognition and solidarity is perhaps harder to see, but 
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it comes to mind when looking at politics that aim at state security and thereby 
ignore or infringe on human rights; it also comes to mind when looking at any 
highly technical, protocolized, systemic28 context (such as professional health care) 
in which people must act according to rules and protocols to the extent that 
individual capacities and qualities are hardly recognized. Within these tensions there 
is, on the one hand, a moral motivation for recognizing this other person (as 
loveable, as a legal person, as specifically capable or qualified) and, on the other 
hand, pressure to ignore this by treating the other without recognition. Self-sacrifice 
may occur within this tension, for example, when a parent decides to care despite 
undermining her or his well-being; when a nurse decides to act against protocols in 
solidarity with a patient; or when a person decides to become a whistleblower by 
uncovering illegal systems, risking her or his own security. Hence conceptually self-
sacrifice emerges as a safeguard against non-recognition. I elaborate further on this in the 
section on Verdinglichung.  
 
However, at this point I also need to criticize Honneth. First of all, in his uncritical 
use of psychology he represents the mother-and-child symbiosis in the first stages of 
life as an essentialist view of the biological mother as the exclusive person capable of 
fulfilling the child’s practical needs. As I argued in Chapter 1, this is a dangerous 
approach to care, essentializing as well as privatizing it, and thereby marginalizing it. 
Limiting care and affective relations to love relations impedes the possibilities for 
thinking of care as an affective openness and commitment to unknown others. This 
is a serious problem that he fails to consider in Kampf um Anerkennung. However, in 
Verdinglichung, to which I turn below in section 3, he alters his view in this respect 
and applies the idea of emotional involvement to other relationships as well. Yet this 
is a question that remains to be further investigated. I examine how one is affected 
by unknown others and committed to others outside the private sphere in both 
Chapters 5 and 6.  
Second, in his idea of legal recognition, Honneth presupposes the ability to 
decide about moral questions in individual autonomy, hence the capability (Fähigkeit) 
of moral accountability of all members (184-185). He makes this capability a 
condition for legal recognition. This view entails the idea that the agency of those 
who lack this autonomous ability is contested, which also has consequences for 
thinking about self-sacrifice. For it presupposes a primarily self-reliant subject; 
                                                             
28 Van Heijst uses the term ‘system’ and its adjective ‘systemic’ to characterize the health care 
institution that is regulated by laws, regulations, and professional codes of conduct. The terms 
refer to codified ways of action that are required by such regulations (Van Heijst, 2011, 172). 
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moreover, its emphasis on individual autonomy uncovers a lack of reflection on 
human dependency as an essential quality. This also has serious consequences, as 
those lacking the capability of moral accountability are denied their status as subjects 
of rights. This legal discussion (for instance regarding mentally disabled care-
receivers) exceeds the boundaries of this research, but developing a view of the 
subject that is more passive and radically related to others is a chief goal of this 
research. This is a matter that calls for further research, to which I turn in the next 
chapters.  
 
d. Three corresponding forms of contempt 
 
Honneth describes three forms of contempt that run parallel to the three forms of 
recognition, thereby answering the question of how the experience of contempt can 
be the motivational impulse behind social resistance, conflict, and even the struggle 
for recognition (213-214). The first type of contempt affects the physical integrity of 
the person, violating what is learned in the love relation, the self-confidence and 
trust in one’s ability to coordinate one’s own body. The second form of contempt is 
that of structurally excluding subjects from certain rights in their own society (215), 
restricting their autonomy and denying them the status of full, morally equal 
interaction partners. The consequence is loss of self-regard (216). The third form is 
contempt for the social value of individuals or groups, regarding certain forms of life 
or convictions as inferior or deficient, harming the chances of certain (groups of) 
subjects to ever gain social recognition of their own qualities. The individual thereby 
loses self-esteem as well as the chance to understand the self as esteemed for his or 
her qualities and capabilities (216-217). 
The three forms of contempt can also be described metaphorically as 
experiences of decline of the embodied human being: physical death, social death, 
and ‘Kränkung’ (a German word meaning both insult and injury). This use of 
language indicates both that contempt endangers the human identity just as illnesses 
do and that one’s attention is drawn to one’s situation by the experience of 
symptoms of suffering from contempt. These negative feelings (whether shame, 
anger, offence, or contempt) can form precisely the affective impulses motivating 
the struggle for recognition, as they stem from the constitutional dependency of 
humans on the experience of recognition. Feelings make individuals aware that they 
are socially excluded from certain forms of recognition (219-220). The feelings 
aroused in the subject by contempt may cause him or her cognitively to decide 
against the injustice that is inflicted and be the motivation to political resistance. 
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Honneth argues that whether this cognitive potential becomes a political-moral 
conviction depends on the political-cultural environment (224). 
 
In conclusion, conflicts are experienced through negative feelings aroused by 
contempt, and these feelings provide motivation for struggle and political resistance. 
Honneth offers a political-ethical understanding of feelings. This is an important 
contribution to care ethics. For care ethics assigns a moral-epistemological value to 
feelings. Honneth shows how feelings can have political-ethical consequences, 
which is an adequate approach to uncover the realities of (informal and professional) 
caring in late modernity. Further, Honneth puts conflicts center-stage in the 
development of both the individual’s and the community’s identity. Through 
struggle the forms of mutual recognition are chosen and contested, leading to new 
struggle and new coherence. The experience of contempt, therefore, is not only 
inevitable but also necessary for further development, both individually and socially. 
The self’s and the community’ identity are both a work-in-progress. Experiences of 
injustice lead to resistance; hence victims are not passive but find their motivation 
for action in their moral outrage. Here the community is further developed, through 
struggle. Sharing life together is not free from conflict, but instead it needs conflict 
to gain new and expanded freedom for all.  
However, one additional remark needs to be made here. In Kampf um 
Anerkennung Honneth rightly supposes the agency of all, and I agree with this, as 
argued in the previous subsection. However, despite his sensitivity to marginalized 
positions, it is necessary to incorporate into his view the idea of vulnerability, i.e. the 
idea that some persons depend on others who in their place are affected by the 
injustice or contempt that is inflicted on them, and who in their place struggle for 
their recognition. Honneth does not express that here, but addresses it in his section 
on the moral logic of social struggle, where he connects solidarity to social struggle 
for a collective identity. To this I turn in the next subsection.  
 
e. The moral logic of social struggle 
 
The moral logic of social struggle, according to Honneth, drawing from Hegel, is 
founded on the idea that a social struggle does not originate in the defense of an 
interest but in the moral experience of injustice (258-259). The Hegelian model puts 
the internal conflict in the center, for the experience of having gained a certain form 
of recognition again and again opens up possibilities for new identities, so that a 
struggle for recognition is the necessary consequence. Not all three forms of 
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recognition, however, unfold according to this logic. Love, as the most elementary 
form, does not contain the moral experience leading to social conflicts (259), as the 
forms of both respect and solidarity do, because these latter forms depend wholly 
upon socially generalized criteria. Here, individual experiences of contempt can be 
understood as key experiences of an entire group. What is more, the entire idea of 
‘struggle for recognition’ may be considered weak, as it does not indicate what kind 
of struggle is intended (violent or nonviolent), nor does it decide about the 
intentionality of the forms of conflict (intended or unintended), nor about the goals 
(personal or impersonal) as long as they are semantically recognized by many as an 
expression of their collective identity (260-261). On the other hand, this descriptive 
openness is counterbalanced by its capacity to explain how the motivation behind 
social resistance and revolt is formed, not by a utilitarian consideration, but rather 
within the framework of moral experiences that emerge from the unfulfilled 
expectations of recognition (261). 
The origins of social movements depend on the existence of a collective 
semantics that allows one to interpret personal experiences of disappointment as 
something that not only affects an individual but also a lot of other subjects in the 
same way. This new subcultural horizon of understanding may motivate a new 
collective struggle for recognition (262). Political action pulls the victims out of their 
passively suffered contempt and helps them to gain a new and positive relation to 
the self. This transformation of humiliation into action involves an engagement that 
enables individuals to relate indirectly to themselves as having moral or social value. 
This holds even more so because of the mutual solidarity that can be experienced 
within the political group, which can be experienced as a form of recognition (263-
264). Hence, Honneth argues, moral feelings are the retarding or hastening moments 
in an overarching development process (270). 
 
In conclusion I want to point out three things. First, Honneth’s political-ethical 
theory depends on experiences of injustice and the moral motivation to struggle 
against them. This is his important contribution to care ethics, which also elaborates 
on experiences of injustice and conflict but subsequently turns to relationality and 
contextuality. Honneth offers a political-ethical view that regards conflicts as part of the 
process of developing the community. Underneath injustice and conflict lies the 
desire of people to live a shared life and build a society, in which moral practices 
that aim at a common good for all are indispensable. Caring is one such practice that 
Honneth considers indispensable. I conclude that self-sacrifice may be required in 
moral practices, such as the struggle against injustice and the collective building of a 
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good society for all. Second, Honneth here opens a space for those who lack the 
means to struggle for recognition themselves, by indicating that feelings of solidarity 
and an understanding of a collective identity may lead to a collective struggle. 
Solidarity is experienced with those suffering from injustice and with and for whom 
one engages in the struggle for recognition. As argued above, he offers a political-
ethical understanding of feelings by giving them political-ethical weight as retarding or 
hastening moments in the political development of the community. The understanding 
of the collective identity supports this struggle, since an unjust society affects all 
members. Therefore struggling to gain recognition for others also affects a person’s 
self-understanding as a member of society. Thus self-sacrifice in the social struggle is 
to be understood as sacrifice for a common good, in which the goods of the other 
and of the self are intertwined. And third, Honneth here reiterates the separation 
between the private sphere (in which no social struggle is needed) and the public 
sphere. As argued before, this is a detrimental reduction. I turn now to this problem, 
making use of Honneth’s other work, Verdinglichung, in which he thinks differently 
about this separation and also examines conflict in the primary emotional 
involvements.  
 
 
3. Honneth’s recognition as emotional involvement in public relations 
 
As I already indicated, Honneth in Kampf um Anerkennung limits recognition in the 
form of love to the private sphere of primary relations, where caring takes place. 
Honneth thereby privatizes love and marginalizes care. In limiting care and affective 
relations to the private sphere, he impedes the possibilities for thinking of care as an 
affective openness and commitment to unknown others. Therefore, in Kampf um 
Anerkennung, Honneth fails to think of care as building society outside the private 
sphere; he redraws the boundaries that marginalize care, and by excluding the 
affective domain from public relations he fails to think of care as a collective, public 
practice. In this subsection I turn to Verdinglichung, in which he presents a different 
view. I first present his point of departure and then the main lines of his thoughts. I 
conclude with my reflection on self-sacrifice.  
 
Honneth offers a different view of relations in the public sphere in his book 
Verdinglichung (reification) (2005). The reason for this altered view is that he seeks 
ways to rehabilitate the term Verdinglichung to describe a social practice in which 
original recognition degenerates or gets distorted (27). As such, it is a further 
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elaboration of his idea of recognition. Honneth is struck by the reappearance of the 
term Verdinglichung (coined by Lukács in 1925) in several sources, such as literature, 
sociological studies, ethics and moral philosophy, and brain research, meaning 
different things (11-17). Where it appears as a normative term, it indicates a 
tendency or sphere in which people treat each other as lifeless objects, violating 
moral and ethical principles. Honneth, however, analyzes the origin of the term 
Verdinglichung to determine whether Lukács’s originally non-normative term is 
adequate to describe a social practice in which people start treating themselves, 
others, and their environment as objects (27).  
 
Honneth’s central thesis is that recognition (Anerkennung) precedes cognition. He 
describes recognition (with references to Hegel, Heidegger, and Dewey) as affective 
relatedness or positive awareness (38), as an existential interest and a practical and 
original commitment in the world (41), or a favorable attitude (38). Cognition (= 
knowledge) is the emotionally neutral orientation (38). Empirically this is supported 
by psychology, which shows that in a child’s development emotional involvement 
and connectedness precede knowledge. Identification with another person is 
essential for a child when entering a world full of meaning (48-53). For meaning is 
first grasped emotionally, and only then cognitively. Honneth finds categorical 
support in Cavell’s argument that an acknowledging attitude always precedes 
understanding, meaning that the non-epistemic confirmation of human personality 
when facing the other precedes epistemology (54-59). For instance, the expression 
“I know you got hurt” is not an expression of a certainty but rather an expression of 
sympathy or participation (Anteilnahme) (56-57). If one is not capable of this attitude, 
one is not capable of maintaining social relations (57). 
According to this primary recognition, subjects gain knowledge of the world 
(including themselves and others) only when entering it in an involved, engaged, 
emotionally connected way. The question then arises of what it is that causes 
subjects to start treating others with a different attitude, turning the world and 
subjects into things (hence reification, Verdinglichung) and forgetting this primary 
recognition (Anerkennungsvergessenheit) (69). Honneth indicates as possible social 
causes those practices or mechanisms that systematically enable or stabilize such 
forgetfulness (99). Considering the reification of others, he speaks of losing the 
ability to understand the expressions of others as an invitation or challenge to a 
response (70). He gives the example of a game of tennis in which a player’s ambition 
to win leads her to forget that the opponent is her best friend and that the original 
aim of the game was to play tennis together (71). Causes may be either the 
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participation in social practices in which the mere observing of others has become a 
goal in itself to the extent of erasing any consciousness of the primary relation with 
the other, or by letting oneself be governed by a system of convictions and beliefs 
that forces one to deny the original recognition (100). Both ways are characterized 
by the forgetting of something that was intuitively mastered previously, in the first 
case due to the participation in the practice itself, in the second case due to the 
assumption of a specific worldview or ideology (100). In the case of participation in 
the practice, Honneth sees the law as having the protective function of guaranteeing 
recognition within practices (101). Examples from professional health care come to 
mind, such as when the law serves to guarantee a patient’s right to refuse treatment.  
More difficult is the relation between social practice and intersubjective 
reification in the case where people let themselves be governed by a system of 
convictions and worldviews due to the reifying typification of groups of persons 
(such as women or Jews) (102). The difficulty is how a mere construction of thought 
or description could influence human interaction to the extent of denying groups of 
persons those qualities which they self-evidently possessed in the primal recognizing 
relation (102). Honneth finds an explanation in the correlative interplay between 
convictions and practice, when the practices of distant observation and instrumental 
understanding of others are cognitively supported by reifying typifications, and 
when – the other way around – the typifying descriptions are fostered by the 
corresponding frameworks of one-sided practices (103). This interplay allows people 
to treat others as things, denying their primary recognition (103). Here too examples 
from professional health care come to mind, such as when patients are treated on 
the basis of convictions – conscious or unconscious – concerning self-management, 
activity stimulation, or autonomy, reducing the (suffering) patient to a consumer 
satisfying a need. 
According to Honneth, reification of the self is caused by the social practices 
of self-presentation of subjects. Although all social action requires a reference to 
one’s own wishes and goals, there are also “institutionalized fields of practices” in 
which one presents the self, like job interviews or customer-related or dating 
services (104). These institutional facilities latently force individuals to pretend or to 
fake, since personal encounters are replaced, captured, and marketed by accelerated 
information processing, stimulating self-reifying attitudes (104-105). Honneth only 
indicates what kind of practices can be stimulated by reifying attitudes, thereby 
aiming to show that societies can fail in different ways than only the violation of 
principles of justice (106-107). 
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To sum up, Verdinglichung uses Honneth’s view of recognition as affective 
relatedness in the broader social context as well. For in this work the public sphere 
too is filled with meaning that subjects have ‘inherited’ from their primary caretaker, 
including concerning ways of interaction with other human beings, affirming and 
acknowledging the personalities one encounters. A key insight is that the primary 
recognition is forgotten as soon as the other person is reified and turned into a thing 
or a means serving a goal. This view extends personal intersubjective involvement to 
the public sphere, where the subject needs to recognize the other as personality and 
to remember the primary involvement he has with others (as opposed to, for 
instance, patient neglect). This idea allows for affective relations in the public sphere 
as well. In this way Honneth meets the objection raised against his earlier restriction 
of affectivity to the private sphere. In Verdinglichung Honneth’s point of departure is 
the subject’s participation in a social practice in which emotional involvement is part 
of each subject’s initial introduction into the world in which meanings are shown 
and assumed, before any emotionally neutral separation from a primary involvement 
occurs. 
 This insight of Honneth contributes to reflection on self-sacrifice in caring in 
the public sphere. The argumentation of Verdinglichung helps to apply the concept of 
recognition as affectiveness also in the public sphere, as affective involvement in the 
world. Recognition is an original involvement in the world, through which each 
human being first learns to grasp the world as filled with meaning. This original 
involvement enables people to relate to the world and to others in a meaningful way 
throughout life. When, for instance, the primary caretaker shows a love for certain 
flowers, the child can later relate to these flowers in the same appreciating way. The 
same holds for learning to be affectively open to unknown others and to appreciate 
a caring attitude towards them as meaningful. This appreciating attitude can be 
forgotten – Honneth speaks of the forgetting of recognition 
(Anerkennungsvergessenheit) – but it nevertheless remains present, though hidden. Self-
sacrifice can then be seen as a form of recognition in the sense of Father Kolbe’s 
self-sacrifice: ‘Yes, I see that you need to be rescued at this very moment, and yes, I 
–fortuitously I – can and will offer to rescue you, sacrificing myself’. Self-sacrifice is 
the recognition of a concrete other as well as the primary recognition of the self’s 
relatedness to and involvement with this other as meaningful for both. Self-sacrifice 
can also be a form of vigilance against Anerkennungsvergessenheit, when in the social 
sphere people ignore and fail to appreciate others.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
I started this chapter with three questions about a political view of self-sacrifice. The 
first question was how to account for a critical relation between the private and the 
public domain; the second was how to conceive a non-Weberian view of power that 
accounts for people building a community; and the third was how such a view can 
incorporate conflict. 
Honneth furnishes a political-ethical view of the community that allows for 
thinking of self-sacrifice as essential to building the community as an 
institutionalized society, although his view does not prescribe this way of thinking. 
Regarding the first question he provides two major insights. The first is that the 
individual incorporates the political domain by transferring norms, expectations, and 
institutions into the self and also relates to the self as a member of society. 
Therefore engaging in institutions – like citizenship or parenthood – is not separate 
from the way in which a subject acts privately. One meets duties as a parent, 
exercises rights as a citizen, in the private sphere as well as in the public sphere. 
Relating to the self includes relating to the self as a member of society that 
participates in its institutions by accepting or – for that matter – struggling against 
their requirements. Hence on the individual level a relation exists between the social 
norms and the inner forces, which can also be a critical relation. For the individual 
may experience a basic friction between social norms and inner forces that explains 
the moral development of individuals and society. However, this friction does not 
prescribe what to do. I substantiated this view with arguments drawn from the 
stories of Jane Eyre (Brontë) and Lucy (Coetzee), who both chose to sacrifice the 
self, but in different respects, the first remaining true to established social norms, the 
second to inner forces. Both, however, testified to the tension, and thereby to what 
they sacrificed. I radicalize the insight that Honneth allows for but seems not to 
adopt himself, i.e. the insight into the deep political character of the so-called 
(modern) private sphere. This is relevant to the ethics of care in general, and to 
thinking about self-sacrifice in particular: self-sacrifice is the re-ordering of bonds in 
living together. 
The second insight into the relation between the private and the public 
spheres can be derived from Honneth’s work Verdinglichung, in which affective 
openness and commitment to unknown others is rooted in the original experience 
of commitment when entering the world. Recognition precedes cognition but can be 
forgotten. In social relations mechanisms systematically enable or stabilize such 
forgetfulness (99). Hence an original recognition also lies at the basis of social 
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relations. Self-sacrifice, I have argued, can be a form of such recognition, as in the 
story of Father Kolbe, and it can also be a form of vigilance against 
Anerkennungsvergessenheit.  
With regard to my second question, Honneth provides a view of power as a 
longing for recognition that is essential to developing the self and the society. This 
idea of power as a centripetal force entails an alternative view of the community and 
of the role played by power. Honneth adds a layer to the idea of power in the 
Weberian sense: before power is the ability to impose one’s will on others, there 
exists a morally motivated community in which individuals simultaneously and 
mutually restrict their own free space in favor of the other, through which the self 
gains freedom in mutual recognition. This longing to live together is empirically 
supported by socio-psychology’s discovery of the need to be recognized by others in 
order to develop a self. In the stages of love, respect, and solidarity the self is 
recognized as loveable, as a legal person endowed with rights, and as person with 
special qualities and capabilities that contribute to the common good. These forms 
of recognition also may require self-sacrifice in the acknowledgment of the common 
good for which the I restricts itself.  
With regard to my third and final question, Honneth provides an alternative 
and more radical idea of conflict. Care ethics has thought about conflict, about 
social opposition, abuse of power. Honneth, however, thinks of the community as 
involving a continuous process of development that depends on the struggle to gain 
mutual recognition, hence that depends on conflict. In other words, community is 
continuously built through the centripetal force of wanting to belong together and 
through conflicts. Here conflicts are not means of oppression or exclusion but ways 
to build the community and to let more people participate. The moral motivation 
for struggle lies in experiences of injustice. When the self seeks recognition of new 
dimensions of its identity that are not yet recognized but treated with contempt, a 
struggle is needed. And since the collective identity of the society resonates in each 
member, social injustice can foster feelings of solidarity with others that motivate 
the self to enter a collective struggle for justice for all. Hence, a view of the 
community to which people want to belong and which they aim to extend with new 
forms of recognition and a wider circle of members allows us to think of self-
sacrifice as required for the improvement of the society, either as a form of 
recognition or as vigilance against reification.  
What is more, Honneth offers a new insight that is highly relevant to care 
ethics, viz. a political-ethical view of feelings. Through his work we have come to 
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see that feelings also have political-ethical impact as retarding or hastening moments 
in the political development of the community. 
In sum, Honneth offers a new political frame that makes room for self-
sacrifice. Politics is reframed as a critical relation between the private and public 
domains, in which power also incorporates a moral desire to live a shared life in 
mutual recognition that is developed through conflict.  
 
However, three questions needing further investigation have been raised in this 
chapter. The first is how one is affected by unknown others and committed to 
others outside the private sphere and outside the primary relations. For even though 
Honneth, in Verdinglichung, argues for affective relatedness and original commitment 
in the world, of recognition as an acknowledging attitude that precedes knowledge, 
this does not yet explain how others outside the primary relations affect the subject. 
Honneth elaborates on how the subject enters the world, grasping meaning first 
emotionally and then cognitively, but his starting point remains the subject, whose 
involvement is with a concrete world, and not an unknown world or unknown 
others. This does not account for the experience of encountering a strange, 
unknown, arbitrary suffering other. I therefore need to return to phenomenology, in 
order to think through this experience of meeting the other as other, as coming from 
the outside, as ipseity, an experience that radically transcends the self and does not 
start with the subject. Second, I argued that the view of the subject needs to 
incorporate more vulnerability than Honneth takes into account. Honneth’s view of 
the subject emphasizes human capability (Fähigkeit), such as the human capacity for 
moral accountability. The subject is primarily a self-reliant subject. This emphasis on 
individual autonomy displays a lack of reflection on human dependency as an 
essential quality. I argue that recognition is also required for human passivity 
(passibilité). In the next chapter I therefore turn to Housset’s analysis of pity. He 
explores the way in which being passively affected by the encounter with the 
suffering other intrudes on the self and is the means of finding the self. What is 
more, he elaborates a phenomenology of the community that is rooted in affective 
human coexistence. Unlike Honneth, who emphasizes the need to build community, 
Housset’s phenomenology shows how a community is rooted in the experience of 
encountering the suffering other. And third, as Honneth argues for a view of 
feelings that has political-ethical impact, I am seeking a view of feelings that 
discloses the pitfalls of feelings as well as the ways feelings can be useful to ethics. 
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 CHAPTER 5: Affective coexistence 
 
The overall aim of this research is to conceive self-sacrifice as a plausible practice 
within practices of caregiving, to inquire into the conditions under which it can be a 
plausible course of action, as well as a constituent of caring practices. In order to do 
so, I have argued that an understanding of the self is necessary in which the self is 
not a self-enclosed entity to whom another is a threat, but rather is connected to 
others to such an extent that goods are shared, and the goods of others and of the 
self are not distinct. I argued that care ethics needs a view of how lives are shared 
and a ‘we’ is not only presupposed but also desired as an aim in caring. In such a 
view self-sacrifice is not reduced to a diminishment of the self but is inevitably part 
of the shared life. 
 In this chapter I go in search of answers to four questions that have emerged 
in this research. First, the question that remained after the discussion of Honneth’s 
view was how the subject can be affected by an unknown other. Another question 
that emerged in the previous chapter, in reaction to the idea that the community is 
built (as Honneth argues), is the question of how to think about the self as finding 
itself amidst a community and experiencing a community when meeting a suffering 
other. Third, care ethics places great importance on feelings, opposing dominant 
rationalistic ethics. However, how can feelings be a trustworthy source of ethics? 
And finally, I am seeking a de-centered subject, a search to which Marion (Chapter 
3) has a lot to offer. However, the question remains of how the de-centered self can 
be connected to the self as a moral agent.  
In this chapter I turn to Emmanuel Housset’s L’intelligence de la pitié. 
Phénoménologie de la communauté (2003), which provides answers to these questions. 
Housset is a former student and a scholar of Jean-Luc Marion, who wrote the 
preface to his student’s book. Before I explain the book’s relevance to my research 
and its divergence from the works that I discussed in the previous chapters, let me 
first introduce his thought with the help of an extensive quotation from L’intelligence 
de la pitié. 
In a manner that is quite amazing, in mercy it is difficult to accept that his 
suffering is precisely his, unimaginable as it seems, and as such it is 
incomparable with all my past suffering. No parallel can be made here 
between the experience of the other and that of my recollection. Thus, the 
suffering of the other alters me, not because I could live it, but because it 
evokes in me an otherness I have to receive in order to remain true to myself. 
[…] The test (l’épreuve) of pity teaches that its origin does not lie in me, nor in 
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the other, but in a community of destiny. In this neither intentional aim nor 
pure passivity, pity is that affection which precedes our decision and frees 
human beings by inviting them to be enlightened by the light of goodness. 
Thus, compassion is sadness that gives me to be (qui me donne à être): being 
aware of this alteration in the heart of my intimacy, I can decide to give 
myself without rest. That is why the sadness, while remaining true sadness, is 
not opposed to the joy that accompanies the work of mercy: “He who shows 
mercy, with cheerfulness” (Romans 12:8) (Housset, 2003, 109-110, transl. 
IvN)29. 
This quotation illuminates the fundamental theme of Housset’s work. I consider it 
point by point. In seeing another person suffering it must be accepted that the 
other’s suffering is his, not mine, and that it remains incomparable to my own 
experiences. Seeing the other suffering engenders mercy in me, altering me without 
making his suffering mine. It alters me in a different sense: I receive an otherness in 
me that I must receive, or else I betray myself. In other words: receiving an otherness 
is receiving a destiny that is unalterably mine, my own, and if I decline this 
otherness, I decline myself, the possibility to be and become myself. In pity I am 
tested: do I affirm my originary belonging to a community of destiny? However, this 
belonging is not my decision, but is given me, liberating me by inviting me to be 
enlightened by the light of goodness. This sadness is a grace that enables me to give 
myself without rest. Here sadness and joy are intertwined, for in sadness I find my 
destiny.  
This quotation requires explanation, by way of introducing Housset’s 
thought30. Housset combines phenomenology with theology. More to the point, he 
uses theology to radicalize his phenomenology. The background of his thought is 
incarnation theology, indicating the joy of the light of life. All light originates in God 
who has brought it to the world in the incarnation. Hence his thought is radically 
vertical: the ultimate gift is the incarnation. Hence the first giver is God, and people 
can receive His gift as a grace, and in consequence of this can give. When people do 
so, they fulfill their destiny, given by God. His phenomenology concentrates on the 
concrete experience of pity in which the subject is overwhelmed by the suffering 
other and in which a community arises (cf. his subtitle). He approaches this 
intersubjective encounter starting from a sadness (tristesse) that does not exclude joy, 
as the above quotation makes clear. Joy and sadness accompany the work of mercy. 
                                                             
29 As is clear in this quotation, Housset uses miséricorde (mercy), pitié (pity), and compassion as 
synonyms. 
30 With special thanks to Frans Vosman for illuminating this to me, personal conversation 6 June 
2013. 
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His radicalization of the appearing itself (‘the phenomenal’) of giving and receiving, 
which illuminates my research on self-sacrifice, is owing to his theological 
foundation. It is in line with Marion’s radical phenomenology, which is also inspired 
by the question of God. Marion seeks to make phenomenology true to its own 
criteria by not allowing shortcuts or premature exclusions; hence he seeks to make 
room for thinking the most radically impossible—God. However, Housset’s 
theological-phenomenological approach differs from Marion’s in two respects: first, 
Housset explicitly incorporates theology in his phenomenology and, second, he 
explores the relation of undergoing (pathos) and moral acting (ethos).  
I have adopted Housset’s approach in this research because his view offers an 
entirely new way of looking at self-sacrifice, precisely because of his phenomenology 
radicalized by theology. Therefore I also must discuss his theology, which offers a 
radically wide horizon of having received a grace that is a task to show mercy, which 
also fulfills the human destiny. When people act according to this God-given task, 
they participate, they take part, with others, in some movement that is larger than 
themselves. Even if one cannot affirm the vertical dimension here, one can possibly 
accept a horizontal transcendence in time, expanding one’s understanding of the self 
as a being preceded by an undiscoverable origin and aiming at an unreachable better 
future. However, this is not Housset’s approach.  
 
Having offered this introduction and explanation of how Housset relates to this 
inquiry, I proceed as follows. In the following section I first elaborate on the 
questions that led me to his work. I present what I found in the previous chapters 
regarding these questions and indicate what remains for further consideration. In the 
subsequent four sections I order these questions with reference to the four 
frameworks that I presented at the end of the Introduction: the subject, 
intersubjectivity, the community, and the horizon of meaning, which loyalty to 
Housset obliges me to call ‘grace’. Each framework, I have argued, needs to be re-
framed. Housset’s view is a challenge to all frameworks. I start each section with a 
presentation of my problem, then I present Housset’s thoughts, and after that I 
reflect on his thoughts and how they challenge and contribute to answering my 
problem. In the concluding, fifth section I give a survey of how Housset’s work can 
be interpreted as a response to my questions and how these reset frameworks 
contribute to thinking about self-sacrifice. I conclude by presenting the questions 
that remain for the next chapter. 
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1. The questions leading to consult Housset  
 
With Housset’s help I aim to answer the question of how a self is affected by the 
other, as well as how a ‘we’, i.e. a community, comes about through the 
commonality that is experienced in this affectivity. This phenomenological analysis 
of the affected self and the encounter as the source of community leads to a 
different understanding of self-sacrifice, one characterized by affectivity and 
commonality. What is more, from the stories considered in the Introduction it 
became clear that people do actually sacrifice themselves in caring for others. 
Rejecting self-sacrifice in caregiving shortcuts any possibility of understanding why 
they do so and why it might even be plausible to do so. Housset’s work contributes 
to the plausibility of self-sacrifice in three respects. First, his phenomenological 
approach scrutinizes how people find themselves being affected in the situation of 
meeting a suffering other. His analysis of pity as both an emotion and a source of 
knowledge is key to incorporating affectivity into ethics. Housset’s refutation of the 
classic objections against emotions within ethics helps to acknowledge their role, 
especially since he connects emotions to knowledge. His work proves to be an 
important help for care ethics as a concrete ethics making room for affectivity and 
concrete involvement as a practice that also serves as a source of knowledge. This 
approach is helpful for thinking about actual situations in which self-sacrifice turns 
out to be plausible. Second, Housset argues that in the meeting of the suffering 
other – who could be a familiar person or a perfect stranger – a human commonality 
is experienced that founds the community. His analysis of how meeting the suffering 
other leads to a repetition of this suffering within the self is helpful for 
understanding what happens when one shares a commonality with the other and a 
sense of community arises. Third, as indicated, Housset founds his analysis of pity 
on the Christian belief in God as the giver of sense and direction to human life. As a 
Catholic this is a central theme in his work. The interesting idea is that pity cannot 
be roused or founded by the self alone, nor can it be caused by an accidental other, 
nor carried by the community alone, but rather it is rooted in beliefs and convictions 
about what has been given that subsist in the community.  
 I have found threads of this proposed different view in the previous chapters. 
That is, other authors have provided ideas that can be connected to Housset’s 
thought, although they have not addressed them in the same way or as elaborately. 
The first element, the concreteness of meeting another in need of care, being 
affected by the other and responding morally by giving care, has been a key element 
in care ethics (e.g. Noddings). The radical phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion, 
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considered in Chapter 3, shows that the passivity of the subject entails being subject 
to what has been given, and it extends the insight of ‘being affected’ to a far wider 
horizon of being given everything that befalls the subject. However, an ethical 
elaboration of this passivity that connects pathos and ethos is offered not by Marion 
but by his student Housset. Honneth’s empirically informed theoretical idea of a 
struggle for recognition, considered in Chapter 4, allows for resistance against 
injustice and recognition of a suffering other. However, Honneth’s political theory 
as considered in the previous chapter leaves unanswered the question of the 
subject’s self-reliance and individual autonomy. This emphasis on self-reliant 
individuality does not account for the concrete situation of the inter-human 
encounter in which the subject is affected and his self-reliance is interrupted. This is 
where Housset is helpful, by making the encounter itself the starting point of a 
concrete ethics.  
The second element of Housset’s work is a deeply revealing insight that has 
not been absent in the previous chapters, although there it has not been considered 
phenomenologically, as Housset does. One can find an indication of the idea that 
commonality is discovered in the concrete meeting of the suffering other in 
Tronto’s idea that one can recognize the needs and concerns of others, even of 
those on the other side of the world, although she connects this idea to the idea that 
one must be attentive to one’s own needs first. Hence she presupposes a common 
humanity. Her moral and political argument for a caring democracy of equals is 
based on the sociological argument that all are givers and recipients of care. 
However, a more concrete foundation is provided by a phenomenological analysis 
of how and why human beings experience commonality and become involved with 
each other in a community. Housset provides this analysis. Moreover, Honneth’s 
view illuminates how and why human beings are involved with each other in a 
struggle for recognition, rooted in the desire to live together that is the source of 
developing identity and community. His theory also includes an analysis of how the 
originally recognized commonality may be lost through violence, disregard and 
reification. Housset’s analysis makes this view more concrete by explaining how any 
objectification of others is broken by the encounter with the suffering other.  
The third element of Housset’s work relevant to my research, the idea that 
human pity is founded in the pity that is shown by God, picks up the theological line 
of thought of Chapter 2. This idea entails a view of individual and collective life as a 
trajectory in which people share their lives with others in given or preferred relations 
and in which they grow together in a community of fate. Sharing life in a trajectory 
between a past and a future, between a present factuality and an imagined future of a 
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good life, is imagined against the wider horizon of meaning, including convictions, 
beliefs, and hopes. This renders self-sacrifice conceivable as participation with 
others in that trajectory. Although Housset’s theological project does not coincide 
with my ethical research aims, his idea that grace is recognized individually and in 
the human community as a wisdom that guides human practice provides a new and 
more radical way to elaborate on self-sacrifice.  
Hence Housset’s phenomenology of pity and of the genesis of the 
community contributes to my inquiry into whether self-sacrifice is plausible in caring 
practices and as a constituent of care. Affectivity, commonality, and grace are the 
key insights that he provides. Their radicality aids in the rethinking of four 
frameworks, which I present in the next sections: the self (section 1), 
intersubjectivity (section 2), the community (section 3), and horizons of meaning 
(section 4). The reframing will, of course, have consequences for understanding self-
sacrifice in caring. 
 
 
2. A new framework for understanding the subject  
 
I need a new framework for thinking about the subject, because a framework in 
which the self can find its self-realization within the self and by the self alone can 
only understand self-sacrifice as self-destruction. It presents the self as an isolated 
individual pursuing individualized goals. What is needed is an understanding of the 
self in which the other is indispensable for the self to become the self. Marion 
emphasized the subject’s givenness but refrained from doing ethics. Honneth 
illuminates the subject’s need for recognition by others, but his view presupposes a 
primarily self-reliant subject and insufficiently takes the human dependency into 
account. Housset’s view fills these gaps.  
 
Housset is helpful for conceiving the subject as not enclosed in itself. He opposes 
the modern idea of man as Hercules, capable of creating itself, perfectly in control 
of itself, without weaknesses, dedicated to the infinite task of accomplishing its 
essence and capable of enduring anything (Housset, 2011, 85). Such a subject would 
never be affected by nor committed to others. Housset’s subject is affected by pity 
by the sight of the suffering other. Pity shatters the closed circle of the self. Pity 
invades the self, is a modality of my exposedness to the other (73). Feeling and 
intelligence join together in pity, immediately bringing the subject to know that he is 
being seized by this other. Hence, for Housset there is no dichotomy of feeling and 
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knowledge. He argues for a subject that is open to the world, uncontrollably and 
undeniably affected and seized by pity. He draws new attention to the need to 
distinguish between the order of ethics and the order of pathos, for pity belongs to 
the latter rather than the former (2003, 12). Pity uncovers the impact of seeing 
somebody else suffer, which is instantaneously disarming and overwhelming. The 
encounter not only gives me the suffering other, but it gives me the foundation of 
the self as well. Moreover, it is the original experience without which there is no me, 
no neighbor, no duty. In the sharing of suffering, the other person gives himself or 
herself in an irrefutable way as my neighbor, as one who assigns to me a being and a 
task (14). The task is to be there where the other emerges in weakness and to 
partake in this original community of suffering and joy, which is not initiated by me 
(16). 
In the next subsections I look more closely at two elements of this view that 
particularly pertain to the subject: first the relation between the subject’s feeling and 
ethics, and second the particularities of Housset’s open subject. After that I return to 
my question and see how Housset contributes to a reframing of the subject. 
 
a. Pity: from the interior sentiment to an ethical moment 
 
Pity is not only a feeling, but it also transforms the subject by evoking the feeling of 
‘I must’. In stressing the need to avoid both the abstraction of an ethic of a pure will 
and the naivety of a morality of sentiment taken as a pure passivity, Housset 
provides an insight necessary to my research into self-sacrifice. He stresses that pity 
is a feeling that seizes the subject even before the subject is aware of this seizure. 
The experience of pity shows both what precedes the individual being and the 
ethical moment that follows, as Housset proposes a dual status for pity (double statut 
de la pitié): there is a pity anterior to conscience as well as a pity that is developed by 
reflection (43). Pathos precedes ethos, and it remains present in the ethical moment.  
 Housset considers pity a mystery and wants to take both its sentiment and its 
ethical knowledge seriously. But how can it be taken seriously that pity is the 
participation in the pain of others without acting as if it is mine? The moment of 
rational decision as an ethical moment cannot be abolished, he argues, for feeling 
does not yet mean knowing what is just. The moment of feeling is not the same as 
the moment of responsibility (52). However, it is also not to be confused with a 
primary form of self-affirmation. Rather it is a primary tearing loose of the self 
without which one cannot really pay heed to the good. The interior sentiment is not 
a natural affection. For Housset it is essentially a grace arising from the encounter 
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with the other, and so is theologically founded. The danger lies in the wish to pass 
immediately from feeling to observing, thereby abandoning the feeling (53). Within 
pity, as an interior sentiment, the subject communicates with the other before the 
latter is objectified (for instance, as a fellow creature), and this feeling is the 
condition for the perception of the other as my neighbor (53-54). 
 Hence Housset sees the subject as opened by the exterior, in which attention 
is given both to what precedes and affects the subject, and to bodily feeling as an 
experience that is relevant to ethics. Housset draws on the French philosopher and 
priest Malebranche, for whom only the interior sentiment is the voice of conscience 
that warns me of my indignity (54). According to Malebranche, its function is to 
destabilize man by tearing him loose from the illusion that he is his own principle 
and compelling him to consult reason. Malebranche valued the importance of the 
interior sentiment against the doctrine of pure love, as well as the grace of light 
against a pure sentimentalism (60). He contemplates the entire complexity of the 
place of feeling in moral life, which Housset considers to be his genius. The cogito is 
not the light of being, but it is preceded by a love that is the light of being, that 
keeps me open. For Malebranche (and Housset) this love is God (60).  
Housset’s theology enables him to radicalize the subject’s passivity, which is a 
given interior sentiment given from the radical outside. The suffering other affects 
me in pity and offers me a sentiment in the true sense of being both interior and 
exterior. Pity invades me, leaps on me, and hence pity is not to be interpreted 
psychologically as a product of the “I” (2011, 73-74). On the phenomenal level the 
suffering other gives this sentiment in the encounter. Housset understands it also in 
a theological sense, as a dignity that is given to the self from the exterior as a 
mysterious grace from God, in which God affects me and guides me towards him 
(2003, 65).  
 
b. Housset’s open subject 
 
In the conclusion of his book Housset argues that pity tears us away from our 
dream of autonomy and awakens us to the reality of our common life. Pity, which 
does not allow itself to be congealed in abstract rules, shows that it is precisely the 
suffering other that is the norm for my action (177). Therefore it must be 
recognized that the unique moral law calls on one to give one’s life for those one 
loves. Those who do not have the courage of pity lock themselves inside of 
themselves, making of their lives a dream in which they follow an ideal but do not 
love anyone (177). Housset, who concurs with Emmanuel Levinas here, stresses that 
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without pity the human community would be reduced to a simple community of 
essence in which both the other and the self would be lost as unique and 
irreplaceable individuals. Only the ‘intelligence of pity’ (l’intelligence de la pitié ) is the 
personalizing and denaturalizing force of the human community, as only in pity does 
one say ‘yes’ to the other instead of to the self (178). A person’s proper task is 
geared toward the community. Against the dream of autonomy, against the illusion 
of self-possession as if enclosed in the self, we must recognize that we can dispense 
with everything in life except with the pity of others, without which the I would 
remain trapped in despair. I need other people, I need their pity, through which they 
need me and give me the task of responding to the community (179). Through this 
exodus identity (tearing me away from myself) received from the sharing of 
suffering, I am more than I think I am in participating in the common work in a 
unique and irreplaceable way. In the unity of this suffering I receive myself as a pure 
gift (179). 
 
c. Conclusion with regard to re-thinking the subject 
 
Housset’s view of the subject is helpful for understanding the subject as a being 
radically given from the outside by God. The subject is incapable of self-
development by the self alone, of feeling or understanding the self starting from the 
self, or of self-fulfillment. Housset’s subject is open, and every subjective power of 
the self is shattered. It is an embodied and concrete person, who feels and is 
affected, is concrete and lives real life with concrete others. This subject’s ethical life 
does not consist in deciding rationally about good and bad but in living among 
others who give, form, and transform the self’s being and ethics. Others are not a 
threat in se but rather a condition for the self.  
This view sheds a light on caregiving as a way of self-fulfillment coming from 
the outside, as a way of being given. Caregiving starts with pathos, which is passivity; 
it becomes one’s ethical task only in a secondary moment. However, pathos remains 
in ethics, as pity does not disappear by reflection but is further developed by it. The 
key moment is the affectedness of the self, which raises a new and unexpected 
understanding of the self as existing within an order consisting of others, a 
community without which I have no clue of what my life is about. This idea of the 
open subject also has consequences for the idea of self-sacrifice, not as something 
done by the self, but as happening to the self despite the self, befalling the self. Pity 
makes the self of self-sacrifice a self whose horizons are shattered by the suffering of 
the other. This self is involuntarily, uncontrollably, and immediately affected by what 
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comes from the outside, from the other; and in pathos the self gains an ethos of 
giving the self. The self finds and fulfills the self through this dynamic of receiving, 
affectedness, and responding to one’s task in the community that starts with the 
unexpected encounter. The self receives the self only through its own disarmament 
and loss of any possibility of self-preservation and self-unfolding. 
 
 
3. A new framework for understanding intersubjectivity 
 
The problem of intersubjectivity, i.e. the problem of how to conceive the relation 
between the self and the other, did not receive a satisfying answer in the preceding 
chapters. Several of the views considered raise problems for the project of thinking 
radically about intersubjectivity as a relation; other views provide parts of an answer. 
While some care-ethical views reduce the caring relation to a dichotomy of self and 
other, others (care ethicists and theologians) offer the idea of mutuality as 
indispensable for human flourishing. And Honneth argues that people depend on 
the recognition of others for self-development and for an affective involvement with 
the world. However, it still needs to be explained how the other can affect the self to 
the extent of their being inextricably involved with each other.  
 
Housset’s work reframes the intersubjective relation. Drawing on his analysis I argue 
that he radicalizes intersubjectivity as abandonment of the self. Only with such 
abandonment does one have a relation of pity. False pity is in fact an enclosure in 
the self, a relation of the self with the self from which the other is excluded, instead 
of being an opening to the other. Housset shows that pity leads to a true relation 
between the two in proximity, which is both a sharing of suffering and a remaining 
apart as unique beings. Housset’s view helps me to think of intersubjectivity as a 
true relation of self and other, but it also reveals of the opposite of this true relation. 
I turn to the non-relation of false pity first, and then to the true relation that pity 
engenders. 
 
a. The non-relation of false pity and the relation of pity 
 
Pity has been the object of critique throughout the centuries. Central to this critique 
is the idea that pity prevents true contact with the other, and therefore prevents true 
relating and ethical acting, as it is the pretension of feeling for the other while 
actually being foremost a feeling sorry for the self. Pity has been variously regarded 
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as a refusal to experience the other, a weakness, hypocrisy, and maliciousness, which 
is pure violence disguised as care (19). The distinctive sign of such sentimental pity is 
that it does not feel anything, as the subject remains enclosed within the self (20-21). 
Hence, pity may as well lead one to flee others as to connect with them. It is a 
sentiment like all others, an affection of the self purely for the self. It is rejected as 
unreasonable and, primarily, as an obstacle to self-mastery, knowledge of the truth, 
and action (22). 
 Housset argues with Augustine for a distinction between true compassion and 
interested pity. The former involves the desire that the other’s suffering disappears 
and not that it remains and gives the pleasure entailed in showing mercy. Augustine 
calls the latter ‘malevolent benevolence’ (24). 
The fiercest critic of pity is Nietzsche, who argues that in reality pity most 
often manifests a self-enclosed interiority that flees everything that may affect it. In 
the first place pity is the refusal of suffering, the avoidance of the suffering of 
others, the mere protecting of one’s own well-being, with attention for others 
remaining essentially on a general level (32). Pity is flight and forgetfulness. Second, 
pity is fundamentally humiliating and impudent. An act of showing off, pity is an 
offense against reverence (la pudeur) (33). A mutual wish to harm lies hidden behind 
the apparent will to do good. Those who evoke pity wish to harm the spectators of 
their misery, which might give them the pleasure of exercising power. Those who 
show pity thirst for pity as a brutal source of their joy. Nietzsche concludes that hate 
lies at the heart of pity, as it is the morality of weak souls that do not master 
themselves and make for an easy prey, viz. those who suffer (33-34). Nietzsche 
states: “Pity is the practice of nihilism” (35). However, Nietzsche does not reject all 
pity. He recognizes a superior form: the pity of the master. If one believes in 
oneself, then one allows oneself to confront suffering instead of fleeing from it. This 
pity contains the paradox of being both the highest affirmation of one’s interiority, 
since one does not lose oneself in the suffering, and the greatest opening to the 
other (36). 
Kant too argues that pity is beautiful and loveable, but also always weak and 
blind. It is a sentiment incapable of universalization, and therefore cannot be 
understood as a duty (37). Hence, pity cannot have any position in ethics as it 
remains blind to good and bad. At best pity may cause good actions, but in no case 
virtues. Therefore, every ethics of the pure will can at best only give an auxiliary role 
to pity, as the autonomy of the rational subject demands that one is not determined 
by anything else than oneself (38). 
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Against these views Housset defends pity, arguing that its critics neither have 
eliminated pity from moral life nor have recognized it for what it is (37). He argues 
that withdrawing from pity its character of abandoning the self when facing the 
suffering of the other is the same as abolishing pity itself. For the abandonment of 
the self is its essence, which can be found both in fleeing from the suffering of the 
other and in benevolence. Neither pity of the weak, based on self-love, nor pity of 
the strong, based on self-mastery, can abandon pity’s irreducible element of being 
dispossessed of the self, of being troubled by an alterity. Searching for the essence of 
pity, Housset concludes that pity must be unconscious and not representing the self. 
Pity does not compare. It is an attention to the other in the other’s singularity 
without being guided by self-love. It is immediate and does not possess the 
representative conscience of duty (39). 
For Housset this abandonment of the self, considered to be the essence of 
pity and not its failing, is crucial. He argues that the sheer impossibility of totally 
excluding pity indicates that sensitivity itself must be part of the fulfillment of ethical 
life. Cruelty of the soul and insensitivity of the body are inseparable. The refusal of 
every emotion and the project of perfect self-mastery always lead to a certain apathy. 
Therefore it is essential to acknowledge the original decentering, which is pity. 
Against stoicism, according to Housset, we must avoid two positions, i.e. both the 
idea of appropriating the suffering of the other in a fusion of sensitivity, and the 
principle of self-positioning of the subject. In both positions the other does not 
have a real opportunity to appear as he or she is, as inalienable (40). Therefore, in 
Housset’s words:  
Recognizing the essential place of pity [...] also supposes recognizing that 
weakness is constitutive to humanity. Man’s weakness, his essential fragility, is 
the place where he can abandon himself in order to listen to the other (41, 
transl. IvN). 
Human weakness and essential fragility constitute the place where the subject can 
abandon the self in order to listen to the other. On this matter Housset cites 
Augustine, who argues that the root of all malevolence and thus of all evil is the 
pretension of being void of all affection. Such ignorance inhibits the love of one’s 
neighbor (41). Pity is an authentically benevolent awakening only to the extent that 
being seized by pity entails the abandoning of taking, in order to welcome the other 
in his or her suffering without judging the other (42). 
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b. The relation and the other in the self  
 
Every ethical decision, according to Housset, supposes an interior sentiment that 
exteriorizes the subject and thereby opens a place where the ethical choice can take 
place. Such a feeling opens the subject to a dimension of the possible (69). Housset 
defines this as the “pathic mode of presence with the self” (ce mode pathique de la 
presence à soi), which is the revelation of an authentic ipseity by the welcoming of the 
other in the self (69-70). This is what Housset calls ‘respect’ (70). For Housset, who 
defines sentiment as an opening to the dimension of the possible, respect is pure 
sentiment (71). It is a total interiority listening to an exteriority that presupposes 
reverence (pudeur), i.e. a retreat of the self. In other words, the original passivity of 
the opening to the other (i.e. respect) is also a movement of retreat, ( i.e. reverence) 
(71). It revolves around the essential weakness and receptivity of the subject, 
opening itself and finding the other in the self. Reverence is an opening to things 
other than the self and not an auto-affection. Housset rejects the simple opposition 
between this sensitive affection and freedom. Instead affection can be the source of 
freedom when respect is not reduced to an affection of the self by the self (84). In 
order to make this conceivable, Housset proposes that we consider respect to be the 
grace par excellence proceeding from the encounter with an other than myself. In this 
he opposes Kant, who construes the sentiment of respect as a sentiment produced a 
priori by reason, as a submission to the self by which one raises the self to its proper 
dignity (85). Hence, Kantian respect entails hardly any sentiment and cannot serve as 
an opening to the manifestation of the other (88). 
In opposition to Kant, Housset regards receptivity as compatible with 
autonomy (89). He argues that life as coming to the subject from outside is part of 
personal genesis (90). Receptivity and autonomy are interlaced, since in respect the 
subject consents to a demand to act, a demand that is absolutely individualizing. 
Here respect is a ‘knowing’ even if it does not tell the subject what to do (91). The 
subject, in reverence, consents to be dispossessed by that which comes towards the 
subject in the encounter (92). Reverence and pity here find their inseparable 
connection: pity presupposes reverence, for that which does not allow for mercy 
cannot have mercy. Reverence is knowledge that one is not one’s own origin. In it I 
know that the other is my future and that the other makes requests of me (95).  
Housset states that in order to comprehend the proper ‘intelligence of pity’, 
respect must be reinterpreted as availability to that which touches us. The subject is 
saved from the isolation of a pure presence with the self in order to reveal the self in 
solidarity and dedication (99). As my own alterity has been revealed to me in the 
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same emotion that makes me belong to the other, I must tear myself away from a 
purely private duty in order to personalize myself while universalizing myself. The 
‘intelligence of pity’ as respect and as reverence does not consist in consulting 
reason within the self but in listening to that which the world demands of me. The 
voice of conscience, therefore, is not the bifurcation of my own voice but a voice 
that seizes me by going through all the other voices of those who are near me. In 
this way “the I” is universalized; the ‘intelligence of pity’ is a listening to the world 
(99). 
 
c. Reflection and conclusion: Housset’s view of intersubjectivity as a contribution to conceiving self-
sacrifice 
 
Intersubjectivity, according to Housset, is key to becoming a self, to finding the 
self’s destiny. In his detailed analysis of false pity and his defense of pity he opposes 
sentimentalism and rationalism. Both foreclose the appearance of the other as other. 
Instead, Housset is a true phenomenologist in his analysis of pity, regarding pity as a 
moment of abandoning the self, being dispossessed of the self, being troubled by an 
alterity, which is immediate and without a conscientious sense of duty. First comes 
this moment of abandonment, the experience of basic human weakness, in which 
the other can be listened to. The other seizes the self; his or her suffering is 
welcomed.  
This view opposes emotionally detached views such as professionalism that 
exclude feelings. It also contests the idea that something is worthwhile insofar as it 
touches one emotionally. The affection engendered by pity, as Housset understands 
it, is devoid of normativity, since it can lead to either flight or benevolence. The 
sentiment that Housset has in mind is an opening to the dimension of the possible, a 
listening to an exteriority. Defined like this, respect is pure sentiment, which is an 
original passivity and a simultaneous movement of retreat (i.e. reverence) (71). When 
Housset argues that in this movement life comes towards the subject as a part of 
personal genesis (90), he connects receptivity to autonomy, seeing them as 
interlaced, for the receptivity of respect does not prescribe to the subject, but the 
subject is enabled to consent to being dispossessed by what comes towards him or 
her in the encounter (91-92). This moment, Housset argues, is the subject’s 
possibility to be saved from isolation and reveals the self in solidarity and dedication 
(99).  
As I indicated at the start of this chapter, phenomenology and theology come 
together in Housset’s argument. His ideas of exteriority, of the sentiment of respect, 
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of the movement of retreat in reverence, of knowledge that one is not one’s own 
origin, and of life coming toward the subject, express a religious attitude of honor 
and praise. However, he remains true to phenomenology, developing it in line with 
Marion’s radical phenomenology and offering new insights. Marion offers insight 
into the subject’s passivity to what is given, to the intersubjective call, and to its 
overwhelming effect. Housset continues and elaborates on this thought.  
I want to stress the importance of these insights to self-sacrifice. His analysis 
of the proper ‘intelligence of pity’, leading him to reinterpret respect as availability to 
that which touches us, which is the rescue for the self, entails the idea that the self is 
betrayed, ruined when the self remains self-enclosed. It is treason against the self’s 
being. This is an insight that is given from the outside, is revealed. Again, theology 
radicalizes the phenomenal: the idea of the other dispossessing me, making a 
demand on me in the encounter is also conceived theologically as a universalizing 
encounter that singles me out. This simultaneous universalizing and singularizing of 
receiving and consenting, which is a listening instead of my own rationalizing, is a 
concept rooted in theology, providing a theological order of the phenomenal. I 
return to this concept below, in the subsection on God’s grace.  
With regard to intersubjectivity, Housset’s thought stresses that the subject’s 
relations are first of all passive experiences. One’s view of the subject, when starting 
from this phenomenological insight of the relation, changes dramatically from a 
subject of autonomy to one of fragility. This insight has consequences for thinking 
about care and self-sacrifice. With regard to care, there are three consequences. First, 
human beings’ essential weakness and fragility opposes the modern emphasis on 
responsibility, including in care ethics. There is no such thing as responsibility that 
can be determined beforehand or conceived apart from being moved. The subject is 
injured and out of control, unable to determine its responsibility. Second, the idea of 
the other as outside the subject is replaced by the idea of the other as within the self, 
as an interior ipseity. Not only is the self ordered from the outside, but, because of 
receptivity, affectivity, and commonality, the other’s demand has become 
inseparable from the self’s own freedom. The dichotomy of self and other, of feeling 
and understanding, of passivity and activity, has been overcome, since self and other 
are interlaced and inseparable. Third, the idea that in order to recognize the needs of 
others one must have experienced needs oneself is rejected by Housset, who draws 
attention to the immediacy of feeling pity, of being affected by the other, and of 
saying ‘yes’ unconditionally. The understanding of care changes, as it is no longer 
understood starting from the self. There is no subject beforehand; the subject’s 
reality is this affectedness and the already-having-complied in the relation.  
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This is an entirely new way of looking at self-sacrifice. The self has become a 
different self; the relation has become not a relation of monads but an interlacing of 
self and other; the other’s demand has become inseparable from the self’s own 
freedom; and the sacrifice has become an immediacy, a giving into what is received, 
what has affected the self, what has been shared. And Housset’s emphasis on grace 
also changes the character of self-sacrifice from that of self-destruction or self-
effacement to that of being the self’s task and destiny, which brings the self to 
fulfillment or wholeness by its self-abandonment and its being given to the world. 
 
 
4. A new framework for understanding the community 
 
The ethics of care has a presupposed “we”, I argued, such as in Tronto’s and 
Fisher’s description of care being everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair 
our world so that we can live in it as well as possible. Hence a conscious or 
unconscious presupposition of a community as a desire to live well together is 
present and founds human caring. However, the focus of care ethics as a political 
ethics is placed on power imbalances that keep caring and care workers 
marginalized; and an elaboration of what binds people together on the social and 
political levels remains implicit and not thought through. Nevertheless, the shared 
world and the good life that form the aim of care are conditions for understanding 
self-sacrifice. An understanding of the community as consisting not of centrifugal 
forces dividing people but as centripetal forces building a community is 
indispensable for understanding self-sacrifice. 
 
In the previous sections it became clear that Housset sees the foundation of the 
community in the encounter of the subject and the other where a commonality is 
experienced. This insight is important, as it connects community to the concrete 
experience of affectivity, of being affected by the suffering of the other and 
experiencing a repetition of this suffering in the self. Commonality, therefore, is not 
the result of a rational calculation but comes about in the immediate affective 
intrusion of the encounter. This has consequences for thinking about self-sacrifice, 
as it too can be conceived differently when affectivity and commonality are put 
central stage. 
 In this section I first present Housset’s thoughts on the community, after 
which I offer a reflection on them. 
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a. Housset’s view of the community as commonality of misery 
 
To have mercy is to suffer for the other, is to sow in tears, and the seeds of 
mercy are the foundation of any true community. Those who do not suffer 
with the hungry and to whom they give food, those who do not mourn the 
dead they bury, act with contempt and not with mercy: there is no neutral 
place where they could be neither in contempt nor in mercy (108, transl. IvN). 
 
As this quotation illustrates, for Housset the bodily experience of pity is crucial for 
the community to arise. Since both the manifestation of the other and the 
conscientious awareness of one’s duty cannot be accounted for solely by the self or 
the encounter, pity is also the experience of a community (15). It is only from the 
starting point of the embodied encounter that an authentic community can arise, 
that is, a community in which universalization entails not the loss of one’s 
individuality but its accomplishment (17).  
Housset opposes a naturalistic understanding of community. The embodied 
encounter of pity shows that nothing precedes the community, as only then does 
one discover one’s unique existence in the participation in the realization of true 
justice. This community is also the antithesis of every abstract universalism, in which 
the individual is subordinated to an impersonal authority. Therefore pity, as a shock 
of the body, allows for an idea of the community that is neither natural nor 
impersonal but instead that individualizes the involved embodied persons in the 
experience of commonality (17).  
 The idea of the approach of the other in reverence results in a new 
understanding of subjectivity. The experience of the other by the ego opens it to a 
‘becoming different’ (devenir-autre) in which the ego is no longer the principle (101). 
Housset, therefore, understands the event of pity as the event that opens the ethical 
domain, yet without transparency: it is impossible to differentiate between what 
comes from me and what comes from the other. This is the mark of an ‘ourness’ 
(nostrité), which is a commonality, a community, anterior to ‘egoity’, revealing an 
origin of the common world (106).  
Housset draws on Augustine’s description of the sociality proper to pity. 
Before I recognize the other as my equal as a rational animal, the two of us are close 
to each other in a common exposure to misery. Compassion carries within itself a 
pity for the suffering of all humanity. Therefore, not only is suffering a particular 
modality through which the other appears, but it belongs to the essence of the 
appearing of the other (107). The opening to the other is a taking responsibility for 
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the other’s suffering, which is called mercy. In mercy, the other is not an alter ego but 
a being who, like me, can suffer. This equality in the face of suffering does not 
abolish the distance between the subjects. It is a non-reflexive proximity, the 
phenomenon of an original coexistence, which allows the self to become the self 
(108). Hence pitying is essentially singling out insofar as it is a co-affection in which 
my suffering is not confused with that of the other, without being able to explain the 
principle of their distinction. It is a more original community, a community of 
misery, proceeding from which the subject can understand the self (109). 
Housset argues that this is the birth of the moral conscience. The affective 
coexistence anterior to the distinction between I and you is also a postponement of 
ethics. There is no dividing of misery but the foundation of a community within 
misery (111). The other as a suffering body is not simply an object over there that 
gives itself to be seen but a person that requires my help and compassion. Here it is 
not the I that seeks to constitute another monad through ‘apprésentation’, as 
Husserl proposes, but a suffering body of the other that announces itself as that of 
another human being requiring me to share it (114). Compassion entails a proximity 
anterior to intentionality in which the other fixes the conditions of its manifestation. 
On this express condition, the misery of the other is truly overwhelming (115). Pity 
addresses not those I prefer but rather everyone who is unconditionally my 
neighbor. It is impossible to exclude persons who are either too close or too strange. 
The characteristic of the community of misery is that it is not determined by any 
condition. For compassion does not occur in a world that precedes it, but it is the 
inaugural deployment of the common world. Indeed, without compassion, there is 
neither a welcoming of the other as a suffering body nor a true experience of alterity 
in general, that is, no experience of the world (116). 
 
b. Reflection and conclusion with regard to Housset’s view of the community 
 
Housset’s emphasis on bodily experience of pity is clear. This is interesting since it 
makes pity something very concrete and inescapably ‘mine’. That is not to say that 
the other’s suffering is transferred to the self (as clarified in section 2) but that the 
suffering of the other is repeated in the self (cf. Marion’s preface, VI). This reading 
is supported by the quite common examples given in the above quotation: suffering 
with the hungry whom one feeds and mourning those whom one buries. This bodily 
experience also reveals that there is no such thing as ‘a bit’ of mercy: it either is or it 
is not. If suffering in the self is lacking, one only acts with contempt for the other’s 
suffering. The community of misery is embodied community, hence affective 
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coexistence, which is the mark of an ‘ourness’ that is the more original community, 
anterior to the distinction between an I and a you. This precedes ethics and allows 
for the birth of the moral conscience. 
 Hence there is first the experience, which is followed by a ‘seeing that’ one 
acts with mercy (or contempt). This means that there is first the experience of pity 
(for the hungry, the dead) and only afterwards the grasping that ‘not pitying’ is 
contempt. Moral conscience is born in the experience of pity. This sheds an entirely 
different light on self-sacrifice, revealing it as different from a choice or the pursuit 
of a moral good. Self-sacrifice, thinking further in Housset’s line of thought, is an 
experience of mercy that is affective coexistence anterior to the ‘egoity’. In other 
words, the experience of mercy that has given rise to the community of suffering is 
anterior to the distinction between an I and a you. Mercy is sowing in tears, but 
these tears do not stem from moral conscience. Self-sacrifice, then, is a practice that 
precedes ethics, which makes the ethical moment not the decision for self-sacrifice but 
rather the consent to self-sacrifice. This is a radically new view of self-sacrifice, i.e. it is 
not a self-gift but a radical consent to having sacrificed already.  
 
There still remains one question with regard to Housset’s idea of the community. He 
speaks of an originary community, hence not of a politically organized society but 
rather of the ‘ourness’ (nostrité) that precedes the ‘egoity’, as an affective coexistence. 
My question is concerned not with the experience of community but with the 
consent to it, hence with the ethical moment. Here, too, no institutions or positions 
seem to play a role. I would think that they are somehow a factor in the way people 
consent to the experience of pity. Even though I agree with Housset and am grateful 
to him for his insight that pity is not restricted in any way and is therefore capable of 
opening the self to the other, no matter what positions people hold. However, when 
I shift the focus from pity to self-sacrifice—and I would argue that this is not a large 
shift—I would say that one’s position does make a difference at the moment of 
consent in the moral conscience. For instance, it does make a difference whether the 
potential caregiver is a parent, a doctor, or the only person around, whether or not 
one consents to self-sacrifice. This question needs to be further investigated. I turn 
to that in the next chapter. 
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5. A reframing of givenness as the experience of grace 
 
Housset is a Marion scholar who thinks in his footsteps. Whereas Marion elaborates 
on the givenness of phenomena in a radical phenomenology, even the so-called 
impossible phenomena, without dealing with God and expressly refraining from 
producing a theology, Housset includes theology in his phenomenological study. In 
the previous sections I focused on what his theological and phenomenological 
thought yields for the subject, intersubjectivity, and the community. I have argued 
that his drawing on theology radicalizes his phenomenology. This was visible 
throughout this chapter. For instance, in the extensive quotation at the beginning of 
this chapter, Housset speaks phenomenologically of the me being altered by the 
suffering of the other, while he speaks theologically of pity as a liberating invitation 
to be enlightened by the light of goodness. In my subsection on the subject, I 
indicated that Housset understands the interior sentiment theologically as a 
mysterious grace from God through which God affects me and guides me towards 
him (65). In this section I focus on Housset’s theological view that human pity is 
founded by God’s pity, and I consider what this contributes to an understanding of 
self-sacrifice.  
 
a. Ethos founded by God’s pity 
 
According to Housset, the opening to all that is human cannot be understood 
starting only from the event of the encounter of the other. If every human soul can 
in a way become all the others, this can only be the effect of a grace (146). Housset 
argues that pity is first of all a theological act. For the being of the other as 
irreplaceable and incommunicable singularity can only be preserved by the love of 
God. The love of neighbor comes from beyond the self and leads beyond the self. 
Therefore pity can only truly appear as a foundation of ethics if its proper 
theological signification is not to be reduced (148). Pity is an appeal to live divinely 
in the way that it opens the spirit to the misery of the world. This gift of the world 
supposes a giver, that is, God. Love, or God, gives me everything that I am: God 
founds my love, my will, and my knowledge (149). 
Housset argues that pity is a form of God’s benevolence itself. Pity is 
inseparable from the incarnation, a divine anthropomorphism, in which God freely 
comes near man while remaining incomprehensible (151-152). God’s pity is without 
limit. Human pity can only resemble divine pity (155). Housset refers to Augustine 
in this regard, who argues that Christ liberates from despair by giving us a unity 
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through participation in the passion of charity that orders all virtue. Pity makes the 
subject an image of the God of mercy and leads him to fulfillment while robbing the 
self of the self, becoming a person in the being-in-Christ (159). The suffering of 
Christ transforms my proper passion, making me participate in his kenosis, making 
me participate in the suffering of God, and through this participation I can become 
attentive to the misery of the world. The possibility of being effectively disinterested 
comes from far beyond the self and supposes a divine initiative. For compassion is 
entirely a matter of reverence and humility. It is not a mask, but a withdrawal that 
lets the pity of God manifest itself through me to the other, and that as such makes 
me enter into intersubjectivity (160). 
In this way, the pity of God transforms the subject into the bearer of the 
community of humankind in its common suffering (161). Pity, moving the human 
heart, is that which gives birth to the desire to soften the misery of the neighbor. 
Pity is in no case about the consolation of a reward that comes later, since the 
community founded on the passion of charity rules out every form of bookkeeping 
(162). For in pity one has to accept being taken in pity, and in that powerlessness 
one must rely completely on God (163). Every search for an equilibrium between 
me and the world, between me and the other me, between my past and my present, 
comes from my pretension to constitute the center of everything (164). Hence, 
compassion is the common good, in the sense that it is not given in order to be 
given back (165-166). That is the theological meaning of dispossession, of robbing 
the self of the self (166).  
In conclusion, pity is the movement itself of transcendence that comes 
troubling my immanence and that, not being initiated by the I, preserves the 
incomprehensible character of goodness. This infiniteness of mercy indicates that 
God has initiated it in us. Through Christ, human beings experience within 
themselves a perfection that liberates them by opening them to being. Here the 
person’s proper character manifests itself (174). The individual can only become a 
person in the act of emptying the self of everything that is an internal obstacle for 
the presence of the other. Taking pity on the other comes down to witnessing that 
which in the self and in the other exceeds us and makes our encounter possible. Pity 
is not the capacity a priori to sympathize but that sparkle that is already love of the 
good and that founds our identity of exodus as effort for receiving the other as a gift 
(175).  
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b. Reflection on grace and conclusion with regard to self-sacrifice 
 
Housset’s theology, as I argued in the introduction of this chapter, is the vertical 
dimension of what transcends the self in its relations to the self, to others, to the 
community. At various points in this research I have reflected on the dynamic of 
giving and receiving. Housset tilts the phenomenology of the gift and argues that, if 
giving and receiving is possible, this is because there is a first giver, who is God. Any 
origin is outside a subject and outside the other. The mere fact that humans can 
experience pity, that they can suffer for any other human being, that they can 
experience an affective coexistence, Housset argues, is the effect of a grace. This 
grace has become flesh and blood in the incarnation. The inimitable pity that God 
has shown by becoming human and sharing life invites humans to resemble divine 
pity and participate in kenosis, in the suffering of God, and through it become 
attentive to the misery of the world.  
 Understanding the self as participating in a theological order alters the self’s 
relation to the self, being disinterested, and to others, being neighbors. It turns the 
world upside down, for since the self is no longer the center, no equilibrium is 
needed in all the self’s relations. Being present with the other requires nothing of the 
self, only emptying the self to make space for the presence of the other.  
 In Housset’s line of thought self-sacrifice is the participation in Christ’s 
passion for all humans, who are, through God, the self’s neighbors. Self-sacrifice is 
the emptying of the self in order to make room for the presence of the other. 
However, it is not a capacity of the self but a grace transforming the self. It is the 
world upside down: the self is an obstacle for the other if it does not consent to the 
sparkle of love that founds the identity of exodus.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
At the end of this chapter I now briefly collect the insights that I have gained from 
Housset with regard to the questions posed at the start. The first question was how 
the subject can be affected by an unknown other. Housset provides a view of the 
subject that is opened by the exterior, in the encounter with the suffering other, 
when affected by pity. This is not restricted to any circles of relations existing 
beforehand (as, for instance, Noddings argues). Nor is the point of departure the 
subject, entering the world starting from an original commitment (as Honneth 
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argues). Being affected befalls the subject, and there are no restrictions with regard 
to the suffering other. 
 The second question was how to think of the community, not as needing to 
be built, but as found. Housset makes clear how, in a commonality of misery 
(suffering with the hungry, mourning the dead), and hence in the bodily experience 
of pity, the community is experienced before being built, as it is impossible to 
distinguish between what comes from the other and what comes from me. In other 
words, one already finds oneself in a community. There is an affective coexistence 
anterior to an ego. 
 The third question was how feelings can be thought of as trustworthy for 
ethics. Housset’s wonderful analysis of pity, differentiating it from false pity, 
provides a touch stone: when feelings are only for the self, they do not lead to 
ethics. Human fragility, Housset argues, is the place where humans can abandon 
themselves and retreat into reverence in order to listen to the other; it is also, I 
might add, the place where ethics begins. 
 And the fourth question was how the de-centered subject can be thought of 
as a moral agent. Housset’s phenomenology, radicalized by theology, provides a 
view in which ethos is essentially founded in God’s pity. My being affected by the 
suffering other, experiencing the interior sentiment as a grace of light that keeps me 
open to the other, reveals that love is first given. Ethos is initiated neither by the self 
nor by the other, but it comes from the outside, liberating the self of the self. Hence 
compassion is reverence and humility, and ethos is the consent of a de-centered self. 
I consider Housset’s answer a first step towards relating passivity to ethics, which 
requires further elaboration. This elaboration is the task of Chapter 6. 
 
In conclusion, I argue that Housset’s work contributes importantly to reframing the 
frameworks of the subject, intersubjectivity, and community, and has also provided 
a view of meaning. What remains is to indicate the new frames and explain their 
relation to conceiving self-sacrifice.  
The framework of the subject is reset by Housset’s emphasis on passive 
suffering. This suffering, or pathos, is followed by ethics, but pathos remains within 
ethics. Self-sacrifice, then, happens to the self despite the self; moreover, it emerges 
as the ethos of giving the self, by responding to the given task in the community that 
has arisen in the encounter.  
The framework of intersubjectivity is reset by Housset as it does not consist 
of two subject poles or of a pre-existing relation. Rather, the other, i.e. any other, is 
indispensable for becoming the self, as pity is a moment of abandoning the self, 
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being dispossessed and troubled by an alterity. The abandonment of self, the 
withdrawal of the self, the robbing of the self, all express the radical idea of being 
taken by pity, of interior ipseity. Hence there is a radical rejection of any equilibrium 
that is theologically founded. It shows how intersubjectivity is the place of discovery 
of life as given to the self through the other, revealing what the self is to be, in 
solidarity and dedication. The self’s destiny is to be available to that which touches 
the self. The self then becomes an entirely different self, which also makes self-
sacrifice entirely different. It is a task and destiny, the forsaking of which means self-
destruction. 
The community is an originary bodily experience of pity, e.g. suffering with 
the hungry whom one feeds and mourning those one buries. Here one experiences 
an affective coexistence, a community of misery, anterior to the distinction between 
an I and a you, which is also a postponement of ethics. This has radical 
consequences for thinking through self-sacrifice, which then consists of a consent to 
rather than a decision for self-sacrifice. Thinking of self-sacrifice along these lines 
differs radically from any moral account of self-sacrifice. However, it also raises a 
question regarding Housset’s view of the community, which as originary lacks 
institutions and positions. For it would seem that precisely in this moment of 
consent these institutions and positions play a role in the consent that is given to 
self-sacrifice. Being the parent or the doctor of someone suffering, or the only 
person around, does make a difference to consenting to self-sacrifice. Housset’s 
thought lacks this differentiation, to which I turn in the next chapter.  
Finally, Housset’s theology sheds a different light on the self in every relation. 
Having been given by the first giver, God, the self is entirely released from seeking 
any equilibrium in relations, since the self can completely rely upon God. The world 
is turned upside down: the presence of the other requires the self to be emptied. 
Self-sacrifice is participation in God’s kenosis. 
 These radicalizations, however, also lead to several questions that I seek to 
answer in the next chapter. Housset’s emphasis on the open and de-centered self, on 
intersubjectivity as robbing the self of self, on being taken by the other, on the 
community as pre-existing affective coexistence anterior to an ego, and on his 
radicalizing view of God’s grace as the absolute initiative lead to the question of how 
these insights can be thought together. Taking a dialectical view, in which tensions 
become fruitful when endured and maintained, is key, as I argue in the next chapter. 
And finally, as just noted above, a view of a community that incorporates 
institutions and positions is lacking in Housset’s work. To answer these questions I 
turn to the dialectic view of the self and of ethics developed by Paul Ricœur. 
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Keeping the tensions of the self, of relations, of the self and the community all alive; 
developing an ethics in which pathos and ethics are related and the moral agent is 
and remains a sufferer as well; and developing a view of an institutionalized 
community—in addressing these questions Ricœur’s dialectics is most helpful.  
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 CHAPTER 6: Keeping tensions alive 
 
This research project originated in a serious problem that I encountered in various 
realities of caring: although self-sacrifice is present in caring practices and is vital to 
disclosing the meanings of caring, it is quietly, if not unknowingly, shunted away by 
critiques that are unimaginably unfitting. As I substantiated with the stories from 
literature, film, and history, self-sacrifice is present in the realities of caring practices. 
Outright rejection would mean that part of that reality is not faced. What is more, I 
argued that self-sacrifice is crucial to understanding the essence of caring. To give 
care means to take risks, to refrain from bookkeeping, to give away what is of the 
self and to give way to what is given, to express meanings, without shrinking back 
from conflict, accepting uncertainty and open-endedness. However, various 
frameworks that are presupposed in care ethics seem to entail a view of care that 
makes self-sacrifice hard to incorporate as part of caregiving. These are the 
frameworks of the subject, of intersubjectivity, of community, and of the horizon of 
meaning. The first framework stresses the subject’s simultaneous dependency and 
autonomy, but does not thoroughly think through how dependency involves 
passivity to a wide context of what has been given. The framework of the 
intersubjective relation stresses the need of ethics to take concrete responsibilities 
into account but does not sufficiently think through how intersubjectivity is 
necessarily and inextricably involved in the subject’s identity. The framework of 
community rightfully stresses the feminist insights into oppression based on sex, 
race, and class, and it connects these insights to a power-analysis of care, but it does 
not sufficiently allow for the elaboration of the idea of an actual shared life. Finally, 
care ethics does not sufficiently take into account the idea of caring practices as ways 
to establish meanings and convictions without any thought of equality, calculation, 
or risk-taking. 
Throughout this research I have assembled important insights for rethinking 
these frameworks in order to make self-sacrifice conceivable, drawing on various 
disciplines – theology, phenomenology, political theory. Still, questions remain for 
which I now seek answers in the works of Paul Ricœur. First I present my line of 
thought up to this point and then I present my view of how Ricœur contributes to 
answering my questions. 
The first question concerns the tension between passivity and agency. The 
phenomenological views of Marion and Housset reveal the importance of 
suspending the ethical in order to see more and provide the insight that the self is 
far more passive than conceived of in care ethics. This insight makes room for an 
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understanding of the subject as humbled by everything that is given, as non-isolated 
and affectively permeated by others in pity, finding knowledge about the self, others, 
and common humanity through others31. Theology too provides a more humbled 
view of the self, as de-centered by what has been given, by life’s abundance. 
Simultaneously, theology makes it conceivable that people embrace meanings and 
find sense when giving care and sacrificing themselves. Starting from the idea of 
human life as a continuous trajectory spanning the gap between origin and 
destination, as a road that is travelled, theology explains how throughout this 
trajectory the urgent question resonates of where we come from and where we are 
heading. The contribution of theology helps make self-sacrifice conceivable as giving 
in to what life gives as agents aiming at a good that is embraced. Housset argues that 
ethos is the consent of the de-centered subject to a grace that is given by God. 
Unlike Housset, I look for a non-dogmatic understanding of theology, one that 
starts within practices and that clarifies the role of people’s beliefs and convictions 
in practice. Thus I aim to avoid an inner-theological ethics killer, i.e. arguing top-
down (dogmatic deductive) from theology to practices, which can kill ethics by 
suggesting that the final answer is given. Therefore, I search for an approach that 
illuminates this tension between more passivity, on the one hand, and more agency 
in giving sense to one’s life and embracing meanings in practice, on the other hand. 
How then is the connection between passivity and agency to be conceived? Ricœur’s 
phenomenology scrutinizes the subject and provides an answer in which the tension 
of passivity and agency, of self and other, of finitude and infinitude, are brought 
within a fruitful tension in his concepts of narrative identity and disproportion. His 
concept of narrative identity is helpful for elaborating how people’s imagination of 
the possible and convictions of the (ultimate) good appear as meaningful within and 
giving sense to their practices. 
The second question is how self-sacrifice can be thought of as morally good 
or required. Care ethics has been insufficiently able to conceive of self-sacrifice as 
possibly morally good or even required. Marion sharply distinguished his 
phenomenology from ethics. I therefore constructed a bridge on my own account, 
with the idea of the relevance of the premoral, and thought further about the 
implications of givenness for self-sacrifice. Honneth sees the experiences of injustice 
as the motivation for entering a struggle for recognition, which enabled self-sacrifice 
to be seen as a possibility in being and building a community. And Housset takes a 
first step towards an ethics, as a consent to a movement that has started elsewhere, 
                                                             
31 A word about Ricœur’s interpretation of ‘the other’: from the start is means the other in plural 
(others) as well as the institutionalized other. 
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i.e. as a grace from God. However, Ricœur’s dialectical ethics thinks of the tensions 
between the ethical aim of the ‘Good Life’ that is connected to living with and for 
others in institutions, and the moral norm, that in turn is connected to the 
community, the intersubjective relation and to the subject’s autonomy. When the 
moral norm leads to conflicts in practice as it requires something that is 
incompatible to the ethical aim, the subject may resort to practical wisdom that is 
capable of muddling through this situation without trespassing the norm too far. I 
argue below, building forth on Ricœur’s thought, that in this dialectic self-sacrifice 
becomes conceivable as morally required by practical wisdom in a situation that 
remains ambiguous and is irreducible to a general norm.  
The third question concerns the political level. In reflecting on Honneth’s 
work I have argued that caring for a distant and unknown other can hardly be 
conceived starting from his view. And although Housset provides an answer to that 
question by scrutinizing the experience of pity in the encounter with an (arbitrary) 
suffering other, his view lacks the idea of an institutionalized community in which 
caring for others (in plural and in general) is organized. Ricœur elaborates and adapts 
Honneth’s view by adding important insights into how care also takes place in 
relations other than the mother-and-child-care and provides a view of the 
community as an institutionalized society. He sheds a more divergent light on self-
sacrifice, as it may differ in various societal areas, which requires a situational 
practical wisdom, in the dialectic of a moral norm and an ethical aim. I explain this 
below.  
 
In this chapter I turn to Ricœur’s work for answers to these questions, which are 
pressing if the self-sacrifice that actually takes place in caring practices is going to be 
allowed to have an impact on care ethics, instead of being rejected by framing care 
in the wrong way. I proceed as follows. After a short general introduction I 
scrutinize my own research topic with the help of Ricœur’s work, ordered in three 
sections. Each section takes Ricœur’s dialectical thought as crucial for the project of 
making self-sacrifice conceivable. The first section centers on the questions of the 
self, i.e. how to think of the self as being both passive and active, as being embodied 
and living within time, as living with others in a community. Ricœur’s dialectical 
thought about the self, elaborated as a tension between idem and ipse in narrative 
identity and as disproportion, helps to think of a self as fragile yet without lacking 
agency. The second section centers on intersubjectivity and the community. 
Ricœur’s dialectical ethics allows for thinking of self-sacrifice as morally required in 
certain situations, and it necessarily incorporates ambiguity. The third section centers 
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on political theory. My reading of care ethics gives rise to the challenge to search for 
a non-Weberian view of power as irreducible to forcing one’s will on others. Ricœur 
expounds such a view using Hannah Arendt’s distinction between two forms of 
power – ‘power’ and ‘domination’ (Ricœur, 1992, 256) – and considers the many 
different ways in which people can have power in one realm while lacking it in 
others, hence the ambivalences expressed by Moser and Crysdale in Chapter 2. 
Further, he adopts Honneth’s theory that recognition is founded on the longing for 
living together. Ricœur also complements Honneth’s theory with a phenomenology 
of gestures that break the circle of reciprocity. These gestures allow for an emphasis 
on the relation for which one makes sacrifices. What is more, his political theory 
offers a view of an institutionalized society that is lacking in Housset’s view of the 
community.  
 Two remarks remain to be made concerning my choice of works. First, 
among Ricœur’s own works I focus on Oneself as Another (1992) and The Course of 
Recognition (2005). Although his ideas are expressed slightly differently in other texts, 
I faithfully follow his thought in these two works. I also make use of a small 
selection of other of his texts that assist me in answering my questions. Second, with 
regard to the secondary literature, I restrict myself to selected authors who typify, 
summarize, or clarify Ricœur’s thought. Hence I do not enter the debates, 
discussions, or full-fledged interpretations of the various phases in his thought. 
 
 
1. Introduction into Ricœur’s thought 
 
Ricœur can best be understood as a thinker who does not choose between opposing 
positions, as he believes that reality is best understood when both positions are 
thought together. This does not mean that Ricœur believes that there is a bit of truth 
in all positions; this would be eclecticism, which he rejects (Lowe, 1986, vii). Rather, 
he holds the opposing positions in an enduring dialectical tension, searching for a 
totality in which both of the conflicting viewpoints together add to our 
understanding by presenting a whole instead of a part of the totality. Therefore, the 
best way to understand Ricœur’s work is 
to watch for the way in which he construes his chosen question in terms of an 
apparent conflict between two contrasting aspects or poles – and then 
proceeds to mediate between them: drawing the contrasting aspects together 
while yet preserving a certain productive tension or dialectic (ix). 
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Hence Ricœur re-categorizes tensions, actively sustaining them by refusing to cut 
through or weaken them, because – although such strategies are tempting – they 
introduce unrealism32. He develops a view that starts with a primary affirmation of 
the human being, believing humans to be primarily good but somehow vulnerable to 
evil, making evil possible (Folens, 2009, 20-22). He wants “to understand freedom 
and evil by each other” (Ricœur, 1986, xlvi, cf. Schaafsma, 2006, 32) by opposing 
any determinism and holding human beings responsible for their acts while at the 
same time admitting their limitations. Human beings are both capable and incapable, 
active and passive, autonomous while also being vulnerable and fragile (Le Blanc, 
2006, 249). 
Although my research questions guide my study of Ricœur’s work, I order 
this chapter according to the way he arranges the questions and issues that drive his 
thinking. My aim is to reset the frameworks of the subject, intersubjectivity, and the 
community, as well as to add the framework of meaning. These four frameworks do 
not completely match the frameworks found in Ricœur’s work. For Ricœur argues 
that the self is necessarily intersubjective, that the self can also relate to the self ‘as 
another’, and that the self incorporates the community within the understanding of 
the self, i.e. through stories and institutions. What is more, from the start Ricœur 
understands ‘the other’ as plural (others) and as institutionalized in a political 
community. Therefore, this chapter is organized not according to my frameworks 
but according to his. 
After the introduction I turn in the second section to Ricœur’s view of the 
subject. His dialectics of the self helps keep alive the tension between the greater 
passivity that phenomenology uncovers and the greater agency in embracing 
meaning that theology reveals. Ricœur’s view offers the new framework of the 
subject at which I am aiming. In the third section I turn to both intersubjectivity and 
the community by way of an examination of Ricœur’s dialectical ethics, in which 
phenomenology and ethics are connected. For his ethics looks at concrete situations 
and keeps alive the tension between a personal ethical aim, the concrete other in a 
concrete situation, and a general moral norm. This tension requires one to find a 
course of action fitting to the situation at hand. And in the fourth section I turn to 
Ricœur’s political-ethical view of recognition, in which again intersubjectivity and 
the community appear together. He develops a view of mutuality that goes beyond 
the private sphere, and he supplements Honneth’s political-ethical view with an 
                                                             
32 With special thanks to Frans Vosman, for giving me this insight (personal conversation, 6 June 
2013).  
SACRIFICE 
182 
 
analysis of how the struggle may at times be broken by acts of generosity, on both 
the interpersonal and the societal levels.  
 
 
2. The dialectics of the self 
 
How to conceive the self is a central question in Ricœur’s work Oneself as Another, 
but also in previous works as well as in his political thought. For my research it is 
important to grasp how he thinks dialectically of the self as a tension between 
agency and passivity. For a self that is both passively subjected to what is given – 
phenomena that invade, others who intrude, a world determining the self – and 
simultaneously capable of acting, deciding, embracing meaning, makes self-sacrifice 
conceivable as a meaningful thing to do: being moved by what emerges as ‘to be 
done’. In this section I focus on his idea of narrativity, which connects agency and 
fragility, and disproportion, which according to Ricœur himself can be the source of 
sacrifice. From the start it must be emphasized that his discipline is philosophy, not 
psychology. 
 I frame the issue of passivity and agency in a dialectical understanding of the 
self. In this section I take four steps in four subsections, each of which concludes 
with my reflection on Ricœur’s thought and its consequences for conceiving self-
sacrifice. Thus the Ricœurian dialectics frame the self-sacrifice question. First, I turn 
to Ricœur’s concept of narrative identity, in which I first present the tension of idem 
and ipse (a). Still part of narrative identity is what Ricœur calls ‘emplotment’, in 
which concordance and discordance form the dialectic (b). Then I turn to Ricœur’s 
earlier work Fallible Man, since he there elaborates on disproportion as the tension 
between fragility and capability (c). And fourth, in this work he himself discusses the 
notion that this tension can bring about sacrifice, a point on which I reflect (d). 
After that I return to my question about self-sacrifice and conclude with a discussion 
of how self-sacrifice can be conceived in line with Ricœur’s narrative identity, 
emplotment, fragility and capability, and sacrifice (e).  
 
a. The dialectics of narrative identity 
 
Ricœur proposes a non-dualistic view of the subject in which the subject and the 
other are not opposed but included in a dialectical tension that characterizes the 
subject itself. The subject’s identity will turn out to be a narrative identity. He 
explains the title of his classic book thus:  
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Oneself as Another suggests from the outset that the selfhood of oneself implies 
otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without 
the other, that instead one passes into the other (Ricœur, 1992, 3).  
According to Ricœur, identity is composed of a relationship between ipse or 
selfhood, on the one hand, and idem or sameness, on the other. Hence identity is not 
simple and univocal but characterized by idem, which encompasses the dispositions 
and characteristics that allow one to identify individuals as remaining the same over 
time, and ipse, through which agency displays itself beyond the confines of selfhood 
(Hall, 2007, 12-13). Identity is constructed in the dialectical tension between 
remaining the same and development or change (Ricœur, 1992, 116). Human beings 
are able to regard themselves as not completely determined, but nor are they 
completely un-determined or pure ‘idea’. Instead the subject develops in the tension 
between the two, which can only be recognized when the temporal dimension is 
included (116). Ricœur’s idea of identity challenges, among other ideas, the Kantian 
idea of permanence through time, the idea of the subject as substance that is 
unchanging and invariant although its accidents change (116-118). He argues that 
character seems to be a lasting dimension of a person, yet it is not unchanging and 
inalterable (119). Although it is a distinctive sign by which one is recognized, it is 
also continuously formed and reinterpreted through a process of sedimentation 
(121). In other words, although my character makes me recognizable to others (as 
idem), it is not me, but rather it belongs to me. I can look at it from an (imaginary) 
distance (as ipse). And second, in acquired identifications the other (in plural and 
institutionalized) enters into the composition of the same. For a large part of the 
identity of a person or a community is made up of these identifications with values, 
norms, ideals, models, and heroes, in which the person or the community recognizes 
itself (121, emphasis in text). Through this process of internalization the initial effect 
of otherness is annulled, or at least the process transfers the effect from the outside 
to the inside (122). Literature provides a ‘laboratory’ for experimenting with 
estimations, evaluations, and judgments of approval and condemnation of the self’s 
narrative (115). Therefore our identity, rather than being a substance, is being built 
through time through sedimentation and internalization (122).  
Another important example showing the temporality of the subject and the 
tension between idem and ipse is that of keeping one’s word. Here idem and ipse are 
severed (123). For the I that promises acknowledges the possibility that the self will 
change over time but simultaneously commits the self to being firm in a certain 
respect, despite change. Hence a promise is a statement creating a self as an “I you 
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can count on” in the face of the other, a form of self-creation, building one’s 
identity in relation to another person (123, cf. Lothes Biviano, 2007, 134).  
Self-constancy is for each person that manner of conducting himself or 
herself so that others can count on that person. Because someone is counting 
on me, I am accountable for my actions before another. The term 
“responsibility” unites both meanings: “counting on” and “being accountable 
for” (165). 
This self-constancy can also count with regard to the past, in a confession of guilt 
(Thomasset, 1996, 183, with reference to the French edition of Oneself as Another, p. 
197-198 [292-293 in the English edition]). This is also a ‘being accountable’ in time, 
in this case with regard to the past: ‘Yes, it was me who was guilty then’. One does 
not hide behind an excuse (‘I was only sixteen at the time’) but constitutes the self in 
intention (‘I confess that I failed’).  
 
Ricœur’s distinction between idem and ipse, I conclude, offers a view of the subject in 
which the other is no longer separated from and external to an isolated self. The 
initial effect of otherness has been transferred from the outside into the inside, 
Ricœur writes, in a process of internalization. As a consequence, otherness is also 
part of the self. With regard to self-sacrifice this means that it occurs in a tension 
that is felt within the self, a tension that can be put into words as follows: ‘I sacrifice 
myself for myself (hence for the one I aim to be) despite myself (hence despite what 
resistance there is within me), as well as recognizing others as constitutive of the 
self, both in their being agent and being vulnerable’. This is further illustrated in the 
example of self-constancy over time in a promise and a confession of guilt. One 
constitutes the self in a statement of self-constancy (Ricœur, 1992, 165) towards the 
future and towards a shared past. In these moments one actually does something 
impossible, for one is not the same as one was in the past, nor will one be the same in 
the future. Still one establishes the self as having remained the same and willing to 
remain the same in one respect, i.e. accountability. This establishment of the self is 
rooted in the awareness that one is not a self if one does not establish this self-
constancy. To be a self means to be accountable. 
Thinking further along this line, I propose a new understanding of self-
sacrifice, viz. as an act of self-establishment with regard to the present, which can be 
verbalized thus: ‘Even though my thoughts withhold me, I do it, for else I am not.’ 
This is a reaching out to the present in the tension between resistance rooted in 
sameness and self-establishment rooted in selfhood. I develop this line of thought in 
the next subsection, which further illuminates how Ricœur helps think this through.  
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b. Emplotment in narrative identity 
 
The term ‘emplotment’ sheds light on narrative identity. It is through emplotment 
that the dialectic of idem and ipse enables the subject to integrate diversity, variability, 
discontinuity, and instability in his or her identity (140-141). Subjects compose their 
identity in a dialectic of discordance and concordance. In seeking one’s identity, one 
needs some concordant idea of the self that gives unity to one’s composition. As 
this process does not stand outside reality, events happen that influence or threaten 
the subject’s identity. This places on the subject the task to discern and admit these 
discordances and to find a new arrangement, a new plot that offers a new 
concordance. This is what the subject does in the activity of emplotment: discern a 
plot that explains a reversal of fortune, ordering events and initiatives. Ricœur 
applies the term ‘configuration’ to this art of composition that mediates between 
concordance and discordance (141). Hence the plot helps link together the elements 
of a story, mediating between actions and events, between unity and sequence, and 
between a mere succession and a temporal unity, even to the extent that chronology 
is abandoned in favor of a different order (141). The narrative event is defined by its 
relation to the operation of configuration, Ricœur argues, through its participation in 
the unstable structure of discordant concordance that is characteristic of the plot. 
Concordance is the principle of order, whereas discordances are the reversals of 
fortune that make of the plot an ordered transformation from an initial situation to a 
terminal situation (141). He writes:  
It is a source of discordance inasmuch as it springs up, and a source of 
concordance inasmuch as it allows the story to advance. The paradox of 
emplotment is that it inverts the effect of contingency, in the sense of that 
which could have happened differently or which might not have happened at 
all, by incorporating it in some way into the effect of necessity or probability 
exerted by the configuring act (142). 
As such, the narrative operation of emplotment is able to incorporate different 
fragments into the unity of one story by understanding events after the fact and 
transfiguring them within the temporal totality, reconciling identity and diversity 
(142-143). 
In narrative theory, the subject is both agent and sufferer (145). He or she is 
the central character of the narrative, acting and suffering, but also the one 
evaluating the story. Not only does the plot unfold one’s character, but the inverse is 
true as well (146). The subject is capable of starting something new, influencing the 
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course of events, and also of determining a beginning, a middle, and an end of the 
narrated action (147). In other words, the story is my story, the story of “me”, of 
who and what I am, and why. Hence it is the identity of the story that also makes 
the identity of the character (148). Still, this is not an invariable story, not a prefixed 
plot, but one that is and can be reinterpreted again and again. The subject’s identity, 
although recognizable as “the same”, is also subject to a continuous process of 
telling and retelling, seeking other possible and plausible variations (148). Although 
these variations most often do not erase the stability of the idem-identity, there are 
exceptions, as in limiting cases. These can be fictitious narratives (as in literature) 
about the loss of identity as sameness, i.e. the loss of the configuration of the 
narrative, such as in a crisis that keeps a narrative from being successfully composed 
into a new unity, for example, when a character in a story ceases to possess a definite 
character (148-149) or in conversion narratives in which the most dramatic 
transformation of a personal identity takes place (166). These are the cases in which 
characters lose their identity as sameness (149).  
 
Thus self-sacrifice in the subject’s stream of thoughts relates to the subject’s 
passivity and agency: not solely agency nor solely passivity. Here Ricœur’s account is 
immensely different from other theories of action. I now turn to its background, in 
Ricœur’s account of the uncertainty of the narrative self. 
As may have become clear from the preceding pages, narrative identity is 
connected to ethics, for narrative self-understanding also incorporates moral 
imputation (163). That is, narrating includes a moral judgment of approval or 
disapproval, which is also present in the thought experiments we perform in 
imagination (164). Ricœur opposes the dichotomy of ‘ought’ and ‘is’, as narration 
serves as a natural transition between description and prescription (170)33. Ethics 
relates to identity, with the self being given the choice between various ways of 
being and acting in the face of another person. Hence the term ‘self-constancy’ is 
already an essentially ethical notion. The uncertainty of the narrative self is the point 
of connection between narrativity and ethics. Here Ricœur proposes a living 
dialectic of narrative identity and moral identity (167). On the one hand, the moral 
identity can constitute a firm point over against the uncertainty of the imagination of 
narrative identity. Imagination can think “I can try anything”, but the moral identity 
can decide, e.g. in the act of promising, “Here is where I stand”, thereby creating a 
fragile concordance between narrativity and morality (167-168). On the other hand, 
the narrative uncertainty of limiting cases can be incorporated into the moral 
                                                             
33 Ricœur’s complete reasons for this opposition are considered in the subsection on ethics.  
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identity, resulting in the question: “Who am I, so inconstant, that notwithstanding you 
count on me?” (168, italics in text). Hence self-constancy is a modest position in 
which one is uncertain of oneself but nevertheless is made responsible by others 
who expect one’s commitment. This is what Ricœur calls “the secret break at the 
very heart of commitment” (168). What matters is a dialectic of ownership and of 
dispossession, of care and of carefreeness, of self-affirmation and of self-effacement 
(168). 
 
In reflecting on Ricœur’s concept of ‘emplotment’ I want to stress the importance of 
both the tension between discordance and concordance and the connection between 
narrativity and ethics. The former illuminates an aspect of self-sacrifice that I have 
discussed throughout this research, which I have termed ‘giving into what life gives’. 
The new element that Ricœur offers is a narrative self that develops the self’s 
identity by composing a narrative consisting of agency and suffering. This entails 
that this self is never reduced to either pure agency or pure suffering, since the 
tension remains. The composition of the narrative identity is never certain, never 
controlled, never solid through time but subject to what happens, to events, to facts 
that remain to be arranged (cf. p. 141). The composition, however, also remains a 
task: no matter what happens, no matter which facts or events are unexpectedly and 
surprisingly given, the narrative that is told is the narrative of an ‘I’ arranging the 
facts, varying them, determining their order, their beginning and ending. Hence the 
self creates a temporary unity or coherence of the story and incorporates what 
threatens it. Neither agency nor suffering is diminished. There is no demand for 
removing uncertainty. This is again an important feature of Ricœur’s theory of 
action. 
 The latter, the connection between narrativity and ethics, is a consequence of 
Ricœur’s dismissal of the distinction between ‘ought’ and ‘is’. The uncertainty of 
one’s narrative due to discordance, especially in the limiting cases when the identity 
is lost, poses the task of constituting (and re-constituting) a self in the ethical sense. 
This connection between narrativity and ethics is fundamental to understanding how 
self-sacrifice is a matter both of passibility (passibilité), i.e. what life gives, and of 
ethics, i.e. of agency. It can be illuminated by several stories that I presented in the 
Introduction. John Bayley, for instance, expresses the paradox of trouble and 
pleasure. The unavoidable burdensome trouble of his care for Iris runs parallel with 
an increase in the value of small satisfactions. Bayley, with his narrative certainty of 
their intertwined identities, his having incorporated her into his self-composition, 
creating a unity enhanced through his writing, is under moral suspicion, is asking 
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whether he in the end is acting selfishly. And the dialectic works the other way 
around in the story of Jane Eyre (Brontë). Here the uncertain narrative self, her story 
having been broken off, finds new unity in dedication to a moral law that has been 
given to her and has proven to stand the test of time (‘There I plant my foot’). She 
creatively evaluates herself and her situation and decides to dedicate herself to a 
higher good that leads her to suffer painfully from a present loss. The “break at the 
heart of commitment” (to adapt a phrase of Ricœur) is a valuable view allowing for 
ambiguity at the heart of the idea of self-sacrifice. It opposes unambiguous terms 
that lack tension, like self-gift. Instead, moral commitment is best thought of as a 
tension between care and carefreeness, between self-affirmation and self-effacement. 
The idea of disproportion is a further elaboration of the subject’s dialectic, in which 
Ricœur himself reflects on sacrifice. I turn now to the unification, the grasping 
together of passible and active, against the background of actual uncertainty. 
 
c. Ricœur’s concept of disproportion between fragility and capability  
 
I turn to Ricœur’s Fallible Man (1986, 1st ed., 1965), which analyzes the problem of 
evil. I turn to this work, however, only for two reasons: first, because he elaborates 
on human fragility (or passibility, passibilité) and, second, because he writes 
beautifully here on sacrifice as the heart’s transcendence. The emphasis on passibility 
is essential to my research, as it puts human moral agency into perspective. Although 
Marion and Housset contribute significantly to radicalizing human passibility, they 
do not enable me to conceive of affective fragility as determining the subject as a 
moral agent. Such a conception of passibility helps avoid reducing self-sacrifice to 
the passive, tragic side of life and instead to conceive of self-sacrifice as a possible 
moral course of action. In Fallible Man Ricœur discusses the human disproportion 
between affective fragility and moral agency. In turn, this disproportion leads to 
conflicts within the heart, resulting in sacrifice. I discuss these two points 
subsequently, with each discussion being followed by my reflection.  
 
Disproportion indicates the subject’s dialectic tension between fragility and 
autonomy. It is the global disposition of human beings that Ricœur calls an unstable 
ontological constitution of being greater and lesser than himself (1)34. Finitude, for 
instance, consists in the subject’s affective perspective, or point of view, which is 
affective from the beginning. For things appear to me as interesting or lovable, 
                                                             
34 Ricœur does not use inclusive language in Fallible Man. If possible I rework his language to make 
it inclusive.  
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attractive, hateful, repulsive. Hence, without noticing it, I start with a perspective 
that is narrowed by my affection, which influences my will (51). The way one feels 
or the mood in which one finds oneself also expresses the finitude of affectivity 
(54). Being embodied, feeling, and sensing determine the subject’s possibilities (56) 
and can be summed up in the notion of character (50).  
Ricœur characterizes the opposite pole, infinitude, as happiness, which he 
describes as the totality of human aims. It is not the sum of fulfilled desires but is 
the whole, the totality, the supreme good, or what the human being as a rational 
being can recognize as the demand of life, as what he should reasonably pursue (66). 
He draws on Kant here, who calls this totality of happiness the entire object of a 
pure practical reason (67). It is not purely theoretical but is an idea influencing me 
on the practical level, providing a sense of direction, or destination. I receive signs of 
my destination that I cannot grasp or clutch but can experience as an assurance that 
I am on the right path (68).  
 Respect is the third and mediating term between character and happiness (69). 
Using Kantian terms, Ricœur argues that “the person is a way of treating others and 
of treating oneself” according to the imperative ‘Act so that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a 
means only’ (72). Therefore the moral feeling of respect is constitutive for the 
synthesis of the person (72). Respect is rooted in both sensibility and rationality, as 
the sensible and rational human person has a capacity to undergo the influence of 
the moral incentive (77).  
 
What is of specific relevance to conceiving self-sacrifice is Ricœur’s emphasis on 
affective fragility as an affective perspective that determines one’s possibilities, 
however without effacing the infinitude of intentional aiming. Like Marion and 
Housset, Ricœur emphasizes that human passivity is an undergoing, but, unlike 
them, he considers it from the ethical perspective. Ricœur keeps alive the tension 
between, on the one hand, the embodied feeling and sensing and, on the other hand, 
rationality, with ethics being rooted in the living tension between them. I now turn 
to a text where he elaborates on the mediation between fragility and autonomy that 
takes place as a struggle in the heart. Sacrifice may be its consequence, according to 
Ricœur. 
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d. Disproportion as the ground for sacrifice as the heart’s transcendence 
 
In disproportion, which is felt in the heart (thumos) as a conflict, sacrifice is 
possible, according to Ricœur. For the heart knows and feels the duality of fragility 
and interiorizing, on the one hand, and its inverse function, objectifying knowledge, 
on the other hand (106). The dialectic shows the human’s fundamental affective 
fragility, as humans are continuously experiencing uncertainty due to their finitude 
and trying to overcome this uncertainty through reason.  
 Ricœur elaborates on the reciprocity of reason and feeling by analyzing 
different schemata of belonging. He describes the heart as the mediator between 
feeling and reason that is able to transcend the everyday level and lift the subject to 
sacrifice:  
[In] the polarity of Heart and Care […] we find the interpersonal schemata of 
being-with as well as the supra-personal schemata of being-for and the 
fundamental intention of being-in. Here the Heart is always the polar opposite 
of Care; its fundamental openness or availability is always opposed to the 
greed of the body and living. Sacrifice is the dramatic form that, in a 
catastrophe, takes on the heart’s transcendence; sacrifice attests that, at the 
limit of life, to give one’s life for a friend and to die for an idea is the same 
thing. Sacrifice shows the fundamental unity of two schemata of belonging, 
the schema of friendship and the schema of devotion (or loyalty). Friendship 
is to another what devotion is to the idea, and the two together make up the 
view – the Aussicht – “into an order in which, alone, we can continue to exist” 
(104, italics in text).  
Although Ricœur comments on this text, he does not focus on the meaning of 
sacrifice. I therefore need to interpret his words and the place he gives to sacrifice. 
The first and the last sentences of this passage indicate the framework of this 
thought, which, on the one hand, is formed by the schemata of being-with (the 
interpersonal schema), being-for (the supra-personal schema), and being-in (the 
fundamental intention). On the other hand, the framework is determined by the two 
schemata of belonging, namely, friendship and devotion (or loyalty), which form a 
unity that is the essential order for our existence. In other words, without friendship 
and devotion, without a sense of belonging to some order that transcends our 
individual existence, we cannot continue with our lives. This is essential: Ricœur 
speaks of a framework for the subject’s existence, which is formed by a sense of 
belonging, hence, by reaching out to others, by giving my life a reason to be, as well 
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as by my being accepted and recognized by others, making my life something that is 
mirrored in the eyes of others to whom I belong.  
Three terms are operative within this framework: heart, caring, and sacrifice. 
(Ricœur elaborates on caring in Oneself as Another, and calls it ‘solicitude’ there. I turn 
to this in the next section, on ethics.) The heart is defined as fundamental openness 
or availability and is opposed to a certain form of care that is focused on the greed 
of the body and living. In order to explore what Ricœur means, I return to a 
previous statement in which he argues that the psychology of feeling is blind, as it 
only analyzes feeling without its relation to rationality, to knowing. Knowing in 
reason can overcome affective confusion by becoming a demand for totality, or as 
Ricœur puts it: ‘In reason I “demand” what I “pursue” in action and that to which I 
“aspire” in feeling’ (102). Reason opposes feeling and evaluates it. Hence, it is 
through reason that I ask what goal I have when I act and what I aim at when I feel. 
Care, however, taken as concern for the narrow “greed of the body and living”, is 
bound to feeling, to the actual, empirical neediness of the body, of the self, of 
others, of living. Care is the enclosure of consciousness, the absorption in everyday 
neediness. It may even be a form of self-concern, including when the care seems to 
be directed at others.  
The heart, then, is the place where feeling and reason are in conflict. Without 
mediation, there would be only opposition. The heart mediates between the moment 
of affective fragility and the demand for totality. The heart, being fundamental 
openness and availability, breaks the enclosure of care (taken as concern) and opens 
the subject to the idea of what transcends the everyday level. The heart may lift the 
subject to this level. 
Sacrifice, according to Ricœur, is the heart’s transcendence, but only in a 
dramatic form, in a catastrophe, or at the limit of life. In such limiting cases sacrifice 
may take place, as the self, through reason mediated by the heart, has a sense of 
belonging, either to another in friendship or to an idea in devotion or loyalty, which 
in the end is the same thing, according to Ricœur. The heart transcends the self and 
aims at a totality, raises the self to a sense of belonging to an order of living that 
makes life itself possible.  
 
To conclude, I interpret Ricœur’s thought on sacrifice as follows. First, life is only 
possible through a sense of belonging, and this sense of belonging may require 
sacrifice. Second, sacrifice only takes place (in limiting cases) through the 
transcendence of “the greed of the body and living”, thus when we become aware of 
a wider horizon and receive a sense of destination. Third, sacrifice is a dramatic 
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form that is restricted to a catastrophic situation or at the limit of life, i.e. cases that 
are extreme, which he also calls ‘limiting cases’ or ‘unsettling cases’ (cf. Ricœur, 
1992, 166). I want to stress Ricœur’s framework: sacrifice takes place within the only 
order that enables us to live, that is, the order of belonging. Sacrifice, then, is the 
opposite of the ideas of destruction and a devaluation of life, for instance, when 
some lives are ‘sacrificed’ for the benefit of others. But sacrifice is also opposed to 
an exclusive valuation of each individual life. Instead, sacrifice takes the middle 
position: the transcendent idea of the order of living is leading our action, 
preventing, on the one hand, a neglect of each person’s worth and, on the other 
hand, the idea that no life may be given for another or for a good. This view is 
important to my work. It helps me to save the idea of sacrifice from being either 
mere stupidity or mere heroism. It takes the ambiguity of sacrifice into account. 
I want to make two more points about this text. First, Ricœur’s idea that 
sacrificing one’s life can only be done in a catastrophic situation differs from the 
idea that sacrifice, on a small scale, is part of everyday caring. I defend this idea that 
sacrifice is commonplace in everyday caring, since caregivers often cross their limits. 
Every time a caregiver feels, thinks, or says that the care that is demanded is too 
much and yet carries on—this, I would say, is a limiting case. I do not limit the idea 
of sacrifice to a catastrophe or a tragedy or the highly dramatic situations of war, 
oppression, and holocaust. Instead, in caregiving the self’s boundaries are not fixed, 
not determined, but they move all the time, and often caregivers find out how much 
their boundaries have shifted only afterwards, when they realize: “I never imagined I 
would be so deeply involved in this caring, but I suddenly find that I am”. My 
second point is that the above argument about this text on sacrifice also holds for 
self-sacrifice: first, self-sacrifice must be understood within a sense of belonging; 
second, self-sacrifice requires an awareness of a wider horizon of a good, a sense of 
destination (hence it is not self-effacement or even close to it), and it remains within 
the tension of giving in to a good or refusing to give in; third, self-sacrifice is 
dramatic, thus not something to be considered lightly.  
 
e. Conclusion with regard to self-sacrifice within the dialectics of the self 
 
Throughout his treatment of the concepts of narrative identity, moral identity, and 
disproportion, Ricœur conceives the subject as a concrete ‘I’, somebody feeling, 
experiencing, finite from an affective perspective, as well as rationally valuing, 
finding meaning, acting and deciding. In his dispute with other philosophers (for 
instance, existentialists, structuralists) he wants to defend the concrete, actual 
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experiences of a living self, which is embodied, temporal, and willing. The subject is 
both capable of acting and at the same time always subject to influence and change from the 
outside. Moreover, the subject is well aware of its finitude, present both at the 
beginning and at the end of its life, which can come at any moment. Ricœur’s 
analysis puts emphasis on the self as finding and giving meaning to the self, but 
never by the self alone. The self is always in need of others and of otherness, not 
only in order to understand the self, but to be the self and to find meaning and 
ethical aims for his or her life. In being capable of considering the self from the 
perspective of infinitude, the self is capable of self-sacrifice for a higher good, 
forsaking immediate pleasure. In the self’s fragility lies the possibility of self-sacrifice 
that is simultaneously self-realization. Developing further Ricœur’s thought on self-
constancy toward the past (confession of guilt) and toward the future (promise), I 
propose to formulate a new interpretation of self-constancy, namely, that toward the 
present: self-sacrifice is the sacrifice of the self as a reaching out to the present in the 
tension between sameness and selfhood. This can be understood as the tension 
between thoughts that withhold and a practice that is nevertheless established, in the 
awareness that the self only exists when doing so. In the next section I turn to the 
question of how self-sacrifice can be conceived in ethics. 
 
 
3. Self-sacrifice within dialectical ethics  
 
In my endeavor to render self-sacrifice conceivable I have argued that several 
frameworks need to be opened up and recast. For this I have turned to theology, 
phenomenology, and political theory. However an answer to the question of how to 
think of self-sacrifice from an alternative ethics to care ethics has been lacking until 
now. Ricœur’s dialectical ethics, which he calls ‘little ethics’, is illuminating in this 
regard. Ricœur enters ethics through narrativity, since the subject, narrating the self, 
also includes ethical deliberations and moral imputation. Consequently Ricœur 
opposes the dichotomy of ‘ought’ and ‘is’, for reasons that he enumerates briefly 
(Ricœur, 1992, 170). First, many sorts of precepts play a role in action – advice, 
recommendation, instruction, and also moral rules – all of which help to define 
practices. A separation between moral rules and non-moral rules can hardly be 
made. Second, narration serves as a link between description and prescription, not 
only describing events but also containing all sorts of thought experiments, 
including ethical ones. Narration also contains an ethical valuation, which may guide 
future action. And finally, a distinction must be made between what is considered to 
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be good and what imposes itself as obligatory, on which Ricœur further elaborates in 
his dialectic of teleological ethics and deontological morality. 
 I turn now to a consideration of this dialectical ethics, in which Ricœur also 
offers rich ideas for thinking about caring, which he calls solicitude, as well as about 
power, which has consequences for thinking about intersubjectivity and the 
community. Ricœur uncovers a tension in interpersonal as well as social and 
collective relations, which he re-categorizes and considers to be indispensable for 
discerning what is practically wise. I conclude that self-sacrifice can be understood 
within this tension as accepting what life gives while being attracted to a good. 
Following this discussion, I close with a reflection on what this ethics contributes to 
thinking about self-sacrifice.  
 
a. Dialectical ethics 
 
In his dialectical ethics, Ricœur sets himself a task: 
The task for which Ricœur exerts himself is to bring together the “teleology” 
of Aristotelian ethics which aims at the good, and the “deontology” of a 
Kantian morality that forbids evil (Abel, 1996, 87, transl. IvN).  
Keeping the two orientations together, Ricœur explains how each corrects the 
possible perverse effects of the other (88). Practical reason finds itself in a concrete 
situation in which the rule that would oblige a certain action meets with ethical 
objections. It is then the task of practical reason to “invent” (inventer) conduct that 
best satisfies the exception required by the situation while least trespassing the rule 
(Ricœur, 1992, 269).  
Ricœur’s ethics is a concrete ethics, considering the moral judgment in a real-
life situation, but it is also an ethics that still centers on the question of the subject, 
taking as a starting point the practical level of the acting subject. He understands the 
self as a moral subject of imputation, meaning that one is capable of being held 
accountable for one’s actions. Ricœur proposes to determine the subject’s action by 
predicates such as ‘good’ and ‘obligatory’ (169), maintaining a tension between 
Aristotelian teleological ethics, which aims at what is considered to be good, and Kantian 
deontological morality, which aims at what imposes itself as obligatory (170, italics in 
text). Ricœur reserves the term ‘ethics’ for the aim of an “accomplished life” and the 
term ‘morality’ for the articulation of this aim in norms that are characterized by the 
claim to universality and by their constraining effect (170, italics in text). Ricœur 
aims to establish:  
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(1) the primacy of ethics over morality, (2) the necessity for the ethical aim to 
pass through the sieve of the norm, and (3) the legitimacy of recourse by the 
norm to the aim whenever the norm leads to impasses in practice (170).  
This is the program through which he unfolds his ‘little ethics’.  
 
b. Ethics: Aiming at the ‘Good Life’ 35 with and for Others in Just Institutions 
 
Ethics, Ricœur argues, has primacy over morality. Hence the starting point is the 
subject that is free to deliberate about the good life, choosing a life plan and courses 
of action that conform more or less closely to an ideal in life, that is, a teleological 
aim (174). This subject is able to account for his or her choices, to evaluate and 
revise them, as a subject of attestation. To attest is to bear witness to one’s being 
free along the entire path of one’s life, in one’s profession, social roles, works, etc. 
(Weickmans, 2003, 7). However, this freedom does not allow for a solipsistic 
interpretation of the self, since the standards that are applied to different 
accomplishments are established socially as rules of comparison shared by a given 
community of practitioners (Ricœur, 1992, 176).  
 In his definition of ethical intention as aiming at the ”good life” with and for others 
in just institutions (172) Ricœur indicates that the ‘good life’ is necessarily 
intersubjective as well as lived in good institutions. I turn now to these two 
dimensions, first to intersubjectivity, then to institutions.  
 
In his exploration of intersubjectivity Ricœur gives a central place to caring, which 
he calls ‘solicitude’. His view of the intersubjective relation draws on Aristotle’s idea 
of friendship, which is defined by reciprocity. Friendship needs both the self and the 
other, in a mutual relationship of which reciprocity is part, sharing commonality and 
even intimacy (183). This reciprocity entails that each loves the other “as being the 
man he is” (183, italics in text36). And through this mutuality, friendship borders on 
justice (184). Ricœur interprets this as the wish of the subject for a reciprocity of 
                                                             
35 Ricœur describes ‘the good life’ as follows: “The first component of the ethical aim is what 
Aristotle called ‘living well,’ or the ‘good life’ […]. The “good life” is what should be mentioned 
first because it is the very object of the ethical aim. Whatever the image that each of us has of a 
full life, this apex is the ultimate end of our action. […] This relativity with respect to us does not 
prevent the fact that the good is not contained in any particular thing. The good is rather that 
which is lacking in all things. This ethics in its entirety presupposes this nonsaturable use of the 
predicate “good” (172).” Hence “the good life” to Ricœur is neither fixed nor arbitrary. I adopt his 
view and his terminology (hence not ‘a good life’).  
36 Ricœur, who himself uses inclusive language, here directly quotes from Aristotle’s Nichomachean 
Ethics.  
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reflexivity that it is shared equally by oneself and others. Friendship, then, indeed 
involves disinterestedness and even sacrifice:  
In this way, it does not prevent friendship from being disinterested, even to 
the point of sacrifice, for disinterestedness is already rooted in the relationship 
of self to self, by virtue of the original bond between intellect, excellence, and 
reflexivity (185).  
Friendship and reciprocity make possible a larger, more just sharing of life in which 
a community is formed:  
As for the corollary of reciprocity, namely equality, it places friendship on the 
path of justice, where the life together shared by a few people gives way to the 
distribution of shares in a plurality on the scale of a historical, political 
community (188). 
Ricœur argues that solicitude is central to the living with and for others and takes 
friendship as a model for solicitude. He emphasizes the reciprocity of friendship, 
opposing Emmanuel Levinas in this regard, who argued that the initiative of contact 
is taken by the other while remaining absolute exteriority. But such a lack of 
reciprocity, according to Ricœur, is irrelation (188-189). Ricœur defends the 
autonomy of the self by giving a more fundamental status to solicitude than to 
obedience to duty (190). He argues that the opposite situation of injunction is the 
situation of suffering, not only of physical or mental pain, but also of the incapacity 
to act. In this suffering one is only capable of receiving the charity of others, who do 
have the ability to give (190, italics in text). Giving and receiving are only balanced in 
true sympathy. 
In true sympathy, the self, whose power of acting is at the start greater than 
that of its other, finds itself affected by all that the suffering other offers to it 
in return. For from the suffering other there comes a giving that is no longer 
drawn from the power of acting and existing but precisely from weakness 
itself. This is perhaps the supreme test of solicitude, when unequal power 
finds compensation in an authentic reciprocity in exchange, which, in the 
hour of agony, finds refuge in the shared whisper of voices or the feeble 
embrace of clasped hands. […] Sharing the pain of suffering is not 
symmetrically opposite to sharing pleasure (191). 
This idea of friendship contributes importantly to thinking about self-sacrifice. For 
friendship is not ‘doing something for somebody else who has done so much for 
me’. Rather, it is a taking of a position, ‘I am her friend, and therefore I want what is 
best for her’. Hence, friendship is a continuous first movement towards the other. It is 
acting for the other, instead of reaction.  
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In this text Ricœur demonstrates a deep understanding of care as sharing of 
suffering. He emphasizes the role of feelings that are spontaneously directed toward 
others (191-192). This has a parallel in Housset, who restored pity as a feeling 
invoked by the other’s suffering and (when not false pity) directed towards the 
other. But instead of making the other the sole source of this feeling, Ricœur argues 
that obligation toward the other and feelings for the other intersect each other in 
friendship, standing as a midpoint between the two extremes of the summons to 
responsibility, where the initiative comes from the other, and of sympathy for the 
suffering other, where the initiative comes from the loving self (192). What Housset 
calls commonness (nostrité), Ricœur calls similitude. It is the natural accompaniment 
not only of friendship but also of all the initially unequal forms of bond between 
oneself and the other (193). Hence similitude exists between all human beings as a 
presupposed bond, whether this bond is at first one of equality or inequality. 
Similitude makes us alike.  
Similitude is the fruit of the exchange between esteem for oneself and 
solicitude for others. […] Becoming in this way fundamentally equivalent are 
the esteem of the other as a oneself and the esteem of oneself as an other (193-194, 
italics in text). 
 
The phrase …in just institutions indicates that the ethical aim links the good life to 
living ‘with and for others’ as well as living ‘in just institutions’, since the self cannot 
exist without the others. The result of Ricœur’s inquiry into institutions is “a new 
determination of the self”, viz. that of ‘each’, of a self having rights (194). From the 
ethical perspective the institution is fundamentally characterized by the bond of 
common mores rather than by constraining rules (194). So Ricœur distinguishes 
between two forms of power at play on the institutional level: one that emphasizes 
‘living together’ and another containing the judicial systems and political 
organizations (194). The desire to live together is ordinarily invisible, Ricœur argues, 
being covered over extensively by relations of domination (196-197). Yet power is 
founded on this ‘forgotten’ desire (197).  
Ricœur considers just institutions to be a part of the ethical aim (201). He 
considers society as a system that regulates the distribution of roles. It transcends 
the opposition between individual and society, since the system exists only to the 
extent that individuals take part in it (200). Hence the institution exists only when 
individuals accept their roles and act according to them. In institutions the individual 
and the society act together.  
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Ricœur reframes intersubjectivity and community. If intersubjectivity has been 
compared to a balance in Chapter 1, as an invasion by the other in Chapter 3, and as 
an affective coexistence anterior to ethics in Chapter 5, Ricœur adds another view. 
He argues for a dynamic intersecting of passibility and ethics, in a phenomenological 
understanding of the sharing of suffering. Feelings for and obligation towards the 
other do not exclude each other but are mutually and dynamically interconnected in 
friendship. What is more, both the subject and the other are actively involved in this sharing. 
Here lies the link that was entirely missing in Marion’s work and was only partly 
present in Housset’s notion of consent. Friendship, as Ricœur sees it, is the model 
relationship in which both the self and the other are involved, the latter by taking 
the initiative with a summons to responsibility, the former by taking the initiative 
with sympathy for the suffering other. 
 Ricœur’s ethical notion of the community points not only at the others as 
plural but also as institutionalized. And the self also relates to the self in institutions, 
by accepting roles and participating in these institutions. This yields an understanding of self-
sacrifice in which the ethical self makes sacrifices without lacking either agency or 
passivity vis-à-vis another as well as an ‘each’ in institutions. Whether the other is a 
friend or someone similar to oneself but as yet unknown or someone with whom 
there is a bond that is not (yet) organized, friendship is the model for this 
relationship in which the self may sacrifice. 
 
c. The deontological norm 
 
Ricœur argues that it is necessary to subject the ethical aim to the test of the norm 
(203). Moral obligation exists on the subjective level, the intersubjective level, and 
the level of the institutionalized society. 
 The dialectic of the ethical aim of the ‘good life’ and moral obligation poses the question 
of universality, i.e. whether my behavior or choice of action could count as a rule for 
all (204). Characteristic of the idea of duty is the idea of constraint (206). For, 
although finitude determines us and our restricted possibilities, we can 
simultaneously determine our action because of our capacity to think of an infinite 
range of actions that would serve a good beyond an immediately felt inclination. The 
good therefore has the form of duty, of the imperative, of moral constraint (206-
207). Freedom here means independence with respect to the law of causality and is 
obedience to oneself, which is obedience that has lost all character of dependence 
and submission. Hence true obedience is autonomy (210). Ricœur proposes a 
dialectical structure of morality in which the opposition between autonomy and 
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heteronomy becomes fruitful. Morality is a matter of the universality of willing, 
which can be grasped only in an abstract moment, when the solitary ego and the 
plurality of persons can all grasp a commonness in which the divisions among them 
fade (211).  
 The dialectic of solicitude and the norm indicates that the norm cannot be found by 
the self alone but only through its fundamental dialogical structure (218). Therefore 
Ricœur connects the norm to the ideas of reciprocity and of autonomy. The norm 
of reciprocity is expressed in the Golden Rule (either as ‘do not do to your neighbor 
what you would not want him to do to you’ or as ‘treat others as you would like 
them to treat you’), which keeps in place an initial dissymmetry, as one is agent, the 
other patient (219). Ricœur considers this basic dissymmetry the source of all 
maleficent offshoots of interaction, ranging from influence to murder (219). Hence 
in morality the Golden Rule is complemented by a series of prescriptions and 
prohibitions: you shall not lie, you shall not steal, you shall not kill, you shall not 
torture. Morality, clearly, responds to violence (221). He argues that the “no” of 
morality responds to all types of evil and that therefore we cannot do without the 
negative form of prohibition (221). Still, the affirmative form of solicitude has 
primacy over the negative form of prohibition, as our sense of the other’s dignity is 
the foundation of ethical action. This, for Ricœur, is the original affirmation of all 
human beings (221).  
 The dialectic of the sense of justice and principles of justice indicates that the 
deontological rule of justice develops on the basis of a sense of justice that belongs 
to the ethical aim (227). Instead of mutually excluding each other, deontological 
procedural conceptions presuppose a sense of justice, whereas a prior commitment 
to the common good of living together also needs to be established as a work-in-
progress that needs procedures of evaluation (228-229). The conflicts between the 
sense of justice and the normative rules require a third term to mediate. This is 
practical wisdom. 
 
To conclude, Ricœur’s view of deontological norms leads to an understanding of 
self-sacrifice that stresses the need for a different understanding of obligation. Being 
obliged to sacrifice the self entails a giving in to how life arises, against a background 
that attracts. This is what it means to be part of a community with a shared past and 
a shared aim. Self-sacrifice is not an autonomous or heteronomous obligation but is 
a giving in to what is fitting now. Practical wisdom operates here.  
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d. Practical wisdom: convictions 
 
The third and mediating part of the dialectic, practical wisdom, is needed for dealing 
with conflicts raised by the moral norm:  
[A] morality of obligation […] produces conflictual situations where practical 
wisdom has no recourse, in our opinion, other than to return to the initial 
intuition of ethics, in the framework of moral judgment in situation; that is, to 
the vision or aim of the “good life” with and for others in just institutions 
(240). 
Hence Ricœur relies on the initial intuition of ethics, which he calls conviction, as 
the only way out in the dialectic of ethical aim and moral norm (240). However, he 
does not disavow moral duty or the morality of obligation by referring morality back 
to ethics, as they are the necessary means of testing out the aim of the good life 
(240). A mediator is needed in the actual existing conflicts in moral life. Ricœur 
presents these conflicts starting from institutions and leading back to the individual 
level, since institutional mediation is necessary for practical wisdom (250).  
Conflicts on the institutional level exist as the political practice contains the 
Arendtian difference between power and domination (256). Power, Ricœur argues, 
exists only to the extent that – and only so long as – the desire to live and act 
together subsists in a historical community. When this idea of power is forgotten 
and confused with domination, the idea of living-together gets lost (256). Balancing 
this relation of power and domination, in both the horizontal and the vertical 
dimensions, hence between the governing and the governed and between rival 
groups, is an endless task of organized political practice (257). Political conflicts can 
be divided into three levels of radicality. First, the everyday public and open political 
discussion about the establishment of an order of priority among the competing 
demands of justice. Second, the debate concerning the ends of good government as 
a longer-term discussion about how the political contributes to a full or good life, 
including discussion about which public goods have priority. And third, the 
legitimation of democracy, which is the ongoing debate about the legitimation of 
domination that requires visibly deriving domination from the desire to live together 
(257-260, italics in text). 
 Conflicts on the relational level can also arise. They appear in the application of the 
general rule to singular situations, hence in concrete ethics dealing with concrete 
responsibilities, where the rule is submitted to the test of circumstances, 
consequences, and the genuine otherness of persons (264-265). On this practical 
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level, concrete situations can call for exceptions on behalf of others, which are 
invented by practical wisdom.  
Practical wisdom consists in inventing conduct that will best satisfy the 
exception required by solicitude, by betraying the rule to the smallest extent 
possible (269). 
It is not a question of simply inventing any kind of behavior, for the rules of 
morality remain valid. The exception, therefore, must remain close to the moral 
norm. Ricœur gives the example of telling the truth to the dying (269). On the one 
hand, telling the truth out of sheer respect for the law without any consideration for 
the dying person’s capacity to receive it and, on the other hand, knowingly lying are 
two extreme attitudes. The solution cannot consist simply in following a rule but 
requires the invention of just behavior suited to the singular nature of the case (269). 
Hence practical wisdom in interpersonal relations takes the form of a new and 
critical solicitude, which is no longer the naïve solicitude of the first position of the 
dialectic but a critical solicitude that has passed through the double test of the moral 
conditions of respect and the conflicts generated by the latter (273). 
Conflicts with regard to autonomy arise in the tension between the demand for 
universalization (universalism) and the moral judgment in concrete situations 
(contextualism), a tension that cannot be resolved by rejecting one of the two 
positions. So Ricœur proposes a dialectical model that mediates between the ethics 
of argumentation and what he calls ‘considered convictions’ (288), the aim of which 
is the practical arbitration of moral judgment in situation (287). Ricœur argues that 
argumentation is only one language game within the greater totality of language, in 
which argumentation is entangled with many other language games, such as 
narratives that discuss life stories or what it means to want to live together. These 
communicative practices take place on a level prior to any argumentative 
formulation (287-288). It is through mediation between argumentation, with its 
universalization requirement, and the other language games that different options 
are discussed and the requirement can be made operative, as the confrontation itself 
can bring forth the best argument for the ones involved in the discussion. It is 
within the reflective equilibrium between the ethics of argumentation and 
considered convictions that both deontology and teleology are given expression; 
however, although this reflective equilibrium is the highest expression, it is also the 
most fragile expression (289). 
 
Ricœur’s third and mediating term, practical wisdom, grasps and expresses well the 
core of the stories presented in my Introduction. Protagonists Lucy (Coetzee), Jane 
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Eyre (Brontë), and Father Kolbe have – each in their own way and circumstances – 
their conflict with regard to institutions, relations, and autonomy. Lucy is a victim of 
a society struggling with structures of domination yet has a most personal 
experience; she does not desire retribution according to the system of justice but 
gives priority to living together, to caring for her baby and network of relations. Jane 
prioritizes the good of the law that demands that she refuse a dishonorable marriage. 
She reminds herself of the law given by God, recognized in her heart, and consents 
to it. Father Kolbe denounces the destructive Nazi-system by his act, which may 
serve as a reminder of the original desire to live together. A religious, sacrificial, 
biblically founded conviction, rather than a decision based on arguments, may have 
overruled the argumentation of self-preservation or rather brought the relations to 
self and others into the perspective of being attracted to a good. This means that my 
argument adds something to Ricœur’s idea of practical wisdom. Where he draws the 
line at ‘betraying the rule to the smallest extent possible’, I would say that when 
people engage in self-sacrifice they betray the rule to a much greater extent. I 
therefore propose to take Ricœur’s dialectic as a point of departure but to re-think 
the relation between the good that is aimed at, on the one hand, and the obligation, 
on the other. Being attracted by a higher good may have much more weight than 
being restricted by a norm. And exactly this imbalance may account for such self-
sacrifice.  
 
e. Conclusion on ethics 
 
Ricœur’s aim is to bring together Aristotelian teleology and Kantian deontology in a 
fruitful tension that allows for ethical deliberation in practice on the individual, 
relational, and political levels. By means of his dialectical model Ricœur creates a 
space for understanding self-sacrifice. I began this section by stating that I was 
seeking an understanding of self-sacrifice as morally required. At this point, after 
having studied Ricœur’s ethics, I must be more precise, for he carefully distinguishes 
between ethics and morality. If I take his thought one step further and think through 
self-sacrifice, I would say that it can only be understood in an ethics that 
incorporates the space between ethics and morality and allows practical wisdom to 
find a moral way of acting in a concrete situation that both conforms with the 
ethical aim of solicitude and betrays the moral norm to the least possible extent; yet 
at times it will betray the norm to a significant extent, without, however, abandoning 
the norm. Hence self-sacrifice must be thought in the tension between an ethical 
aim and a general norm: if the ethical aim of solicitude were to stand alone, then 
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self-sacrifice could become an idealized form of self-effacement; if the moral norm 
that every person is an end-in-itself were to stand alone, then self-sacrifice would be 
forbidden, which does not help out in concrete circumstances. The concrete 
situation requires avoiding both extremes: on the one hand, an overvaluation of each 
individual life that would not allow anyone to give one’s life for another and, on the 
other hand, an undervaluation of each individual life that would all too easily allow 
for self-sacrifice. If it remains a betrayal of the moral norm, if it fits with conduct 
that is required by solicitude, then it is practical wisdom. It then also remains within 
the criteria found in Chapter 2 that safeguard self-sacrifice against extreme forms of 
oppression, submission, or exploitation. And it can be thought of as giving more 
weight to the higher good at which one aims, which attracts one with greater force 
than the norm repels. This higher good is by no means exclusively a spiritual-
religious good, but a good that is highly autonomous and reasonable, as the story of 
Lucy (Coetzee) shows. 
 This necessary and indispensable tension in the concept of self-sacrifice 
between the ethical aim and the moral norm is not resolved by ethics but remains 
present; it can lead to a practical impasse, in which case practical wisdom can decide 
that the self is realized in self-sacrifice. However, even once the decision is made, it 
remains open to re-evaluation so as to determine whether it continues to still serve 
the ethical aim, whether it is suitable conduct required by solicitude, and whether it 
is not an uncritically large betrayal of the moral norm. As circumstances and 
situations alter, the evaluation by practical wisdom needs to continue.  
A touchstone for this conclusion is Bess’s story (Lars von Trier). Her 
excessive self-sacrifice does not seem conform to Ricœur’s axiom that the moral rule 
be betrayed to the least extent possible. Leaving aside the excuse that fiction tends 
to exaggerate, I would argue that Bess’s story discloses that in her case practical 
wisdom had to deal with extreme institutions, an extremely tested relation, and 
extreme language games. Even if these are bracketed, one can draw a conclusion 
that I support as valid, based on Bess’s own uncertainty, hesitation, and fear. I 
conclude that self-sacrifice stemming from practical wisdom remains uncertain, 
risky, open-ended, and with no guarantee regarding its consequence, result, or 
reception. The decision reached by practical wisdom, therefore, may prove to be 
wise yet unexpectedly harmful or destructive. 
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4. The political theory of mutual recognition 
 
In Chapter 4 I presented Honneth’s political theory of the struggle for recognition, 
in which he elaborates on the Hegelian idea of Anerkennung. Ricœur’s work The 
Course of Recognition (2005 [2004]) is in line with this political theory, and Ricœur 
explicitly gives credits to Honneth for his extrapolation of Hegel’s theory to a more 
empirically informed theory, thereby abandoning the absolute speculative point of 
view (182). I need not repeat the ideas elaborated in Chapter 4. Instead, I turn 
directly to Ricœur’s work because he elaborates on Honneth’s three models of 
intersubjective recognition – love, law, and social respect – exactly pertaining to the 
questions that remained in Chapter 4. First, Ricœur elaborates on recognition in the 
form of love in other ways than mother-and-child care; second, he has a different 
view on the threshold between the first and the second forms of recognition, 
thereby supplying a more adequate view of the relation between the private and the 
public spheres; and third, Ricœur expounds a view of community as an 
institutionalized society that makes his work useful for answering the question that 
remained in Housset’s work, whose idea of community lacks any consideration of 
institutions and positions. A fourth point of Ricœur’s political theory of recognition 
is especially relevant to self-sacrifice, namely, his idea of acts and gestures that end 
the struggle for recognition and establish so-called ‘states of peace’. These acts of 
agape, gift-giving, and mutuality offer rich insights for thinking about self-sacrifice. I 
consider these four points successively. 
 
a. Recognition as Love in adulthood 
 
Whereas Honneth elaborates on the Hegelian view of love by complementing it with 
psychoanalytic insights into early childhood development, Ricœur sees parallels in 
adult relationships. He argues that love relationships in adulthood also face the test 
of separation that results in the capacity to be alone, although this does have an 
emotional cost (189). Both lovers and friends experience the same, i.e. the desire for 
union and the desire for separation, as also expressed by Simone Weil, from whom 
Ricœur quotes: 
Lovers or friends desire two things. The one is to love each other so much 
that they enter into each other and only make one being. The other is to love 
each other so much that, having half the globe between them, their union will 
not be diminished in the slightest degree (190). 
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The form of disregard that corresponds to this model of recognition is humiliation, 
the opposite of what is at stake here, i.e. approbation. This is what parents, friends, 
and lovers do. They mutually approve each other’s existence, and being deprived of 
this approbation would make the person as if nonexistent (191). 
 I adopt Ricœur’s term as a more adequate expression for the first form of 
recognition, ‘approbation’, which, like legal recognition and esteem for personal 
qualities, precedes and is a condition for good care. Whereas Honneth emphasizes 
the strains required of the mother, in this first form of recognition, Ricœur discloses 
that love requires one to maintain and endure the tension of union and separation in 
other relations as well. This pulls love and caring away from the romanticized 
mother-and-child dyad and makes caring and self-sacrifice understandable in other 
affective relations as well.  
 
b. The non-division of the private and public spheres 
 
Ricœur offers an adequate view of the relation between the private and the public 
sphere. He shows that the relations of love also need to be regarded as institutions 
(191). The relations of parent-child, of husband-wife, and the relations within the 
family must be considered the educator for our first point of initiation into culture, 
teaching us to live together with a small number of people (191). But this institution 
is also governed by juridical law. Looking at one’s genealogy one can see which 
relations are prohibited as sexual relations, by the incest-prohibition, and it also gives 
the individual an identity in the eyes of civil institutions, as being the son or daughter 
of… (192-193). 
 Hence Ricœur shows that instead of being detached from the organized 
society, the private sphere is part of its organization into institutions. As a 
consequence, caring as well as self-sacrifice in caring can never be viewed as isolated 
within the private sphere, since the public sphere is already present in rules, 
positions, and expectations. 
 
c. Recognition as social esteem in the institutionalized society 
 
Ricœur expands on Honneth’s view of the third form of recognition, social esteem, 
by analyzing the organization of social systems within which there are different 
measures of standing (204-212). One should not speak too easily of solidarity of a 
common humanity without recognizing this pluralization of different criteria of 
standing (205). Confronting this idea with the views of Hegel and Honneth, Ricœur 
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argues that disagreement about social esteem exists on a larger scale and in a greater 
variety of forms: 
Beyond the rivalries created by the tests of justification in each world having 
to do with questions of standing, acquaintance with other worlds tends to 
extend such disagreement to the tests themselves, even to the point of 
challenging their contribution to the common good. […] The challenge then 
takes on the form of a difference of opinion, in the absence of a basis for 
argumentation stemming from a single system of justification – a difference 
of opinion affecting not only the criteria of standing in a given world, but the 
very notion of standing. What is the standing of a great industrialist in the 
eyes of a great orchestra director? (209) 
Social esteem, therefore, is a multi-layered term, and its establishment leads to a 
complex struggle. What interests Ricœur most is the human capacity to understand 
and even support values of another world than one’s own, which is a new dimension 
of personhood (209). This presupposes that individuals are able to recognize 
themselves in different worlds, and also to enter into a debate between these diverse 
worlds about the common good (210). Paradoxically the common good is both 
presupposed by and the result of processes of compromise engaged in by practical 
wisdom, aiming at justification without separating justice from the search of a fitting 
action in every situation (210). 
 The politics of recognition, according to Ricœur, also involve multiculturalism 
(212). The problems that are unveiled by the struggle for recognition by different 
cultures, by feminist movements, by racial or cultural minorities, are problems of 
public institutions in civil society and ultimately of the political structure itself, which 
is confronted with the demands for equality on the social plane (212-213). He argues 
that our identity is partially shaped by recognition or the absence of recognition 
(213). This idea brings to mind the views of Tronto, Halkes and Moser, who argue 
for the need for the unheard to gain a public and political voice. 
 
Ricœur’s conception of organized society is enriching. It gives a more detailed idea 
of the struggles that take place in society, as well as the struggles in the subject that 
participates, and it gives a more differentiated idea of power as well as of 
recognition. With regard to self-sacrifice it becomes understandable that different 
sacrifices are required in different areas and that what is considered a sacrifice may 
differ between areas. As a consequence, an ethics is needed that takes the actual and 
situational practice into account and seeks practical wisdom in a dialectic of ethical 
aim and moral norm. The tensions for which practical wisdom is required may be 
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tensions present in contemporary life in various worlds as well as tensions and 
struggles that one takes upon oneself. 
 
d. The break from struggle 
 
Ricœur poses the question of whether the struggles for affective, juridical, and social 
recognition will not prove to be an indefinite demand that is infinite (218).  
To ward off this worry about a new “unhappy consciousness” and the 
consequences that follow from it, I propose to take into consideration our 
actual experience of what I shall call states of peace […]. The certitude that 
accompanies [these] states of peace offers […] a confirmation that the moral 
motivation for struggles for recognition is not illusory (218). 
I embrace Ricœur’s idea that sacrifice as such is a break from struggle. 
Ricœur, for instance, sees the gift that is given as an expression of generosity 
(224). Instead of emphasizing the obligation to give back, he emphasizes the first 
movement of the gift, which he characterizes as the sacrifice that opens a circle of 
positive reciprocity (228). This circle of positive reciprocity is the virtuous circle of 
the gift (a gift for a gift), as opposed to the well-known vicious circle of vengeance (a 
blow for a blow) (228). Ricœur argues that this all-too-familiar vicious circle need 
not come about, when people cease responding to violence with further violence, 
for instance, by transferring the right to respond to a third party, such as the divine 
(228). 
The emergence of “someone killed who has not killed,” at the source of the 
violence of a sacrifice, is always an event. And if the formula for making a 
sacrificial offering is “Give to one who is going to give,” there is still the 
gesture of making the sacrifice, the “offering” that inaugurates the entry into 
the realm of the gift (228). 
A sacrifice, on this view, is something or someone given up as a first ‘gift’ or 
‘offering’. In both the vicious circle of destruction and the virtuous circle of the gift, 
sacrifice is the source that was not caused or obliged by a preceding gift or offering. 
Ricœur rejects the problem of the paradox that the gift given in return seems to 
destroy the generosity of the first gift. He argues that only in theory is a gift bound 
in reciprocity, but not so in practice. Rather the actual actors taking part in the 
exchange experience a transcendence of the exchange (229). Ricœur supposes that, 
in concentrating on these experiences, we can discover that a gift is a form of 
mutual recognition (230). The gift in theory can expect a return, but a gift on the 
plane of action between giver and receiver is a risky, contingent burden (231). So the 
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gift is opposed to the commercial exchange, where payment ends the mutual 
obligations (231). Ricœur, therefore, distinguishes between reciprocity and mutuality 
and reserves the idea of commercial exchange for reciprocity, making mutuality the 
expression of a lasting bond between those involved, i.e. a relation (232-233). So 
that is exactly what happens when actors recognize a gift as a gift: they recognize the 
relation that is the ground for generosity. Hence the state of peace of mutual 
recognition in a gift exists in a mutuality between those exchanging gifts rather than in 
a theoretical concept of reciprocity standing above the social agents and their 
exchange (232, italics in text). 
Ricœur’s consideration of the gift as phenomenon leads him to the 
conclusion that gift-giving is a gesture that initiates a process. He points to practices 
of gift giving such as offering, risking, accepting, and giving something of oneself in 
giving some simple thing (242). Instead of a return gift such generous first gifts hope 
for a response of gratitude (being, in French, one of the meanings of recognition), 
which is a feature of good reciprocity, according to Ricœur, as good receiving 
depends on gratitude (243). Gratitude changes the relation between giving and 
giving in return. It creates a gap between two movements: giving and receiving, on 
the one hand, and receiving and giving in return, on the other. This gap may be 
filled out by gratitude since neither the value of the generous gift nor the timing of a 
return can be determined (243). 
As a last step, Ricœur considers the experience of being recognized in the 
experience of the gift. He argues that the ceremonial character of the gift is related 
to this recognition in a complex way (244). Especially the festive character of a gift, 
which is exactly what escapes any moralization of the gift, resembles the solemnity 
in the gesture of forgiveness (244). These kinds of gestures cannot become an 
institution, and their exceptional character pleads against any moralization, for 
example, the request for pardon by Willi Brandt, the German Chancellor, in his 
gesture of kneeling before the Warsaw Shoah monument. These kinds of gestures 
give recognition in a particular way (244-245). They secretly and indirectly contribute 
to the advance of history toward states of peace (245). 
 
In conclusion, Ricœur’s thought on the states of peace offer an important 
complement to the political theory of the struggle for recognition. Instead of leaving 
the possibility of endlessness intact, he uncovers gifts and gestures that may end the 
struggle. Sacrifice appears at the heart of this break in either the circle of violence or 
the circle of giving. By distinguishing between two movements – giving/receiving 
and receiving/giving-in-return – and by emphasizing the ‘first’ movement of a gift, 
KEEPING TENSIONS ALIVE 
209 
 
Ricœur opens a gap that is filled with recognition of the underlying relation that has 
invited gift-giving, as an expression of the ‘between’ in mutuality.  
 This is important for conceiving of self-sacrifice as an expression of valuing a 
relation as a third term between the value of the self and of the other. It can also be 
understood in the collective sense: alongside a sense of a collective identity 
characterized by an unrecoverable guilt that needs to be recognized (as in the case of 
Brandt, but also other cases, such as Dutch guilt about its history of colonialism and 
involvement in the slave trade) and a sense of the recognition owed to the others as 
victims, there is also the recognition of the relation that needs to be expressed 
between the two, e.g. in order to be restored or made livable. The value of the 
between does not entail a decrease in the value of either, since the (singular or 
plural) other is not outside or opposed to the self but belongs to the self in a most 
intimate way and to the greatest degree. By expressing the value of the relation in 
self-sacrifice, the self not only sacrifices for the other as other but also for the other 
as part of the self. The self would not be the same without the other, nor without 
the relationship that connects the self to the other, which forms the self.  
 Here a connection can be made with the idea of friendship, as elaborated in 
subsection 3.a above. I there emphasized the importance of Ricœur’s idea of the first 
movement by taking the position of a friend, from which one acts for a friend. The 
first movement is not connected to another movement, is not a reaction. In this 
section this idea is worked out in Ricœur’s distinction between the two movements 
of giving and receiving, on the one hand, and receiving and giving in return on the 
other hand, between which there is a gap that is filled with gratitude. Each 
movement expresses a good that is wanted for the other, as a generous first gift. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This research started with a serious problem in the realities of everyday caring 
practices, viz. self-sacrifice is being shunted away by wrongly placed critique, 
whereas it not only is present in care practices but also discloses meanings that are 
established in those practices. Throughout the course of this study it has appeared 
that the wrongly placed critique is due to various frameworks that limit what can be 
seen. I have identified four such frameworks that need to be reframed, viz. the 
subject, intersubjectivity, community, and a wider understanding of meanings. This 
research has already resulted in numerous answers presented in previous chapters. 
Still, some questions remained, and they have guided my reading of Ricœur’s works. 
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I conclude this chapter first by presenting these questions, then summarizing 
Ricœur’s contribution, and finally summarizing what his thoughts yield with regard 
to self-sacrifice.  
 
The first question concerns the framework of the subject, which needs to 
incorporate both more passivity and more agency. In his concepts of narrative 
identity, moral identity, and disproportion, Ricœur elaborates on this tension and 
makes it fruitful. The self both feels, senses, suffers, is affectively finite and is 
autonomous, capable of deciding and finding meaning. In the self’s fragility lies not 
only the possibility but also the task of autonomy, of realizing the self. The two 
belong together, in a dialectic tension. Whereas Ricœur thinks about self-constancy 
in the tension of sameness and selfhood, and elaborates on self-constancy with 
respect to the future (promise) and the past (confession of guilt), I interpret self-
sacrifice as a form of self-constancy with respect to the present. It can then be 
conceived of as an established practice despite objections to self-sacrifice that the 
self may also acknowledge but that nevertheless do not impede self-sacrifice. For the 
self is aware that the self only exists when sacrificing the self.  
 
The second and related question is how self-sacrifice can be thought of as morally 
good or even required. Ricœur’s dialectical ethics makes space for thinking about 
self-sacrifice in the tension of the ethical aim and the moral norm, as a conclusion of 
practical wisdom for a moral way of acting in a concrete situation. Hence self-
sacrifice is not reduced to an ethical aim, which would idealize it (and feminists, 
womanists, and historical researchers have uncovered the detrimental effects of such 
idealization). Nor is self-sacrifice either obliged or forbidden by a moral norm, 
which would be a repetition of the shortcuts this research aims to avoid. Rather, 
Ricœur’s ethics maintains the tension between ethical aim and moral obligation, by 
avoiding both an overvaluation of each individual life and the prohibition against 
giving one’s life for a good or for another. In dialectical ethics self-sacrifice remains 
a betrayal of the moral norm. However, whereas Ricœur argues that this betrayal of 
the norm should be the least possible required by solicitude, I argue that in fact self-
sacrifice may be a betrayal of the norm to a higher extent, owing to the attraction of 
a higher good, however without abandoning the norm.  
 
The third question concerns the ethical relation between the subject and (plural) 
others in an institutionalized society. Several questions remained from the previous 
chapters. Honneth’s work leaves his readers with the challenge to develop a more 
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adequate view of the first form of recognition, love, one that is not restricted to nor 
modeled on the image of the mother-and-child relation as well as a more adequate 
view of the connection between the private and the public sphere. Ricœur fulfills 
this need with his view of love in adulthood and by his non-division of the private 
and the public sphere.  
Another question is raised by Housset’s work. Although his view of pity 
answers the question how to think of caring for unknown others, his view of the 
original community lacks institutions and positions. Ricœur’s work on recognition 
offers a more differentiated idea of status and power and a view of the various 
forms of recognition as social esteem. This view accounts for the tensions within 
society as well as in individuals’ lives and also helps to overcome a simplified view of 
society as consisting in two opposing parts, oppressors and oppressed. It overcomes 
dichotomies and illuminates how tensions permeate practices. What is more, we 
have come to see how Ricœur illuminates the ways in which the struggle for 
recognition at times is brought to a halt in a state of peace. This is important for 
self-sacrifice, for when people make offerings, they express the importance of the 
relation itself, of mutuality, of the between. This contributes to thinking about why 
people sacrifice themselves, about meanings and significance that make self-sacrifice 
even plausible.  
 
I conclude that Ricœur has contributed fundamentally to my research by providing 
ideas that connect the findings of previous chapters. First, concerning the subject, 
he allows us to conceive the paradox of both more passivity and yet more agency. 
The greater passivity proposed by phenomenology fits together with the agency that 
cannot be lacking from an ethical point of view in Ricœur’s view of the narrative 
identity that contains idem and ipse and is a composition of concordance and 
discordance. Second, concerning human relatedness towards others, Ricœur 
establishes a view on both the intersubjective and the community’s level that ties 
together a view of inequality and a view of mutuality. In friendship – as in the 
sharing of suffering – the unequal capability to give charity, on the one hand, and 
receive charity, on the other, is balanced in true sympathy. Friendship is also key to 
discovering a similitude, a commonality, as a bond between the two. This view helps 
to overcome a view in which inequality is confined to upper and lower positions and 
offers a view of the meaning of the relation on both ends. What is more, Ricœur 
bridges the gap between phenomenology and ethics in his dialectical ethics, which 
overcomes the opposition between ‘ought’ and ‘is’. Although Marion’s non-ethical 
radical phenomenology helps bring into view all that is outside ethics, Ricœur shows 
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that ethics can hardly be separated from what is given. In this research I have shown 
how the moral shines through in Marion’s premoral. Ricœur provides an even more 
stable bridge in arguing that humans are affective from the beginning, hence that 
affective fragility influences the will. There is no neutral space. His dialectical ethics 
offers the model for thinking of self-sacrifice as a tension between a higher good 
and a moral norm. It allows for an understanding of self-sacrifice as morally 
required, as practical wisdom that muddles through the tension and finds behavior 
that suites the situation. The moral norm remains present but can be exceeded, even 
to a great extent – so I have argued – when the good attracts with more force that 
the capacity of a norm to prohibit. Finally, on the level of community, Ricœur offers 
insight into the desire to live together that founds relations of domination. His work 
on the differentiated forms of recognition offers a view of an institutionalized 
society in which people take positions, which is a rich view of the community as 
political society. And his analysis of gestures of generosity that temporarily end the 
struggle and express a sense of relation, on both the individual and collective planes, 
makes visible that people do desire to belong together and express this desire that 
founds the community. 
  
 CHAPTER 7: Conclusions 
 
 
In real life stories, as well as in stories from literature and film, people sacrifice 
themselves. Not only stories about James-Bond-like heroes or Buddhist monks 
using self-immolation for political purposes, but also more intimate stories about 
family relations, friendships, and the connection between a care professional and a 
patient may be characterized by the motive of sacrifice. These stories reflect the 
common experience of people in our society of having to give up parts of their lives 
in order to care for others. Parents getting out of bed for a crying child several times 
a night for long periods of time; adult children taking leave from work or cutting 
working hours to take care of their ageing parents; neighbors rearranging their 
working hours and leisure time, making schedules to share the care needed for an ill 
neighbor whose family cannot help; friends making meals in turn for a family that is 
going through difficult times; teachers, nurses, and doctors doing something out of 
the ordinary and beyond their professional duty, since they consider a pupil or a 
patient ‘theirs’. Perhaps it will be argued that these actions are not examples of 
sacrifice, but are examples of a certain family or work ethic which can be qualified 
positively as a high standard or negatively as over-identifying. I argue that these are 
examples of normal, non-excessive care. I insist that they are instances not of some 
rare high standard but of common practice; nor are they examples of over-
identification but of a common characteristic of caring, which I call self-sacrifice in 
caregiving. 
 This is the scandal (scandalum) of the daily reality of caring. Although few 
people want to hear of it, self-sacrifice is present in the common reality of caring.  
 
 
1. The problem 
 
The central problem of this research is that care-ethical theory either prematurely 
rejects self-sacrifice or reduces it to objectionable submission or oppression; but in 
neither case does it fully think through self-sacrifice. The ethics of care, developed 
since the early 1980’s, has made a strong plea for an ethics that incorporates context, 
relations, feelings, and power as critical insights that have been neglected (or at the 
least not sufficiently incorporated) in dominant abstract, rational ethics. It defines 
caring in various ways, but a main characteristic of all is that caring is defined as a 
practice that is a source of moral knowledge about what is good care. This 
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rootedness in practices and contexts has led care-ethical authors to address the 
question of self-sacrifice in caring and to answer it in ways that vary according to 
their framing of care. However, they have confined themselves to a limited and, in 
the end, theoretical idea of a practice; and since none of them has fully thought 
through self-sacrifice, their answers have been inadequate.  
The reason for this, I argue, is that in certain preliminary frameworks care is 
conceived of in such a way that self-sacrifice can only appear as a perversion of care 
that undermines its validity. This research aims to contribute to care-ethical theory 
on this point by recasting these frameworks. However, it should start by 
acknowledging the two major points brought to attention by care ethics as 
inescapably connected to care: power and gender (gender is here understood as 
inequality or bias based on sex that incorporates as well awareness of race and class 
inequality). For the opposite of prematurely rejecting self-sacrifice can also still be 
observed, i.e. the idealization of self-sacrifice without taking power and gender into 
account, leading to a romanticized view of care and a naïve political ethics. It then 
leads to promotion of an ideal for certain groups of people which is an ideological 
fortification of socially construed power-imbalances. This also most likely leads to a 
further marginalization of care. 
Critical insights into power and gender, therefore, should be incorporated into 
any care-ethical theory. Without this, all too easily those without power (in the 
Weberian sense) are expected to sacrifice their time, energy, career perspectives, 
money, in order to support those with power. Most likely those sacrificing 
themselves in caring will be women, especially those of lower education and socio-
economic class and of non-white race or non-western culture, by devoting their lives 
to others, leaving their own families (e.g. the ‘care drain’ that leads Filipina and 
Ethiopian women to serve Italy’s middle-class families, Polish women to take care 
of German elderly, and Surinam women to take care of Dutch middle-class elderly 
in nursing homes), and suspending their own goals in life. Hence this research has 
found a demarcation line for determining what counts as apt self-sacrifice and what 
as a perversion of it, viz. (1) the sacrifice needs to be acknowledged as valuable, and 
basic human worthiness is a precondition for any view of self-sacrifice (Williams); 
and (2) it is a situational term – which has potential for explanation and change and 
is meaningful for describing reality – and not a description of identity (Moser). The 
rhetoric of the language of self-sacrifice unequally affects different groups of people 
and enhances the unequal distribution of power and care.  
However, care ethics needs a different interpretation of power than the 
Weberian interpretation of it as ‘the capacity to impose one’s will on others’. Nor is 
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power to be reinterpreted in the sense of Foucault’s distinction between the 
‘strategic’ power of the powerful and the ‘tactical’ power of the powerless. Rather, 
power must be understood in its original sense as elaborated by Hegel, Honneth, 
and Ricœur, as the desire to live together, a desire that founds the organization of 
the community but that brings inequality with it. The power relation, then, is 
something other than domination-submission. This view of power will return 
throughout this conclusion. 
This research aims at contributing to care ethics in various respects, rectifying 
the failure of care ethicists to see the full reality of care, which contains self-sacrifice. 
It argues that self-sacrifice is key to an essential understanding of caring as a more 
complex, ambiguous, and even paradoxical practice. If self-sacrifice is conceived only 
in terms of a power imbalance in gender relations, then it fails to see the full 
complexity of care. The stories from literature, film, and real life considered in the 
introductory chapter testify to this complexity. Power inequality is not absent from 
these stories: Gerasim is Ivan Ilyich’s servant (Tolstoy); Mr Rochester is Jane Eyre’s 
master (Brontë); Lucy, as a single woman and farmer who becomes a single mother, 
is relatively powerless despite being the farm’s white owner, a privilege she 
eventually gives up, sacrificing her land ownership (Coetzee); Bess’s community 
oppresses women, and the Church community rejects and excludes her, while those 
who love her accuse her of will-less and powerless submission to Jan’s wishes, which 
they reject as perverse (Von Trier); the Beslan grandmother and Father Kolbe are in 
the power of their violent oppressors. However, one cannot reduce their self-
sacrificial acts to submission or powerlessness. None of them lacks agency, none of 
them is to be reduced to misconceiving their being oppressed. Neither is their self-
sacrifice romantic or naïve, but rather full of conflict and struggle. None of these 
stories reduces self-sacrifice to mere perversion, exploitation, or ‘spineless 
submission’ (Groenhout, 2006).  
But neither is the protagonists’ self-sacrifice to be reduced to their agency. Such 
a representation of their reality would also fail to take into account their larger 
contextuality. If self-sacrifice is only thought of in terms of choice and the weighing 
of goods, then the full extent of their passivity is unjustly reduced, and the 
complexity of caring is lost. For instance, if Bess’s self-sacrifice is separated from the 
context of her community, from the faith as it was preached to her, or from the 
freedom and love that Jan gave her in their marriage—in other words, if she is taken 
out of relation and context—then she is reduced to a fool. If Gilbert (Hallström) is 
seen as grown up and free to leave his family, then his wishes are merely immature. 
But this view fails to see his connectedness to his family as constitutive of himself, 
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his identity being irreducibly intertwined with his family members. And if Father 
Kolbe is made into a hero instead of a saint, then he is reduced to a tradition-less 
individual. However, he stood in a tradition of narratives recommending the love for 
strangers and the redemption that awaits those who would rather lose than save 
their lives. Although his act may be seen as having been provoked by a context in 
which each person’s autonomy was destroyed, and as an act of humanity in a 
dehumanizing situation, the narratives of faith that were given to him must also be 
taken into account. These were not his own doing. Hence, taking the full reality of 
contextuality into view prevents any general condemnation of self-sacrifice. It needs 
to be embedded in relation, context, and living tradition. 
Thus in this conclusion I argue that, if the frameworks of care ethics remain 
in place without a more adequate understanding of care practices, then care ethics 
fails to see the full complexity of self-sacrifice in caring to which these stories testify. 
Care ethics does not know how to cope with self-sacrifice, although it is present in 
caring practices and has something specific to say about the characteristic themes of 
care ethics – contextuality, relationality, feelings, and power. In order to answer for 
this inadequacy in care ethics, these characteristics need to be re-formulated as:  
- more radical contextuality 
- more radical relationality 
- more radical affectivity  
- a different view of power 
and by incorporating the fact that people provide care and thereby 
- find and establish meaning and sense.  
Sharply formulated: on these points care ethics needs to be re-thought, re-framed 
- too narrow frames need to be widened (contextuality, relationality, 
affectivity); 
- the wrongly framing of power needs to be thought differently; 
- and the new framework of meaning and sense needs to be added. 
 
I amend the frameworks of identity, intersubjectivity, and community along these 
lines. Also I widen the scope to include the establishment of meaning. My goal is to 
contribute to care ethics by proposing and exploring these new conceptual frames. 
In my research I have made use of stories and the metaphor of self-sacrifice, 
claiming the first to be indispensable and the second to be a helpful means for 
uncovering the full reality of care. In the next section, I substantiate these claims. 
After that I systematically present the new conceptual frames. In my final section I 
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return to the metaphor of self-sacrifice and the stories of self-sacrifice in caring, and 
I draw my conclusions for care-ethical theory.  
 
 
2. The epistemological and hermeneutic claim of this research 
 
The scholarly problem that initially impelled this research—and thus my initial 
insight, which I later extended—is the fact that care ethics limits its view of care by 
its emphasis on power as domination and by taking an insufficiently wide 
contextuality into account. My contribution to the care-ethical understanding of the 
essence of care is a double claim: first, the epistemological claim that stories are 
indispensable in order to arrive at an adequate understanding of the practices of 
caring; second, the hermeneutical claim that the metaphor of self-sacrifice is a useful 
hermeneutical means for conceptualizing self-sacrifice in those practices. 
First, why does care ethics need to draw knowledge from stories? Why does it 
need to connect to non-theorized knowledge and insights that cannot be completely 
(i.e. without remainder) theorized? In the introduction I argued that stories of care 
taken from literature, film, and real-life provoke unease, uncover false 
simplifications, and allow ambiguity to emerge. Stories of care disclose realities that 
are often more complex and ambiguous than the realities envisaged in theories. They 
offer insight into why a protagonist acts by sacrificing the self. Even when the self-
sacrifice is disputed (as in the case of Breaking the Waves), the dispute itself shows that 
two goods are perceived instead of one: both self-preservation and self-sacrifice. 
What is more, stories undermine the idea that self-sacrifice can be judged abstractly. 
For stories force on their readers or viewers a ‘contextual turn’ that does not allow 
for abstractions or generalizations, such as a rejection of self-sacrifice in all 
circumstances. Stories allow us to understand how persons may find themselves in a 
situation that leads them to sacrifice themselves. And this is key: the abstract 
judgment ‘I would never sacrifice myself’ differs from ‘I do not appreciate the idea 
of sacrifice in general, but I can understand that this (fictional or historical) person 
in this situation has come to the point where she sacrifices herself’. Stories help us to 
see beyond our own present state of mind and understand other situations. Stories 
open up possible worlds37. They provide a view of a more layered reality, of different 
positions, of various circumstances and other possibilities. In short, stories reveal a 
more complex and fuller reality. Hence my epistemological claim that care ethics 
                                                             
37 As Ricœur argued with regard to metaphorical imagination, one must take a distance from this 
world in order to let a different possible world appear (Abel,1996, 99).  
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needs to tap into stories. This not only helps care-ethical theory, but is also helpful 
in caring practices: listening to stories with a non-judgmental attitude that allows for 
surprise and a broadening of one’s view – i.e. a phenomenological and 
hermeneutical approach – is a most valuable way for finding out what good care can 
be in a given situation. 
The latter claim, that the metaphor of self-sacrifice is a helpful hermeneutical 
means for conceptualizing care, is rooted in the contention that caring is 
misrepresented or misconceived when viewed as reciprocity or exchange of some 
sort. This contention finds support in the stories that I selected as a witness to this 
claim. Why use a metaphor? In Lakoff’s example of a metaphorical concept, 
‘argument is war’, war is a term that belongs to another sphere than argument but 
still explains a characteristic of argument. Now, the metaphor of self-sacrifice 
explains something about care. I advocate a view of caring as a gift, a giving away 
and giving way to the abundance of life itself. It is done by somebody, a caregiver, 
who aims at a good for this other (a thing, a person, the environment, the self’s 
body or mind). Caregivers put the one in their care center stage, not their own 
preservation or survival. Neither is caring an exchange in the sense that a return is 
required. The one receiving care is not expected or required to give as well. Caring is 
not necessarily reciprocal. In that sense care is truly given, in the sense of sacrificed, 
offered. However, the self is involved in caring in such a way that sacrifices often 
contain the self. Care is not produced by a machine but involves a person giving 
time, energy, attentiveness. It involves bodily presence: eyes that notice and 
recognize; ears that listen and are keen; hands that nurture, change diapers or beds, 
wash, dry, dress, support; noses that smell; arms that lift, comfort, and hug; laps that 
can be sat on; legs that walk or run, climb stairs; bodies that can be a shelter, etc., in 
short a person giving the self. Self-sacrifice, therefore, uncovers the involvement of 
a self in caring, a self that is given, offered, and may be given up as giving way to life 
itself. What is more, the metaphor of self-sacrifice reveals caring as characteristically 
uncertain: just as sacrifices are made only hoping to establish some good, so too 
caring only hopes for a good. No one involved in caring knows for certain what is 
good care, what will be its effect. Other effects may occur, better or worse than 
expected, and acts other than the intended ones may effectuate good care. Self-
sacrifice expresses such open-endedness of a gift, something that is believed in, 
hoped for but not grasped, controlled, or contained. It is determined by the 
possibility to give life, not by controllable effects of the act of giving. This is at odds 
with industrially determined care acts. 
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By means of this metaphor I contest views that reduce care to reciprocity, in 
the sense that care is given only on the condition that something is given in return, 
an immediate or indirect facio ut facias. Or in the sense that caring is meaningful since 
so much is given in return. Or in the sense that one needs return gifts in order to 
continue giving care. I do not contest that these returns are helpful and gratifying; I 
do contest that these returns are constitutive of care. Self-giving opens up space for a 
relationship, whereas returns make space for instrumentalization. I do not deny that 
much care is given in the expectation of a benefit for the self. Caring for the 
environment, friends, family may indeed be supported or even motivated by self-
interest. However, this is not the quintessence of caring. Understanding the essence 
of caring, I argue, requires rescuing it from reduction to serving one’s self-interest, 
to reciprocity, or to causality. Caring itself is lost when reduced in this way. And it is 
no longer possible to understand those practices of caring that do not serve a self-
interest, like caring for flowers or the grave of an unknown person. Also caring for 
comatose or dying patients who are not family members, for persons of all ages who 
are disabled to the extent that no contact whatsoever is possible, or for aggressive or 
violent patients is hard to understand when framed in a narrow idea of reciprocity in 
which caring is a movement back and forth. The one-dimensional gift that is a 
sacrifice reveals that this is still caring as a giving up that is an offering for some 
good that may emerge in this relationship but is not produced by reciprocity. 
Therefore ‘horizons of meaning’ (Charles Taylor) are necessary, which is expressed 
in the literal meaning of sacrifice, ‘making holy’. This religious term points at a 
belief, a faith, a conviction – hence not certainty – in an ‘ultimate good’ or 
‘humanization’ or ‘love’, etc. (which simultaneously makes it susceptible to misuse 
and misunderstanding). Self-sacrifice expresses a person’s embrace of a meaning that 
makes self-sacrifice worthwhile. This belief is expressed, for instance, by Jane Eyre’s 
dedication to the laws given by God and recognized in her heart (Brontë); by Bess’s 
‘I can believe’ (Von Trier); by Gilbert’s ‘failure’ to distinguish between the goods of 
others and his own good (Hallström); by John’s discovery of the paradox of 
suffering and gift that keeps him going (John Bayley); by Gerasim’s ‘simple’ 
conviction that this is what one should do for a dying man, while everybody else 
declines this task (Tolstoy). These protagonists embrace a meaning within their 
struggle; they prefer one meaning over others, which points to a way out of their 
ambiguity. They do not remain within their conflicts and struggles but embrace one 
preferred meaning and sacrifice themselves for it. 
I now can give a fuller account of why the use of stories is so appropriate. In 
the first instance, I try to read or see the stories as they are told and see how the 
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protagonists explain themselves through their relationships, their practices, and their 
taking positions. However, the use of stories needs to be taken one step further. 
Utilizing Ricœur’s hermeneutical approach, I distinguish between explanation and 
interpretation. Ricœur considers these an initial contradiction, which he aims to 
reconcile. Explanation analyzes the story’s structure, themes, and context. The story, 
however, provides food for thought, and therefore the story turns from the story of 
a narrator into our story. This is the hermeneutical step (De Visscher, 2007, 169, 
italics in text). Ricœur argues: 
Initially the text had only a sense, that is, internal relations or a structure; now 
it has a meaning, that is, a realization in the discourse of the reading subject. 
By virtue of its sense, the text had only a semiological dimension; now it has, 
by virtue of its meaning, a semantic dimension. […] The text seeks to place us 
in its meaning, that is – according to another acceptation of the word sens – in 
the same direction. So if the intention is that of the text, and if this intention 
is the direction that it opens up for thought, then depth semantics must be 
understood in a fundamentally dynamic way. I shall therefore say: to explain is 
to bring out the structure, that is, the internal relations of dependence that 
constitute the statics of the text; to interpret is to follow the path of thought 
opened up by the text, to place oneself en route toward the orient of the text 
(Ricœur, 1991, 119-122).  
Therefore, the stories open space for exploration, while also giving direction. At this 
point, employing Ricœur’s hermeneutical theory, I position myself as the interpreter 
of these stories. I regard them as orienting me as a reader in the direction of thinking 
self-sacrifice, of making it conceivable in care theory. The stories help us to 
understand self-sacrifice as an adequate metaphor for expressing a giving up or a 
loss of the self in giving in, which many consider to be meaningful or good in caring 
for others. 
In substantiating this view, I have adopted an approach based on theoretical 
approaches other than those commonly used in the ethics of care, even if a case can 
be made for their affinity. My argument has several steps: I have elaborated on my 
initial insight; I have indicated where the boundaries of conceiving care should be 
changed; I have drawn upon theories that both account for self-sacrifice and that are 
indispensable for making self-sacrifice conceivable; I have shed a new and unusual 
light upon self-sacrifice, i.e. phenomenology and the theories of Honneth and 
Ricœur; and by this I have argued for the position that self-sacrifice is conceivable 
and plausible. However, as Ricœur’s theory also makes clear, this position will be 
open to further research and debate with those who provide a perspective on a more 
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plausible reality. My goal is to make it conceivable and plausible that self-sacrifice 
belongs to the essence of care, not to provide a knock-down argument for this 
claim. Finally, making self-sacrifice conceivable does not mean judging all self-
sacrificial actions to be morally good and defensible. It is, however, a possible line of 
thought that cannot be discarded by referring to power and power abuse nor to self-
evident historical practices of self-denial. Self-sacrifice is what has to be taken into 
account when critically reflecting on what good care is about.  
 
 
3. New conceptual frames 
 
In order to use the metaphor of self-sacrifice in a clarifying way in care ethics, it is 
required to find new conceptual frames for thinking about identity, about 
intersubjectivity, about the community, and about meaning and sense. These four 
frames are foundational for conceiving of care from a care ethical point of view, 
especially when care is interpreted using self-sacrifice as a hermeneutical means.  
I have argued that identity should not be reduced to power or agency, for 
then either one is in the position of power and agency or one lacks these. In either 
case, self-sacrifice can only be a perversion, for it either entails the giving up of 
something of the self that is a decrease of the self, or it involves a further 
submission to those in power. Therefore the framework of identity should be recast 
in terms of tension between fragility and autonomy. Intersubjectivity should not be 
limited to a relation of two individuals, in which case care would involve a 
dichotomy between self-care and other-care, asking for a balance between the two. 
This containment allows only for a view of self-sacrifice as an extreme form of 
other-love that goes hand-in-hand with lack of a sense of self-worth. Therefore the 
framework of intersubjectivity should be recast in two ways: first, as a given and 
indispensable relationship in which the self becomes a self and, second, as mutuality 
that overcomes the dichotomy of self and other. If the community is only conceived in 
terms of power and oppression, self-sacrifice can only be thought of as contributing 
to the marginalization of those who give of themselves and thereby reduce 
themselves, their power and impact. Therefore the community should be recast in 
terms that conceive power as a desire to live together which cannot eliminate 
conflict and struggle but does alter conceptions of the social and political life. And if 
the framework of meaning and sense is lacking, reducing caring to the exchange of giving 
and receiving without incorporating meanings that are uncertain, open-ended, and 
exceeding the immediate interest of the subject, the relation, or the community, then 
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one cannot grasp self-sacrifice as a possible embrace of a higher good, an ultimate 
concern that is significant to the self but essentially uncertain. Therefore the 
framework of care should incorporate such an understanding of meaning and sense 
that is embraced by those giving care.  
I elaborate on these four frameworks below. Although they are dealt with in 
individual sections, they should not be thought of as standing apart but rather as 
intertwined and presupposing each other. However, the focus of each section will be 
on the framework at hand and only secondarily do I relate it to the others. What is 
more, it is not only a recasting of four frameworks that I propose but also the 
incorporation into these frameworks of two more threads. The first thread is time, 
and the second is ordinariness. The temporal dimension cannot be ignored, since 
identity, intersubjectivity, community, and meaning and sense can only be 
understood as coming into existence, developing, changing, and having consistency 
over time. And from the start this research has approached self-sacrifice as a feature 
of everyday commonplace caring practices rather than as something exceptional.  
 
a. Recasting the frame of identity of the self 
 
When thinking about identity, one could say that self-sacrifice cannot be good for a 
self, since it can only be an expression of lack of a sense of the self and an act of 
self-destruction based on such self-deprecation. This view, however, makes of the 
self an isolated individual that is reduced to agency. If, on the other hand, the self is 
conceived of as including more contextuality, more relationality, and more 
affectivity, as well as including the idea of agency as embracing a belief and 
commitment to a good, then one’s view of self-sacrifice necessarily changes. In the 
stories cited in the Introduction I found evidence of people sacrificing the self 
without lacking a sense of self and self-worth, for instance, John Bayley. His self-
sacrifice involved a situation or relation that was given, uncovering his passivity, and 
it was also an act in which he established a good that was good for both caregiver 
and care-receiver, in their mutuality. Therefore I propose a different idea of identity, 
one which yields a fuller understanding of caring. It is a view of identity as 
fundamentally fragile yet autonomous, i.e. incorporating passivity, complex 
relationality, ambiguity, conflict, and struggle, but also as capable of a far greater 
agency that permits for self-sacrifice by embracing a meaning in uncertainty and 
ambiguity. 
This view cannot be captured sufficiently by the care-ethical view of mature 
care (Gilligan, Pettersen, Hem) or of interdependency (Tronto). Care ethics has 
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contested the liberal emphasis on autonomy and self-development, which makes 
individual survival the ultimate rational goal (Fierke, 2013, 6). From a liberal point of 
view, caring for others cannot be understood as anything other than serving one’s 
self-interest; and, as self-sacrifice cannot serve any self-interest, it is a stupid thing to 
do. Care ethics opposes the myth of the self-made man and argues for an 
interdependent view of identity. Human beings are related to each other, with care 
for the self and for others alternating.  
In ‘mature care’ caregivers are able to avoid the extremes of egoism and 
altruism, of self-centeredness and self-sacrifice, by balancing between self-care and 
other-care, limiting both to a ‘reasonable mean’. An ethic of care sees human 
identity as related, vulnerable, autonomous yet dependent on others during periods 
throughout life. Even a more normative view of care, such as Van Heijst’s, that 
acknowledges that self-sacrifice discloses a characteristic of caring, still insists that 
self-sacrifice is given freely, is rooted in a commitment and feelings of professional 
responsibility, and does not express a sense of disregard of the self. However, this 
framework is still based on a dichotomy of self and other within which the self of 
the caregiver acts either on behalf of the self or on behalf of the other. It lacks the 
reference to a larger foundation of identity. And it fails to see that a ‘reasonable 
mean’ can be bad care. 
My proposed recast framework radicalizes the subject’s contextuality, 
relationality, and affectivity, and includes the finding and establishing of meaning 
and sense. It can be described as follows. One’s identity has come about through 
others, through the relations that have been given and discovered when the self 
develops, that have grown over time, forming the self and being inexorably part of 
the self’s identity. Ethicists who think in terms of interdependency acknowledge 
human dependency in childhood and in old age, as well as in some situations and 
periods in between. But this is something else than seeing the self as continuously 
needing others to come to life, finding the self as existing with and for others, being 
part of others’ lives and narratives, being called before speaking, being affected by 
others, and being only temporarily autonomous, due to basic fragility. Identity must 
be seen as fragility, which is more fundamental than autonomy and which sets 
autonomy as a task and makes it fragile again (fragiliser, Le Blanc, 2006, 251). This 
means that caring for others is seen in a different light. Caring is a continuous 
practice moving back and forth between different parts of the self’s identity, such as 
relations, institutions, positions, since one understands the self as belonging to 
others, as having an interior ipseity, as having incorporated ‘otherness’ into the self, 
being and becoming a self only in relation with others. This makes the self’s 
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dependency more than temporary dependency, a mere break from usual autonomy. 
Rather, if identity is indeed founded on fragility, the interests of self and others are 
more intertwined and harder to separate. What I give away is, then, not a reduction 
of myself, of my powers or belongings; rather, I give to myself as a friend, as a 
partner, as a parent, as a nurse or doctor, as a member of society, all of which makes 
me who I am and want to be. Hence the self’s identity is far more ambiguous than 
care ethicists make it out to be, to the detriment of understanding what caring is 
about. And still, within this ambiguity, the self embraces a good and thereby ends 
this ambiguity, in self-sacrifice, which is both other-serving and self-serving, as the 
other cannot be separated from myself and my identity. I am permanently affected 
by the other, in ways that constitute my identity and require me to take a position. 
 This insight into the complexity of identity is one of the major insights gained 
throughout this research. I advocate a view of human identity that encompasses 
both more passivity and more capability than conceived of by care ethics. This is the 
paradox: more passivity and more capability. I first determine more precisely this 
paradoxical identity, and then I relate identity to the other frameworks, which 
cannot be separated from one another.  
First, human identity encompasses much more passivity than care ethicists 
think. Throughout this research various authors have contributed to this insight. 
Theologians have illuminated the ideas of trajectory, in which the self finds the self, 
participation, in which the self is given a task and a role, and uncertainty, or the self as 
not controlling. Marion proposes the term ‘the gifted’, which puts the subject in the 
dative instead of the nominative. The self is de-centered, since not only phenomena 
are given, but also the self is given. Honneth argues for the idea of recognition by 
others as essential to and constitutive of the subject. The three forms of recognition 
(love, respect, solidarity) establish the self and recognition, since an emotional 
involvement in the world is given by others and precedes any cognitive knowledge. 
Housset scrutinizes the idea of a self being dispossessed by pity, of a retreat of the 
self by the suffering other that robs the self of the self. His view of the open subject 
incorporates the other and the relation. And finally, Ricœur keeps the tensions alive 
between passivity (passibilité) in concordance and discordance, and autonomy in 
composition of narrative identity, and in the disproportion of affective fragility and 
moral capability. The self’s passivity, therefore, consists in the having been given 
(theology), in the remaining phenomenality (Marion), in the recognition of others 
(Honneth), in receptivity and affectivity (Housset), and in the human fragility of 
affectiveness, disconcordance, and finitude (Ricœur). 
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The passive, fragile identity puts self-sacrifice into a different perspective. The 
idea of an isolated individual deciding whether or not to give up the self does not 
hold from this perspective. Rather, the sacrificing self is part of what is happening 
and what is given in life. The sacrificing self is affected and attached, finding the self 
in a given state of affectedness, in an overwhelming situation, in a network of 
relations, and in a moment in time that determine the self. Hence a far greater 
passivity within the self is a new point of reference for understanding identity. This 
can also be shown on the level of the everyday caring experiences in the private and 
the professional spheres. Caring often forces itself on someone very much in the 
way that Marion describes the appearance of phenomena that befall the self: the 
experience of a sudden ache while doing sports, or of hunger, exhaustion, illness, or 
the sudden sting of grief, befall the self; but also the crying of a baby or the alarm of 
a patient; accompanying children or residents on an outing where comfort, joy, 
pride, discovery, capability, surprise, safety, and inability all ask for attention; seeing 
someone in need of assistance in some public place, say, lifting a stroller into the 
train. These givens affect the self and uncover the self’s passivity. When self-sacrifice 
is conceived of from this perspective of de-moralized givenness, it looks different 
than when starting from the self’s moral choice. 
The second element of the paradox is the self’s greater capability. For this too 
is true: one’s autonomy exceeds an act, making the self far more capable of agency 
than is grasped by care ethics. Not only does the self decide about an act or 
responsibility, but the self’s agency is extended to deciding about meaning as well. 
The self does not ‘merely’ choose between various interchangeable options but 
chooses from conviction, from dedication, from a deeply held belief about who the 
self is and wants to be. Or, in line with Crysdale’s way of putting it, one embraces 
travail by relating to human fragility and hence establishes meaning in practices. The 
agency consists not only in deciding but also in actively accepting and taking upon 
oneself what is given and in the moral attestation of one’s actions, all in relation to 
one’s identity. A crying baby in the night does not wake up its parents inviting them 
to deliberate whether or not to respond. The parents do not deliberate about 
whether to respond or not. They might need to interpret the meaning of the cry, but 
whenever they are convinced that something is wrong, there is no hesitation, only 
conviction: Go see what’s wrong. There might be deliberation, yet there is no 
possibility of completely abstaining from responding. Perhaps this was the 
conviction of the teacher protecting ‘her’ children against the gunman, in the 
example mentioned at the start of the Introduction. The children were ‘hers’: she 
had already become their teacher, was already in the position of their teacher, not 
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only accepting the responsibility to teach them but also connecting herself to them 
and connecting their lives to her own. 
Hence there is no decision starting from a detached point of view, no 
hesitation about who one is. It is not merely about accepting a responsibility, but 
about being who and what one is, about a conviction about the self. There is no 
deliberating about that, on whether or not I as a parent or teacher have to be a 
parent or a teacher for ‘my’ children. I recall the words of Marion: je me suis fait, the 
phenomenon has the power to say its fact to me, as I am already taken in. Of course, 
there may be hesitation about the best way to respond, but not about my being the 
one who is already the one—the only one—in the position to respond. With 
Crysdale, Housset, and Ricœur I argue for a subject that is first of all characterized 
by fragility, a subject dramatically different from an autonomous self deciding about 
acts and responsibilities. With Ricœur I want to maintain the tension between 
fragility and autonomy. In fragility lies not only the possibility but also the task of 
autonomy. This is crucial: the moment of choice has not disappeared but rather 
stands against a much wider horizon of identity connected to others, to one’s beliefs 
about the self, to the institutions and positions that one accepts and assumes, and to 
the meanings that one embraces.  
As a consequence of the self’s greater capability, self-sacrifice looks different. 
It is always an ambiguous thing to do. It cannot be reduced to mere victimization, 
but rather it is a decision of a self that is well aware of the givenness of the situation 
or relation and of what is at stake with regard to the self’s identity, both in what is 
given in to and in what is given up. Still, the decision for self-sacrifice is the decision 
to aim at a good, while being aware of other goods that cannot simultaneously be 
aimed at and therefore have to be given up. This is not all tears and sorrow, as John 
Bayley charmingly shows. He uncovers not only the hardships of ageing and caring 
for a demented partner but also the importance of humor, especially his own 
position-related humor in this complexity. The role of humor can hardly be 
overestimated, creating space, giving comfort, and easing the everyday burdens. 
What is more, there is no guarantee of the result. One’s capability exists with regard 
to the autonomy to decide, not to control the decision’s outcome. One’s capability 
exists, therefore, in embracing meaning, in dedicating oneself to a good. What the 
self faces is the decision (in all ambiguity and uncertainty) of what good to embrace. 
If one commits oneself to a good, one does so in the awareness of other possible 
goods and by preferring one good to those other goods. This entails the paradox of 
understanding, on the one hand, one’s passivity (one is attracted to a good that has 
emerged and is given the task of choosing) and, on the other hand, one’s activity (I 
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choose this good prior to other goods). Due to this paradox self-sacrifice is not 
reduced to a matter of holy characters but remains in the tension of passivity and 
capability, without certain outcome. 
The other frameworks, i.e. intersubjectivity, community, and horizons of 
meaning, are necessarily intertwined with the self’s identity. First, identity is 
necessarily intersubjective. One cannot become a self without others, like Baron von 
Munchhausen. However, not only does the other invade the self, but identity is 
related to institutions and to horizons of meaning as well. For instance, one is not 
only a subject or moral actor, but also a woman, a mother, a daughter, a wife, a 
student, a citizen, a member of a choir, an employee, a colleague, a neighbor, a 
friend, a customer, and a regular passenger on the Dutch railways. All of these put 
one in positions that co-establish or confirm one’s identity. Not only is it a mother’s 
relation to her child that establishes her identity as a mother, but as a mother one 
also takes a position in society, hence not just a sociological role but a political 
position: by holding positions we enact the ordered living together. The institution 
of motherhood or parenthood was already there, given in society. One relates to 
institutions in the way that one takes positions and either fulfills or objects to the 
rights and obligations attached to them. The institution of motherhood poses aims 
and tasks, and expresses expectations and responsibilities, even if one might want to 
change them. And, if consistent, the community supports the institutions by 
providing means that help people to fulfill their goals. The same goes for marriage, 
daughterhood, citizenship, etc. Identity consists in all these positions, some of which 
are chosen, others received. Several positions involve caring tasks and 
responsibilities, which one can fulfill in one’s own way, but only up to a certain 
point. In professional care one is available for arbitrary others, i.e. those who 
‘happen to’ enter or be in the institution. The choice to be a professional caregiver 
involves the conscious choice of being available to anyone needing care. But whom 
one meets, what care is needed, and the extent to which one is affected and gets 
involved, are hardly matters of choice. One will always face one’s finitude in the 
body, in time, in affectiveness. Therefore, fragility must be faced in the form of 
finitude as well as in passively undergoing what is given by community, by positions, 
by institutions.  
Finally, the frameworks of identity, intersubjectivity, and community (with 
positions and institutions) stand against an even wider horizon of meanings. 
Meanings may be embraced that exceed the immediate situation, for instance, when 
the self connects the self to a memory of another person in the same situation, or a 
handed-down family narrative about a related person, e.g. ‘My grandmother had 
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nine children and an ill husband; she coped, although her caring task was much 
tougher than mine’. Or meaning may be embraced as a result of one’s imagination 
of a future memory of the others in one’s care, e.g. ‘I hope they will remember me 
as a good carer’. From these meanings one can draw comfort or support, but only if 
one assumes them as meaningful through dedication to them or by sacrificing 
oneself for them. This is how, in the framework of identity recast as finding the self 
within practices and in an already involved position in a trajectory, various periods 
of that trajectory can be discerned and connected, giving sense to one’s life. 
Meaning, therefore, is found and established in practices that testify to this meaning, 
but without guarantee. My identity may be witness to a meaning, but whether or not 
it exists for others is not in my hands. 
Hence the new framework for understanding identity is the paradox of a 
larger passivity coexisting with a larger agency of the self. My passivity exceeds the 
immediate context, while my agency exceeds a mere autonomous decision about acts 
or responsibilities. Simultaneously both passivity and autonomy are everyday 
experiences of care, as facts present themselves (as fait accompli) and pose a 
possible task related to my identity. Identity, therefore, incorporates a tension that is 
and remains to be endured. This recast framework of identity also embeds identity 
in time. My fragility exists in having been somebody in the stories of others before 
birth, being part of other person’s stories throughout life, and being somebody still 
in the stories of others after death. Most of the time, what others make of me is out 
of my control and depends on what happens and is given that affects how I am 
conceived before, throughout, and after my life. Autonomy exists in choosing, from 
among what has been given, those examples that I want to follow and those 
meanings that I embrace in my life. I have been given these meanings and can only 
aspire to and long for a future realization. This inextricable crosslinking of passively 
receiving and actively relating to what is given shows the autonomy that is made 
possible as well as posed as task by fragility. This ‘posing as a task’ drags the self 
away from mere passivity, from remaining overwhelmed, and confirms the capability 
of autonomously relating to fragility. And it allows for infinite aspiration towards an 
uncertain future. 
 
In conclusion, this study contributes to care ethics by proposing a different 
understanding of identity. It needs to incorporate fragility as a greater dependency 
and passivity. Identity is necessarily intersubjective, but it is dependent not only 
upon others but upon many other givens that constitute dependency as well, like 
time and place, events and facts, finitude, body, and character. Identity also needs to 
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incorporate a wider contextuality of institutionalized community. Identity necessarily 
contains ambiguity and conflict, for it is formed by various positions and goods, not 
all of which can be fulfilled. Simultaneously it needs to incorporate a wider 
understanding of agency as also being capable of establishing meaning by embracing 
a good within a horizon of meaning. And identity needs to incorporate uncertainty, 
for meaning and effects are not certainly established. Identity, therefore, is more 
complex and ambiguous, uncertain and struggling. Self-sacrifice is not a choice 
between options of a freestanding individual. Rather in self-sacrifice one is giving 
way to the tension of fragility and autonomy, of passivity and capability.  
 
b. Recasting the frame of intersubjectivity 
 
The intersubjective relation of caregiver and care receiver in care ethics is seen as a 
most important source for finding out what is good care. Mutual acknowledgement 
as human beings and attunement are necessary, if possible. The care relation is 
threatened, care ethicists argue, both by the vulnerability of the care receiver that 
opens possibilities for abuse and by the possible risk of the caregiver being asked to 
care beyond her limits of time, energy, and resources. Because of the care receiver’s 
vulnerability, the caregiver needs to take into account the care receiver’s response to 
care in order to determine if it is adequate and good care. And since many caregivers 
are already in a powerless position, their vulnerability for exploitation requires their 
empowerment. Both, therefore, are equal on the fundamental level of human 
neediness, despite their asymmetry within care.  
I fully agree that the relation between two human beings involved in care is 
the key source for finding out what is good care. (However, these two are as little 
isolated from others as the self has been, since they have come together amidst 
many others and must be thought of as a duo among the many, as I argue below.) 
This relational source works best when both involved are aware of the power 
asymmetry and try to attune to the other in order to meet each other as human 
subjects. However, the emphasis on power in the Weberian sense in this relation 
narrows our view of intersubjectivity by presenting it as a seesaw on which one can 
go up only on the condition that the other goes down. For then the relation is one in 
which, if one has more, the other necessarily has less. And accordingly a gift (time, 
energy, money, care) of one to the other necessarily is a gain for the latter while 
being a loss for the former. It puts intersubjectivity into the dichotomy of self and 
other, by putting the two on two different scales. This idea can be recognized, for 
instance, in the idea of mature care. Self-sacrifice is then either rejected or limited in 
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time and requiring something in return in order to restore the balance. Also the 
discussions of self-love (eros) and other-love (agape) represent the dichotomy of self 
and other, although the balance here often tips over to the side of agape as selfless 
love. It remains dubious, however, whether understanding care is helped with this 
image, with this dichotomy.  
This view is a simplifying reduction of intersubjectivity, which hampers a full 
understanding of caring. It represents intersubjectivity as entailing two subjects who 
may be involved but only as rather freestanding individuals capable of choosing 
whether and how much they enter (and leave) intersubjectivity and remain 
unchanged (Peterson, 2009, 35). I would argue for a different view in two respects. 
First, intersubjectivity is not so much something that two persons do but rather 
something that is given to them. This means that intersubjectivity is given as a relation 
in which both the self and the other already find themselves, in positions that are 
given and that they assume. Whether these relations fall out of thin air or are 
longstanding, key is that they are given in such a way that one is always already 
involved, attached, affected, and so one cannot consider this intersubjectivity from a 
detached point of view. Moreover, with this intersubjectivity one is already given a 
position, and therefore one already finds the self assigned a task (e.g. to take care). 
Second, I argue that intersubjectivity must be seen in such a way that the dichotomy 
of self and other is overcome. Instead, intersubjectivity is a relation of self and other 
in which the other is constitutive of the self, the self is inescapably intersubjective, 
and otherness has become an ‘interior ipseity’ (Housset). Both are far more 
intermingled instead of isolated or separated. This calls for incorporating a third pole 
into the idea of intersubjectivity, i.e. that of the valuable relation itself as expressed 
by the ideas of philia and mutuality.  
I therefore advocate a view of intersubjectivity that, first, takes passivity into 
account and, second, that incorporates this third pole. First I elaborate on these two 
points. But it also requires that intersubjectivity not be regarded as the horizon of 
care, for it is necessarily embedded in a community and wider horizons of meaning. 
Hence I subsequently elaborate on these other frameworks.  
 
Theology as well as philosophy has contributed to the idea that intersubjectivity is 
not a mere human accomplishment. For instance, Halkes and Van Heijst point at a 
wider horizon that precedes human intersubjective acting. To Halkes the theological 
symbols of creation – incarnation – resurrection – eschaton form a continuous 
utopian trajectory calling human beings to renewal and transformation. Van Heijst 
re-introduces the theological expression do quia mihi datum est in order to incorporate 
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‘what has been given beforehand’ into the care-ethical understanding of 
intersubjective giving and receiving within care. She argues that caregivers have 
already received a surplus from which they are willing to give to others. Vacek 
grounds this idea by looking at moral life itself as something that does not consist in 
isolated acts performed by isolated individuals toward other isolated individuals, but 
starts in factual as well as desired human connectedness. 
The philosophers Marion and Housset conceive of intersubjectivity from the 
perspective of phenomenology, as given in everyday, more common experience. 
Marion argues that in a gift the giver and receiver can be bracketed, and the gift does 
not need to be reified. Hence, even what appears to be an intersubjective transfer 
turns out on analysis to be something completely different: it is the gift itself that 
prompts both giver and receiver to enter a sphere of giving. Phenomena, like a gift, 
direct the self, but equally direct intersubjectivity. Both the self and other may be 
taken aback by events or faits accomplis. What is given to both, what affects them 
positively and negatively, what overwhelms them, events and incidents, all befall the 
two, without calculation or intention. Hence intersubjectivity is not the horizon of 
caring, as if the two together decide what happens, but rather both the self and other 
are governed far more by what is given. Marion puts intersubjectivity into the 
perspective of givenness. What is more, the other in intersubjectivity may also 
overwhelm the self in the call (Marion) and in the confrontation with the suffering 
other (Housset). Housset illuminates how the self detects the originary coexistence 
in the confrontation with the suffering other. He argues for a new idea of the self’s 
identity that is not enclosed in the self but finds the self only through the encounter 
with the suffering other who decenters the self. Intersubjectivity befalls the subject, 
or rather the other robs the self of the self and is an interior ipseity. These 
phenomenological views shed a completely different light on intersubjectivity, which 
is seen as both uncontrollable and indispensable: the self is inescapably 
intersubjective, and intersubjectivity is the precondition for finding the self, a 
precondition that is given instead of made. The indispensability of intersubjectivity 
finds support in Honneth’s empirically informed political theory. In order for the 
self to develop, a reciprocal recognition of one’s personal as well as generalized 
identity is indispensable, in love, respect, and social esteem. Hence Van Heijst’s 
argument of do quia mihi datum est is extended by this research: not only am I capable 
of giving as I have received beforehand, but I myself have been given to myself in 
the relation. I have found myself, and this enables me to give. 
 It follows that intersubjectivity is neither the starting point nor the horizon of 
either care or self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice appears not as a gift of the self by the self, 
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decided in isolation, but as a giving in to what appears, emerges, has been given, 
what intrudes, weakens, and decenters the self. The self already finds the self in 
intersubjective relations, in a trajectory that has preceded the self in an infinite past 
and that extends itself into an infinite future and in a narrative of the self that 
includes a connection to the narratives of others, extending over time beyond the 
limits of my own life. That is why I spoke about a radical reformulation. Therefore it 
cannot be thought of without an understanding of time, i.e. a past and a future. Self-
sacrifice in caring for the other does not start from a ‘point zero’ or a ‘tabula rasa’ 
but is given by the relation itself, since the self only finds the self within 
intersubjectivity. Hence self-sacrifice may take all kinds of forms but is never 
separated from the involvement with another, which may stem from a loyalty that 
has grown over time or that one assumes for a future.  
In the previous section I discussed the fragility of the self of self-sacrifice. In 
this section I conclude that intersubjectivity is fragile as well, since both the self and 
the other stand against the horizon of givenness; but I also conclude that for both 
intersubjectivity is indispensable for finding the self. I elaborate on this below.  
 
The second recasting of the framework of intersubjectivity concerns the 
replacement of the view of intersubjectivity as a balance or seesaw, since such a view 
restricts caring and reduces self-sacrifice to a giving up of myself by adding to the 
other. Instead I propose a different frame in which the intersubjective relation is 
characterized by mutuality instead of a dichotomy. This makes self-sacrifice in 
caregiving conceivable as something that realizes rather than reduces the self within 
intersubjectivity, and can be meaningful as well, in all ambiguity. I draw from various 
authors for this proposal, both from theology (Halkes, Vacek) and philosophy 
(Housset, Ricœur). Halkes elaborates on the idea of ‘mutuality’ as sustaining and 
caretaking relations as allowing all creatures to flourish, which calls for 
transformative conversion on a personal, social, and ecological level, which – I 
conclude – cannot happen without sacrifices. Vacek advocates a view of love that is 
neither eros nor agape but rather is a form of love for the sake of the mutual 
relationship, philia, which is shared. Hence love is not for the self or the other, but 
rather a being with the other. He points at special relationships in families, 
friendships, congregations, and professions. Housset elaborates on the connection 
between pathos and ethics, in which the affectedness by the suffering other leads to 
an unconditional ‘yes’. Pity shatters the pre-determinable self-protection in relation 
and enables the being-with-the-other, which is a retreat of the self. And Ricœur has 
elaborated on friendship as taking a position and making a first movement towards 
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the other, being a friend. Moreover, his idea of gift-giving being a first movement, 
creating a gap between giving and receiving, on the one hand, and receiving and 
giving back, on the other, discloses the intersubjective relation as non-dichotomous. 
Further, he argues for the distinction between reciprocity and mutuality. Reciprocity 
is a relation in which giving and receiving take the form of exchange; mutuality, on 
the other hand, is a valuing of the relation itself. What is given in mutuality is open: 
it may be a thing or time or attention or the self. One gives for the sake of the 
relation, expressing the relation’s value, and not because something is expected in 
return. All these ideas – friendship, gift-giving, mutuality – expose the uncertainties 
of practices and elucidate what people aim at, which far exceeds any balanced 
reciprocity.  
This view of intersubjectivity points at the paradox of self-sacrifice and self-
realization that only becomes conceivable when the leading image of caring is not 
that of a balance but that of intertwined identities that develop together over time. 
Only then does self-sacrifice come into view as a possibility that is given in the 
relation, not as a threat to the self, but rather as a confirmation of the relation. Then 
self-sacrifice is not a reduction of the self but a far more radical relationality, viz. a 
continuous participation in a relation that is part of one’s own identity. This active 
participation requires that the self attests one’s act and decisions as one’s own and 
that they are confirmed as a possibility for self-realization. In other words, one may 
sacrifice the self for the other to whom one’s identity is inextricably linked and 
thereby confirm all the same that this sacrifice is the realization of the self. As long 
as the self-sacrifice is attested—i.e. accepted and taken upon oneself as a moral good 
in concordance with one’s identity—it can be self-realization as well. As self-
constancy it is a reaching out to another in the present that is a commitment despite 
resistance. Having been given the other, having faced the other’s suffering, one can 
discover oneself as sharing in this suffering, which is already self-sacrifice. Self-
sacrifice then appears not as an individual decision of an agent that reduces the self-
sacrifice to agency but rather as something that may be required by the relation and 
the situation in which one finds oneself, thereby incorporating passivity or fragility 
as well. It shows how self-sacrifice can be part of one’s own identity, an identity that 
is inescapably intersubjective.  
This idea of self-sacrifice is further illuminated by the ideas of mutuality and 
philia. Both terms express a view that does not reduce the relation between self and 
other to a balance. The sharing of life is central, and bookkeeping is out of order. 
Basic is the idea of the desire to live together, of wanting the relation to continue, of 
intertwined happiness. This makes both the self and the other autonomous as well 
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as fragile: each is affected by the suffering of the other, and each is capable of being 
a friend in giving support, comfort, or care, or, as Ricœur puts it, ‘in the clasping of 
hands’. Since the goods of the two are inescapably related, the good of the other is 
equally a good for the self. However, this does not exclude ambiguity, since both 
involved in intersubjectivity may well realize that other goods also exist and that this 
shared good has been preferred among the plurality of goods. One is then glad to 
give to the other, since this giving is not a reduction of the self but a confirmation of 
the relationship that is valuable and enriching to both. What has been shared has 
more value than what is owned. Again, self-sacrifice may be self-constancy in giving 
the self: ‘Even though my thoughts withhold me, I do it, I sacrifice myself, for else I 
am not.’ This is self-realization; the opposite would destroy the self.  
 
This proposed new view of intersubjectivity needs to incorporate time as well. For 
many relations grow over time, and this growth determines the identity of each. No 
relation remains the same over the years. And as relations develop over time, one’s 
own identity is affected as well. For instance, in becoming a parent one becomes 
attached to another human being for the rest of one’s life (for even a deceased child 
still has a mother and father). And one’s life can be divided into periods, before and 
after having become a parent. Moreover, being a parent requires different things 
from time to time. One’s identity develops accordingly. This development of 
identity is not a matter of balance but rather a sailing along on the same stream of 
growth and development, through ups and downs, which is illuminated by Ricœur’s 
narrative emplotment, connecting concordance and discordance into one 
composition. Professional care relations also may develop over time, both in the way 
the professional caregiver performs and in the attitudes of the care receiver. Time is 
involved in the development of skills and attitudes, in the forming of views of 
professionalism and personal goals. Therefore intersubjective attuning also alters 
over time.  
 
At this point I need to make it clear that intersubjectivity also stands against wider 
horizons that not only surpass but also found intersubjectivity, i.e. the horizons of 
community and meaning. I elaborate on these horizons in the next sections, but at 
this point I briefly present them in relation to intersubjectivity. As Housset stresses, 
the meeting with the suffering other breaks open the subject enclosed in itself. Pity 
is the experience of a community, for, in the encounter with the suffering other, the 
other gives him- or herself indisputably as my neighbor. The horizon of the self is 
broken open by the other evoking pity. And, as Housset argues, it is not possible in 
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the event of pity to divide what comes from me and what comes from the other, but 
rather pity reveals the ‘ourness’(nostrité) that is a community. 
What is more, intersubjective relations, as argued, are given as relations in 
which one already finds oneself, affected and in a position that is given and 
assumed. These relations may be family bonds that precede and largely determine 
one’s identity, but also relations that are given with one’s position, e.g. as a 
professional caregiver. Therefore these relations go hand-in-hand with informal and 
formal rules of conduct, norms and privileges, expectations and aspirations, 
possibilities and limits. Restricting caring to the horizon of intersubjectivity 
forecloses this wider framework and falsely represents the two as related without 
context. However, the broader context largely determines the positions that the two 
take and what is required of them. As Ricœur points out, family relationships are not 
only personal but also institutional, since they are bound to rules determining when 
a marriage is allowed, when a sexual relationship is incestuous, who has the financial 
and legal responsibility, etc. Hence thinking about positions within a community 
draws attention to institutions, such as parenthood, profession, citizenship. Hence 
intersubjectivity cannot be conceived of apart from an institutionalized community, 
apart from taking positions within an organized political community, in the private 
as well as in the public spheres. 
Finally, these positions are not only given but also actively received when the 
self assumes the position. As Vacek expresses it, the special relationships in which 
one finds oneself also provide the basis for much of one’s moral life, since one acts 
as a friend, as a father, as a citizen. Here passivity and capability are connected, or – 
in Housset’s terms – pathos and ethics are related. Intersubjectivity is the place 
where the self finds the self not only as given but also as capable of assuming one’s 
position, of “attestation of self”, as Ricœur says. This attestation means that a 
meaning is embraced.  
 In the next section I further elaborate on the idea of community. At this point 
it is important to stress that intersubjectivity is not achieved by the two involved but 
rather is found in the experience of ‘ourness’ in the encounter, and that 
intersubjectivity is embedded in the institutionalized community that gives the two 
positions that involve requirements.  
 
In conclusion, the recast framework of intersubjectivity encompasses the sense that 
the relation is not something that two people do but rather something that is given to 
them. Intersubjectivity is not controlled by those involved, is not a free option, but 
is received. The two are not separate from what has preceded them, what is given to 
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them, what appears, what positions they have been given and have assumed, what 
rules govern their relation as determining factors that are given by society, and what 
meanings they embrace in their intersubjective relation. Housset argues that, since 
the first giver was neither an I nor a you, but the first gift was received as a grace, 
human relations have nothing in common with a balance, and no equilibrium can be 
sought. The presence of the other, as seen against this background, requires the self 
to be emptied. And thinking in line with Van Heijst’s idea of a surplus looking for a 
destination, one understands intersubjectivity as a relation in which meaning can be 
established and one’s own life can find significance in caring for others. Hence, the 
framework of intersubjectivity is reset by a radicalization of contextuality (by 
including far more passivity, time, coexistence in community, meaning), of 
relationality (stressing the relation itself by the concepts of friendship and mutuality), 
and affectivity (by radicalizing the idea of being affected by the other). The idea of 
power that divides oppressors from oppressed is replaced by a view of mutuality in 
which is added a third pole that is valuable in itself and is the foundation for giving 
to the other. And the framework of meaning and sense is added, as people find 
sense in these relations that give direction to their lives. 
Self-sacrifice then becomes conceivable, and care ethics can gain by altering 
its understanding of intersubjectivity. Replacing the idea of a balance with the image 
of sailing together, of intertwined identities making the good of each inseparably 
connected to that of the other, of mutuality instead of ‘to each his or her own’, 
sheds a different light on caring. Self-sacrifice then is not opposed to self-realization, 
since the good of both is served in care, even if it entails self-sacrifice. Such self-
sacrifice may have the character of a sacrifice for an ultimate yet uncertain good that 
is established in the sacrifice without any guarantee, yet as expressing meaning and 
being significant to both involved.  
 
c. Recasting the frame of community 
 
I also propose a new conceptual frame for understanding the community. It should 
be altered in four respects, some of which are already taken into account in care 
ethics, but they need to be radicalized; others should be added. They are: first, the 
idea of power as the desire to live together; the awareness that conflict and struggle 
are unavoidably part of living together; the idea of ‘states of peace’ that (temporarily) 
end struggle and conflict; and the awareness that the community should be 
understood against the background of horizons of meaning. These four points are 
interrelated, although they will be considered separately. First I show what the care-
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ethical framework of the community already consists of and what is lacking or 
should be reinforced. Then I propose the new points of reference for the new 
framework. Finally, I describe what this new frame yields for thinking about self-
sacrifice in care. 
 
Because the ethics of care is taken as a political ethics, community is a care-ethical 
issue. One of the oldest expressions in the ethics of care is ‘circles of care’, pointing 
precisely at the central concept of community. Political care ethics has rightly 
unveiled the aim of caring practices as that of building society. It also has adequately 
analyzed the interconnection between power and care and the mechanisms at work 
that marginalize care, keeping it from having any political impact. It is built on view 
of power in the Weberian sense, i.e. a definition of power as ‘being able to impose 
one’s will upon others’, and reveals that groups of people are able to impose their 
will upon others, transferring caring responsibilities to others and keeping those 
others in subordinate positions. This view of power, however, hampers an 
understanding of self-sacrifice in care. Starting from this conception of power, one 
can only understand self-sacrifice as contributing to the power imbalances of those 
involved in caring by submitting themselves to the caring needs of others, with the 
language of self-sacrifice belonging to an oppressive ideology. This is similar to the 
metaphor of the seesaw that I used in the section on intersubjectivity, where power 
is the force that enables some to keep the upper position by pressing others down. 
Those in subordinate positions are expected, if not forced, to make sacrifices, or 
they offer to do so in the hope of benefitting thereby.  
However, this near-sighted approach does not account for those who, in the 
absence of any oppression, sacrifice themselves. As argued, self-sacrifice also may 
stem from a sharing of life with others in such a way that the good of others and of 
the self are not separated but intertwined. Care ethics does not lack such an idea of a 
shared life in community. For instance, Berenice Fisher’s and Joan Tronto’s 
definition of caring supposes a ‘we’ that is involved in caring as maintaining, 
continuing, and repairing ‘our’ world, so that ‘we’ can live in it as well as possible. 
However, they do not explain what this ‘we’ entails, nor what it may require. This 
needs to be thought through. For although a ‘we’ is presupposed, the emphasis on 
inequality narrows the care-ethical view of what it is that is shared in community. 
This sharing of life sheds a different light on self-sacrifice. 
Also the idea that caring involves conflict and struggle is not lacking in care 
ethics. All care-ethical authors treated in this research have acknowledged that 
conflicts are inevitable and that a struggle for the recognition of ethical arguments 
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stemming from caring is necessary. Especially Tronto deserves credit for her 
political analysis of caring, which uncovers the conflicts connected with the 
distribution of care and power and with the definition of needs. However, what is 
lacking is the idea that community is built through struggle and conflict, which will 
always be part of the development of society and hence also of caring practices, on 
both the (inter)personal and the community levels. No recognition is given without 
struggle or conflict. This too has consequences for conceiving self-sacrifice. 
Third, this research contributes a new insight to the concept of the 
community, one that is lacking in care ethics. For, although conflicts are inevitable, 
they need not be endless, as at times gestures of generosity are made that end the 
struggle (even if only temporarily). These gestures suggest a different view of self-
sacrifice.  
Finally, the community exists against horizons of meanings that found the 
community, in which convictions, beliefs, and meanings are shared, developed, and 
embraced. These too need not be seen only as ideologies liable to be misused, but 
also as sources for an ethical aim or the utopian invitation to strive for a good for all. 
These horizons of meanings also allow for much more ambiguity in practice than 
has been acknowledged in theory.  
These four points need to be more deeply incorporated into the frame of the 
community than provided by care ethics. I elaborate on them below. 
 
First, as argued, the idea of the community should more clearly contain the idea of 
power as the desire to live together. What I aim at is not to presuppose a ‘we’, but to 
argue for an understanding of what it means to be a community, providing a 
foundation for understanding self-sacrifice in caring practices, also on a community 
level. 
My argument draws on the theories of Van Heijst, Halkes, Crysdale, Williams, 
Honneth, Housset, and Ricœur. Van Heijst elaborates on a sense of belonging that 
is the foundation of care, including professional care. Although the pillars of her 
view of care (cf. Chapter 1) provide the foundation for a deconstruction of the self-
interested subject and the polarized intersubjective relation, of power as oppression, 
which would make self-sacrifice radically non-dichotomous, she does not think 
through the full consequences of her view. Self-sacrifice remains a free choice 
rooted in a commitment and in feelings of professional responsibility. Halkes and 
Williams develop a theology that calls for a community of right relations in which all 
can flourish, no groups of people have been given dominion over others, and no 
groups of people have to suffer for redemption. Crysdale elaborates on the need to 
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restructure meaning and to create new communities of meaning in an ongoing 
struggle against one-sidedness, simplification, and mythologization, and for a better 
life. Honneth develops an idea of community that has a moral foundation in the 
experience of injustice, as opposed to the self-interest-based social contract that 
serves to prevent war (as in the Hobbesian view). Housset shows how an encounter 
with the suffering other leads to the discovery of the commonality of a ‘we’ (nostrité). 
He goes one step further: prior to any conscious desire, there is an affective 
coexistence anterior to any division between an I and a you. And Ricœur elaborates 
an ethics that incorporates a view of the community as politically organized, which is 
more differentiated and helps to overcome a simplified view of society as consisting 
in two opposing parts, oppressors and oppressed. It overcomes dichotomies and 
illuminates how tensions permeate practices. Further, he elaborates on the Arendtian 
idea of power as the desire to live together, as a forgotten original power 
necessitating the organization of society. The distribution of power in practices of 
living together must be visibly derived from the founding desire.  
Drawing on these ideas, I argue that the community is a shared life that is 
indispensable for discovering the self and for having intersubjective relations. One 
can only find out about the self through others. One can only encounter another 
when a commonality is recognized. The community gives the self to the self through 
formal and informal relations, through a given position in a family, a local 
community, etc. The community is the carrier of history, of meanings, of narratives, 
all of which are there and given to the self before one is an ‘ego’. Neither the self 
nor the intersubjective relation can be thought of as detached or freestanding, as 
isolated, self-determining or the horizon of a practice, since the community founds 
the subject and the relation. However, this does not mean that a shared life without 
exclusion of anyone or any group is actually realized. This is what the term ‘desire’ 
implies in the phrase ‘the desire to live together’. The desire works as a ‘social 
imaginary’ (cf. Taylor, 2007, 171-176) that invites people to transform unjust 
relations, to embrace the travail of restructuring meaning that can be shared by all 
and that includes ever more (groups of) people. It draws people together and aims at 
the morally good life together with others in just institutions, with good relations 
and mutual recognition in justice and solidarity. Self-sacrifice is conceivable 
departing from this idea, as it is required of all to give up privileges and freedom in 
order to realize a shared life with others. 
 
Second, the idea of the community should more clearly express the awareness that 
conflict and struggle are unavoidably part of living together.  
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 Drawing on Honneth’s view, I maintain that experiences of injustice provoke 
an ongoing struggle for recognition, as people try to gain recognition for ever more 
human qualities as well as to expand the number of people that gains recognition for 
these qualities. The existing community, therefore, must allow for critique from the 
outside (as Halkes also argues), calling attention to those qualities that are not yet 
recognized and those forms of contempt that still exist and exclude or harm others 
as well as the self as a member of society. This ongoing struggle is necessary for the 
development of the community, which is nevertheless founded on the desire to live 
together. Honneth assigns a political-ethical meaning to feelings, regarding them as 
affective impulses that motivate the struggle for recognition and political resistance. 
This is an important contribution to care ethics, for, although care ethicists assign a 
moral epistemological value to feelings, Honneth goes further, showing how feelings 
can have political-ethical consequences. This is an adequate approach for uncovering 
realities of (informal and professional) caring in late modernity. And drawing on 
Ricœur’s view of the community as an organized society, I argue that people build 
society by participating in this organization, which indispensably leads them to 
accept positions to which they have been appointed. Hence there is a double 
relation: community distributes roles and positions to its members, but these 
members build the community by accepting their roles and positions and actively 
participating in the community. Inevitably these two basic characteristics of 
community and its members surface together, but equally inevitable are the conflicts 
and struggles that emerge.  
So not only is human living-together indispensable, as I argued above, but it 
also restricts the freedom of each individual by assigning tasks and requiring forms 
of participation. As such, the community allows for individual freedom that leads to 
conflict and struggle. Hence it forms, enriches, but also deforms. Conflicts and 
struggle are unavoidable when establishing recognition. Self-sacrifice, then, can be a 
form of recognition, a form of vigilance against contempt or 
‘Anerkennungsvergessenheit’ (reification or forgetting of original recognition). Calls for 
empowerment or emancipation are calls for recognition that require sacrifices. 
Feminist movements have required self-sacrifice of many women (and others), as 
Groenhout (2006) points out. Self-sacrifice, in other words, is unavoidable within 
society as a form of recognition as well as in conflict and struggle, through which 
society and its members gain a certain good, reach just institutions, and increase 
solidarity. 
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Third, I argued that the idea of ‘states of peace’ also needs to be incorporated into 
the view of community. If there is a shared desire to live together, but also a 
constant struggle and indefinite demand for recognition, then there could be an 
endless fight, and the idea of sharing life could be lost.  
For this idea I draw on Ricœur’s view of the possible ‘states of peace’ of the 
gift (as a mere desire to give as an expression of generosity) and mutuality (as 
opposed to reciprocity and only seeking to express a lasting bond between those 
involved). Crysdale too contributes to this idea, arguing that an ethic of risk involves 
the breaking of the cycles of revenge. This requires the need to embrace inevitable 
suffering, which involves the restructuring of meaning, the acknowledgment of the 
entanglement of agency and suffering, the recognition of limitations and risks, and 
the creation of new communal meanings. Finally, I connect Van Heijst’s idea of 
‘expressionate acts’ to this idea of ‘states of peace’. These acts do not require or even 
expect a return; rather, their value lies in what is expressed and in the person who is 
expressing it. They are valuable in se and do not serve an external purpose. Van 
Heijst’s example is the laying down of flowers on a grave. 
 A community is built not only through struggle, but also through gestures of 
generosity that do not require reciprocity and through an ethic of risk that breaks 
cycles of revenge. In expressionate acts, or gestures of commemoration, 
acknowledgment, giving recognition, one humbles the self and honors the other. 
This makes self-sacrifice conceivable. For these generous gestures and risky ethics 
are open-ended. It is not guaranteed that the gesture is understood or accepted. 
When a return is not required, when retribution is renounced, when suffering is 
embraced and risks are accepted, one sacrifices for a good and accepts uncertainty.  
 
Fourthly, the community should be understood against the background of horizons 
of meaning. I develop this idea in the next section, but at this point I need to 
mention it in relation to the idea of building a community. Feminist and womanist 
theologians (Halkes, Williams, Crysdale) argue for the need to transform unjust 
relations in community, and they found their views on wider horizons of meaning. 
For Halkes this horizon is symbolized by the theological symbols of creation – 
incarnation – resurrection – eschaton; for Williams it is given with the ministerial 
example of Jesus’ life; for Crysdale it lies in the reconciliation of the idea of 
redemptive suffering that is the core of a theology of the cross with actual suffering 
of groups of people (especially women). Housset contends that pity does not stem 
from the self or from the other but from the affection that precedes human decision 
as an invitation to be enlightened by the light of goodness, as a grace from God. 
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And Ricœur expresses the horizon in his dialectical ethics in the teleological aim of 
the ‘good life’ with and for others in just institutions.  
As I argue below, theological concepts allow for radical understandings of 
interpersonal and social relations. However, I do not restrict the horizons of 
meanings to theological concepts. Although these do express an imagined new 
community, a utopian view that invites or calls people to strive for a good life, I take 
the horizons of meanings to be broader than these theological concepts. The 
development of the community involves historically established and transferred 
horizons of meaning that people accept and recognize.  
 
In conclusion, I argue that self-sacrifice can meet resistance in the private sphere of 
caring for loved ones, but it most certainly meets opposition in the (Western) public 
and political sphere, being regarded as one of the ideologies keeping power and the 
distribution of caring roles in place. The analysis of the (direct or indirect) 
oppressive effect of the language of self-sacrifice on specific groups of people 
supports the rejection of self-sacrifice in care within the community. However, this 
analysis presupposes a certain view of the community that lacks the elements of the 
desire to live together, the inevitability of struggle and conflict in developing the 
community, the gestures and risky ethics that (temporarily) end the struggle, and the 
wider horizons of meaning. By incorporating these elements more fully into our 
view of the community, we avoid this reduction of community without rejecting the 
continuous tension present in the community. In the recast view, the community is 
reduced neither to the struggle for power (the Hobbesian war of all against all) nor 
to a romantic melting together of individuals in a whole. If the view of the 
community is framed in such a way that we can only see the struggle for power, then 
the idea of self-sacrifice is incongruous; for, if all need to struggle for individual 
survival, then self-sacrifice is a foolish thing to do. On the other hand, if the idea of 
the community is framed in such a way that the community is a melting together, 
then self-sacrifice is also out of order, since a sense of self is lacking that would 
make self-sacrifice possible, and nothing could be given up since everything belongs 
to everybody. Hence both are needed: struggle and desire. The desire is the 
foundation of the community. The struggle allows the community to be in a 
continuous process of building together, which involves the distribution and 
redistribution of institutional roles and positions. It also allows the community to 
incorporate within itself the plurality – of relations, positions, meanings – that exists 
in everyday life. This makes possible continuous ambiguity on the personal, 
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intersubjective, and communal levels, as well as states of peace and the creation of 
new communities of meaning.   
 In conclusion, if the conceptual frames of thinking the community are altered 
in these respects, a political-ethical view of self-sacrifice can be incorporated in care 
ethics. Seeing the community as existing in the making of it, self-sacrifice appears as 
a way to develop the community and to let ever more people participate as members 
of that community. Self-sacrifice is required of all by the shared life in an organized 
political community as well as by the struggle needed for its further development. 
This view of self-sacrifice as contribution to the common good replaces the political 
reduction of self-sacrifice to oppression or submission by a view of longing for 
community and a different view of violence and conflict. The desire to live together 
self-evidently encompasses compromises in which something of the self is given up 
for the good of all. The foundation is the idea of being part of a larger community. 
Struggles and states of peace require to sacrifice the self for a new identity and new 
relations. And when the community is considered as not our own, human making, 
the self needs no equilibrium in relation but can empty the self for the other. 
 
d. The framework of meaning and sense 
 
Throughout this research another common thread has emerged, namely, that an 
additional framework of meaning and sense is needed to make self-sacrifice in care 
conceivable. This new framework permeates the frameworks of identity, 
intersubjectivity, and the community. For as long as caring is restricted to the 
subjective, intersubjective, or communal level, without incorporating the meaning 
and sense that are found and created in caring, it is barely understandable why 
people care in a way that entails self-sacrifice. There must be some sort of meaning 
or sense that transcends self-interest, that transcends the intercourse of people and 
the common interests within a community. In order to understand caring as an 
open-ended practice that is uncertain and does not require a return but aims at 
establishing a good, even if this good does not receive any confirmation or 
recognition, it is necessary to sketch the discovery of meaning. 
 In this section I first present the arguments that lead to this claim, after which 
I present those authors who support this claim in various ways. Then I argue that 
these horizons of meaning are necessary in order to make self-sacrifice conceivable 
in care. 
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This research shatters the horizons of the self, of intersubjectivity, and also of the 
community. The self is not capable of establishing the self by the self alone but is 
basically fragile and given in his or her finitude. Simultaneously the self is capable of 
infinite imagination and aspiration. For this reason the self is not only basically 
intersubjective and embedded in a community, but transcends the self, 
intersubjectivity, and the community. If asked what is ultimately good or what is this 
happiness that exceeds pleasure, then one may express one’s vision of, or aspiration 
to, that which has never yet been established but of which one has caught a glimpse 
or has had a brief experience. Moreover, intersubjectivity moments may be 
experienced in which more than exchange or pleasure is shared. People may be 
affected by something that exceeds the immediate and transcends the two involved. 
These are moments that give space to a larger experience of what is good. A 
friendship or a love relationship or a caring relationship (private or professional) 
may fill a person with gratitude, not solely towards the other, but towards a larger 
whole of having received the blessing of this relationship, this moment, this 
experience of sharing, loving, intimacy. Likewise in the community, when aspiring to 
a good society, to more democracy, justice, equality and humanity, this need not be 
established; but still a sense of what should be the ultimate goal and good may arise 
and be commonly shared.  
 This idea has gained support throughout this research. The theological 
concepts presented in Chapter 2 all express meanings transcending human life on 
the personal, intersubjective, and communal levels. For instance, the utopian view of 
a new creation (Halkes), the uncertain and ambiguous embrace of travail as a risky 
aiming at redemption (Crysdale), the having received in do quia mihi datum est (Van 
Heijst), and the idea of a pluralist love of God in eros, agape and philia (Vacek) all 
express an idea of such horizons. I do not take these views as metaphysical 
foundations for morality, arguing instead that they express meanings that human 
beings aspire to. These expressed meanings establish a truth that is believed but not 
fixed, that is aspired to but never reached. The expressions express a truth but 
without fixing the truth. I concur with Crysdale that redemption itself must be 
redeemed from false certainty by putting it in the ambiguity of the search and the 
conviction that we hold the truth (122).  
At the end of Chapter 2, I considered Charles Taylor’s view of the horizons 
of meaning. That view makes it clear that meanings do not stem exclusively from 
the religious domain. Housset’s phenomenology of the community is combined with 
his theology of God’s pity that was given as a grace and rooted in the encounter 
with the suffering other. His theology radicalizes the idea that what is received in the 
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encounter also includes the human task of showing mercy. His theology purifies the 
affectiveness of the self, as the radical exteriority of grace destroys any self-enclosed 
feeling-for-the-self. Ricœur proposes a dialectic of finitude and infinite being, of 
fragility and capability, showing a self that is capable of embracing meanings, of 
transcending the self, of imagining ideals and aspiring to them, and of exceeding the 
factual self in the ‘impossible’ act of a promise. From Ricœur one can draw a rich 
understanding of the human capacity for transcendence. These ideas now need to be 
thought through with regard to how they make self-sacrifice in caregiving 
conceivable. 
 
I argue that the idea of horizons of meaning sheds a different light on self-sacrifice 
and makes it conceivable in caregiving. If the self is understood as having received a 
surplus, a capacity to care for others, then meaning is found when another or 
multiple others are found to whom one is dedicated in caregiving. People may 
consciously pursue a professional career and position themselves as available for 
arbitrary others (Van Heijst, 2011, 169), which may entail self-sacrifice in 
establishing meaning. If the self is understood as already suffering with the others 
who are hungry, or grieving for those who are buried, meaning is received prior to 
an ego and is consented to (Housset). I have proposed to see self-sacrifice 
accordingly, as finding oneself in it, prior to consent. And in the struggle between 
reason and affective fragility that takes place in the heart, the heart is capable of 
transcendence in sacrificing one’s life for another or for a good (Ricœur). And 
within the tension between an ethical aim and a moral norm, giving to practical 
wisdom the task of muddling through situations of conflict between the two, the 
pursuit of a good life may lead to a betrayal of the norm. Although Ricœur argues 
for ‘a betrayal to the smallest possible extent’, I argue that this betrayal can be much 
greater in self-sacrifice, however without abandoning the norm entirely, since being 
attracted to a higher good may have much more weight than being restricted by a 
moral norm. One has found sense in this good that exceeds norms and that gives 
direction to life.  
Meaning, for Taylor, can be found both in what is given and in human 
responses. Meaning can be found in human fragility as well as in human agency. It 
emerges in the encounter with the suffering other, where I discover myself as well as 
in my ethical response. Hence it is not restricted to agency but is also found, given, 
received. And it is shared in a common sense of meanings. Therefore self-sacrifice 
appears as ambiguous, as meaningful, but also as understandable from a common 
sense of meaning.  
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In conclusion, I propose to add to the conceptual frames for care this framework of 
horizons of meaning, which makes self-sacrifice conceivable. I argued in the 
Introduction that my research introduces ‘meaning’ and ‘sense’ as new categories for 
thinking through caring practices, stressing the self’s capability to reach out to a 
good, to embrace it, to aim at establishing it as part of the self’s identity, giving sense 
and direction to one’s life. Including Taylor’s idea of the horizons of meaning in my 
research allows me to indicate that caregivers, when sacrificing the self in caregiving, 
may do so because they have embraced a meaning that transcends immediate, 
concrete concerns. It also illuminates the uncertainty of this embrace, as it is witness 
to a hope without guarantee. One finds or aims at sense, which gives direction to 
one’s life but which lacks certainty. One establishes a meaning by this embrace, but 
it remains open whether or not this meaning is recognized as such and received by 
others. Although extreme examples (Father Kolbe and the Beslan grandmother) 
come to mind, I argue that this is also an everyday experience in caregiving. One 
finds meaning in what is believed to be significant, valuable, precious. One strives 
for a meaningful life with and for others but does not achieve it with any certainty. 
One’s care remains the witness of the intentions and hope, of sense and direction, 
but the effects are out of one’s hands. It is the embrace that establishes the meaning 
that remains open-ended.  
 One further question comes to mind, which I cannot answer here but which 
needs to be addressed. I have drawn on Taylor’s idea of horizons of meaning. Taylor 
speaks of meanings that are shared by people and as such can be found as a plurality 
in a moral map that transcends the level of mere subjective experience. Sense, 
however, seems to indicate something else, viz. direction, an awareness or 
perception of what is experienced, and a direction toward which life is heading. I 
have been using the terms meaning and sense alternately, but they remain to be 
defined more precisely. Further, it remains to be determined whether sense is the 
better term to use in care ethics, as it fits with the idea of caring as an open-ended, 
embodied practice.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Having altered the conceptual frameworks for understanding identity, 
intersubjectivity, the community, and the horizons of meaning, I am now able to 
conceive of self-sacrifice in caregiving in a way that avoids being a perversion of 
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care. I have argued that the frameworks of the ethics of care – consisting of 
concepts as well as conscious and unconscious presuppositions – narrow its 
understanding of caring and self-sacrifice. In turn, my reset frameworks are not to 
be taken as fixed, but they require constant confrontation with late modernity, in 
order to prevent them from narrowing our conception of caring. Therefore I 
conclude with an epistemological criterion, i.e. the need for a continuous self-critical 
confrontation with late modernity and its questions.  
However, my intention was not only to make self-sacrifice understandable in 
caring practices but also to show that it is key to a better understanding of the full 
reality of care, to seeing its multiple layers, its ambiguities, and its complexity. With 
this aim I now return to the stories from the Introduction. Once more my aim is to 
describe the essential characteristics of care as they emerge from one story and are 
confirmed by the other, and see if we indeed can understand these better with the 
help of the metaphor of self-sacrifice. This will lead to the concluding paragraph in 
which I summarize the characteristics of self-sacrifice in caregiving as they have 
emerged throughout this research. 
 
a. Addressing a fuller reality of care 
 
This research started with a quote from a U.S. mayor praising a teacher who 
powerlessly tried to protect ‘her’ children from the bullets of a gunman. Her story 
seems to exemplify heroic self-sacrifice. The mayor, however, characterized her 
action as care: “You have a teacher who cared more about her students than 
herself,” he said. This self-sacrificing care “speaks volumes to her character, and her 
commitment and dedication.”  
The mayor’s characterization of her care confirms the notion that care is 
rooted in one’s commitment and dedication, i.e. in one’s moral agency. However, he 
also connected it with her character, which belongs to her passive fragility. Still other 
essential aspects surface when the reframed concepts of identity, intersubjectivity, 
community, and horizons of meaning are taken into account.  
 First of all, this story speaks of ‘her’ students. This expresses the idea that care 
is rooted in human connectedness. Hence there consists a bond between people, not 
only in private relations, but also in relations of professionals with ‘their’ children, 
patients or clients. They share parts of their lives together or even only a moment in 
which the courses of their lives crossed each other. This sharing is characterized not 
only by the love of one for the other, but also by mutuality, i.e. they value what they 
share (a relation, a moment) and wish it to be good. This is confirmed by the story 
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of Lucy (Coetzee), who restores the network of her community, and by Father 
Kolbe, who could not share much in the concentration camp but could take another 
man’s place and give his own life to establish a good. Self-sacrifice confirms that 
giving one’s life for another good or another person can be the radical expression of 
such bond and is founded on a sense of belonging. 
Second, just like this teacher, people may find themselves in situations that 
they never wished for or thought possible. She was probably overwhelmed by the 
violence that had entered the school, forcing her to desperately seek a way out, 
especially for her students. This situation intruded on them. Likewise, more 
common situations force themselves on people, such as having a demented partner, 
like John Bayley, requiring demanding care 24/7; being torn between the love for a 
partner and the participation in family life that requires attentive care for special 
needs and concerns, like Gilbert (Hallström); being raped and having to live on in a 
violent society and in compromised relations, like Lucy; or finding a close person in 
agony, like Gerasim (Tolstoy); these situations unexpectedly force themselves on the 
protagonists. Their situation is one of passivity, of undergoing, of being 
overwhelmed. The metaphor of self-sacrifice confirms that there is no control, no 
certainty, no causality. Neither in what is given, nor in the consequences of one’s 
commitments.  
Third, by their embracing of meaning, people have great capacity to act as 
agents amidst this passivity. The teacher perhaps did not have the chance to escape, 
but it is also possible that she acted in a firm belief that this was the right thing to 
do, hence that she acted meaningfully and significantly without any effectiveness. 
The other protagonists too, even when overwhelmed or intruded upon and robbed 
of their agency by events, establish their greater agency by testifying to a meaning. 
Even when disputed or rejected (like Lucy (Coetzee) and Bess (Von Trier)), they 
express their conviction about and dedication to the meaningfulness of their acts. 
They are convinced about what is good in this situation: ‘There I plant my foot’, 
Jane Eyre (Brontë) decided. ‘I can believe’, Bess argued. Lucy insists on the 
recognition of subjectivity of her violators (and herself) and refuses to place their 
actions on an impersonal, abstract level. The metaphor of self-sacrifice expresses a 
belief as well, viz. in a ‘making holy’, a dedication to a good that exceeds other 
goods. This belief is the firm ground for the agent’s commitment. The caregiver, 
despite his or her fragility, confirms this commitment and belief in self-sacrifice. 
Fourth, neither the teacher nor the other protagonists should be reduced to 
their individuality. Their relations with others, their community, and their 
convictions were not chosen or invented by themselves. Their relatedness changes 
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their identity; their community provides the institutional setting of their care; the 
horizons of meaning give them the idea of a meaning with which they can identify 
their goals in life. Jane, Lucy, Bess, Gilbert, and most explicitly John Bayley are 
certainly defined by their relationality, finding their identity as interconnected and 
intertwined. The teacher was related to ‘her’ students, but she also considered 
herself ‘their’ teacher. Her position as a teacher also brought requirements and 
expectations: she was ‘supposed to’ take care of her children and, like all teachers, 
‘expected to’ be affected by them. And the same goes for the questions of what one 
is ‘supposed to’ do for a suffering other (Gerasim) or for one’s family (Gilbert, the 
Beslan grandmother), whom one can and cannot marry (Jane Eyre), what marriage 
may require, the role of women, and how one is supposed to care for oneself (Bess), 
or how one is supposed to seek retribution for suffered violence (Lucy). They live in 
a society filled with institutions (education, marriage, family, justice). They are also 
embedded in a culture filled with ideas and expectations. One cannot help being 
influenced by these existing ideas, but one can confirm them or contest them. In any 
case, one relates to them, whether confirming or contesting. Self-sacrifice is also to 
be understood within a community, in which ideas are shared and relationality is 
given, in intimate relations as well as a larger commonality that makes caring and 
sacrificing for a third other understandable. 
Fifth, the story of the teacher is inevitably one of struggle and conflict, 
however little chance there was of survival. Her story shows the conflicting goods 
that are given with her positions: as a teacher she aims at protecting her students, 
whereas as a daughter, sister, or friend, she would have had to pursue her own 
survival. Also none of the situations narrated in the stories is without conflict, some 
explicitly violent and involving the struggle for survival, like the stories of Lucy, the 
Beslan grandmother, and Kolbe. On a more commonplace level, John Bayley 
struggles to survive in daily life, to get through another day. Others struggle more 
with conflicting goods, like Jane Eyre’s struggle to do what is good and Ivan Ilyich 
worrying about Gerasim’s other tasks and need for sleep. Gilbert struggles with the 
various goods that are given with the different positions that he takes as a family 
member, an employee, and his new position as Becky’s boyfriend. Caring is not 
romantic or symbiotic, nor is it restricted to intersubjectivity. There are conflicts 
between caregivers and care recipients as well as conflicts within the caregiver, 
whose own care conflicts with other goods. And conflicts are given with the 
organized community, which demands different things from caregivers. Self-sacrifice 
brings this inevitable conflict even more to the surface, in that a commitment to a 
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good necessarily requires the suspension or destruction of other goods or even of a 
self.  
 These stories force us to look these aspects of caregiving and self-sacrifice in 
the face without oversimplification. The metaphor of self-sacrifice proves to be a 
useful tool for avoiding such oversimplification or reduction. Turning the teacher 
into a hero, reducing Bess to a simpleton or Gilbert to a selfless person, praising 
John Bayley for his great love for his wife, without taking their self-sacrifice into 
account ignores the full reality of their care. The reduction of care to heroism, 
dedicated love, praiseworthy (or foolish) selflessness, leads to insufficient social 
recognition of the sacrifices made and the tensions existing within care. Hence care 
bursts out of any idealization. Covering this up leads to a misunderstanding, false 
ideals, or disregard for what care entails. Self-sacrifice helps to uncover the more 
complex and ambiguous structure of care, its conflicts, struggles, and uncertainty, as 
well as its tension between what has been given and what is actively decided upon. 
 
b. A better view of self-sacrifice in care 
 
I started this research with a provisional description of self-sacrifice:  
Self-sacrifice is an intrinsic commitment of caregivers to a good that requires 
them to give care. It resembles self-gift, devotion, dedication, but the term 
self-sacrifice more clearly than these terms expresses the element of giving 
and giving up required by a commitment to care. This consists, for instance, 
in suspending or even entirely giving up one’s own aims and goals or parts of 
one’s life that have been important. Caregivers’ intrinsic commitment guiding 
their caring practices is vital to their identity, even though it is always 
ambiguous, as caregivers are well aware of other meanings and goods. 
This description contains the commitment to a good amidst other goods that can be 
weighed against each other. It has become clear, however, that this weighing cannot 
happen in a neat and orderly manner. Caring bursts out of this ethical 
representation, not only in extreme cases but also in the everyday practices of care. 
Hence, from the beginning there is conflict, for the giving up of aims, goals, or 
important goods for the sake of the one good to which one is committed is not 
without struggle or pain. These goods conflict within the self or between the various 
commitments in one’s life (e.g. family, career, friends, leisure activities, social or 
cultural involvement). Also, there is ambiguity, for in self-sacrifice the self is realized 
but always in one particular way, excluding other ways of self-realization and either 
excluding or suspending other goods and meanings.  
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Throughout this research insights have been given that call for this 
description to be adapted. I conclude with the following re-description of self-
sacrifice in caregiving: 
Self-sacrifice in caring is a practice that is directed at an other, others, the self, 
the world, aiming at a ‘higher good’ in which the self simultaneously realizes 
the self’s identity. Self-sacrifice stands in the tension between fragility and 
autonomy, and it is inevitably ambiguous and uncertain. Self-sacrifice in 
caring for another is understandable only when intersubjectivity is seen, not as 
a balance between the self and the other, but as a relation of intertwined 
identities. Self-sacrifice in caring on a political level requires an understanding 
of the community as founded on a desire to live together. Self-sacrifice in 
caring requires as well that caring be understood against the horizon of 
meanings that are embraced in caring. Finally, self-sacrifice in caring entails 
inevitable conflicts and struggle on all levels – identity, intersubjectivity, 
community, and horizons of meaning.  
A different metaphor from that of the seesaw or balance is more appropriate. I 
propose the metaphor of self-sacrifice, which uncovers what I contend belongs to 
the essence of caregiving.  
First, this metaphor breaks with an understanding of caregiving as meaningful 
only when the caregiver gains by giving, for instance, because of effects that are caused or 
thanks to all those tangible and intangible things that are given in return. The 
metaphor of self-sacrifice discloses the factual reality that caregiving is about giving 
meaningful care, establishing a good by losing (something of) the self without effect or 
without receiving in return. This reality of caregiving uncovered by the metaphor of 
self-sacrifice contests the tendency—present at least underneath the surface but also 
explicitly in common remarks made by caregivers about their care, such as ‘there is 
so much that one receives in return’—to think of individual preservation as the main 
goal and hence to think of caregiving as somehow ‘rewarding’ insofar as it effects a 
result or a return gift. Our idea of care should not include a prohibition against 
caring for the self as well, nor forbid care receivers from giving back; at the same 
time, however, it should not make a balance or reciprocity a (hidden) precondition 
of care. For such a view simply goes against the facts. Giving care may be purely 
giving. If care is demanding to the extent that caregivers are forced to stretch their 
limits, or if care receivers are not capable or not willing to contribute to care, then it 
certainly makes caregiving a hard job. However giving up on the job affects not only 
the other but the self as well. Being a caregiver involves inevitable giving up, 
conflict, harm, in short: self-sacrifice. Hence: caregiving is inevitable loss. 
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Second, the metaphor of self-sacrifice discloses care as non-causal. Self-sacrifice 
can be compared to Ricœur’s ‘gift’, a gesture of generosity, an offering, a ‘first 
movement’ that is a ‘risky, contingent burden’ without assured effects. It initiates a 
process and hopes for a response in gratitude, but without certainty. Likewise, self-
sacrifice is non-causal, without a guaranteed outcome, as is caring. That is to say, 
care in the restricted sense of medical or nursing intervention does restore functions, 
but even then most doctors and nurses are aware that their actions are not 
guaranteed to have the hoped-for effect. But all other forms of care are even more 
uncertain. There is no chain of certain causality. For caring is an open process, both 
in the way needs and concerns emerge in caring and in the aims of care. With the 
best intentions one can cause harm, and what is given unintentionally may be the 
exact key for good care. Many different factors may lead to a result, without being 
able to pin down the cause. And many intended interventions may lead to no effect 
at all. Still, even without causality, caring can be significant in the established practice 
that aims at a good. Caring stands against the horizon of what we cannot grasp, 
what uncontrollably starts and is never certain about its effects. Hence: caregiving is 
inescapably uncertain and non-causal. 
 Third, this metaphor of self-sacrifice draws our attention to the necessity of a 
community understood as a shared life, an organized society derived from a sense of 
belonging together, and in which a third person is recognized as belonging to an 
‘ourness’. The community is not only the place where rich sources of narratives can 
be found, from which one draws for one’s own identity. The community also 
determines what may be required of persons on the social level. Institutions and 
positions are established and distributed in the community, determining who cares 
for whom, what is care and what are its limits, and what is good care. Caring is a way 
of participating in the community by accepting one’s position within institutions, 
and so caring is also a way of contributing to that community. But this can only be 
understood when the community is confirmed by a sense of belonging, by a desire 
to live together and build good institutions that make this community possible. 
Hence: caregiving is an expression of community.  
 Fourth, this metaphor of self-sacrifice reveals care to be significant thanks to 
inevitable loss, uncertainty, and non-causality. For its significance lies precisely in 
losing, in uncertainty, in its non-causality. The analysis of the gift in generosity 
discloses these characteristics, as well as the gift’s significance as expressing a 
meaning that is embraced by one (or more) involved in care and that may be 
recognizable and supported by a broader community. This meaning lies beyond 
cause/effect and points, for instance, at honoring nameless victims, reconciliation, a 
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good life, or an ultimate good. Caregiving can be recognized as meaningful even in 
the absence of an effect, such as when holding a wake or caressing someone in a 
coma or honoring the dead. This has to do with the sense of a ‘higher good’ that is 
expressed by the act itself, which is not in the effect but in the expression itself. 
Hence: caregiving points at a horizon of meanings. 
 
To conclude, the metaphor of self-sacrifice expresses a paradox which also uncovers 
a characteristic of caregiving. From its start, caring has been called a burden and a 
good (in Dutch: ‘een last en een lust’). The paradox is that care can indeed be 
simultaneously an unbearable burden and a priceless gift. Its meaning often lies in 
the paradox of the loss of self and the simultaneous realization of the self, which is 
common in everyday caring. The term self-sacrifice expresses this paradox and 
uncovers a fuller understanding of the reality of caregiving in terms that are 
borrowed from religious practices. It discloses caring as being constituted by the 
willingness to give, to give up, and to give in, in the conviction of its 
meaningfulness, and not owing to any hoped-for return. 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Zorgethiek (‘the ethics of care’) heeft van meet af aan gepleit voor een ethiek waarin 
de context, (zorg)relaties en gevoelens een rol spelen en waarin aandacht is voor 
macht. De zorgrelatie is een bron van kennis, en deze kan niet los gezien worden 
van de context, van gevoelens en van machtsverschillen. Zorgethiek is ook een 
politieke ethiek die een visie heeft op een goede samenleving, waarin zorgen 
onmisbaar deze samenleving helpt bouwen.  
 In verhalen (literatuur, films, hedendaagse geschiedenis) over zorg zijn vele 
verbeeldingen te vinden van zorgverleners die zichzelf opofferen. Een selectie van 
dergelijke verhalen vormt de aanzet van het proefschrift. Ondanks de evidente rol 
van zelfopoffering in zorgen, zoals verbeeld in deze verhalen, ligt zelfopoffering 
moeilijk in zorgethiek. Zorgethici nemen verschillende standpunten in ten aanzien 
van zelfopoffering: van radicale verwerping, via erkenning van het daadwerkelijke 
risico in zorgverlening, naar erkenning van zelfopoffering als bruikbaar 
hermeneutisch instrument om kenmerken van zorgen te duiden. Geen van de 
zorgethici echter doordenkt zelfopoffering grondig. Dit maakt iedere algemene 
verwerping van zelfopoffering prematuur en in tegenspraak met haar eigen pleidooi. 
Zelfopoffering, zo komt in de verhalen aan het licht, vindt plaats binnen een 
context, relationele verbondenheid en geraaktheid die zelfopoffering alleszins 
begrijpelijk en voorstelbaar maken. Dit proefschrift bepleit dan ook een herijking 
van zorgethiek als radicaler contextueel, relationeel en ruimte gevend aan 
affectiviteit. Daarmee kan de complexiteit en gelaagdheid van de zorgpraktijken 
beter worden doordacht.  
Naast deze drievoudige herijking bepleit dit proefschrift twee aanvullingen. 
De zorgethische gevoeligheid voor machtsongelijkheid verraadt een versmald, 
Weberiaans idee van macht als de mogelijkheid anderen jouw wil op te leggen. Deze 
idee dient aangevuld te worden met de idee van macht als het verlangen om samen 
te leven dat de samenleving fundeert. Alleen dan is het mogelijk zelfopoffering in 
politiek opzicht te zien als gericht op een goed, in plaats van als onderdrukking of 
onderwerping. Een tweede aanvulling op de zorgethiek betreft de idee van betekenis 
en zin. Zorg verlenen is een praktijk waarin zin en betekenis worden gevonden en 
gesticht. Juist het vinden en stichten van zin in zorgen maakt zelfopoffering 
begrijpelijk. Beide aanvullingen verdiepen het inzicht in samenleven en zin als 
belangrijke karakteristieken van zorgen.  
 Het pleidooi van dit proefschrift loopt langs verschillende auteurs. In het 
eerste hoofdstuk staat de zorgethiek centraal. Vier verschillende posities ten aanzien 
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van zelfopoffering komen ter sprake. Telkens gaat het om auteurs die een visie 
hebben op zorgen, die leidt tot een bepaalde kijk op zelfopoffering. Deze posities 
worden kritisch tegen het licht gehouden. 
Het tweede hoofdstuk behandelt de theologie, meer specifiek de 
moraaltheologie en spiritualiteit. Deze discipline biedt niet alleen een definitie van 
(zelf)opoffering, maar ook kritische discussies. Ze worden selectief behandeld, voor 
zover ze het denken over zorgen verdiepen en verbreden. Feministische en 
womanistische theologie wijzen op de historisch aantoonbare schadelijke effecten 
van een theologie die zelfopoffering verheerlijkt, zowel voor zorgverleners als voor 
zorgontvangers. Tegelijkertijd doordenken feministisch-theologische denkers een 
welomschreven onvermijdelijk lijden en de rol van zelfopoffering daarbij. 
Onvruchtbare dichotomieën (zoals agape en eros, naastenliefde en zelfliefde) worden 
bestreden en voorzien van een alternatief, zoals de idee van gezamenlijkheid en 
vriendschap. Empirisch en theoretisch (theologisch en politiek-ethisch) onderzoek 
in verschillende culturen laat zien dat vrouwen zelf de term zelfopoffering bruikbaar 
vinden om de feitelijke situatie van vrouwen te beschrijven, indien zij niet worden 
vastgepind op passiviteit. Zelfopoffering is bruikbaar als ambigue term om deze 
spanning uit te drukken. Theologie levert drie sleutelbegrippen – ‘trajectory’, 
participatie en onzekerheid – om zorgen te beschouwen tegen een bredere horizon 
die zelfopoffering in zorgen begrijpelijk maakt. 
In het derde hoofdstuk toont de radicale fenomenologie van Jean-Luc Marion 
de noodzaak van een niet-ethische blik. Door eerst te kijken en alles te beschouwen, 
hetgeen het opschorten van ieder oordeel vergt, komt het subject (ook binnen het 
denken over zorgen) op een radicaal andere positie te staan, namelijk die van ‘having 
been given’. Van zijn radicaal anti-ethische fenomenologie kan de zorgethiek 
profiteren door het openbreken van de horizon van het subject en van 
intersubjectiviteit. Eerst en vooral ondergaan zij, worden zij geraakt, doordrongen. 
De impact van ‘wat is gegeven’ draagt bij aan het radicaliseren van de ideeën van 
contextualiteit en affectiviteit. 
 Het vierde hoofdstuk draait om de politieke theorie van Axel Honneth. Aan 
zijn werk ontleent dit proefschrift niet alleen het idee van macht als verlangen om 
samen te leven dat de fundering vormt voor de samenleving, maar ook het daaraan 
gekoppelde idee dat conflicten en strijd onvermijdelijk zijn. Honneth spreekt van 
een morele motivatie tot samenleven, die (zij het kritisch) te verbinden is met 
Tronto’s politieke zorgethiek die stelt dat mensen door te zorgen mede de 
samenleving opbouwen. Tegelijkertijd maakt hij conflicten tot een onvermijdelijk en 
onmisbaar onderdeel van de ontwikkeling van individu en samenleving. 
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Zelfopoffering wordt inzichtelijk in zowel het verlangen om samen te leven, als in de 
ervaring van miskenning en geweld, die leidt tot nieuwe strijd.  
In het vijfde hoofdstuk worden enkele sleutelelementen uit eerdere 
hoofdstukken op een heel andere manier belicht. Waar zorgethiek het morele belang 
van gevoelens benadrukt, is een fenomenologische analyse van hoe een mens 
zichzelf aantreft als hij affectief geraakt wordt door het lijden van een ander nog niet 
gegeven. Waar Marion het ‘gegeven zijn’ benadrukt, wordt nog niet duidelijk hoe het 
geraakt worden (‘pathos’) door wat gegeven is, te verbinden is met ethiek (‘ethos’). 
Waar Honneth verduidelijkt dat mensen samen willen leven, is nog niet duidelijk 
waarom ze dat willen en in welke fundamentele ervaring dit verlangen wortelt. En 
hoewel theologie beelden en verhalen heeft geboden die helpen om praktijken te 
doordenken, is nog niet duidelijk hoe deze in radicale zin ons denken op een ander 
been kunnen zetten. Emmanuel Houssets analyse van compassie als het moment 
van gemeenschappelijkheid verbindt theologie en fenomenologie. Hierdoor kan 
zelfopoffering op een nog radicalere manier gedacht worden. 
Als laatste auteur komt, in het zesde hoofdstuk, Paul Ricœur aan bod. Aan de 
hand van zijn werk worden de eerder uitgezette lijnen spanningsvol samengebracht 
en verder doordacht. Zijn analyse van het relationele zelf, als een zelf in relatie met 
zichzelf, met de plurale ander, met instituties, en ook in relatie met zichzelf in de tijd 
– naar verleden en toekomst – biedt de grond voor een nieuw idee van 
zelfopoffering. Het vindt plaats in de spanning tussen fragiliteit en capabiliteit, 
tussen ondergaan (‘passibilité’) en actorschap, en in de inspanning tot zelf-
bestendigheid (‘self-constancy’). Met Ricœur keren we ook terug naar de ethiek. Zijn 
‘kleine ethiek’ biedt een model om zelfopoffering begrijpelijk te maken als praktische 
wijsheid in een concrete situatie in de spanning tussen ethisch doel en morele plicht. 
Ricœurs ethiek is ook een politieke ethiek, met een wezenlijke rol voor instituties. 
Behalve spanningen en strijd, zijn in de samenleving ook momenten zichtbaar 
waarin de strijd tijdelijk wordt stopgezet, zgn. ‘states of peace’. Deze momenten 
werpen een nieuw licht op zelfopoffering.  
In de loop van dit proefschrift blijken drie frames – subject, intersubjectiviteit 
en gemeenschap – het begrijpen van zelfopoffering in zorgen te beperken en een 
vierde – zin/betekenis – heeft onvoldoende doorwerking in het denken over zorg. 
Gezien de expliciete en impliciete zorgethische opvattingen over deze frames, lukt 
het haar niet om zelfopoffering te erkennen als essentieel kenmerk van zorgen, 
zonder dat het overigens in iedere vorm van zorgen aanwezig hoeft te zijn. Het 
proefschrift biedt een fundamentele herdenking en ‘reframing’ van deze frames. Het 
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beoogt de zorgethiek radicaler te laten zijn in haar eigen uitgangspunten, en daarmee 
te verrijken.  
 
